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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how postcolonial critics figure the centrality of imperialism to 
the cultures and socio-politics of those societies at the hegemonic apex of today’s 
geopolitical hierarchy. I begin by addressing the discipline’s homogenisation of ‘the 
West’, which I attribute to a totalist articulation of the category, whether as a 
geopolitical agency, a geojuridical bloc, a polity, an identity, or a central ideologeme 
within colonial discourse and contemporary imperialist ideology. I argue that this 
totalisation elides variances of consciousness, purpose, and practice that cut across 
whatever unity obtains within and among the constituent societies of the 
‘geopolitical West’. I then look to the thought of Antonio Gramsci, Raymond 
Williams, Claude Lefort, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and Jacques Rancière 
for a way of understanding that unity in light of these internal variances. Moreover, 
drawing on Rancière’s notion of ‘dis-identification’ and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s of occupying ‘a position without identity’, I establish how if we are to 
challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of ‘Western’ imperialism, then we must 
acknowledge these variances. I then explore how literary representations of 
‘Westerners’ by Jamaica Kincaid, V.S. Naipaul, Gil Courtemanche, Bret Easton 
Ellis, and Nadine Gordimer variously question the claim that anyone that benefits 
from contemporary imperialism cannot ever oppose it with integrity.  
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Introduction: On ‘the postcolonial’ as epochal aspiration 
Writing in 1992 on the then-emerging discipline of postcolonial studies, Anne 
McClintock objected to the term ‘postcolonial’, whose implicit, ‘premature 
celebration of the pastness of colonialism, runs the risk of obscuring the continuities 
and discontinuities of colonial and imperial power.”1 I find it debatable whether any 
postcolonial critic has ever claimed to be living in a thoroughly postcolonial world, a 
present in which all vestiges and legacies of European colonialism have been 
comprehensively dissolved and consigned to the past. As Ella Shohat noted – 
writing alongside McClintock – the ‘post’ in ‘postcolonial’ aligns the term ‘with a 
series of other “posts” – “post-structuralism,” “post-modernism,” “post-marxism,” 
“post-feminism,” “post-deconstructionism” – all sharing the notion of a [...] 
supercession of outmoded philosophical, aesthetic and political theories’.2 Shohat, 
though, echoed McClintock when remarking on how this alignment existed in an 
‘unarticulated tension’, with the unavoidable fact that the prefix ‘post’ equally 
‘aligns the “post-colonial” with another genre of “posts” – “post-war,” “post-cold 
war,” “post-independence,” “post-revolution” – all of which underline a passage into 
a new period and a closure of a certain historical event or age, officially stamped 
with dates.’3 As Shohat acknowledged, the first alignment stresses that the term 
‘postcolonial’ only references ‘a movement beyond a specific point in’ intellectual 
history, beyond a paradigmatic shift. However, for Shohat, this first alignment is 
unable to entirely eclipse the second, epochal sense of the term ‘postcolonial’, which 
implies a movement beyond the social conjuncture of colonialism. As a result, the 
term ‘is imbued, quite apart from its users’ intentions, with an ambiguous spatio-
temporality’, and so ‘can easily become a universalizing category which neutralizes 
                                            
1 McClintock, Anne, “The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term ‘Post-Colonialism’”, in 
Social Text, 31/32, ‘Third World and Post-Colonial Issues’ (1992), p. 88. 
2 Shohat, Ella, ‘Notes on the “Post-Colonial”, in Social Text, 31/32, ‘Third World and Post-
colonial Issues’ (1992), p. 101. 
3 Shohat, p. 101. 
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geopolitical differences between France and Algeria, Britain and Iraq, or the U.S. 
and Brazil since they are all living in a “post-colonial epoch.”’4 
 Postcolonial studies has never managed to shake off the utopian promise of 
the term ‘postcolonial’, a promise that, since George W. Bush’s declaration of a 
‘war against terror’, has increasingly provoked debates over how to properly define 
the role, responsibilities, and practice of the postcolonial critic. Hence Robert 
Spencer’s more recent claim that ‘the calling of the postcolonial critic’ is ‘to help 
humankind prevail over the manifestly undiminished consequences of imperialism.’5 
Spencer more explicitly echoes Shohat’s appraisal of the ‘ambiguous spatio-
temporality’ of the term ‘postcolonial’, when remarking on how the U.S.-led 
occupation of Iraq from 2003 ‘made starkly visible an imperialist project that has 
not, as our field’s moniker suggests, been drawing to a close but has on the contrary 
been expanding American hegemony, extending corporate power and hijacking 
international institutions of governance.’6 Spencer is not alone in responding to this 
‘war against terror’ by returning to the utopian promise of a literally postcolonial 
world. A year earlier, the editors of Postcolonial Studies and Beyond (2005) had 
commented similarly, that ‘[t]he shadow the 2003 US invasion of Iraq casts on the 
twenty-first century makes it more absurd than ever to speak of ours as a 
postcolonial world.’7 Moreover, Spencer is not alone in finding that much of the 
‘jittery compunctions about intellectual work’8 that postcolonial critics do – 
including their engagements with the limits of representation and ‘holistic forms of 
social explanation’,9 such as ‘totality or systemic analysis’10 – is of doubtful utility 
                                            
4 Shohat, pp. 102-3. 
5 Spencer, Robert, ‘Edward Said and the War in Iraq’, in New Formations, 59 (Autumn 
2006), p. 52. 
6 Spencer, ‘Edward Said and the War in Iraq’, p. 52. 
7 Loomba, Ania, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton and Jed Esty, ‘Beyond What? 
An Introduction’ in Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, ed. by Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, 
Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton and Jed Esty (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 
2005), p. 1. 
8 Spencer, ‘Edward Said and the War in Iraq’, p. 52. 
9 Bhabha, Homi K., The Location of Culture (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 248. 
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or even relevance to the task of ‘help[ing] humankind prevail over the manifestly 
undiminished consequences of imperialism’. Indeed, if anything, these 
investigations have discouraged postcolonial critics from aspiring to the task of 
‘system-toppling upheaval’.11 For in light of ‘the downturn in the fortunes of 
liberation movements in the third world, the degeneration of the second and the 
rebuffs suffered by the labour movement in the first’, postcolonial critics have more 
or less ‘concluded that all world-altering political projects are [...] doomed to 
coercion, aberrancy and failure.’12 As a result, although ‘[e]verybody knows what 
postcolonial theorists are against’, Spencer admits to being uncertain as to what 
‘they [are] actually for’;13 what it is they aspire to and work towards.  
 Spencer’s notion of ‘system-toppling upheaval’ suggests that for him, ‘the 
calling of the postcolonial critic’ resembles that of revolutionary socialism as 
defined by Fredric Jameson, insofar as both must aspire towards ‘a total 
transformation of society’.14 For Jameson, the socialist who cannot envisage ‘the 
possibility of transforming a whole social system’15 must settle instead for 
‘reforming an eternal capitalist landscape’.16 Similarly, a world that has not been 
completely divested of ‘the manifestly undiminished consequences of imperialism’ 
cannot be called ‘postcolonial’, in a strict, epochal sense of the term. Given their 
apparent aversion to ‘holistic forms of social explanation’, I would find it 
unsurprising if postcolonial critics have generally come to use the term 
‘postcolonial’ to refer to a paradigm rather than an epochal aspiration. Moreover, I 
would also be dissatisfied if this usage had encouraged postcolonial critics to lose 
                                                                                                                           
10 Lazarus, Neil, ‘Introducing postcolonial studies’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Postcolonial Literary Studies, ed. by Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 4.  
11 Spencer, p. 53. 
12 Spencer, p. 53. 
13 Spencer, Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p. 19. 
14 Jameson, Fredric, ‘Cognitive Mapping’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. 
by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 360. 
15 Jameson, p. 355. 
16 Jameson, p. 355. 
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sight of that aspiration, or abandon it altogether. Given this dissatisfaction, therefore, 
this thesis revisits that aspiration, and considers a crucial yet unanswered question 
pertaining to how we might achieve a totally ‘postcolonial’ world – a truly global, 
comprehensive dissolution of imperialism, along with its continuations, its 
consequences, and its legacies. This question concerns how we might overcome the 
hegemonic ascendancy of imperialism among individuals and societies that 
constitute or belong to ‘the West’, ‘the metropolis’, ‘the core’, or ‘Euro-America’, to 
list just some of the terms used by postcolonial critics to refer to the hegemonic apex 
of today’s systematically uneven, global distribution of social, political, economic, 
and cultural power.17 If this question remains largely unanswered, it is because the 
aversion among postcolonial critics towards ‘holistic forms of social explanation’ 
has disobliged them of envisioning a quite literally ‘total transformation’ of that 
global conjuncture. As such, postcolonial critics are under no pressure to work out 
how they might effectively challenge the perception of imperialism as either 
desirable or inevitable, among those who occupy that hegemonic apex of today’s 
global distribution of power.  
 No vision of a world that is thoroughly divested of imperialism and all its 
‘undiminished consequences’ can possibly avoid answering this particular question. 
For as it has been demonstrated numerous times, the endurance of imperial power 
derives not only from its uneven distribution of capital and commodities, or even the 
violent imposition of that unevenness. For whatever reason, these material aspects of 
imperialism have depended on the orchestration of popular sentiment, as well as the 
management of public access to information pertaining to imperial ventures and 
interests. Thus, John M. Mackenzie has outlined in meticulous detail many of the 
public institutions that propagated widespread enthusiasm for imperialism among 
the lower classes of Victorian Great Britain, during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.18 Similarly, Edward W. Said emphasised how popular support for 
                                            
17 I will address the geographical ambiguity of each of these terms in my note on ‘the West’ 
below, pp.  34-38. 
18 Mackenzie, John M., Propaganda and Empire : the Manipulation of British Public 
Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); the scope of 
Mackenzie’s study is literally vast, covering the print media, music hall, bric-a-brac, 
youth culture, and public institutions like the Imperial Institute, among other areas of 
British popular culture. Moreover, Mackenzie attributes much of this enthusiasm to an 
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imperialism in Victorian Britain was such that, ‘[w]ith few exceptions, [even] the 
women’s as well as the working-class movement was pro-empire.’19 Said saw and 
covesignificant parallels between the largely unchallenged ubiquity of this Victorian 
‘imperial consensus’,20 and ‘the epic scale of United States global power and the 
corresponding power of the national domestic consensus created by the electronic 
media’, during and after the first Gulf War in 1991.21 More recently, Paul Gilroy 
observed that the years following the events of September 11
th
 2001 saw an 
escalation in jingoistic and xenophobic nationalism in U.S. and European public 
cultures, much of which was conducive to the interests of those governments that 
had become heavily involved in the global ‘war against terror’. Indeed, Gilroy 
strongly suggests that those governments were responsible for encouraging much of 
this parochialism in order to justify their involvement in the conflict.  
As with Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ of Victorian Britain and post-Cold War 
America, so with Gilroy, support for imperialism continues to encompass not just 
policymakers, corporatists and public intellectuals, but also the general public, in 
ways that cut across class and ideological lines. Said’s account, though, is 
ambivalent with respect to the spontaneity of this consensus and – by extension – the 
prospect of challenging its ascendancy. On one hand, Said found that the U.S. 
‘national domestic consensus’ was carefully, deliberately orchestrated by the 
combined efforts of U.S. policymakers and major media outlets, who together 
controlled what information was made available to the U.S. public. In contrast, 
though, Said maintained that the ‘virtual unity of purpose’ that encompassed 
Victorian Britain was entirely spontaneous; that the close alignment of popular 
sentiment with the imperial affairs of state was ‘voluntary (or at least rational and 
noncoercive)’22 – that is, not actively encouraged or forcibly imposed by the latter. 
Indeed, such claims have led many commentators to critique Said for overstating the 
spontaneous ubiquity of his ‘virtual unity of purpose’ across all of the societies that 
                                                                                                                           
orchestrated propaganda programme that was intended partly to contain growing class 
antagonisms and the spread of socialism in Britain itself.  
19 Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993). p. 62. 
20 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62. 
21 Said, Culture and Imperialism, pp. 391-92. 
22 Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 6. 
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he refers to collectively as ‘the West’.23 Moreover, Neil Lazarus’s more recent 
critique finds Said’s subsequent, monolithic account of ‘Western’ consciousness, 
experience, intention, and practice to epitomise a ‘disposition to homogenisation’24 
that obtains more generally among postcolonial critics. This habit – Lazarus argues 
– pertains mostly to how postcolonial critics perceive those societies and individuals 
that occupy the apex of today’s globally uneven distribution of power, and entails 
‘flatten[ing] out history, failing to register the necessary distinctions between 
qualitatively different moments, epochs and determinate universes of meaning.’25 
Similarly, Lazarus finds that, ‘with respect to geo-politics, [...] internal differences 
and divisions – as between one country and another, one policy and another, one 
ideology and another – are cavalierly disregarded, ignored altogether or treated as of 
no consequence.’26  
Let me be clear here. I do not wish to argue against Said’s claim that in 
Victorian Britain, ‘there was scarcely any dissent, any departure, any demurral from’ 
the ‘virtual unanimity that subject races should be ruled, that they are subject races, 
that one race deserves and has consistently earned the right to be considered the race 
whose main mission is to expand beyond its own domain.’27 Similarly, I do not wish 
to argue against Said’s claim that this ‘virtual unity of purpose’, if not ubiquitous, 
nonetheless managed to cut across class and ideological differences. Unlike Lazarus, 
I am prepared to accept – albeit to an extent – Said’s claim that, despite their ‘many 
and manifest differences’, ‘the ideas of, say, Marx and Carlyle, Kipling and 
Multatuli, Lévi-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss, Hugh Trevor-Roper and Thomas Hodgkin 
[...] are unified at the deepest levels by structuring assumptions deriving from an 
episteme centred on ‘western-ness’’.28 I find that in his eagerness to distinguish, say, 
                                            
23 I will discuss some of these critiques in Chapter 1 of this thesis, pp. 52, 58. 
24 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, in Race & Class, 53.3 (2011), p. 15. 
25 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15. 
26 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15. 
27 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62. 
28 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, pp. 15-16. 
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Karl Marx’s intentions from those of Thomas Carlyle,29 Lazarus emphasises their 
differences almost to the point of suggesting that they have absolutely nothing in 
common; that they occupy two separate ‘universes of meaning’ that do not overlap, 
interact, or have any genealogical relation with one another, in any way. Frankly, I 
find this approach to be no less unhistorical than Said’s, whose emphasis on the 
commonalities between Marx and Carlyle – Lazarus argues – is such that he loses 
sight of their ‘many and manifest differences’.  
After all, no collective form of human social belonging – whether a 
community or an ideology – exists in total isolation from others, perhaps unless they 
are geographically cut off entirely from other groups. Hence Said’s insistence on 
‘how oddly hybrid historical and cultural experiences are, [...] how they partake of 
many often contradictory experiences and domains, cross national boundaries, defy 
the police action of simple dogma and loud patriotism.’30 Said’s emphasis here is on 
cultural and national identities, but the same can be said for political, moral, and 
philosophical identities and ideologies as well, none of which spring to being in total 
isolation from other such identities, without any interaction with other sensibilities. 
Having said that, I do agree with Lazarus that emphasising these underlying 
affinities can become ‘too blunt an instrument, too reductive and 
undiscriminating’,31 albeit only wherever it eclipses the ‘many and manifest 
differences’ altogether. After all, losing sight of these disunities prevents us from 
accounting for how Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ was able to overcome them, as well 
as why that consensus was necessary to the pursuit of imperial power in the first 
place. In turn, without such an account, the task of imagining how we might 
effectively challenge that unity of purpose becomes much more difficult, especially 
if our inattention to those ‘many and manifest differences’ prompts us to understand 
that unity as occurring spontaneously, ‘voluntarily’, or ‘noncoercively’, as Said 
often did. If we are unable to envision any such challenge, then the prospect of a 
thoroughly postcolonial world becomes doubtful.  
                                            
29 I should note here that Lazarus does not specify which Carlyle he refers to, whether 
Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) or English Orientalist Joseph Dacre 
Carlyle (1759-1804), or some other historical figure by the same name. 
30 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 15 (emphasis in original).  
31 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 16. 
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In short, this prospect depends on us apprehending Said’s ‘imperial 
consensus’ as something other than the spontaneous expression of some immutable 
cultural essence or ‘civilizational value’,32 underlying the ‘many and manifest 
differences’ that otherwise fracture those whom that consensus encompasses. 
Instead, we must apprehend this ‘virtual unity of purpose’ as being deliberate, 
actively orchestrated, and conducive to the interests of whoever orchestrates it. For 
if we cannot envisage even the possibility of ‘Westerners’ assuming intentions that 
diverge from those of imperialism, then we cannot possibly claim to live in a 
‘postcolonial’ epoch, at least as long as ‘the West’ exists, whether as a geopolitical 
bloc, a social aggregation, a collective identity, or an episteme. Hence Robert J.C. 
Young’s claim in 1990 that, given the steady ‘decentralization and decolonization of 
European thought’33 throughout the latter half of the twentieth century – of which 
postcolonial studies is but a more recent stage – ‘we are witnessing the dissolution 
of ‘the West’.’34 This is clearly a bold claim, especially since the category of ‘the 
West’ continues to be widely used in reference to a geopolitical agency and 
transnational community twenty-five years later. Indeed, we might argue that the 
boldness of Young’s claim here suggests that he grossly overstated the impact of 
‘the decentralization and decolonization of European thought’, whose effects within 
the constituent societies of the geopolitical ‘West’ have largely been restricted to an 
academic context. In this respect, we might critique Young for perceiving imperial 
power ‘as a textual function, [from which] it follows that the proper form of combat 
for a politically engaged critical practice is to disclose the construction of the 
signifying system and thereby deprive it of its mandate to rule’.35 If this is a fair 
appraisal of Young’s apprehension of imperial power, then this ‘form of combat’ 
has clearly failed to have as monumental an effect as Young envisaged.  
                                            
32 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, in Marxism, Modernity and 
Postcolonial Studies, ed. by Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.54.  
33 Young, Robert J.C., White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1990), p. 18. 
34 Young, p. 20. 
35 Parry, Benita, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 26; Parry’s critique here is aimed at Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
and Homi K. Bhabha, although she strongly intimates that it is equally applicable to a 
wider, ‘textualist’ approach in postcolonial studies.  
- 9 - 
Parry and Lazarus are prominent voices in the so-called ‘materialist’ critique 
of postcolonial studies that has steadily gained momentum over the last fifteen 
years, but which stretches at least as far back as Aijaz Ahmad’s In Theory (1992). 
Parry sums up a common ‘materialist’ complaint against prevailing strands of 
postcolonial studies, when objecting to how postcolonial critics have generally 
privileged ‘“discourse” as the model of social practice,’ to such an extent as to 
‘promote an incuriosity about enabling socio-economic and political institutions.’36 
Parry finds that, in turn, the subsequent assumption of a ‘theoretical position wholly 
neglectful of political economy [...] has had the effect of disengaging colonialism 
from historical capitalism and re-presenting it for study as a cultural event.’37 As 
‘the material impulses to colonialism, its appropriation of physical resources, 
exploitation of human labour and institutional repression’38 are increasingly ignored, 
so imperialism becomes increasingly understood as a consequence not of ‘calculated 
compulsions’, but rather of some ‘air-borne will to power’.39 Lazarus echoes this 
appraisal of the ‘culturalist emphasis’40 of postcolonial studies, objecting to the 
tendency across the discipline of apprehending imperialism ‘in civilisational terms, 
as an ‘encounter’ or ‘ongoing contest between north and south, metropolis and 
periphery, white and native’, and refer[ring it] to ‘the West’ rather than to 
capitalism.’41 The product of this misattribution is ‘a dematerialised (and, for that 
matter, unhistorical) understanding of the forces powering the world system over the 
course of the past 500 years’.42 Lazarus finds that this understanding is epitomised 
by how postcolonial critics approach Eurocentrism ‘not as an ideology or mode of 
representation but as itself the very basis of domination in the colonial and modern 
                                            
36 Parry, Benita, ‘The Institutionalization of Postcolonial Studies’, in Lazarus ed., p. 69. 
37 Parry, ‘The Institutionalization of Postcolonial Studies’, p. 74. 
38 Parry, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique, p. 3. 
39 Parry, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique, p. 4. 
40 Lazarus, ‘Introducing postcolonial studies’, p. 9. 
41 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 14. 
42 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 14. 
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imperial contexts.’43 In short, Eurocentrism is what caused imperialism, not the 
pursuit of maximised profit. 
In turn, this dematerialised understanding of imperialism only further 
encourages that disregard for ‘internal differences and divisions’ that gives rise to 
Lazarus’s ‘disposition to homogenisation’, described above. Increasingly, 
postcolonial critics assume that ‘[t]here is only one kind of ‘western’ thought [...] 
and that is the dominating kind: Eurocentric, colonising, logocentric, rationalist.’44 
Again, to claim that European, modern, or ‘Western’ thought is ‘constitutively 
Eurocentric’45 or imperialist, casts doubt upon the feasibility of a truly, thoroughly 
postcolonial world as described above, at least as long as these forms of thought 
continue to exist. Hence ‘the genuinely progressive desire to contribute to the 
decolonisation of knowledge’ that – as Lazarus acknowledges – is not only ‘central 
to postcolonial studies; it is arguably the only project that all scholars active in the 
field would agree that they hold as a common aspiration.’46 Lazarus, though, objects 
to the claim that European, modern, or ‘Western’ thought is ‘constitutively 
Eurocentric’, not only because he finds it ‘too reductive and undiscriminating’, but 
also because it threatens to undermine any possibility of an alternative, less ethically 
compromised mode of knowledge or critical practice. Hence Lazarus’s fairly 
straightforward solution to this impasse, which is to reconceive Eurocentrism as an 
‘ideology’ rather than as an ‘episteme’. Rather than as ‘an untranscendable horizon 
governing thought – its forms, contents, modalities, and presuppositions so deeply 
and insidiously layered and patterned that they cannot be circumvented, only 
deconstructed’,47 Lazarus proposes that we think of Eurocentrism as 
an ideological formation (selective, interested, partial, and partisan) 
[...] If we understand Eurocentrism as an ideology (as I myself do), 
then it could become subject to critique. One’s general 
methodological assumption would be that it is always possible in 
                                            
43 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 43. 
44 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15. 
45 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 59. 
46 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 7. 
47 Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
p. 127. 
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principle (and indeed in practice) to stand outside a given problematic 
in order to subject its claims to scrutiny. 48 
According to this reformulation, then, ‘[t]he project of ‘unthinking Eurocentrism’’49 
entails judging the accuracy of truth-claims, the extent to which they accord with a 
‘reality’ that the postcolonial critic is somehow able to fully access, given the right 
critical practice. As with Young, though, what effect this practice will have beyond 
the academy is ultimately very unclear. For one thing, Lazarus does not explain how 
the postcolonial critic is to verify the accuracy of their own truth-claims. More to the 
point, though, even if we were somehow able to confirm the accuracy of their 
knowledge, Lazarus does not consider the possibility that the postcolonial critic’s 
judgements might go unheeded by others whose access to ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ is – 
for whatever reason – not as extensive; or that the authority of these judgements 
might amount to little compared with the appeal of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ and 
its dubious truth-claims. I might be equally sceptical towards the claim that 
‘Western’ consciousness, experience, intention, and practice – including its modes 
of thought – are all invariably imperialist. Nevertheless, I profoundly disagree with 
Lazarus’s own claim that a ‘culturalist’ approach – according to which one can be 
imperialist without being an imperialist, given that the former derives from more 
than one’s intentions – has absolutely nothing to offer to the task of adequately 
understanding ‘what imperialism is and how it works’.50  
Equally, I profoundly disagree with the implication of Lazarus’s objection to 
how postcolonial critics refer imperialism ‘to the West rather than to capitalism’: 
namely, the implication that we cannot refer imperialism to both simultaneously. 
According to Lazarus, the category of ‘the West’ is nothing but a ‘fetish’ that 
betrays the inadequacy with which postcolonial critics grasp the true nature of 
imperialism. For ‘the West’ ‘has no coherent or credible referent’; it ‘references 
neither to a polity nor a state (nor even a confederation of states’’;51 still less ‘a 
                                            
48 Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious, p. 126. 
49 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 7. 
50 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 54. 
51 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
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mode of production or a social formation’.52 Instead, the category references ‘a 
“civilization,” something altogether more amorphous and indeterminate’, and whose 
‘sociological actuality’ is simply ‘impossible to certify’.53 As a result, Lazarus finds 
that referring imperialism to ‘the West’ rather than to capitalism ‘mystif[ies]’ 
imperial power, ‘rendering its social ground opaque.’54 No doubt the shifting 
frontiers of what is regarded as the geographical location of ‘the West’ – whether as 
a people, a state, or a state-form – renders the category inadequate to the task of 
situating the material basis of imperial power. Moreover, referring imperialism to 
‘the West’ alone may well compound that ‘effect of disengaging colonialism from 
historical capitalism and re-presenting it for study as a cultural event’ outlined 
above.  
I agree, therefore, with Lazarus than any effort ‘to “get imperialism right,” 
that is, to understand what imperialism is and how it works’,55 cannot refer it solely 
to ‘the West’, at least without obscuring certain of its most crucial aspects. Yet 
surely because of this obscuring effect, any adequate grasp of ‘what imperialism is 
and how it works’ must encompass a discourse that in some way refers it to this 
category. An approach that refers imperialism to capitalism rather than ‘the West’ 
may well encompass such a discourse, figuring it as a means of ‘enabling’ the 
pursuit of imperial power, and thus blurring Parry’s implicit distinction between 
‘discourse’ and ‘enabling socio-economic and political institutions’ above. I find 
merit in this approach, insofar as it would apprehend Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ as 
a calculated effort to legitimate the pursuit of imperial power, by either justifying or 
obscuring the imposition of a violently unjust, exploitative, and expropriative 
dispensation upon another people ‘against the[ir] informed will’.56 This approach 
would apprehend that ‘imperial consensus’ according to an interplay between a 
                                            
52 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 54. 
53 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
54 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
55 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 54. 
56 Goonatilake, Susan, ‘Cultural Imperialism: A Short history, future, and a Postscript from 
the Present’, in Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural 
Domination, ed. by Bernd Hamm and Russell Smandych (Peterborough ON: 
Broadview Press, 2005), p. 33. 
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constituency of material interests, some of which benefit more than others from 
imperialism’s uneven distribution of commodities and capital, along with its 
correspondingly uneven distribution of political power and agency. As such, it 
would be irrelevant that ‘the West’ does not reference a persistent, tangible, or 
‘material’ polity, state, confederation of states, mode of production, or social 
formation. Indeed, to conclude on this basis that ‘the West’ is irrelevant to analysing 
imperialism is to claim that this analysis can only proceed in terms of polities, states, 
confederations of states, social formations, and modes of production, but not ideas 
and discourses that influence how people perceive the interplay between these 
agencies.  
Any such claim is clearly inadequate to the task of explaining how Said’s 
‘imperial consensus’ could encompass either material interests that quite visibly 
benefit much less than others from imperialism, if at all; or political and ideological 
positions that we might otherwise expect to oppose imperialism. Again, if we figure 
‘[t]he project of ‘unthinking Eurocentrism’’ in terms of challenging its truth-claims, 
then we come to a simple explanation: those who support imperialism in spite of 
their material interests or political principles do so because they are misinformed of 
what imperialism really entails. This may well be the case, but only to an extent. For 
Said attributes the longevity of his ‘imperial consensus’ to more than just 
misinformation, given his remark that, ‘when one belongs to the more powerful side 
in the imperial and colonial encounter, it is quite possible to overlook, forget, or 
ignore the unpleasant aspects of what went on ‘out there’. The cultural machinery 
[...] has had an anaesthetic as well as informative effect on European audiences.’57 
One can be relatively well-informed of the grim realities of imperialism, and yet still 
support it, either by ignoring, disavowing, or simply being indifferent to those 
realities, or finding ways of legitimating them, such as by denying human status to 
those who suffer them.  
Moreover, one does not have to materially benefit from imperialism to 
support it in spite of what one knows of these realities. For one thing, as we have 
seen, Said acknowledged how ‘the more powerful side in the imperial and colonial 
encounter’ hardly shared that power between them equally, given the extensive class 
and gender inequalities that divided even them. Nonetheless, even those who 
                                            
57 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 157 (my emphasis).  
- 14 - 
enjoyed less of this power – if any – were no less likely ‘to overlook, forget, or 
ignore’ the grim realities of colonial rule. Similarly, as Gilroy notes, over the past 
century, there has been a steady ‘drip of embarrassing and uncomfortable 
information about imperial and colonial governance that has [...] challenge[d] 
[Britain’s] instinctive sense that its imperial ambitions were always good and its 
political methods for realizing them, morally and legally defensible.’58 However, the 
resurgence of jingoistic nationalism in post-9/11 Britain can only suggest – Gilroy 
argues – that ‘Britain’s brave but confused affiliates prefer an ordered past in which 
they were exploited and pauperized, but nonetheless knew who they were, to a 
chronically chaotic present’.59 Again, insofar as it has been ‘engineered politically 
from above by crown and government’,60 this resurgence corresponds to Lazarus’s 
above definition of ideology as a ‘selective, interested, partial, and partisan’ 
perception of the world that is conducive to the interests of those who orchestrate it. 
I have no objection to approaching this resurgence in this manner, except that it 
cannot account for why it should equally be ‘produced with apparent spontaneity 
from below’ – why those with much less to gain materially from imperialism should 
‘voluntarily’ or ‘noncoercively’ support it, especially given that ‘drip of 
embarrassing and uncomfortable information’ about what really ‘went on ‘out 
there’.’  
Simply put, this burgeoning alternative to conventional ways of 
remembering British imperialism – as benign, if not selfless – has not managed to 
dispel the latter entirely. This failure, therefore, suggests that exposing the 
dubiousness of Eurocentrism’s truth-claims is not enough to significantly challenge 
its hegemonic ascendency, along with that of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’. If we are 
to mount such a challenge, we must acknowledge that choosing to subscribe to that 
consensus is motivated by more than what one knows of either one’s material self-
interest, or the grim realities of imperialism. To assume that simply exposing these 
realities is enough to dissuade one from supporting imperialism is to assume that 
everyone’s political decision-making is rational when adequately informed. This 
                                            
58 Gilroy, Paul, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 101. 
59 Gilroy, p. 120. 
60 Gilroy, p. 97. 
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latter assumption, though, ignores a whole swathe of other factors that influence 
one’s political priorities and subsequent behaviour, such as ‘culture’, ‘morality’, 
‘identity’, ‘tradition’, and – most perniciously – ‘common sense’, all of which are 
often presumed to take immutable forms, but all of which are defined in ways that 
ceaselessly change over time. If we are to effectively challenge the ascendancy of 
Said’s ‘imperial consensus’, we must therefore take these ‘irrational’ influences into 
account, and find ways of counteracting them.  
Equally, though, neither should we mistake the quite clearly considerable 
influence of these factors as evidence of their immutability. It is arguably this 
mistake that underlies the claim that ‘Westerners’ are incapable of perceiving the 
world in anything other than terms that are conducive to imperialism. Not only do 
such claims subscribe to an essentialist logic that is patently unhistorical; they are 
also self-defeating, insofar as they foreclose any recognition in ‘Westerners’ of any 
capacity to depart from an imperialist habitus. To repeat: if we cannot ‘decolonise’ 
‘Western’ consciousness, intention, and practice; if we cannot displace Said’s 
‘imperial consensus’, then we cannot envisage the total decolonisation of the world. 
If we are to sustain this vision, then we must find a way of apprehending Said’s 
‘imperial consensus’ in non-essentialist terms, as something that is not entirely 
spontaneous, but which is actively propagated by those with the power to do so, as 
well as the motivation of a vested interest in doing so. On the other hand though, we 
must also find a way of explaining why those who visibly benefit less from 
imperialism nonetheless participate in that consensus actively – that is, 
spontaneously, ‘voluntarily’. In this thesis, I will look towards Antonio Gramsci’s 
notion of hegemony as a way of reconceiving this ‘virtual unity of purpose’ without 
losing sight of the ‘many and manifest differences’ and disunities that underlie it. 
Turning to this concept is hardly a new departure for postcolonial studies, although 
it has generally been used in the discipline with reference to the imposition of 
imperial power in a colonial setting. In this thesis, I propose that we use the concept 
as a way of understanding how ‘the cultural and epistemological authority of 
colonialism’61 is established among ‘history’s victors’62 themselves, whether they be 
Europeans, Americans, ‘Westerners’, or ‘metropolitans’.  
                                            
61 Spencer, ‘Cosmopolitan Criticism’, in Rerouting the Postcolonial: New Directions for the 
New Millennium, ed. by Janet Wilson, Cristina Șandru and Sarah Lawson Welsh 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 37.  
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To do so, though, we must reconsider what we mean by ‘hegemony’. Given 
their attention primarily to a colonial setting – more so than a ‘metropolitan’ one – 
postcolonial critics have largely used the concept of hegemony in its coercive sense, 
as describing the imposition of a particular configuration of social power ‘against 
the informed will’ of those who are made to occupy it. Even wherever they have 
attended to the consensual dimension of hegemony, postcolonial critics have mostly 
done so with reference to socio-political scenarios in which official attempts ‘to 
make imperial dominance acceptable, even desirable’63 to colonised peoples have 
categorically failed to even temper the latter’s implacable opposition to imperial 
rule. Any such attempts to directly influence and orchestrate an otherwise detracting 
or even resistant ‘will of the people’ can only ever be coercive. For even if they 
entail methods that are exclusively non-violent, these attempts still amount to the 
imposition of a particular configuration of social power ‘against the informed will’ 
of those who must then occupy it. In this respect, postcolonial critics register the 
porosity of Gramsci’s distinction between ‘consensus’ and ‘coercion’, the twin 
modalities of establishing and sustaining hegemonic authority.  
This porosity has been observed elsewhere, in such disparate engagements 
with the notion of popular consent – and the ways in which regimes have historically 
solicited or ‘manufactured’ it – as those of Raymond Williams, Michel Foucault, 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, 
Jacques Rancière, and Ranajit Guha, not to mention Gramsci himself. Indeed, for 
most of these critics, the political strategies and techniques that fall under the rubric 
of ‘consensus’ have nothing to do with registering and then aligning a regime’s 
agenda with pre-existing popular attitudes, opinions, and sentiments. This alignment 
is necessary to an extent if authority is to be rendered hegemonic.64 Yet as Guha 
notes, the notion of a thoroughly ‘uncoercive state’ – that is, a ‘populist utopia of 
total consent that is not traversed by a constable’s beat’ – is nothing more than ‘a 
liberal absurdity’ that runs completely against ‘the basic drive of Gramsci’s own 
                                                                                                                           
62 Coronil, Fernando, ‘Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical 
Categories’, in Cultural Anthropology, 11.1 (1996), p. 78.  
63 Guha, Ranajit, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India 
(Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 34.  
64 Hence Gramsci’s notion of ‘organic intellectuals’, which I discuss in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, pp. 122-24. 
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work’.65 In fact, to some exist ‘consensus’ amounts to a less obvious form of 
coercion, even wherever the public grant it on the basis of an ‘informed will’. For 
even then consent is successfully solicited by informing that will in the first place – 
influencing it, shaping it, manufacturing it. Hence Guha’s modification of Gramsci’s 
pairing  ‘consensus’-‘coercion’, by replacing the former term with ‘Persuasion’, thus 
defining hegemonic ascendancy as ‘a condition of Dominance (D), such that, in the 
organic composition of D, Persuasion (P) outweighs Coercion (C).’66 This definition 
suggests that popular consent is by no means a product of simply ‘registering 
already existing interests’, but rather something that is actively solicited by 
‘shaping’ popular consciousness itself, including popular perceptions of their 
‘rational’ interests.67  
However, Guha then establishes that British colonial rule in India was 
‘nonhegemonic’ according to a rather different definition of hegemonic authority, 
one that ironically leaves open the possibility of a completely ‘uncoercive state’. 
Thus, according to Guha, the Raj was ‘nonhegemonic’ because it ‘did not originate 
from the activity of Indian society itself’,68 or ‘even remotely issue from the will of 
the [Indian] people’.69 Guha reinforces this point by contrasting the Raj’s 
subsequently autocratic nature with the apparently democratic nature of the 
‘metropolitan bourgeois state’70 in Britain itself. This contrast is often absolute, to 
the point where Guha finds it incredible that 
the metropolitan bourgeoisie who professed and practiced democracy 
at home […] were quite happy to conduct the government of their 
Indian empire as an autocracy. Champions of the right of the 
European nations to self-determination, they denied the same right to 
their Indian subjects […] Their antagonism to feudal values and 
                                            
65 Guha, p. 22.  
66 Guha, p. 23; this modification was already implicit in Gramsci’s description of his 
‘organic intellectuals’ as ‘permanent persuaders’ (Gramsci, Antonio, ‘The Formation 
of the Intellectuals’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. by Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 10).  
67 Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2014), p. xvii.  
68 Guha, p. 64.  
69 Guha, p. 66.  
70 Guha, p. xii.  
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institutions in their own society made little difference […] to their 
vast tolerance of pre-capitalist values and institutions in Indian 
society.71 
As we see here, Guha often celebrates ‘the heroism of the European bourgeoisie in 
its period of ascendancy’,72 as if the ‘metropolitan bourgeois state’ was hegemonic 
because – in almost direct antithesis73 to the ‘nonhegemonic’ nature of Britain’s 
‘South Asian colonial state’ – it directly ‘originate[d] from the activity of [European 
or British] society itself’, from ‘the will of the [British or European] people’. Guha 
leaves it unclear, though, what role – if any – ‘Persuasion’ had to play in 
establishing the hegemonic authority of these ‘metropolitan bourgeois states’. 
Certainly, given his primary concern with colonial India, it is unsurprising that Guha 
does not disclose in detail the conditions that allowed the ‘metropolitan bourgeois 
state’ to render their authority hegemonic, still less how it exploited these 
conditions. Nevertheless, his near-absolute distinction between democratic Britain 
and autocratic British India encourages the impression that the former did not have 
to rely on any kind of ‘persuasive strategy’ in order to claim hegemonic authority 
via popular consent. Guha certainly gives us no reason to assume that his scorn 
towards the notion of a completely ‘uncoercive state’ does not equally apply to the 
‘metropolitan bourgeois’ state-forms of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. 
Thus, if the hegemonic authority of these states was indeed established via modes of 
‘Persuasion’ as outlined above, Guha leaves it unclear why official strategies of 
persuasion were more successful in the ‘metropole’ than they were in colonial India.  
                                            
71 Guha, p. 4.  
72 Guha, p. 4.  
73 This binarism is comparable with the ‘Manichaean’ constructions that Ann Laura Stoler 
and Frederick Cooper observe in studies of European colonialism, wherever ‘Europe 
and its colonies, the colonizer and the colonized, are taken to be discrete entities 
occupying separate frames of reference’ (David Scott, ‘The Social Construction of 
Postcolonial Studies’, in Loomba, Kaul, Bunzl, Burton and Esty eds., p. 394). For 
Stoler and Cooper, these constructions often detract from how ‘[c]olonial regimes were 
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about the legitimacy of the venture’ (Stoler, Ann Laura and Frederick Cooper, 
‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda’, in Tensions of 
Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. by Frederick Cooper and Laura 
Stoler (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 6).  
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I might appear to be collapsing Guha’s distinction between ‘metropole’ and 
colony completely when arguing that, even in the ‘metropole’, state authority was, 
and continues to be sustained by active, coercive state intervention in ‘the life and 
consciousness of the people’.74 Although inaccurate, this impression is surely to be 
expected, considering how postcolonial critics mostly address the state apparatuses 
that coercively sustain imperial power in a colonial setting. Given this emphasis, we 
could initially conclude from these analyses that the distinction between ‘consensus’ 
and ‘coercion’ is only porous in that setting; that state power is only coercive 
wherever it is exerted ‘against the informed will’ of those who are subjected to it. 
The implication, of course, is that wherever state authority enjoys popular consent – 
wherever state and popular will are aligned – no state apparatuses exist that are 
designed to ensure such consent by actively intervening in, and shaping ‘the will of 
the people’. Indeed, there is the further implication that such apparatuses are 
unnecessary in this scenario; that the ‘metropolitan bourgeois’ state-form simply 
‘issue[d] from the will of the [metropolitan] people’, and that this popular will 
simply emerged spontaneously, independently of any state intervention. Both 
implications clearly subscribe to that ‘idea of an uncoercive state’ that Guha 
dismisses above. Thus, in order to acknowledge the existence of such apparatuses in 
the ‘metropole’, without collapsing the distinction between ‘metropole’ and ‘colony’ 
entirely, we should avoid assuming that power is coercive only wherever it is 
exerted ‘against the informed will’ of those who are subjected to it.  
Indeed, we should consider the possibility that one might experience this 
shaping of one’s consciousness, intentions, and practices not as coercion, but rather 
as a deferral to what one believes is one’s autonomous, ‘informed will’. Williams 
describes a similar effect when describing how the concept of hegemony 
sees the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as 
practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process 
of living – not only of political and economic activity, nor only of 
manifest social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities 
and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what 
can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural 
system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple 
experience and common sense. It is a whole body of practices and 
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expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of 
energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world.75 
According to Williams, ‘hegemony’ apprehends not just ‘the articulate formal 
system which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as ‘ideology’’,76 but also the way in 
which this system conditions individual consciousness – including the way one 
perceives oneself – albeit in a manner that avoids conflating the two. For this 
conflation would suggest that no distinction exists between ideology and individual 
consciousness or experience. Any affinity between the two, then, would be 
spontaneous, rather than a product of the former’s active intervention in the latter’s 
formulation. Nothing in the latter would resist, exceed, or simply differ from the 
terms of ideology’s ‘formal system’. This distinction, therefore, registers a 
dissonance between ideology and individual consciousness; between a systematised, 
regulated ‘official consciousness’ and ‘practical consciousness’,77 the inchoate sum 
of one’s encounters with that unsystematic, inconsistent, overdetermined world that 
is one’s physical and social environment.78 Subsequently, to perceive ‘the pressures 
                                            
75 Williams, Raymond: Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 
110 (my emphases).  
76 Williams, p. 109.  
77 Williams, p. 130.  
78 For Williams, this term means much the same thing as it did in Louis Althusser’s original 
formulation. ‘Overdetermination’ captured Althusser’s claim that the form, content, 
and structure of any social conjuncture is determined by more than its underlying 
economic ‘base’ or ‘infrastructure’ – ‘the forces of production and the relations of 
production’ (Althusser, Louis, For Marx, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 
1969), p. 99). Althusser was arguing against ‘the radical reduction of the dialectic of 
history to the dialectic generating the successive modes of production, that is, in the last 
analysis, the different production techniques’, a formulation that was commonly known 
as ‘economism’ (Althusser, p. 108; emphases in original). Althusser himself 
maintained that social structure was determined ‘in the last instance by the (economic) 
mode of production’, yet in proposing ‘overdetermination’, he acknowledged ‘the 
relative autonomy of the superstructures and their specific effectivity’ (Althusser, p. 
111). Williams would define the term relatively simply, as having the ‘intended 
meaning [of] determination by multiple factors’ (Williams, p. 83). A decade later, 
Laclau and Mouffe would incorporate discourse and the symbolic into the range of 
determining elements. In the process, they would define ‘overdetermination’ as 
entailing all the different ways in which every single element in a society is inscribed. 
Indeed, all of these inscriptions themselves would become ‘elements’, as would be all 
the different ways in which a society’s elements are related to other elements according 
to how they are inscribed. As a result, for Laclau and Mouffe, ‘overdetermination’ goes 
beyond mere ‘determination by multiple factors’, becoming instead the watchword for 
a theory of the irreducibly infinite complexity of a society, given the irreducibly 
infinite number of ways it is inscribed by an infinitude of discourses and value-
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and limits of [...] a specific economic, political, and cultural system’ as ‘the 
pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense’, is to perceive no 
distinction between ‘official consciousness’ and ‘practical consciousness’. In this 
scenario, the latter has been refashioned in the terms of the former, in a process that 
Williams maintains is by no means spontaneous or ‘uncoercive’. Instead, this 
process is orchestrated – however indirectly – by the hegemonic agency within a 
given social conjuncture, or what Williams calls the ‘ruling class’.79 
Once again, this process of hegemonic incorporation seems to be invariably 
coercive, given how it entails imposing the regulated structure of ‘official 
consciousness’ upon the unruly, amorphous content of ‘practical consciousness’. It 
may therefore seem all the more pointless to retain Guha’s distinction between 
‘Persuasion’ and ‘Coercion’, given that both terms refer to practices that are both 
coercive. Nevertheless, what this distinction usefully isolates is what Williams 
describes as the act of ‘liv[ing a] system of meanings and values’; assuming an 
active role in the process of being submitted to the regularity of ideology, by 
regulating one’s own consciousness accordingly. This is what Williams means when 
claiming that ‘[t]he true condition of hegemony is effective self-identification with 
the hegemonic forms: a specific and internalized ‘socialization’ which is expected to 
be positive but which, if that is not possible, will rest on a (resigned) recognition of 
the inevitable and the necessary.’80 Again, we might argue that only this latter, 
reluctant stance blurs the distinction between ‘Persuasion’ and ‘Coercion’, given 
how it amounts to the imposition of a given ideology upon a will that does not 
entirely conform. However, if we consider ‘positive’ identification as readily or 
eagerly seeking to embody the relatively rigid terms of ‘official consciousness’, then 
there is little to distinguish this ‘positive’ or affirmative, willing subscription to 
ideology from that ‘resigned’ capitulation to what appears to be the innocuous, 
unassailable ‘pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.’ For 
both responses equally entail submission to those ‘pressures and limits’. As a result, 
                                                                                                                           
systems. In short, with ‘overdetermination’, Laclau and Mouffe claim that ‘society’ is 
never ‘the zero-sum game intrinsic to all economistic and reductionist conceptions’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 7). I will explore how a comparable claim arises in the work of 
Claude Lefort, Jacques Ranciere, and Spivak throughout Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
79 Williams, p. 93. 
80 Williams, p. 118 (emphasis in original).  
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in order to understand how this affirmative subscription is achieved, we must 
establish what compels one to enthusiastically assume an active role in one’s 
submission to the prescriptions of a systematic ideology, whether it be desires, 
anxieties, prejudices, beliefs, principles, traditions, or theories. Simultaneously, we 
must establish how ideology manages to inscribe ‘practical consciousness’ without 
either compromising its own regularity, or drawing attention to the discrepancies 
between ‘official consciousness’ and ‘practical consciousness’.  
Equally, though, we must not lose sight of that discrepancy, that ‘gap’ or 
‘interval’81 which would indicate that something exists in the latter that the former 
cannot fully incorporate. For as I will demonstrate in the latter half of this thesis, this 
‘unassimilable excess’82 – to use Young’s phrase – is what makes it possible for us 
to challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’, which in 
turn opens up the possibility of dissolving imperialism entirely. Again, this 
ubiquitous, inevitable excess is central to how Williams defines hegemony, as 
evidence of the contingency of any hegemonic formation, which in turn makes 
possible the coalescence of alternative formations that might challenge its 
ascendancy.83 If Lazarus is correct regarding the ‘disposition to homogenisation’ 
among postcolonial critics – as outlined above – then current understandings of the 
spontaneity of both ‘Western’ unity and Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ foreclose that 
possibility, by imputing that both are not contingent. This thesis will establish their 
contingency by apprehending both these collectives in terms of ‘hegemony’, as 
outlined by Williams, and Laclau and Mouffe. In the process, I hope to contribute 
towards the resurrection of that epochal aspiration of a truly, thoroughly postcolonial 
world that Spencer has recently turned back to.  
This thesis will fall into four chapters. In Chapter 1, I will consider whether 
we might attribute Lazarus’s ‘disposition to homogenisation’ to the homonymy of 
terms like ‘the West’ and ‘Europe’. Focusing on how three prominent postcolonial 
critics use the first of these terms, I will demonstrate how using it as if its meaning 
were self-evident – that is, without explicitly outlining what one means by ‘the 
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West’ – does little to discourage the assumption that one is referring equally to an 
entire polity as much as a state or ‘confederation of states’.84 I will explore how 
Edward Said, Paul Gilroy and Robert Young sustain a totalist articulation of ‘the 
West’, even as they encounter evidence of the disunity within and among the 
constituent societies of the ‘geopolitical West’. Indeed, I will consider whether these 
critics use the term ‘the West’ to refer to anything that exists beyond discourse 
whatsoever. For each of these critics uses the term in similar fashion to how Dipesh 
Chakrabarty uses the term ‘Europe’ – that is, not in reference to ‘the region of the 
world we call “Europe”’,85 so much as to an ‘imaginary figure’86 that mostly 
remains confined to discourse, and whose ‘sociological actuality’ is open to debate. 
As such, just as Chakrabarty debunks his ‘hyperreal Europe’87 as nothing more than 
‘a piece of fiction told to the colonized by the colonizer in the very process of 
fabricating colonial domination’,88 so ‘the West’ emerges in Said, Gilroy and 
Young’s work as a contested signifier, whose ambivalence reflects a dispute over 
the circumstances that led to today’s geopolitical hierarchy.  
In short, for Said, Gilroy and Young, ‘the West’ is an immutable will to 
power that has driven European imperialism, U.S. exceptionalism and the enforced 
globalisation or ‘neoliberalisation’ associated with the Bretton Woods institutions, 
most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this 
capacity, ‘the West’ resituates today’s geopolitical hierarchy – marked as it is by the 
ascendancy of nation-states that are conventionally regarded as belonging to ‘the 
West’ – as a product of the pursuit of power, rather than a natural consequence of 
the inherent superiority of ‘Western society’ or ‘Western civilisation’. This counter-
narrative of ‘Western’ ascendancy is crucial to the pursuit of social justice.  We 
should not lose sight, though, of how this counter-marrative gives rise to a counter-
                                            
84 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44.  
85 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 3.  
86 Chakrabarty, p. 4.  
87 Chakrabarty, p. 36.  
88 Chakrabarty, p. 34.  
- 24 - 
articulation of ‘the West’ – what I call the ‘other West’89 – that in many respects is 
no less ‘hyperreal’ than Chakrabarty’s ‘imaginary’ ‘Europe’. After all, insofar as 
Said, Gilroy and Young articulate ‘the West’ as a will to power, they reduce it to a 
singular, unitary intention. As such, wherever they use the term to reference a social 
aggregation as well, then all three critics posit that aggregation as being discrete, 
cohesive, coherent and internally undifferentiated – in short, a totality. As Young 
documents, whether any social aggregation could spontaneously exist in this form is 
highly debatable. Moreover, to claim that ‘the West’ is undifferentiated is to evince 
Lazarus’s ‘disposition to homogenisation’. Considering how Said, Gilroy and 
Young do not distinguish between the multiple senses in which they use the term 
‘the West’, I will therefore suggest that avoiding this ‘disposition to 
homogenisation’ must begin with explicitly acknowledging the homonymy of terms 
like ‘the West’, and explicitly delineating what one means whenever one uses such 
terms. Otherwise, using these terms as if their meaning were self-evident can 
encourage a slippage between their various meanings, which in the case of ‘the 
West’ can lead to the assumption that ‘Western society’, ‘Western civilisation’, even 
‘Western consciousness’ is immutably, congenitally imperialist, an assumption that 
– as I have emphasised throughout this Introduction – risks foreclosing the 
possibility of overcoming imperialism entirely.  
Having demonstrated how critical articulations of ‘the West’ in postcolonial 
studies are often informed by a totalist logic, in Chapter 2 I will explore how we 
might reconceive Said’s ‘virtual unity of purpose’ without assuming that it is 
entirely spontaneous. For this assumption can only return us to a totalist or even an 
essentialist logic, as if the spontaneity of this ‘virtual unity of purpose’ reflected an 
underlying, inherent unity across all of ‘Western society’. I will suggest that we 
understand this ‘imperial consensus’ according to Williams’s notion of a disjuncture 
between ‘official consciousness’ and ‘practical consciousness’. I will demonstrate 
how a similar disjuncture informs the thinking of two principal influences on Said: 
Foucault and Gramsci. Indeed, in the process, I will argue that Said’s well-known 
critiques of Foucault’s ‘theoretical overtotalisation’90 of power profoundly 
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misinterpreted Foucault’s claim that ‘[p]ower is everywhere’.91 In short, Said 
overlooked Foucault’s accompanying claim that ‘[w]here there is power there is 
resistance’, although I will explain this oversight by suggesting that by ‘resistance’ 
Foucault meant something very different to what Said might have thought. For as I 
will demonstrate with reference to Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, Said 
understood ‘resistance’ as if it were synonymous with ‘opposition’. In contrast, I 
will suggest that by ‘resistance’ Foucault meant a friction that arises from a 
disjuncture between power’s institution of society in a stable, coherent form, and the 
irreducibly infinite complexity of the ‘positive’ content of society, including 
individual consciousness, experience, intention, and practice. Simply put, the latter 
always exceeds the terms of the former, and yet the former is necessary if ‘society’ 
is to exist as a stable environment. Thus, for Foucault – as for Gramsci – social unity 
is never spontaneous or guaranteed; instead, it must be actively maintained via the 
exertion of power.  
I will suggest, therefore, that we approach Said’s ‘virtual unity of purpose’ as 
a non-spontaneous unity – indeed, a precarious unity that persists only as long as 
some agency intervenes in the consciousness and intentions of those who subscribe 
to it, disciplining, coercing, or ‘educating’ them in ways that are conducive to the 
task of sustaining that unity. In the process, I will suggest that the individual 
consciousness and experience – in some cases, perhaps also the intentions and 
actions – of those who subscribe to this ‘imperial consensus’ always exceed it, even 
if these individuals willingly, eagerly subscribe to that consensus. For as Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak has argued, subscribing to any form of collective existence – 
whether it be a group identity or a ‘partition of the sensible’92 – entails ‘self-
metonymization’,93 the act of identifying the whole of oneself according to only that 
part of oneself that ‘agrees’ with the terms of the collective in question. As such, 
even willingly subscribing to a collective demands that one disavow aspects of 
oneself that do not ‘agree’ with those terms, which suggests that the terms of any 
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given collective are always exceeded by their constituent elements. Hence 
Foucault’s contention that both ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ are everywhere, in the form 
of ‘odd term[s] in relations of power’ that ‘are inscribed in the latter as an 
irreducible opposite’.94  
Subsequently, if Said finds no evidence of ‘odd terms’ disrupting the 
consistency of his ‘virtual unity of purpose’ – insofar as there is ‘scarcely any 
dissent, any departure, any demurral’ from his ‘imperial consensus’ among 
‘Westerners’ – then I wonder whether this paucity of evidence indicates not the 
absence of ‘odd terms’ themselves, but rather limitations in Said’s interpretive 
framework that prevent him from seeing them. I will therefore explore how we 
might observe these ‘odd terms’ that potentially elude Said, by considering how 
Spivak’s notion of occupying ‘a position without identity’ pertains to something that 
affects not only her ‘subalterns’ – that is, only the most disenfranchised and 
impoverished demographics – but to anyone, anywhere. For Spivak, subalternity 
pertains to forms of consciousness and practice that exceed existing interpretive 
frameworks.95 Yet in claiming that belonging to a collective – including a group 
identity – as always entailing ‘self-metonymisation’, Spivak suggests that we all 
evince incommensurable forms of consciousness and practice. Clearly, though, not 
everyone is a ‘subaltern’ in the sense of being ‘removed from all lines of social 
mobility’.96 I will avoid any such assumption, therefore, by decoupling the notion of 
occupying ‘a position without identity’ from this definition of the term ‘subaltern’. 
In the process, I will consider whether Spivak’s notion of ‘read[ing] against the 
grain’ by seeking out ‘misfits in the text’97 provides a way of challenging Said’s 
totalisation of ‘Western consciousness’ – not just theoretically, but also 
‘empirically’.  
In Chapter 3, I will outline how assuming that any given collective 
exhaustively articulates the consciousness, experience, intentions, or practices of 
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those who subscribe to it has political as well as methodological consequences. I 
will continue to explore the extent to which Spivak’s notion of occupying ‘a position 
without identity’ applies more generally than Spivak herself allows, given how in 
Spivak’s thinking this notion remains tied up with how she defines subalternity 
above. I will argue that we see ‘a position without identity’ being claimed by 
Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white male’ students who, according to Spivak, often claim to 
be unable to ‘speak’, or participate competently in classroom debates. To claim that 
‘I am only a bourgeois white male, I can’t speak’ is clearly nonsensical, most 
obviously because – unlike Spivak’s subaltern – ‘bourgeois white males’ can quite 
clearly ‘speak’ in most contexts. The statement, though, is nonsensical in at least 
two other ways. Firstly, precisely because ‘bourgeois white males’ can ‘speak’, the 
statement indicates a desire to ‘speak’ as something other than a ‘bourgeois white 
male’, which renders the statement nonsensical in a second way. For this desire 
suggests that the students are actually not just ‘bourgeois white males’ – that their 
consciousness and intentions exceed the terms of the category of ‘bourgeois white 
male’. Thus, to claim to be ‘only a bourgeois white male’ who is nonetheless unable 
to ‘speak’ is to claim ‘a position without identity’, since although the claimant is 
more than just a ‘bourgeois white male’, their insistence to the contrary suggests that 
they can think of no other, more appropriate way of identifying themselves.  
I will argue that this absence of alternative ways of identifying oneself is 
only compounded wherever we assume that anyone’s consciousness, experience, or 
intentions do not exceed the terms of whatever collective they subscribe to. As such, 
if we do not affirm this excess by presenting alternative ways of identifying oneself, 
then we risk sustaining a situation that would appear to corroborate that assumption. 
In so doing, we risk inducing a cyclical, self-corroborating logic in which our 
original understandings appear to adequately apprehend a situation that we 
subsequently do not intervene in. If an individual who identifies themselves in the 
terms of a collective identity undergoes ‘self-metonymisation’, then to address them 
as if their consciousness, experience, intentions, or practices did not exceed those 
terms is to address them synecdochally. Rather than encourage ‘dis-identification’, 
this synecdochal address will simply compound that individual’s identification with 
the collective, which in turn will corroborate our synecdochal address, and so on ad 
infinitum.  Thus, in order to avoid this tautology, the task of encouraging ‘dis-
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identification’ must assume that all individual consciousness, experience, intention, 
and behaviour exceeds the terms of all such collectives.  
 In the latter half of Chapter 3, I will explore how this argument is borne out 
in several literary explorations of the subjective experience of social privilege. First, 
I will consider how in A Small Place, Jamaica Kincaid looks beyond her reductive, 
caricatural portrait of North American and European tourists visiting Antigua, 
ignorant of or indifferent towards how their patronisation of the island’s tourist 
industry implicates them in how that industry mires the country in poverty, political 
corruption, and economic dependency on Europe and North America. As Lindsay 
Pentolf Aegerter and Rhonda Frederick have recounted, A Small Place is notorious 
for provoking hostile responses from ‘mainstream’ readers, by addressing them in 
the second person as ‘incredibly unattractive, fat, pastrylike-fleshed’98 tourists. Yet 
as Frederick and Lesley Larkin have demonstrated, Kincaid very subtly addresses 
her reader as if they were not just tourists, a manoeuvre that opens up the possibility 
of discouraging them from wishing to become tourists ever again. I will compare 
this affirmation that tourists are never just ‘tourists’ with how George Orwell – in 
his essay ‘Shooting an Elephant’ – describes his experience of being addressed by 
the Burmese people as an imperialist. Given that Orwell was a police officer in 
colonial Burma, this mode of address was apt, and yet it refused to allow for the 
possibility that he was more than just a functionary of British imperial power. 
Orwell claims that by the time of the incident he describes in the essay, he had 
already concluded that imperialism was indefensible. Thus, by addressing him as an 
imperialist oppressor, the Burmese refused to acknowledge the possibility that 
functionaries like Orwell could be subject to variances of consciousness, experience, 
intention, and on occasion practice, some of which might not have been conducive 
to imperialism.  
 As a result, Orwell claims to have found himself in a state of confusion and 
uncertainty that prevented him from more closely aligning his practices with his 
intentions. What Orwell describes here is a similar predicament as the ‘tormented 
dance’ of Albert Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’.99 As I will demonstrate, the 
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latter’s paralysis derives from Memmi’s inability to imagine them ever aligning their 
practices with their intentions, given how contradictory their subject-position was, 
having declared their opposition to a colonial order that they otherwise benefitted 
from directly. A comparable pessimism is what underlies V.S. Naipaul’s damning 
appraisal – in his novel Guerrillas – of the intentions and subsequent actions of 
white radicals travelling to the Third World, hoping to contribute to local efforts in 
pursuing social justice. Famous for his nihilistic fatalism, I suggest nonetheless that 
throughout this novel, Naipaul acknowledges how this pessimism might well be a 
form of political complacency. For although he is highly critical of complacent, 
irresponsible white radicals, in many respects Naipaul resembles how he portrays 
them in Guerrillas. As an educated expatriate, Naipaul is just as able to avoid having 
to endure the daily hardships of life in a Third World country, as are his white 
radicals. In critiquing these privileged, mobile radicals, then, Naipaul subtly 
acknowledges how this critique can be directed at himself. Subsequently, Naipaul’s 
discouraging appraisal of the prospects of white radicals aligning their actions with 
their attested intentions, is troubled by a worrying sense that he is too deterministic; 
that he too readily forecloses the possibility of any such alignment; and that – 
moreover – he can afford to do so, given his relatively privileged position within our 
global distribution of power.  
 A similar foreclosure discourages Bernard Valcourt – protagonist of A 
Sunday at the Pool in Kigali, Gil Courtemanche’s fictional memoir of the Rwandan 
genocide – from doing more to intervene in the events that lead to the genocide. 
Valcourt is all too aware of how he is no less responsible for these events than the 
rest of Rwanda’s European and North American expatriate community, most of 
whom would rather take a swim in the hotel pool than pressure the country’s Hutu 
Power government to stop fomenting the violence. Yet Valcourt initially refuses to 
acknowledge how even this awareness distinguishes him from his fellow expats. As 
a result, much like Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’, Valcourt mostly agonises over 
his complicity in the forces that gave rise to the situation in Rwanda that led to the 
genocide. Yet Valcourt is no less tormented by his awareness that such agonising 
does little to resolve the crisis, and that just like Naipaul, he can afford to agonise 
over his own integrity, because as a white Canadian, he can escape the crisis, either 
by remaining in Kigali’s Hôtel des Milles-Collines or leaving Rwanda altogether. As 
with Orwell and Naipaul, so with Courtemanche, we achieve little by refusing to 
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acknowledge even the possibility of a variance of consciousness, intention, or 
practice among the beneficiaries of an unequal, unjust, and oppressive social 
conjuncture. Indeed, such refusals can be counterproductive, as they discourage 
anyone from even trying to encourage such variances among these beneficiaries.  
 Chapter 3 will conclude by illustrating how such a refusal can overlook 
evidence that such variances exist. I will do so by demonstrating how critical 
approaches to Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho have generally apprehended its 
narrator-protagonist Patrick Bateman synecdochally. Patrick is a racist, classist, 
misogynist Wall Street yuppie whom critics have largely received as an embodiment 
of the intellectual, emotional and moral bankruptcy of either 1980s U.S. consumer 
culture in general, or his yuppie peer group in particular. As the epitome of a social 
type, critics like Elizabeth Young and David Eldridge find that Patrick’s 
consciousness does not exceed the terms of that wider collective identity, and that he 
is therefore ‘Everyyuppie’.100 My reading of American Psycho, though, will 
demonstrate how Patrick’s elaborate, albeit dubious claims to being a serial killer 
indicate both a consciousness that does in fact exceed those terms, and which is also 
self-conscious of that fact. Indeed, I will argue that this alter ego is an attempt to 
give form to that excess, although it is also an attempt to reconcile that excess with 
Patrick’s persistent desire to achieve the impossibly idealised image of yuppie 
perfection, as dictated by the rigid social and personal etiquette that his peers 
fervently subscribe to. Patrick’s pursuit of this impossible reconciliation, this 
endeavour to somehow fully inhabit the yuppie etiquette despite being an 
‘unassimilable excess’ to it, reflects an absence of other ways of articulating his 
experience of having exceeded the terms of the yuppie social type.  
Patrick certainly gives us very little reason to believe that he is anything 
other than a racist, a misogynist and a classist. Nonetheless, even if his prejudices 
are typical of the yuppie mentality, it remains that Patrick’s consciousness and 
experience exceed the yuppie stereotype as characterised by critics like Young and 
Eldridge. Thus, whenever they claim that Patrick amounts to nothing more than 
‘Everyyuppie’, an exemplum of a collective identity, these critics address him 
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synecdochally. Indeed, if Patrick’s alter ego is an implicit acknowledgement of his 
inability to achieve yuppie perfection – that is, of ‘the impossibility to perfectly 
conform to the [yuppie] etiquette’101 – then this synecdochal address is ironic in its 
apparent affirmation of Patrick’s exemplarity as a yuppie. For if Patrick gains his 
peers’ acceptance by presenting them with a carefully-regulated public persona – 
what David Roche calls Patrick’s ‘false, social and performing self’102 – then he 
does so by metonymising himself in the manner described above by Spivak. Thus, to 
apprehend Patrick synecdochally as ‘Everyyuppie’ is to corroborate his own ‘self-
metonymisation’, which in turn corroborates this original synecdochal address, and 
so on. And yet Patrick’s claims to being a serial killer – whether or not they are 
reliable – indicate that Patrick is more than ‘Everyyuppie’, even though he aspires to 
being nothing more than a yuppie. Patrick is by no means a misunderstood 
champion of the rights of the ‘margins’, or indeed a socially marginal figure himself. 
I will argue instead, then, that American Psycho presents us with a social stereotype, 
only to question the extent to which any such stereoype is ever a ‘sociological 
actuality’. In the process, the novel conveys more than a dispiriting appraisal of 
1980s U.S. consumer culture or yuppie greed, insofar as Ellis also warns us against 
comfortable assumptions regarding the consciousness of those who not only benefit 
from systemic injustice, but who also revel in their subsequent, undue privilege.  
Of course, though, we cannot dissolve imperialism by simply maintaining 
the possibility that variances of consciousness, experience, intention, and practice 
obtain among its beneficiaries. Neither can we challenge the hegemonic ascendancy 
of imperialism solely by exploiting such variances in order to encourage those who 
subscribe to Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ to ‘dis-identify’ from it instead. For it is 
entirely possible to ‘dis-identify’ – or at least claim to do so – without actively 
pursuing the dissolution of whatever one ‘dis-identifies’ from. Thus, in Chapter 4, I 
will consider how we might redress this inactive ‘dis-identification’, with reference 
to a historical case example: white South Africans who under Apartheid espoused 
liberalism in supposed defiance of the regime, but who were able to avoid active 
politics without having their ethical and political integrity seriously questioned. This 
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case example is useful as a way of exploring how we might effectively address 
inactive ‘dis-identification’. In 1968, a group of radical non-white students broke 
away from the white-dominated, liberal-oriented National Union of South African 
Students (NUSAS), precisely because of the latter’s perceived complacency, their 
reluctance to undertake more active, more risky ways of campaigning against 
Apartheid. The new organisation – the South African Student Organisation, or 
SASO – articulated this complacency as deliberate, calculated collusion with 
Apartheid on the part of white students looking after their own privileges at the 
expense of the aspirations of their non-white compatriots. This self-interest was all 
the worse given NUSAS’s claims to oppose Apartheid, and to represent the interests 
of the country’s non-white majority. SASO, therefore, publicly denounced liberal 
whites – and eventually, dissident whites in general – as covert white-supremacists 
who were unlikely to, or even incapable of actively pursuing a more just, egalitarian 
alternative to Apartheid.  
This conflation of ‘liberals’ with ‘racists’ provoked a response among liberal 
whites that largely compounded SASO’s scepticism towards the integrity of 
dissident whites. Not all whites responded in the same way, and SASO managed to 
encourage radicalisation among certain white-led organisations, including NUSAS. 
However, it appears a majority of whites refused to consider the cogency of SASO’s 
accusations against them of complacency, and so continued to espouse a liberal 
agenda that entailed doing very little to combat Apartheid. Indeed, many liberals 
responded with their own counter-accusations, especially concerning SASO’s non-
whites-only membership policy, which many liberals thought of as a capitulation to 
Apartheid sensibilities. Undoubtedly, many of these responses were guilty of the 
very complacency that SASO observed among all whites. Nonetheless, in Chapter 4, 
I will consider whether this insistence on identifying all whites as white-
supremacists – this conflation of complacency with conspiracy – might have 
contributed to the general lack of radicalisation among liberal whites during and 
after the 1970s. For this conflation refused to recognise any variance of intention 
among whites, let alone among dissident whites. Subsequently, we might attribute 
the stubbornness of many liberal whites to the fact that liberalism appeared to be the 
only ‘sensible order’ at the time that did recognise a variance of purpose between 
dissident whites and Afrikaner nationalists.  
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SASO’s refusal to recognise this variance, therefore, did little to redress the 
lack of another ‘sensible order’ that might both denounce liberal complacency, and 
acknowledge the possibility that whites could oppose Apartheid with integrity. I 
wonder, therefore, whether this lack hampered the prospect of encouraging more 
active, more radical opposition among whites during this period. For what this 
prospect demanded was an alternative way of being a dissident white – that is, an 
alternative to the liberal alternative to white-supremacism, a second-order alternative 
that both affirmed the integrity of white opposition to Apartheid, and called upon 
dissident whites to take greater risks, to make a more meaningful contribution to the 
resistance. In Chapter 4, I will consider those responses from among dissident 
whites that added a third term – such as Richard Turner’s identity of the white 
radical – to SASO’s binary analysis of white socio-politics, according to which one 
was either a ‘liberal’ or a ‘racist’, although ultimately the two amounted to the same 
thing. Moreover, I will consider how Nadine Gordimer’s responses to SASO and 
Black Consciousness highlighted this lack of second-order alternatives, along with 
the potential consequences of failing to redress this lack. I will compare the 
conclusions of three of Gordimer’s novels published after SASO’s most active 
period – Burger’s Daughter (1979), July’s People (1981) and A Sport of Nature 
(1987) – in order to establish how Gordimer’s search for a more radical praxis for 
whites in response to SASO, was counter-balanced by a sense that SASO’s refusal 
to acknowledge variances of intention among whites was hampering that search.  
Gordimer was very receptive to SASO’s critiques of liberal white 
complacency, yet she was also mindful of the limits of the organisation’s strategy of 
addressing dissident whites as white supremacists, in order to provoke them into 
radicalising themselves. Throughout her engagements with these limits – I argue – 
Gordimer suggests that the inactive ‘dis-identification’ among liberal whites could 
only be redressed by compelling them to ‘dis-identify’ from their liberal ‘sensible 
order’ as well as that of Afrikaner nationalism. In short, for Gordimer, what was 
needed was a second-order ‘dis-identification’. In turn, radicals – white and non-
white – had to avoid assuming that the consciousness, experience, and intentions of 
even the most complacent liberal white could never exceed the terms of the ‘sensible 
order’ of South African liberalism. Thus, redressing inactive ‘dis-identification’ is 
only possible under the same conditions that gave rise to it in the first place. By 
refusing to recognise a variance of purpose among them, SASO hampered the task 
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of encouraging second-order ‘dis-identification’ among dissident whites by 
suggesting that their consciousness, experience, and intentions did not exceed those 
of Afrikaner nationalism. I will therefore explore how Gordimer sought to affirm 
this excess in her fiction, even as she acknowledged the cogency of SASO’s 
accusations against liberal whites of complacency towards their inevitable 
implication in white supremacy.  
A note on ‘the West’ 
This thesis begins with ‘the West’, moves through colonial Burma, the postcolonial 
Caribbean, 1980s Manhattan, and Rwanda, before ending in South Africa in the 
decade following the Soweto uprisings of 1976-77. This trajectory, therefore, begs 
the question of what a ‘Western’ country or a ‘Westerner’ actually is. Martin W. 
Lewis and Kären E. Wigen have illustrated how the frontiers of the ‘geopolitical 
West’ shift considerably according to disparate criteria for defining what ‘the West’ 
is, as well as what it has been.103 Indeed, as if to demonstrate the irreducible 
infinitude of these criteria, Alastair Bonnett notes that Lewis and Wigen’s ‘seven 
versions of the West’ – seven maps that trace how these frontiers have shifted as the 
meaning of the term ‘the West’ has changed over time – comprise only ‘a partial 
portrait and one, moreover, drawn largely from the perspective of the West’ 
itself.’104 Thus, Bonnett demonstrates how ‘non-Western’ definitions of ‘the West’ 
are no less innumerable. In short, ‘the West’ is a homonym: it is used in a multitude 
of different ways, to refer to innumerable different things, not all of which are 
mutually compatible. Such is the amorphousness of this term that – as we have seen 
– Lazarus finds it ‘impossible to certify even the sociological actuality, still less the 
unity or transhistorical integrity’105 of whatever it is meant to reference. Moreover, 
as I will demonstrate in Chapter 1, the term’s homonymy contributes much to the 
‘disposition to homogenisation’ that Lazarus observes in postcolonial studies, 
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largely because this homonymy goes unacknowledged, and the term is used as if its 
meaning were self-evident. This homogenisation, therefore, can be redressed – albeit 
only to an extent – by simply delineating explicitly what one means when referring 
to ‘the West’. I will therefore briefly outline here what I mean by ‘the West’, as well 
as some of the different ways in which I will be using the term in this thesis.  
Although I will be referring to the ‘geopolitical West’, I am interested in the 
term primarily as an indicator of an underlying, paradigmatic issue in postcolonial 
studies, regarding the intersections between social privilege, political power, and 
individual intention. Other indicators are the terms ‘Europe’, ‘Euro-America’, 
‘modernity’, ‘the centre’, the ‘core’, the ‘metropole’, the ‘First World’, the ‘global 
north’, and the ‘core capitalist nation-states’.106 I wish to reconceive Said’s ‘virtual 
unity of purpose’ and Lazarus’s ‘structuring assumptions’ in a manner that avoids 
presuming that we can automatically deduce individual intention according to the 
extent of one’s social privilege and political power. As such, my attention to ‘the 
West’ gradually subsides as I engage more directly with the intersections between 
these three notions. I address how postcolonial critics use the category of ‘the West’ 
in a totalist sense, primarily as a starting point for exploring how this usage implies a 
certain correlation between privilege, power and intention. I do not wish to 
challenge the claim that a correlation exists between privilege – including forms of 
cultural privilege that do not always manifest as material advantage – and power. 
Instead, I wish to question whether we can wholly deduce one’s individual 
intentions according to the extent of one’s social privilege and political power. Thus, 
I begin by demonstrating how postcolonial critics articulate ‘the West’ as a totality, 
in order to illustrate how such articulations influence a more general understanding 
of this relationship between privilege, power and intentionality. I am not concerned, 
therefore, with establishing what ‘the West’ is – still less with whether the category 
pertains to something that exists beyond discourse – either for postcolonial critics or 
for anyone else. Neither am I concerned with tracing the category’s intellectual 
                                            
106 Lazarus, Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 31 these categories are hardly coterminous, of 
course. And yet, as Lazarus notes, many of them ‘are routinely conflated in the 
postcolonial discussion, such that, for example, the US is presented as a more or less 
organic outgrowth of ‘Europe’ merely with a broader geostrategic base’ (Lazarus, 
‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 16).  
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history, which by all accounts is overwhelmingly complex.107 I am interested in ‘the 
West’ solely as a symptom of more general assumptions underlying postcolonial 
studies.  
Nonetheless, throughout this thesis, I will present the case for more 
adequately distinguishing between the various senses in which postcolonial critics 
use the term ‘the West’, preferably via a properly diversified terminology. In 
Chapter 1, I use a limited number of ‘subcategories’ in order to more clearly 
distinguish between these various senses of the term. For the sake of clarity, I will 
now briefly define each of these ‘subcategories’ for the reader’s reference. Thus, 
throughout this thesis, ‘the West’ will always refer only to the category of ‘the 
West’, in all its possible senses, without meaning to suggest that it pertains to 
something that exists independently of the category itself. The ‘geopolitical West’ 
will refer to the societies or polities that are currently regarded as belonging to ‘the 
West’, although I will not identify individual countries in order to avoid imposing 
one specific definition of what distinguishes a ‘Western’ from a ‘non-Western’ 
country.  Similarly, I will avoid defining ‘Western society’, ‘Western civilisation’ 
and ‘Western consciousness’, except insofar as they postulate a unitary, internally 
coherent collective consciousness, experience, will or intention, one that is 
susceptible to a malicious will to power that drives ‘Westerners’ to pursue the 
domination of other peoples. I find these formulations essentialist, and therefore 
insufficient as ways of explaining Said’s ‘virtual unity of purpose’ or Lazarus’s 
‘structuring assumptions’. Subsequently, I will use these terms to refer to attitudes 
rather than actualities, and I do not wish to suggest that anything like a unified 
‘Western consciousness’ actually exists, at least as a spontaneous union that occurs 
independently of discourse or the active, coercive disciplining of individual 
consciousness.  
My argument in Chapter 1 turns upon my distinction between the ‘Hegelian 
West’, the ‘other West’, and the ‘Other West’. Admittedly, the first term is 
something of a misnomer, insofar as ‘Hegel had scant interest in developing an 
                                            
107 Again, see Lewis and Wigen’s The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography; 
and Bonnett’s The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History. See also Stuart 
Hall’s ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, in Formations of Modernity, ed. 
by Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with the Open 
University, 1992), pp. 275-320. 
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explicity or overarching sense of Western identity. The ease with which he 
dispenses with the West is indicative of its continuing marginality as an idea’ in 
nineteenth-century European thought.108 The ‘Hegelian West’, therefore, refers more 
to Hegel’s claim that European society or civilisation embodies ‘the end of History’ 
in its movement ‘from East to West’. Chakrabarty notes a very similar claim that 
continues to inform historicist approaches that posit ‘Europe’ as a standard against 
which to appraise non-European societies, especially with respect to the extent of 
their modernisation. According to Chakrabarty, this claim – along with its 
articulation of ‘Europe’ as ‘the end of History’ – ‘was of course nothing but a piece 
of fiction told to the colonized by the colonizer in the very process of fabricating 
colonial domination.’109 By presenting modern European society as a product of the 
unfolding of autonomous, teleological social processes that existed within all 
societies, this ‘fiction’ recast the global hegemony of imperial Europe as a natural, 
inevitable consequence of the pre-eminently advanced nature of European society. 
In the process, this ‘fiction’ disavowed the violence and injustices through which 
imperial Europe achieved its global hegemony.  
Thus, by the ‘Hegelian West’, I mean a conception of ‘the West’ that has a 
similar effect as this ‘hyperreal Europe’ – that is, a watchword for a particular way 
of explaining the contemporary geopolitical and global economic hierarchy, 
especially with respect to the ascendancy of Lazarus’s ‘core capitalist nation states’, 
a geopolitical bloc that others would refer to as ‘the West’. In short, this ‘official’ 
explanation posits that hierarchy as a natural or inevitable consequence of the 
inherent superiority of ‘Western civilisation’, U.S. exceptionalism and neoliberal 
globalisation. Postcolonial studies contests this ‘official’ narrative with a counter-
narrative that catalogues those injustices. In the process, the discipline recasts ‘the 
West’ as the orchestrator and principal beneficiary of today’s unjust global 
hierarchy. Rather than the enlightened embodiment of the ‘end of History’, what 
emerges from this counter-narrative is what I refer to as the ‘other West’ – the 
orchestrating agent of a history of violent, exploitative injustice that is all too often 
conveniently overlooked or disavowed, with regrettable consequences for billions of 
people around the world.  
                                            
108 Bonnett, 24. 
109 Chakrabarty, 34. 
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Finally, the ‘Other West’ emerges from efforts to establish a ‘new type of 
knowledge’, one that ‘can analyse plural objects as such rather than […] simply 
comprehend[ing] them within totalizing schemas’.110 According to Young, the 
pursuit of this ‘new type of knowledge’ was prompted by the revelations of the 
injustices wreaked under European imperialism. On the basis that European 
knowledge itself was as compromised by these revelations, this ‘new type of 
knowledge’ was to be the product of ‘the decentralization and decolonization of 
European thought – insofar as it is ‘incapable of respecting the Being and meaning 
of the other’, and to the extent that its philosophical tradition makes ‘common cause 
with oppression and with the totalitarianism of the same’.’111 I will address the 
potential shortcomings of this claim that European thought is inherently, invariably, 
congenitally imperialist in Chapter 1. By the ‘Other West’ I mean the antithesis to 
this ‘new type of knowledge’; the ‘constitutive outside’112 by which the latter is 
defined as a means of producing knowledge that does respect ‘the Being and 
meaning of the other’, and which does not make ‘common cause with oppression 
and with the totalitarianism of the same’. Insofar as postcolonial critics are united by 
a ‘genuinely progressive desire to contribute to the decolonisation of knowledge’,113 
the ‘Other West’ references usages of the term ‘the West’ as referring to an intention 
that is antithetical to that of ‘the postcolonial’. Thus, of all the ‘Wests’ that I refer to 
in this thesis, this ‘Other West’ – ‘the West’ as Other to the non-imperialist Self that 
is ‘the postcolonial’ – is the most removed from a sociological sense, insofar as it 
references a paradigm, rather than a polity, state, or confederation of states.  
                                            
110 Young, p. 11.  
111 Young, p. 18.  
112 Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London, New York: Verso, 1993), p. 2; Marchart, 
Oliver, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, 
Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 41; borrowing 
this notion from Jacques Derrida, Mouffe deploys it as a way of understanding how 
group and political identities define themselves in terms of what they are not – that is, 
as against someone else. Although I use the phrase with respect to the process of 
defining a scholarly methodology or sensibility, rather than a political identity, in a way 
I find that the identity of the postcolonial critic combines the two, insofar as their 
methodology is informed by an overtly political consciousness and intention.  
113 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 7.  
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A note on literature 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to literary texts to illustrate my claim that we should be 
wary of assuming that we can exhaustively apprehend the consciousness, 
experience, will, intentions, and practices of anyone, anywhere, at any time. I look 
to these texts not as reliable accounts of a ‘sociological actuality’ – that is, empirical 
evidence that somehow ‘proves’ this claim – but rather as speculative explorations 
of the intervals between individual consciousness, experience, and intention, and the 
terms of a wider collective identity or will. I explore how Kincaid, Orwell, Naipaul, 
Courtemanche, Ellis, and Gordimer all engage with the notion that individual 
intention can be deduced entirely from the extent of one’s social privilege and 
political power. In Gordimer’s case, this engagement is prompted by the 
provocations of Black Consciousness, which deduced a common purpose among all 
white South Africans from the fact that they all benefited in some way from 
Apartheid. In Ellis’s case, American Psycho initially appears to offer us a portrait of 
a social type that is comfortingly familiar, and which confirms much of our 
assumptions regarding the intellectual, emotional and moral bankruptcy of either 
consumer culture in general, or yuppies in particular. Hence the curious tendency 
among the novel’s critics of acknowledging Patrick’s fictionality – which Ellis 
foregrounds via the novel’s narrative inconsistencies and ambiguities, especially 
with respect to whether Patrick really is a serial killer – while also using American 
Psycho to pass judgement on the social and cultural conjuncture in the U.S.A. at the 
end of the 1980s. For American Psycho is often approached as if it were a reliable 
basis for a sociological analysis of that conjuncture, even though it is a fictional text 
– one, moreover, that draws attention to its fictionality.  
 Again, I wish to avoid this tendency, with respect to all of the literary figures 
discussed in this thesis. I look towards the work of these writers, therefore, as 
presenting a counterpoint to conventional understandings of the consciousness and 
intentions of certain, relatively privileged social groups – European and North 
American tourists; European colonial functionaries; white radicals interfering in 
Third World social movements; white expatriates indifferent towards the suffering 
that surrounds them; selfish, materialist Wall Street yuppies; and complacent 
middle-class, Anglophone white South Africans. As I will demonstrate, we observe 
these conventional understandings informing how critics have read the work of Ellis 
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and Gordimer, in particular. Thus, I am interested in how these works exceed the 
terms in which critics read them, how their portraits of individuals who initially 
appear to typify a particular social group or identity ultimately do not conform 
entirely to that identity. I attend to how these works render critical approaches to 
them inadequate to the task of exhaustively apprehending them, and how these 
approaches yield interpretations that are at best synecdochal, either by reducing the 
sum total of the works to one specific aspect, or by ignoring aspects that exceed the 
terms of the analysis altogether. I focus primarily on the more ambiguous aspects of 
these works, moments of uncertainty that point to something that exceeds either our 
expectations or our comprehension, and which cannot be reduced to the terms of 
existing interpretive frameworks or ‘partitions of the sensible’, including those 
within the works themselves. In this respect, I use these novels in similar fashion to 
how Chakrabarty uses his ‘subaltern pasts’ – as an excess that cannot simply be 
incorporated into existing interpretive frameworks, and which therefore gives us a 
‘glimpse’ of their finitude ‘finitude’, ‘a glimpse of what might constitute an outside 
to’ them.114 As I will insist throughout this thesis, I do not mean to suggest that any 
of these privileged beneficiaries are somehow subalterns, at least as Spivak defines 
the term. Nonetheless, in Chapter 3 I will outline how Spivak’s method of exposing 
subaltern ‘inarticulacy’ suggests ways in which we might nuance our understanding 
of the intersections and correlations between social privilege, political power and 
individual intention. 
 
                                            
114 Chakrabarty, p. 93.  
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Chapter 1 
The ‘Other West’ in postcolonial studies 
 
For Neil Lazarus, the category of ‘the West’ is of little value to the task of 
adequately understanding ‘what imperialism is and how it works’.1 Because it 
‘references neither a polity nor a state (nor even a confederation of states), but a 
“civilisation”, something altogether more amorphous and indeterminate’,2 the term 
lacks ‘a coherent or credible referent’.3 Referring imperial power to ‘the West’, 
therefore, can only ‘mystify this power, rendering its social ground opaque’, and 
hindering efforts to produce ‘a plausible account of the structurality of the modern 
world order’.4 Lazarus is right to claim that ‘it is impossible to certify even the 
sociological actuality, still less the unity or transhistorical integrity’5 of any one of 
the polities, states, or confederations of states that the category of ‘the West’ is used 
to refer to. No doubt, then, that we cannot properly understand ‘the structurality of 
the modern world order’ by referring imperialism solely to ‘the West’.6 However, I 
find that in dismissing the category’s relevance to this task altogether, Lazarus the 
shortcomings of his own envisioned, ‘materialist’ alternative to a ‘culturalist’ 
approach to this task.  
 For even if ‘the West’ does not reference any single, persistent polity, state, 
or confederation of states, it remains that contemporary geopolitical and socio-
political imaginations continue to be influenced by an intellectual discourse and 
popular tradition according to which there exists a social formation and political 
agent that is widely recognised as being ‘the West’. As Alastair Bonnett observes, 
                                            
1 Lazarus, Neil, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, in Marxism, Modernity 
and Postcolonial Studies, ed. by Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 54.  
2 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
3 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
4 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
5 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
6 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, in Race & Class, 53.1 (2011), p. 10.  
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even if we cannot locate ‘the West’ as a persistent phenomenon – whether in a 
geopolitical, ‘sociological’, cultural, or demographic sense, or indeed as anything 
that is material or tangible – we cannot ignore the fact that 
[p]eople use ‘the West’ to articulate and structure their thoughts. It is 
a category, an intellectual resource, that helps map out the big 
picture; that gives coherence and statue to what, otherwise, can 
appear eclectic and tendentious opinion. The fact that contradictory 
things are said about the West does not imply its redundancy but its 
extraordinary intellectual and political utility.7 
For Bonnett, rather than a singular, identifiable polity, institution, structure, 
formation, or agency, ‘the West’ may be just an idea, whose content or significance 
– moreover – ceaselessly shifts according to different perspectives, criteria and 
agendas. Nevertheless, ‘the West’ is an idea that profoundly influences how 
policymakers, corporatists, interest groups, the general public and, of course, 
academics understand contemporary culture, geopolitics, socio-politics, and socio-
economics, as well as how they subsequently act politically. Bonnett, therefore, may 
well agree with Lazarus that the category does not reference one specific, peristent 
polity, state, or confederation of states. Nevertheless, all such categories remain 
socio-politically significant as long as they influence individual, institutional and 
collective political consciousness and – by extension – political behaviour, not to 
mention economic behaviour.  
 As a result, I find that we cannot simply dismiss ‘the West’ as being 
irrelevant to the task of understanding either ‘the structurality of the modern world 
order’, or ‘what imperialism is and how it works’, simply because it ‘references 
neither a polity nor a state (nor even a confederation of states)’. For the category is 
not restricted to this particular function; moreover, I doubt we can adequately 
understand ‘the structurality of the modern world order’ if we analyse it solely in 
terms of polities, states, and confederations of states. Nonetheless, insofar as it lacks 
‘a coherent or credible referent’, I agree with Lazarus that ‘the West’ is unreliable as 
a way of locating the ‘social ground’ of imperial power. Thus, if we are to avoid 
‘mystifying’ this ‘social ground’, then we must refrain from using ‘the West’ to refer 
to a polity, state, or confederation of states. In particular, this caution is necessary 
given that the category is very often articulated as a totality – that is, a collective 
                                            
7 Bonnett, Alastair, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History (Basingstoke, New 
York: Palgrave, 2004), p. 6. 
- 43 - 
whose constituent elements, no matter how infinitely differentiated from one 
another, are nonetheless united by some all-defining element, such as a common, 
substantive characteristic that distinguishes all these elements from those belonging 
to another, separate collective.8 This emphasis on commonalities between 
constituent elements of a given social aggregation often detracts from their 
differences, to such an extent that the aggregation in question is apprehended solely 
in terms of that all-defining element, or ‘datum’.9  
We might observe a similar emphasis on this all-determining ‘datum’ in how 
postcolonial critics articulate ‘the West’, especially wherever they use the term to 
reference a social aggregation that exists beyond discourse. It is this emphasis that 
Lazarus critiques when objecting to the assumption among postcolonial critics that 
‘[t]here is only one kind of ‘western’ thought [...] and that is the dominating kind: 
Eurocentric, colonising, logocentric, rationalist.’10 Moreover, it is this emphasis that 
gives rise to the ‘disposition to homogenisation’11 that Lazarus observes across the 
discipline, with regard to European, U.S., ‘Western’, or ‘metropolitan’ socio-
politics, socio-economics, culture, and ideology – not to mention the consciousness, 
experience, will, intentions, and practices of individuals belonging to any of these 
                                            
8 According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, a social or ‘hegemonic formation’ is 
discrete only ‘insofar as a systematic ensemble of differences can be cut out as totality 
with regard to something beyond them, and it is only through this cutting out that the 
totality constitutes itself as formation’ (Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2014), pp. 129-30 (emphases in 
original)). A ‘hegemonic formation’ is discrete only insofar as its internal differences 
are overridden by a common difference to whatever lies beyond that formation, 
including constituent elements of another ‘hegemonic formation’.  
9 Again, I take this term from Laclau and Mouffe, who use it to refer to that single aspect of 
society which in a totalist logic is held to determine the character of every other aspect, 
and which therefore gives rise to the forces that lead to social change, as well as 
revolution. As a way of explaining working-class political unity – and by extension any 
form of social or collective unity –  Laclau and Mouffe outline their notion of 
‘hegemonic articulation’ in opposition to that of ‘datum’. The former explains 
collective unity as occurring through active intervention in the consciousness and will 
of individuals, such as through political campaigning, education, and propaganda. In 
contrast, the latter explains this unity as a given, as the expression of some underlying, 
infrastructural ‘law’ of ‘the social’ that unfolds regardless of human activity or will 
(Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 73-74). Thus, social form could be explained solely by 
identifying the ‘datum’, which for orthodox Marxism would have been the modes of 
production.  
10 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15.  
11 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15.  
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collectives. Thus, even if it were an existing social aggregation, locating the ‘social 
ground’ of imperial power in this totalised ‘West’ inadequately specifies where, or 
rather among whom this power lies within what might otherwise be a deeply divided 
and uneven social bloc. The question remains, though, whether postcolonial critics 
even use the category of ‘the West’ to refer to a particular polity, state, or 
confederation of states, as a way of locating the ‘social ground’ of imperial power. 
In this chapter, I will explore to what extent postcolonial critics use the category in 
this way. Through close readings of key texts by three prominent figures within 
postcolonial studies – Edward W. Said, Paul Gilroy, and Robert J.C. Young – I will 
demonstrate how ‘the West’ functions less as a geopolitical category, than as a 
watchword for an account of the legacies of European imperialism, U.S. 
exceptionalism, and neoliberal globalisation. This account challenges official 
explanations of how the geopolitical ‘West’ achieved its current global ascendancy, 
which it reinscribes as something other than a natural consequence of ‘the West’s’ 
inherent superiority over the ‘non-West’; as instead a product of the former’s 
violent, unjust, and expropriative domination of the latter.  
This alternative account, therefore, disputes the ‘sociological actuality’ of the 
‘Hegelian West’, by which I mean something similar to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s telic 
or ‘hyperreal Europe’.12 According to Chakrabarty, this ‘hyperreal Europe’ first 
emerged as an ‘imaginary figure’, ‘a piece of fiction told to the colonized by the 
colonizer in the very process of fabricating colonial domination.’13 Specifically, 
Chakrabarty’s ‘hyperreal Europe’ is the sovereign subject of nineteenth-century 
historicism, a way of conceiving world history as a holistic, teleological process in 
which social change culminates in the form envisaged by European bourgeois 
liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For historicism, Europe is ‘the 
site of the first occurrence of capitalism, modernity, or Enlightenment’, the 
implication being that these institutions will subsequently occur elsewhere, 
spontaneously, according to this ‘“first in Europe and then elsewhere” structure of 
time.’14 Chakrabarty notes that generally these accounts are ‘completely internalist 
                                            
12 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 36. 
13 Chakrabarty, p. 34. 
14 Chakrabarty, p. 7. 
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histories of Europe’ that explain the emergence of these institutions ‘mainly with 
respect to “events” within the geographical confines of Europe’.15 Chakrabarty, 
therefore, finds it significant that these ‘internalist’ histories have relatively little to 
say about ‘the repression and violence that are instrumental in the victory of the 
modern’.16 Thus, Chakrabarty’s efforts to ‘provincialise’ this ‘hyperreal Europe’ 
entails ‘writ[ing] into the history of modernity the ambivalences, contradictions, the 
use of force, and the tragedies and ironies that attend it.’17  
In this chapter, I explore how Said, Gilroy, and Young variously contribute 
to a similar counter-history, writing into the history of ‘Western’ geopolitical 
ascendancy the violent, exploitative legacies of European imperialism, U.S. 
exceptionalism, and neoliberal globalisation that gave rise to, and in some cases 
sustain today’s geopolitical hierarchy. I will also demonstrate, though, how all three 
critics use the term ‘the West’ without delineating what it means, as if its meaning 
were self-evident. Thus, by not acknowledging how the term is in fact profoundly 
homonymous, Said, Gilroy, and Young leave it unclear whether or not they use it to 
refer to a polity, state, or confederation of states, as much as to something else. If 
they do, then we might observe in each of these critics’ articulations of ‘the West’ 
that ‘disposition to homogenisation’ that Lazarus notes more generally among 
postcolonial critics. For all three critics may well present a counter-articulation of 
‘the West’ that is more historically accurate than the ‘Hegelian West’, insofar as it 
better reflects the considerable historical evidence of imperialism’s injustices. 
Nonetheless, in many respects, this ‘other West’ is no less ‘hyperreal’. For one 
thing, this counter-articulation equally posits the existence of a singular, unitary 
political agency or intention beyond discourse. Thus, as long as Said, Gilroy and 
Young do not acknowledge the homonymy of the term ‘the West’, they encourage 
the assumption that they use it to refer to a correspondingly discrete, cohesive, 
coherent, internally undifferentiated social bloc – in short, a totality. As such, in 
itself, this totalist ‘other West’ need not be problematic or unreliable, so long as we 
                                            
15 Chakrabarty, p. 7. 
16 Chakrabarty, p. 44. 
17 Chakrabarty, p. 43. 
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remain aware of the limits of its own ‘sociological actuality’, and take care to avoid 
overstating its correspondence to anything that exists independently of discourse.  
 In this chapter, I will demonstrate the importance of avoiding such 
overstatements, by exploring how Said, Gilroy, and Young all manage to sustain a 
totalist articulation of ‘the West’ even as their own analyses put pressure upon its 
reliability. As such, a tension arises between this articulation of ‘the West’ and these 
critics’ acknowledgement – however implicit, in some cases – of how a totalist logic 
elides the complexity of the societies that they address as belonging to the 
‘geopolitical West’. This tension is especially apparent in Said and Gilroy’s 
analyses, insofar as they more directly address societies that are conventionally 
thought of as belonging to the ‘geopolitical West’. Indeed, since the scope of 
Young’s analysis is primarily epistemological, comparing Young with Said and 
Gilroy will corroborate my contention that a totalist articulation of ‘the West’ need 
not be problematic, just as long as we do not overestimate the correspondence 
between this articulation and anything that exists beyond discourse. Nevertheless, all 
three cases will equally demonstrate the necessity of both explicitly delineating what 
one means by ‘the West’ – or indeed any such homonymous topographical 
categories, including ‘Europe’ – and distinguishing more clearly between the 
disparate yet highly interrelated senses of the term, preferably via a diversified 
terminology.  
In Young’s case, the need for a clearer distinction between these various 
senses becomes especially urgent. Given the epistemological scope of his analysis, 
Young’s ‘West’ arguably functions even less in a constative manner, as having a 
‘coherent or credible referent’ beyond discourse. For in Young’s case, ‘the West’ 
comes to reference an imperialist will to power as it manifests in ‘European 
thought’, a significance that is quintessentially totalist. Indeed, considered as a 
strictly epistemological category – rather than as also referencing a social 
aggregation – Young’s ‘West’ serves as a paradigmatic antithesis to a nascent ‘new 
type of knowledge’, one that ‘can analyse plural objects as such rather than […] 
simply comprehend[ing] them within totalizing schemas’.18 Young traces the 
emergence of this ‘new type of knowledge’ in the debates concerning orthodox 
                                            
18 Young, Robert J.C., White Mythologes: Writing History and the West (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1990), p. 11. 
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Marxist social thought, as well as those provoked by Said’s Orientalism (1978) 
concerning the role of ‘Western’ knowledge in enabling European colonial 
expansion. Thus, I will suggest that this sense of ‘the West’ – which we might refer 
to as ‘the Other West’ – serves as an antithesis or ‘constitutive outside’19 to the 
notion of ‘the postcolonial’ itself, at least wherever the latter denotes the pursuit of a 
non-totalising, non-imperialist ‘new type of knowledge’. However, it remains that 
using the term ‘the West’ to refer to this imperialist will to power without explicitly 
delineating its meaning, imputes a totalist logic that – as I will demonstrate in my 
next chapter – is profoundly misleading. Thus, although I will explain some of the 
ways in which the term currently works in postcolonial studies, I maintain that it 
needs to be refunctioned in a manner that will not frustrate attempts to adequately 
understand the political economics of imperialism.  
1.1  Manufacturing ‘the West’ in Edward Said’s Culture and 
Imperialism 
As simply a counter-articulation of the ‘Hegelian West’, the ‘other West’ is 
ironically no less of a totality, and its own ‘sociological actuality’ is therefore no 
less limited. Said’s own, significant contributions towards the counter-history of a 
rapacious ‘Western’ imperialism – as described above – make apparent this limited 
actually. In particular, this counter-articulation of ‘the West’ becomes increasingly 
problematic in Said’s Culture and Imperialism (1993), especially in the book’s 
fourth and final chapter, ‘Freedom from Domination in the Future’. Up until this 
point, Said has extended a central argument in his earlier book Orientalism, 
concerning the distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘political knowledge’: namely, that 
such a distinction too often ‘obscures the highly if obscurely organized political 
circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced.’20 In Culture and 
                                            
19 Mouffe uses this term to refer to how commonality is established among constituent 
elements of a collective, according to a common difference to what lies beyond the 
collective (see note 8 above). Thus, for Mouffe, if ‘we accept that every identity is 
relational’, then ‘the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a 
difference, the determination of an ’other’ that is going to play the role of a 
‘constitutive outside’’ (Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London, New York: Verso, 
1993), p. 2). ‘The West’, therefore, serves as a ‘constitutive outside’ for postcolonial 
critics insofar as it denotes an imperialist intentionality that the latter seek to avoid in 
their own critical practice.  
20 Said, Edward W., Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 10. 
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Imperialism, Said extends this notion in order to interrogate a similar assumption, 
according to which ‘culture’ itself is ahistorical and apolitical. Said is sceptical 
towards the belief that ‘culture’ is ‘somehow divorced from, because transcending, 
the everyday world’, a belief that wrongly perceives ‘culture’ as ‘a protective 
enclosure: check your politics at the door before you enter it.’21 In the first three 
chapters, Said challenges this belief, by tracing how the historical context of 
European colonialism influenced intellectual trends and cultural identities within 
nineteenth-century Europe itself, along with how anti-colonial resistance very often 
took the form of cultural and intellectual as well as armed resistance. Throughout 
these chapters, Said attends to cultural-intellectual dynamics that largely correspond 
to the second of two definitions of the term ‘culture’ that he outlines in his 
Introduction: that is, 
culture as a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, 
each society’s reservoir of the best that has been known and thought, 
as Matthew Arnold put it in the 1860s. Arnold believed that culture 
palliates, if it does not altogether neutralize, the ravages of a modern, 
aggressive, mercantile, and brutalizing urban existence.22 
These first three chapters of Culture and Imperialism cast doubt upon the extent to 
which these forms of culture are divorced from the histories of European colonial 
ascendancy, questioning in the process their supposedly universal or historically 
transcendent quality.  
In Chapter 4, the scope of Said’s discussion shifts to engage with how the 
contemporary mass media help to enable the pursuit of an imperialist political-
economic agenda by U.S. policymakers and corporatists, by promoting consent 
among the country’s general public. In the process, Said describes a much more 
direct causal relationship between government interests and corporate policy among 
major news outlets in the U.S.A. during and immediately after the Cold War. 
Furthermore, the shift entails exploring how both the intelligentsia and the general 
public sustain the ascendancy of an imperialist political-economic agenda, by 
participating in imperialist ideology. Perhaps inevitably, Said finds that this shift 
raises questions concerning the general public’s influence over the national agenda, 
as well as the conditions that enable what Said earlier claimed was the near-
                                            
21 Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993), p. xiv. 
22 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xiii.  
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ubiquitous ‘imperial consensus’23 throughout ‘Western society’. Subsequently, these 
questions reinforce the sense – expressed already in many critiques of Orientalism – 
that Said overstates the unity of ‘the West’ with regard to the ubiquity of imperialist 
consent among ‘Westerners’.24  
For Said, contemporary U.S. imperialism is distinguished from its European 
predecessors by the unprecedentedly ‘epic scale of United States global power and 
the corresponding power of the national domestic consensus’25 that supports 
consolidating that power, regardless of – or even oblivious towards – the human 
cost. As a result, Said concedes that ‘[n]ever has there been a consensus so difficult 
to oppose nor so easy and logical to capitulate to unconsciously.’26 Said, though, 
maintains that such opposition is necessary, given that ‘[c]itizens and intellectuals of 
the United States have a particular responsibility for what goes on between the 
United States and the rest of the world’.27 However, for Said it appears unlikely that 
anyone could ever challenge imperialism’s ascendancy in the U.S.A., given the 
sheer enormity of the power of those who wield it in order to sustain that 
ascendancy. Here, Said risks recapitulating to a strain of argument in Orientalism 
that – according to Young – drew several critiques for precluding the possibility of 
surmounting Orientalist discourse with alternative, less imperialistic modes of 
knowledge, by portraying Orientalism itself as being all-encompassing.28 According 
to Said, though, Culture and Imperialism aspires towards a more nuanced, less 
smoothly unilateral account of British, French and later U.S. imperialism than that 
                                            
23 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62. 
24 The current discussion of Culture and Imperialism will address this objection as it has 
been variously raised by Dennis Porter, James Clifford, Robert Young, and Aijaz 
Ahmad. A similar objection underlies Lazarus’s claim that Said evinces the 
‘disposition to homogenisation’ that he observes among postcolonial critics in general: 
see my Introduction to this thesis, pp. 6-7. 
25 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 391.  
26 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 392. 
27 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 64. 
28 Young, p. 127.  
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which he had presented in Orientalism, and which has been critiqued by many for 
imputing that ‘power and discourse is possessed entirely by the coloniser’.29 
Subsequently, in Culture and Imperialism, Said ‘expand[s] the arguments of 
the earlier book to describe a more general pattern of relationships between the 
modern metropolitan West and its overseas territories’,30 so as to to acknowledge 
how it was never ‘the case that the imperial encounter pitted an active Western 
intruder against a supine or inert non-Western native; there was always some form 
of active resistance and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the resistance finally 
won out.’31 Said claims that as a result of this historic challenge, ‘[f]or the first time 
Westerners have been required to confront themselves not simply as the Raj but as 
representatives of a culture and even of races accused of crimes – crimes of 
violence, crimes of suppression, crimes of conscience.’32 This challenge has entailed 
the interruption of ‘official’ histories of European imperialism by alternative, less 
palatable accounts that convey what ‘the more powerful side in the imperial and 
colonial encounter’ have historically been able to ‘overlook, forget, or ignore[:] the 
unpleasant aspects of what went on ‘out there’.’33 To some extent, this selective 
memoralisation continues even after ‘Westerners’ encounter these alternative 
narratives, insofar as they react to this narrative intervention by  
rethinking the whole process of decolonization. Was it not true, ran 
their new evaluation, that ‘we’ had given ‘them’ progress and 
modernization? Hadn’t we provided them with order and a kind of 
stability that they haven’t been able since to provide for themselves? 
[…] Shouldn’t we have held on to the colonies, kept the subject or 
inferior races in check, remained true to our civilizational 
responsibilities?34 
As such, Said is ambivalent regarding the capacity of these alternative narratives to 
radically alter prevailing perspectives – or what Said refers to as ‘structures of 
                                            
29 Parry, Benita, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 23.  
30 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xi. 
31 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xii. 
32 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 235. 
33 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 157. 
34 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 23. 
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attitude and reference’35 – among ‘Westerners’ regarding the legacies of European 
and U.S. imperialism. Indeed, although critiques of imperialism in contemporary 
popular culture are often indebted to Joseph Conrad’s doubt-ridden ‘anti-imperialist 
irony’,36 Said finds that all too often these critiques are unwilling ‘to take seriously 
the alternatives to imperialism, among them the existence of other cultures and 
societies’.37 Indeed, these critiques too often continue to deride the latter as being 
‘unutterably corrupt, degenerate, irredeemable’,38 in much the same way as the 
imperialist order they supposedly critique. So, ‘contemporary novelists and film-
makers who have learned [Conrad’s] ironies so well’ might well ‘have done their 
work after decolonization, after the massive intellectual, moral, and imaginative 
overhaul and deconstruction of Western representation of the non-Western world’.39 
Yet Said finds that ‘Conrad has passed along his residual imperialist propensities, 
although his heirs scarcely have an excuse to justify the often subtle and unreflecting 
bias of their work.’40  
For Said, this attitude is a specific yet exemplary instance of a much more 
general tendency among ‘Westerners’ to recapitulate to an ‘Occidocentric’ 
worldview, even wherever they espouse a less self-congratulatory account of the 
legacies of European and U.S. imperialism. Said therefore finds it unsurprising that 
                                            
35 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 61; this phrase invokes Raymond Williams’s notion of 
‘structures of feeling’, which for Williams referenced ‘meanings and values as they are 
actively lived and felt’, as opposed to the kind of ‘selected and interpreted beliefs and 
acted and justified experiences’ that could be encapsulated within ‘more formal 
concepts of ‘world-view’ or ‘ideology’’ (Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 132). By ‘structures of attitude and 
reference’, Said refers to ‘the way in which structures of location and geographical 
reference appear in the cultural languages of literature, history, or ethnography, 
sometimes allusively and sometimes carefully plotted, across several individual works 
that are not otherwise connected to one another or to an official ideology of ‘empire’’ 
(Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 61). Said’s phrase intends to capture the mass 
discursive production of imperial space, including the differential positions of ‘centre’ 
and ‘periphery’ within that space.  
36 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xxi. 
37 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xxii. 
38 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xxi. 
39 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xxi-xxii. 
40 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xxi-xxii. 
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imperialism has persisted even after formal decolonisation, both as a culture and a 
political-economic agenda whose pursuit the culture somehow enables. 
Subsequently, in order to better understand how imperialism has persisted even after 
these narrative interruptions, Said finds it necessary to explore ‘how the national 
British, French, [and later] American cultures maintained hegemony over their 
peripheries. How within them was consent gained and continuously consolidated for 
the distant rule of native peoples and territories’.41 According to Said, this persistent 
hegemony has partly been sustained precisely by the widespread exertion within ‘the 
West’ of ‘[t]he power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and 
emerging’,42 including other, discordant narratives concerning the benignity of 
European colonialism, U.S. military belligerence, and neoliberal globalisation. As he 
explores the role of the U.S. mass media in exerting this power, Said directly 
confronts the implications of his earlier doubts over the possibility of challenging 
U.S. power, prompting him to wonder whether ‘‘the people’ have direct access to 
power? Or are the presentations of that power so organized and culturally processed 
as to require a different analysis?’43 Said’s initial response is bleak, remarking that 
‘in the main we have rarely been so fragmented, so sharply reduced, and so 
completely diminished in our sense of what our true (as opposed to asserted) cultural 
identity is.’44 Indeed, throughout this final chapter, Said tacitly addresses the 
uncertain questions regarding power and individual agency that initially arose in his 
earlier account of the ‘imperial consensus’45 that supposedly encompasses all of 
‘Western society’. 
 As I have already mentioned, several commentators have critiqued Said for 
glossing over discordant voices within ‘Western society’ itself, whether anti-
imperialist or otherwise. For example, commenting on Orientalism in 1983, Dennis 
Porter remarked that ‘one important reason why Said apparently cannot suggest the 
form alternatives to Orientalism might take in the present is that his use of discourse 
                                            
41 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 59 (my emphases). 
42 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xiii. 
43 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 387. 
44 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 387. 
45 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62. 
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theory prevents him from seeing any evidence of such alternatives in the past.’46 
Subsequently, Porter found that, ‘although Said claims that what interests him as a 
scholar is the detail and that he intends to be attentive to individual voices, virtually 
no counter-hegemonic voices are heard’, in which case ‘Said does not seem to 
envisage that more directly counter-hegemonic writings or an alternative canon may 
exist within the Western tradition.’47 Said appears to corroborate Porter’s critique 
here when attesting to the ubiquity of the ‘imperial consensus’ throughout ‘Western 
society’ in Culture and Imperialism. Nevertheless, as he discusses the role of the 
mass media in enabling U.S. imperialism, Said becomes increasingly aware that the 
subsequent ‘unity of purpose’ that he describes may not always be completely 
spontaneous, derived – that is – from eager, uncoercive consent.  
 Hence the increasingly despotic tone in which Said describes this ‘unity of 
purpose’ in the final chapter of Culture and Imperialism, such as when remarking 
that the mass media’s  
goal is to mobilize consent, to eradicate dissent, to promote an almost 
literally blind patriotism. By such means the governability of large 
numbers of people is assured, numbers whose potentially disruptive 
ambitions for democracy and expression are held down (or narcotized) 
in mass societies, including, of course, Western ones.48  
                                            
46 Porter, Dennis, ‘Orientalism and its Problems’, in The Politics of Theory, ed. by Francis 
Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iverson and Diana Loxley (Colchester: University of 
Essex Press, 1983), p. 181. 
47 Porter, p. 181. 
48 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 375; what Said describes here is comparable with the 
so-called ‘democratic paradox’, according to which escalations in demands for 
recognition and rights can eventually threaten the unity and stability of a society. 
Jacques Rancière neatly summarises this argument as one that claims that  ‘democratic 
government is threatened by nothing other than democratic life’, insofar as ‘democratic 
life’ is overly idealistic (Rancière, Jacques, ‘Does Democracy Mean Something?’, in 
Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. and trans. by Stephen Corcoran (London, 
New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 47). Thus, ‘[o]n the one hand, democratic life calls to 
implement the idealistic view of government by the people for the people. It entails an 
excess of political activity that encroaches on the principles and procedures of good 
policy, authority, scientific expertise and pragmatic experience. In this instance, good 
democracy seems to require a reduction of this political excess. Yet a reduction of 
political action leads to an increase in the aspirations and demands that work to 
undermine political authority and civic behaviour. As a result, ‘good democracy’ refers 
to a form of government able to tame the double excess of political commitment and 
egotistical behaviour inherent to the essence of democratic life’ (Rancière, ‘Does 
Democracy Mean Something?’, p. 47). The ‘democratic paradox’, then, entails an 
irresolvable tension between demands for increasing liberties, and reconciling those 
demands – which are not all compatible with one another – in ways that sustain social 
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The connection Said traces here between the promotion of imperialist consent and 
the pursuit of social harmony and political unity is highly reminiscent of Edward S. 
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s analysis of the relationship between U.S. 
policymakers and major stakeholders in the country’s mass media. Writing in 1988, 
Herman and Chomsky noted that information publicly disseminated by the U.S. 
media industries was being increasingly vetted via two key pressures. On one hand, 
ownership of these industries was ever more concentrated among conglomerates, 
and so they had ‘lost some of their limited autonomy to bankers, institutional 
investors, and large individual investors’.49 The mass media, therefore, became 
increasingly controlled by ‘groups [who] obviously have a special stake in the status 
quo by virtue of their wealth and their strategic position in one of the great 
institutions of society [and who] exercise the power of this strategic position, if only 
by establishing the general aims of the company and choosing its top 
management.’50 On the other hand, these industries relied upon policymakers 
themselves, both as a major information source and ‘for more general policy 
support. All business firms are interested in business taxes, interest rates, labor 
policies, and enforcement and nonenforcement of the antitrust laws’, as well as 
‘diplomatic support for their rights to penetrate foreign cultures with U.S. 
commercial and value messages and interpretations of current affairs.’51 Ultimately, 
Herman and Chomsky contend that the pressures of these various, interconnecting 
vested interests – the government, the corporate elite, and the media themselves – 
allow ‘the powerful […] to fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general 
populace is allowed to see, hear, and think about, and to “manage” public opinion by 
regular propaganda campaigns’.52 Herman and Chomsky refer to the subsequent 
management of information made publicly available as a process of ‘manufacturing 
consent’, a phrase that Said briefly acknowledges only once in Culture and 
                                                                                                                           
stability and civic order. For a fuller discussion of Rancière’s own engagement with 
this ‘democratic paradox’, see Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 138-44.  
49 Herman Edward S. and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy 
of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), p. 8. 
50 Herman and Chomsky, p. 8. 
51 Herman and Chomsky, p. 13. 
52 Herman and Chomsky, p. lix (my emphasis). 
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Imperialism.53 However, the similarities between Said’s account of the mass media’s 
role in promoting a belligerent foreign policy and that of Herman and Chomsky are 
striking. For one thing, the latter also equivocate over the democratic nature of U.S. 
public culture, given how ‘[t]he public is not sovereign over the media – the owners 
and managers, seeking ads, decide what is to be offered, and the public must choose 
among these. People watch and read in good part on the basis of what is readily 
available and intensively promoted.’54  
Compared with Said, Herman and Chomsky are unforthcoming regarding 
how the ideologies that influence content disseminated by the mass media resonate 
with prevailing public sentiment. To some extent, Herman and Chomsky register a 
slight disconnect between the two, given that 
[p]olls regularly show that the public would like more news, 
documentaries, and other information […] There is little reason to 
believe that they would not like to understand why they are working 
harder with stagnant or declining incomes, have inadequate medical 
care at high costs, and what is being done in their name all over the 
world. If they are not getting much information on these topics, the 
propaganda model can explain why: the sovereigns who control the 
media choose not to offer such material.55 
For Herman and Chomsky, information disseminated by the mass media is hardly an 
exact index of popular sentiment: indeed, the disjuncture between the two 
compounds their sense that the mass media compromise what is otherwise claimed 
to be the democratic sovereignty of the American people. In contrast, Said finds no 
significant difference between the ideologies propagated by the mass media and 
those that prevail among the general public. Said, therefore, tones down the despotic 
terms of his analysis by clarifying that  
 [i]n speaking of control and consensus […] [i]t is not a question of a 
directly imposed regime of conformity in the correspondence between 
contemporary United States cultural discourse and U.S. policy in the 
subordinate, non-Western world. Rather, it is a system of pressures 
and constraints by which the whole cultural corpus retains its 
essentially imperial identity and its direction. This is why it is accurate 
                                            
53 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 346. 
54 Herman and Chomsky, p. xix. 
55 Herman and Chomsky, p. xix. 
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to say that a mainstream culture has a certain regularity, integrity, or 
predictability over time.56 
Said allows for a slight reciprocity between spontaneous popular sentiment and 
government policy, albeit a reciprocity that the latter actively sustains by closing off 
the possibility of alternative or dissenting narratives emerging. Again, Said’s 
analysis resonates here with Herman and Chomsky’s, who note that the process of 
‘manufacturing consent’ equally involves ‘marginaliz[ing] dissent’.57 Said, however, 
goes one step further, by equating this marginalisation to criminalisation, both of 
marginality and alternativeness.58 Said refers this claim to a contention that runs 
throughout Culture and Imperialism concerning the constructed, contingent nature 
of any monolithic cultural identity.59 Here, though, Said explicitly approaches the 
construction of these identities as equally being imposition, as a form of social and 
ideological coercion, albeit by rigidly, narrowly defining an ‘us’ that is absolutely 
distinct from ‘them’. As a result, when discussing the use of the pronoun ‘we’ by 
U.S. public figures when debating the case for pursuing war, Said remarks that ‘this 
pronoun, almost more than any other word, fortifies the somewhat illusory sense that 
all Americans, as co-owners of the public space, participate in the decisions to 
                                            
56 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 392 (my emphasis). 
57 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2. 
58 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 392. 
59 Said opens Culture and Imperialism with an extended critique of monolithic cultural 
identities, claiming instead that, ‘[p]artly because of empire, all cultures are involved in 
one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily 
differentiated, and unmonolithic’ (Culture and Imperialism, p. xxix); and that ‘the time 
has come in cultural analysis to reconnect their analysis with their actuality’ (Culture 
and Imperialism, p. 15). Said’s ‘contrapuntal’ historiography seeks to re-establish this 
connection, insofar as it entails ‘a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan 
history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with 
which) the dominating discourse acts’ (Culture and Imperialism, p. 59). This approach 
strongly resembles Chakrabarty’s distinction between ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2s’; 
between a universalist historiography that consigns everything to a single, all-
encompassing and ‘homogeneous’ narrative – typically of capitalist modernity’s global 
proliferation – and narratives consisting of elements and experiences that cannot be 
accommodated within the abstract, totalising categories of ‘History 1’. For 
Chakrabarty, this distinction emphasises the fact that human experience, as well as the 
infinite variety of human social organisation, cannot be reduced to the terms of a single 
mode of analysis. Said’s ‘contrapuntal’ awareness is comparable to Chakrabarty’s 
distinction, insofar as it seeks to affirm that all ‘cultural forms are hybrid, mixed, 
impure’ (Culture and Imperialism, p. 15).  
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commit America to its far-flung interventions’.60 Having initially been a potential 
cause of embarrassment for today’s ‘vanguards in the social contests of our time’, 
Said gradually comes to approach the ubiquitous ‘imperial consensus’ in ‘Western 
society’ as conveying a tendency among contemporary ‘Western’ governments 
toward authoritarianism.  
 As we have already seen, for Lazarus, Said’s apparent disinclination towards 
acknowledging any evidence of ‘counter-hegemonic writings’ from within ‘the 
West’ itself, encourages the impression that – according to Said – not only is ‘the 
West’ itself an ontological reality, but so is its congenital, immutable imperiality. 
According to Lazarus, not only is this implication ahistorical; it also conflicts with 
Said’s own contention that, ‘as both geographical and cultural entities – to say 
nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as 
“Orient” and “Occident” are man-made.’61 For this contention – along with Said’s 
analysis throughout Orientalism – posits ‘the West’ as being ‘as much an effect of 
imperialist practice and theory as was “the East”’.62 As a result, Said ‘situate[s] the 
concept of “the West” precisely within Orientalist discourse, and […] render[s] it 
unusable by any putatively post-Orientalist criticism – at least until it ha[s] been 
refunctioned or deconstructed.’63 However, Lazarus finds that no such 
‘refunctioning of the concepts of “Europe” or “the West” is attempted in 
Orientalism. On the contrary, despite having compellingly demonstrated the 
ideological character of these concepts, Said proceeds to use them relatively 
unselfconsciously throughout his study.’64 To an extent, this ‘refunctioning’ does not 
take place in Culture and Imperialism either, insofar as, even in this later work, 
Said’s analysis does not lead him to reconsider the extent to which his singular, 
unitary articulation of ‘the West’ reflects any ‘sociological actuality’ existing 
independently of discourse. Only in this later book’s final chapter does Said very 
tentatively consider the possibility that ‘Western’ unity might not be as self-evident 
                                            
60 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 354. 
61 Said, Orientalism, p. 4. 
62 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 55. 
63 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 55. 
64 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 54. 
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as it might have previously seemed to him. Thus, Said reformulates the semblance 
of unity within ‘Western society’ as most likely reflecting a profoundly uneven 
distribution of socio-political power within it, rather than an ontological 
predisposition shared among all ‘Westerners’.  
According to Aijaz Ahmad, Said’s ‘remarkable’ tendency to essentialise ‘the 
West’65 reflects his ironic attachment to a humanist tradition which was historically 
implicated in colonial discourse – including Orientalism – and, by extension, 
European imperial expansion. For as Ahmad remarks, it is quintessentially humanist 
to attest – as Said often does – that  
(a) there is a unified European/Western identity which is at the Origin 
of history and has shaped this history through its thought and its texts; 
(b) this seamless and unified history of European identity and thought 
runs from Ancient Greece up to the end of the nineteenth century and 
well into the twentieth, through a specific set of beliefs and values 
which remain essentially the same, only becoming more dense; and 
(c) that this history is immanent in – and therefore available for 
reconstruction through – the canon of its great books.66 
Indeed, Ahmad finds that Said’s suggestion that ‘modern Orientalism [was] 
presumably already there in Dante and Euripides’67 resonates tellingly with Eric 
Auerbach’s efforts – in Mimesis (1946) – to trace an unbroken civilizational 
continuity from Ancient Greece to the modern, post-war ‘West’.68 As such, Said’s 
generally unitary articulation of ‘the West’ may simply be a by-product of his 
famously staunch commitment to humanism. This articulation, therefore, only 
begins to unravel when Said’s attention shifts from exploring how ‘great books’ 
contribute towards a discourse claiming the existence of a unitary, telic ‘West’, to 
considering how such a discourse might give rise to patterns of social organisation 
                                            
65 Ahmad, Aijaz, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London, New York: Verso, 
1992), p. 183. 
66  Ahmad, p. 167 (emphases in original). 
67  Ahmad, p. 182. 
68 Ahmad, p. 163; indeed, given Ahmad’s claim that Orientalism repeats several aspects of 
Auerbach’s work – including ‘its emphasis on the canonical text, its privileging of 
literature and philology in the constitution of ‘Orientalist’ knowledge and indeed the 
human sciences generally, its will to portray a ‘West’ which has been the same from 
the dawn of history up to the present, and its will to traverse all the main languages of 
Europe’ (Ahmad, p. 163) – only further suggests that Said’s subsequent articulations of 
‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ are no less totalist than Auerbach’s.  
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that appear to corroborate that claim. In short, Said shifts from approaching this 
discourse as being constative to considering the extent to which it has a performative 
capacity instead. Thus, by the end of Culture and Imperialism, Said has addressed 
how the fraught epistemological crisis that he raised in Orientalism equally applies 
to ‘the West’ itself, or rather to the question of to what extent its singular articulation 
corresponds to a unitary, consistent social formation that exists independently of 
discourse.  
However, this development only further necessitates the ‘refunctioning’ of 
all such concepts as ‘Europe’, ‘Occident’, and ‘West’. As such, Lazarus’s critique of 
Said for failing to provide this ‘refunctioning’ in Orientalism can be extended – in 
my opinion – to the Said of Culture and Imperialism. For Said’s analysis in Chapter 
4 of the latter book does not culminate in a decisive reassessment of whether ‘the 
West’ exists independently of discourse, and so the questions concerning individual 
agency within ‘Western society’ raised in  this chapter are never fully answered or 
even expanded upon. We might explain this apparent hesitancy by approaching 
Culture and Imperialism as merely developing on Orientalism’s oppositional 
response to the Auerbach of Mimesis, whom Ahmad describes as ‘the master of 
European knowledge against which the counter-knowledge of Orientalism is 
assembled.’69 Approaching Culture and Imperialism as a ‘counter-classic’,70 as 
Ahmad describes Orientalism, emphasises the manner in which it contributes 
towards the development of the ‘other West’ described above. Subsequently, the 
shift in scope in Chapter 4 of the later book demonstrates the need to remain aware 
of the potentially limited ‘sociological actuality’ of this ‘other West’, no matter how 
much more historically-grounded it may be compared with the ‘colonial fictions’ – 
that is, Chakrabarty’s ‘hyperreal Europe’; my ‘Hegelian West’ – that it may seek to 
contest.  
1.2  Locating ‘the West’ in Paul Gilroy’s After Empire 
Of course, Said’s despotic portrait of how popular imperialism within ‘the West’ 
itself is promoted may reflect an ironic reversion to the fatalist thinking that critics 
                                            
69 Ahmad, p. 163. 
70 Ahmad, p. 163. 
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such as Young, Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak have all observed 
in Orientalism. According to Bart Moore-Gilbert, the latter two critics noted this 
fatalist tendency with respect to how Said afforded only a negligible degree of 
agency to colonised peoples.71 In Culture and Imperialism, this lack of agency 
appears to extend to the colonisers as well. For if there has never ‘been a consensus 
so difficult to oppose nor so easy and logical to capitulate to unconsciously’72 as 
today’s ‘Western’ ‘imperial consensus’, then the prospect of challenging it seems 
grim. Indeed, Said here may well be accused of providing an alibi – however 
inadvertently – for those who subscribe to this ‘imperial consensus’. Subsequently, 
if Orientalism imputes that, within the colonial space, ‘power and discourse is 
possessed entirely by the coloniser’, so Culture and Imperialism suggests that, 
within the metropolitan space, ‘power and discourse is possessed entirely by the 
policymaker’. If this is the case, then the possibility of surmounting the legacies of 
‘Euro-American’ imperialism is only further reduced. For no matter how many 
Europeans or Americans might actively pursue that possibility, the near-
insurmountable extent of today’s ‘imperial consensus’ reflects a similarly 
overwhelming imbalance of political power. Thus, Said’s pessimism in Orientalism 
may well have derived from an essentialist argument concerning the congenital 
imperiality of all ‘Western’ culture. Yet in Culture and Imperialism, this argument 
becomes comparatively historical, given how the insurmountable ascendancy of a 
government-orchestrated imperialist agenda reflects instead a profoundly, 
systematically uneven distribution of socio-political power within ‘Western society’ 
itself. Just like the colonised – at least as imputed in Orientalism – so too the 
coloniser is seemingly unable to resist or even think beyond imperialism. Either 
way, Said continues to articulate ‘the West’ as an immutable totality.  
Furthermore, as with Orientalism, we might attribute Said’s fatalism in 
Culture and Imperialism as much to his usage of discourse analysis, as to the 
cogency of his account concerning this insuperable imperial edifice. Hence Porter’s 
                                            
71 Moore-Gilbert, Bart, ‘Spivak and Bhabha’ in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, ed. 
by Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford, Malden MA: Blackwell, 2000), p. 452; 
Young observes Said’s fatalism with regard to his apparent scepticism towards the 
prospect of ‘Westerners’ ever thinking beyond the terms of Orientalism. I will discuss 
Young’s perspective on this aspect of Orientalism later on in this chapter.   
72 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 392. 
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claim that Said’s inattention to ‘counter-hegemonic voices’ in Orientalism is due to 
his use of discourse theory, a mode of analysis which James Clifford – also in 
response to Orientalism – has argued ‘is always in a sense unfair to authors. It is not 
interested in what they have to say or feel as subjects but is concerned merely with 
statements as related to other statements in a field.’73 Paul Gilroy’s After Empire: 
Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (2004) similarly engages with what often 
appears to be an all-pervasive ‘imperial consensus’, albeit in post-9/11 Great Britain. 
Nevertheless, whereas Said cannot envisage any possibility of challenging this 
‘imperial consensus’ as it prevails across the public culture of the post-Cold War 
U.S.A., for Gilroy this possibility resolutely remains. Indeed, Gilroy finds that even 
in the aftermath of 9/11, this challenge has become more than a mere possibility, 
given the advent of ‘convivial cultures’ that have emerged out of ‘the processes of 
cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculture an ordinary feature of 
social life in Britain’s urban areas’.74 Thus, for Gilroy, this emergent phenomenon 
not only affirms this possibility of challenging Britain’s ‘imperial consensus’, but 
also suggests that this challenge is already under way, with respect to to both the 
collective memoralisation of past empires and the continued pursuit of an imperialist 
agenda. In short, if Said generally disregards ‘counter-hegemonic voices’, Gilroy 
does not. In the process, Gilroy avoids Said’s fatalism along with his apparent 
essentialism, which would otherwise risk foreclosing the possibility that British 
national identity might someday shed its deep-seated imperialist aspirations, a 
moment whose apparent imminence Gilroy passionately heralds throughout After 
Empire.  
Nevertheless, as much as he avoids totalising British socio-politics, Gilroy 
articulates ‘the West’ in similar fashion to Said, as a singular, unitary will that 
suffers from no internal ‘counter-hegemonic voices’. In the process, Gilroy risks 
reaffirming the congenital imperialism of ‘the West’, even as he casts it into doubt 
by hailing the advent of counter-hegemonic ‘convivial cultures’ within a supposedly 
                                            
73 Clifford, James, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, 
Literature, and Art (Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 270. 
74 Gilroy, Paul, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2008), p. xi. 
- 62 - 
‘Western’ country.75 Having said that, Gilroy articulates ‘the West’ rather vaguely, 
and so it is ultimately unclear what exactly constitutes a ‘Western’ country, or even 
whether the category references a social formation whose existence extends at all 
beyond discourse. Indeed, despite their similarities, Gilroy’s articulation of ‘the 
West’ seems far less problematic than Said’s, albeit only because ‘the West’ remains 
marginal to Gilroy’s close attention to British socio-politics. As a result, unlike Said, 
Gilroy never has to find a way of explaining how ‘the West’ can be gripped by a 
‘virtual unity of purpose’, despite all its disparate social disunities. In fact, Gilroy 
hardly ever mentions ‘the West’ in After Empire, and other ‘Western’ polities – such 
as Europe and the U.S.A. – have a similarly slight, marginal presence, serving 
largely to situate the post-9/11 resurgence of British nationalism within a 
geopolitical context that has been marked indelibly by the global ‘war on terror’. 
Because of this marginality, Gilroy can sustain a comparatively singular, 
undifferentiated, totalist articulation of ‘the West’ that appears to reaffirm both its 
political and ideological unity, and its congenital imperiality. Just like in Said’s 
Orientalism, therefore – at least according to Lazarus – ‘the West’ in After Empire 
merely ‘comes to stand in for imperialist power’.76  
To an extent, this usage allows Gilroy to avoid approaching Britain’s 
resurgent nationalism as evidence of the country’s supposedly inherent, invariable 
imperiality, in favour of attributing it to wider geopolitical pressures, including a 
more general, worldwide rise in ‘[s]tate-sponsored patriotism and ethnic-absolutism’ 
in response to ‘new social and geopolitical circumstances in which the larger West 
and our own local part of it are again under siege’.77 Nevertheless, since ‘the West’ 
only ever serves to reference its own ‘reborn imperial power’78 in After Empire, 
Gilroy risks reaffirming ‘the West’s’ own, immutable imperiality, as if this anti-
                                            
75 For Gilroy, these ‘convivial cultures’ are counter-hegemonic insofar as ‘[t]here is no 
governmental interest in the forms of conviviality and intermixture that appear to have 
evolved spontaneously and organically from the interventions of anti-racists and the 
ordinary multiculture of the postcolonial metropolis’ (After Empire, p. 136). Thus, in 
attempting to promote a narrow, impoverished national identity, Britain’s New Labour 
governments have ‘confirmed their detachment from the world the rest of us inhabit’ 
(After Empire, p. 144).  
76 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 54. 
77 Gilroy, p. 27. 
78 Gilroy, p. 65. 
- 63 - 
essentialist approach does not extend to ‘the West’ in general, or even beyond 
Britain itself. In this respect, Gilroy’s usage of the term corroborates Lazarus’s claim 
that, ‘since what is thus named is pre-eminently a civilizational value rather than a 
mode of production or a social formation, this alibi of “the West” serves to 
dematerialize what it tacitly references.’79 However, this consequence in itself need 
not render problematic either Gilroy’s own, rather specific articulation of ‘the West’, 
or his analysis of British socio-politics. For Gilroy does not present After Empire as 
an account of how our global conjuncture is politically and economically imperialist. 
The material impetus of global-scale imperialism is as marginal to Gilroy’s priorities 
as ‘the West’ is. As such, we might argue that After Empire contributes little towards 
ascertaining either the utility or relevance of the category to comprehending this 
conjuncture in specifically political-economic terms. Indeed, insofar as he 
consistently ‘refer[s]’ imperial power ‘to ‘the West’ rather than to capitalism’, 
Gilroy may be critiqued for frustrating this analysis by effectively ‘mystify[ing] this 
power, rendering its social ground opaque.’80 Certainly, Gilroy prioritises engaging 
with imperialism ‘as a political dispensation’ rather than as ultimately a mode of 
production, which might explain why he is able to consistently refer imperial power 
to ‘the West’ rather than to some other entity or agency, and with minimal reference 
to the material basis of this power.  
Nevertheless, I maintain that this omission of the economic in itself does not 
establish the category’s irrelevance to comprehending imperialism specifically as a 
mode of production. For as with Said, Gilroy suggests that ‘the West’ is relevant to 
the task of understanding that process of ‘manufacturing’ an ‘imperial consensus’, a 
task that is no less important to understanding imperialism itself than that of 
apprehending its underlying modes of production. Thus, from the start, Gilroy 
reconciles the apparent unity of ‘the West’ with the social disunity of ‘Western’ 
countries like Great Britain in similar fashion to Said: by articulating ‘the West’ in 
terms of government efforts to mobilise public support for their pursuit of an 
imperialist agenda, as well as a way of minimising opportunities for subsequent 
public dissent. Indeed, in the process, Gilroy uses despotic language that is 
                                            
79 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 54. 
80 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
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reminiscent of Said’s. For example, Gilroy comments upon how the post-9/11 
geopolitical climate has provoked a  
militarization of social life [that] promotes an automatic solidarity in 
which soldier-citizens who carry or practice the defining culture of 
their national state become indistinguishable to the point of being 
interchangeable [...] The info-war is already underway. It erases any 
possibility that dissent might have a positive value and declares that 
seeking any distance from the national culture’s center of gravity is a 
form of low-grade treachery. By addressing conflicts between groups 
of associated national states rather than within them, civilizationist 
common sense scorns the idea that public dissidence could ever be a 
measure of the buoyancy and health of a democracy.81 
As with Said, so for Gilroy, whatever unity may obtain in ‘Western society’ is by no 
means entirely spontaneous, and is as much a product of the exertion of ‘[t]he power 
to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging’. At no point, 
therefore, does Gilroy explicitly preclude the possibility that his complex portrait of 
British socio-politics equally applies to the socio-politics obtaining elsewhere in the 
‘geopolitical West’. Indeed, it is perhaps from an implicit belief in the existence of 
such wider complexities that Gilroy affirms his belief that the advent of Britain’s 
‘convivial cultures’ ‘might one day teach the rest of Europe something about what 
will have to be done in order to live peacefully with difference’.82 In short, Gilroy 
here suggests that his anti-essentialist approach to imperialist elements in 
contemporary British national consciousness is equally applicable across a much 
wider geopolitical scale.  
Just how far this wider applicability extends, though, is ultimately unclear, 
not least because it is just as unclear how far beyond Britain, Europe, and the U.S.A. 
Gilroy’s ‘West’ extends geographically. This ambiguity in itself is hardly 
extraordinary, considering how considerably the geographical boundaries of ‘the 
West’ have varied over time, and according to disparate criteria. However, it is 
especially unclear whether this applicability extends to ‘the West’ at all, given how 
the category does not appear to reference any form of social collective existing – to 
whatever extent – beyond discourse. Gilroy is unforthcoming about what, who, or 
even where his ‘West’ is, owing largely to its vagueness, given its marginality to his 
analysis of British socio-politics. In this respect, Gilroy’s articulation of ‘the West’ 
                                            
81 Gilroy, pp. 26-27 (emphases in original). 
82 Gilroy, p. 166. 
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corroborates Lazarus’s assertion that the category largely references ‘neither a polity 
nor a state (nor even a confederation of states)’. To an extent, Gilroy’s ‘West’ does 
reference a ‘civilisation’, albeit as a transnational sense of community based on an 
ill-defined sense of cultural commonality. Indeed, Gilroy is quick to associate this 
communitarian spirit with the governmental authoritarianism that he observes 
among the constituent nations of the ‘geopolitical West’. Thus, for Gilroy, ‘Western 
civilisation’ is at most a notion that helps sustain an ‘imperial consensus’, insofar as 
the threat of its impending dissolution is also – ironically – its founding axiom: ‘it is 
telling that even when armed to the teeth, [the West’s] fortified wholeness is 
imperilled, subject to anxiety about the prospect of its durability and tormented by 
the knowledge of its inevitable decline.’83 Given his emphasis on this notion’s 
expediency to population control, Gilroy does not appear to presuppose that 
‘Western civilisation’ exists independently of discourse.  
Nevertheless, insofar as he does not explicitly outline what he means by ‘the 
West’, Gilroy’s usage of the term risks being construed as if he does in fact 
subscribe to this presupposition. Generally, Gilroy’s ‘West’ jars with his efforts to 
avoid homogenising British socio-politics or cultural identity. For Gilroy, British 
national identity has become a site not only of cultural, but also of political and 
ideological contestation. As a result, there are effectively multiple ‘Britains’ in 
Gilroy’s analysis, all of which vie for primacy even within that analysis itself, but 
none of which can co-exist with any other.84 For Gilroy, though, it seems that there 
                                            
83 Gilroy, p. 21. 
84 This particular antagonism, though, may be due to the manner in which Gilroy 
approaches British socio-politics according to a Jacobin logic that pits the state against 
the rest of society in general, and which homogenises both in the process. This logic 
becomes most apparent – and problematic – wherever Gilroy notes a complementarity 
between the xenophobic, nationalist attitudes of government and those among the 
general public. In these moments, the prescription of an ethnocentric, monological 
national identity no longer indicates merely an official erosion of democratic freedoms, 
but also a democratic expression of public will. Thus, this prescription simultaneously 
legitimises the erosion of democratic freedoms, and seeks to redress ‘what has become 
a perennial crisis of national identity’ among contemporary Britons, precipitated by 
‘successive political and economic crises […] the gradual breakup of the United 
Kingdom […] the arrival of substantial numbers of postcolonial citizen-migrants, and 
[…] the shock and anxiety that followed from a loss of any sense that the national 
collective was bound by a coherent and distinctive culture’ (After Empire, pp. 97-98). 
Thus, Gilroy seemingly vacillates between approaching this state-orchestrated 
nationalist resurgence as reflecting either the state’s complete disconnection with 
public opinion, or precisely with its attentiveness to a desperate, widespread popular 
desire for ‘even a partial restoration of the country’s long-vanished homogeneity’ 
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is only one ‘West’ – that which is nothing more than the sum of its ‘reborn imperial 
power’, in which case it is only logical that this ‘West’ should protect that power at 
whatever cost, including its hard-won democracy, since its very existence depends 
upon sustaining that power. In this respect, it appears that what makes a country 
‘Western’ is their having made an imperial investment, whether cultural, political-
economic, or both. Subsequently, if these nations were indeed to shed this 
investment, then it becomes unclear whether they should continue to be regarded as 
being ‘Western’ at all. Thus, ironically, this mass imperial disinvestment that After 
Empire looks forward to would spell the ‘inevitable decline’85 of ‘the West’, a 
nightmarish prospect that is almost as old as ‘Western’ identity itself,86 and which 
continues to be used – according to Gilroy – to justify the pursuit of an imperialist 
agenda, along with an accompanying ‘militarization of social life’ and curtailment of 
democracy itself, among the constituent nations of the ‘geopolitical West’.  
In using ‘the West’ to contextualise Britain’s resurgent nationalism, Gilroy 
might successfully avoid discussing today’s resurgent British nationalism as if it 
were simply the expression of some immutable imperiality or xenophobia that 
marked all Britons. This approach, though, eventually returns Gilroy to a totalising 
logic, insofar as British nationalism becomes an instance of a wider cultural logic 
that is fundamentally, invariably imperialist. Thus, Gilroy’s account of Britain’s 
contested national identity amounts to what Laclau and Mouffe – again, following 
Gramsci – call an ‘organic crisis’, a scenario in which the inner multiplicity and 
                                                                                                                           
(After Empire, p. 95). By homogenising the general public as distinguished from the 
state, Gilroy is unable to acknowledge a multiplicity of disparate, often conflicting 
ideologies among the public themselves. Gilroy might depend upon a fractured portrait 
of British society, in order to affirm the radical potential of the country’s ‘convivial 
cultures’ to dismantle its continuing imperial investments. However, the extent of these 
fractures appears to exceed the terms of Gilroy’s analysis.  
85 Gilroy, p. 21. 
86 Bonnett remarks that, ‘[f]rom its first, recognisably contemporary deployment in the 
West, [the idea of] the West has been claimed to be in decline. It has been gasping its 
last breath from The Doom of Western Civilization (Little, 1907) to The Death of the 
West (Buchanan, 2003)’ (Bonnett, p. 6). Bonnett, however, also notes that ‘[o]ver 
roughly the same period and with equal conviction the West has been hailed as 
triumphant. From Benjamin Kidd’s Principles of Western Civilisation, published 1902, 
to Victor Hanson’s Why the West has Won, published 2001, the West has been seen as, 
not merely healthy, but unstoppable. So, for the past one hundred years, the West has 
been in decline and on the ascendant, it has been dying but also being born’ (Bonnett, 
p. 6).  
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disunity inhering in all social formations, nevertheless becomes self-evident in ways 
that cannot be ignored.87 In contrast, Gilroy’s ‘West’ appears to suffer from no such 
disunity whatsoever, and indeed appears to function as the underlying totality of 
which British nationalism becomes an expression. This is the manner in which 
Gilroy is ultimately returned to a totalising logic. We might attribute the unity of 
Gilroy’s ‘West’ to the possibility that it is not suffering from an ‘organic crisis’. 
Moreover, Gilroy does not explicitly preclude the possibility that there are as many 
‘Wests’ as there are ‘Britains’. Thus, Gilroy’s categorical association of ‘the West’ 
with imperialism would merely denote the hegemonic status of one specific form of 
‘Western’ identity – one that enables or indeed depends upon the pursuit of an 
imperialist agenda – without precluding the possibility of alternative, non-imperialist 
identities. Gilroy should not exactly be critiqued for never making this possibility 
explicit in After Empire, considering that interrogating the ‘sociological actuality’ of 
‘Western’ social unity is not his primary concern. Nevertheless, neither should 
Gilroy’s articulation of ‘the West’ be considered to be reliable on account of being 
sufficiently historical. Indeed, its vagueness only reinforces my claim that it is 
necessary to distinguish between the multiple senses of the term, in order to specify 
just how it ought to be used when analysing the political economics of global 
imperialism.  
1.3  Decolonising ‘the West’ in Robert Young’s White Mythologies 
Gilroy’s ‘West’ reinforces the importance of remembering that the ‘other West’ – as 
articulated in counter-histories of European imperialism and ‘Western’ geopolitical 
ascendancy – is ultimately no less of a totality than is the ‘Hegelian West’, even 
though it may well be more of a ‘sociological actuality’. Indeed, its marginality 
within his analysis only further emphasises the overall ahistoricity of Gilroy’s 
‘West’, compared with his relatively complex account of British socio-politics. In 
contrast, because it remains central throughout Said’s analysis, the apparent totality 
that is ‘Western society’ inevitably begins to dissolve as soon as he directly 
addresses the tension between its supposedly self-evident unity, and what appears to 
be mounting evidence of socio-political unevenness and disunity within societies 
that are allegedly ‘Western’. Whereas it is ultimately unclear whether Gilroy’s 
                                            
87 Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 136, 189. 
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‘West’ extends at all beyond discourse, there is no doubt that Said’s does, even 
though it becomes increasingly unclear in what form. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that in White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (1990), the unity of Robert 
Young’s ‘West’ seems just as untroubled as that of Gilroy’s. For the scope of 
Young’s analysis is almost exclusively epistemological, as he endeavours to 
demonstrate how G.W.F. Hegel ‘articulates a philosophical structure of the 
appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge which uncannily simulates the 
project of nineteenth-century imperialism’.88 Thus, compared with After Empire, the 
extent to which the singularity of the ‘Hegelian West’ reflects a comparably unitary 
social reality seems even less important to Young’s concerns in White Mythologies. 
Nevertheless, in contending that Hegel’s ‘philosophical structure’ resonates with, 
indeed ‘mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of 
the non-European world by the West’,89 Young clearly presupposes the existence – 
in whatever form – of such a reality. Young’s ‘West’, therefore, remains a 
homonym, whose disparate, albeit interrelated referents Young never explicitly 
distinguishes from one another. As a result, Young only ever uses the term in a 
totalist manner.  
 Again, this totalist articulation of ‘the West’ is not in itself problematic, 
albeit only as long as Young’s concerns in White Mythologies remain strictly 
epistemological. Of the three critics discussed in this chapter, Young’s ‘West’ is 
closest to Chakrabarty’s ‘Europe’, in the sense of referencing ‘imaginary figure[s]’ 
rather than ‘region[s] of the world’, even if we cannot adequately grasp the former’s 
history without reference to the latter’s. Chakrabarty, though, is quick to clarify that 
‘I was aware that there were and still are many Europes, real, historical, and 
fantasized’,90 and subsequently that ‘Provincializing Europe is not a book about the 
region of the world we call “Europe”.’91 Instead, Chakrabarty engages with a 
‘hyperreal’ Europe ‘whose geographical referents remain somewhat 
                                            
88 Young, p. 3. 
89 Young, p. 3. 
90 Chakrabarty, p. xiv. 
91 My emphasis. 
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indeterminate’,92 and which in fact amounted to ‘a piece of fiction told to the 
colonized by the colonizer in the very process of fabricating colonial domination.’93 
Chakrabarty makes it clear that he is concerned with a ‘Europe’ that exists almost 
entirely within discourse, albeit as a discursive construct that has had palpable social 
and material consequences for colonised peoples worldwide. In contrast, Young 
provides no such clarification, despite the fact that, like Chakrabarty, his concern in 
White Mythologies is precisely with discrediting the notion of totality as – among 
other things – an unreliable way of accounting for social unity and coherence. 
Indeed, Young’s principal argument in White Mythologies is that the notion 
of totality amounts to an ‘ontological imperialism’,94 a mode of knowledge that 
cannot comprehend or tolerate the notion of a radical incommensurability that would 
successfully resist its apprehension-through-comprehension. Towards this 
endeavour, Young chronicles the debate concerning the Hegelian foundations of 
orthodox Marxism’s totalist, teleological social thinking, a debate which informed 
Laclau and Mouffe’s own, comprehensive critique of ‘totalities’ as a reliable 
understanding of the ‘mechanics’ underlying social unity and change. According to 
Young, this debate was initiated after the ascendancy of Fascism and Stalinism, both 
of which appeared to invalidate the teleological claims of an orthodox Marxist 
‘science’. Young describes how prior to the rise of Fascism, orthodox Marxists 
contended that social change expressed the underlying totality of History – an 
irrefutable, irreversible and seemingly natural law, according to which human 
society as a whole progressed through particular stages of social organisation 
towards a common telos: socialism. According to Laclau and Mouffe, these claims 
were already subject to considerable debate following the so-called ‘crisis of 
Marxism’ in 1890s Germany, where after twenty years of economic depression and 
a correspondingly high level of working-class political unity, ‘a wave of successful 
trade union economic struggles’ rendered increasingly obsolete the unifying efforts 
of the trade unions’ political leadership. As working-class unity fragmented, there 
occurred a gradual ‘autonomization of spheres […] which implied that any type of 
                                            
92 Chakrabarty, p. 27. 
93 Chakrabarty, p. 34. 
94 Young, p. 13. 
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unity could only be attained through unstable and complex forms of [political] 
rearticulation.’95 Working-class unity during the depression had seemingly 
corroborated the claims of orthodox Marxist ‘science’, that complex modern 
societies simplified over time into a confrontation between two homogeneous 
‘classes’ – the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.96 
Orthodox Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, therefore, were unable to account 
for this gradual fragmentation of a working-class unity that they had so far taken for 
granted. Indeed, according to Laclau and Mouffe, Kautsky continued to insist upon 
the inevitable simplification of society and immanence of socialist revolution, to 
such an extent that he advocated simply preserving a unitary working-class identity 
                                            
95 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 12. 
96 Althusser describes how the Russian revolution of October 1917 presented a further 
challenge to this teleological, orthodox Marxist ‘science’. Previously, Marxist 
intellectuals had generally regarded Russia as ‘the ‘most backward’ country in 
Europe’’, having not even experienced a ‘bourgeois revolution’ like those of England 
in 1649, and France in 1793 (Althusser, Louis, For Marx (London: Allen Lane, 1969), 
p. 95, 97 (emphasis in original)). Given their conviction that a proletarian revolution 
could not precede a ‘bourgeois revolution’, Marxists were at a loss to explain how this 
grand confrontation between bourgeoisie and proletariat had occurred in Russia; how 
the contradiction between ‘Capital and Labour’ could have become purest there, rather 
than in Wilhelmine Germany, where it had seemed most likely. For Althusser, it was 
precisely this apparent anachronism that could explain how it was that ‘in the 
revolutionary situation facing the whole of humanity Russia was the weakest link in the 
chain of imperialist states’ (Althusser, p. 97 (emphasis in original)). ‘[O]verdue with its 
bourgeois revolution on the eve of its proletarian revolution’, Russian society had been 
riven by innumerable contradictions that coalesced into one ‘gigantic contradiction 
which [the country’s] divided ruling classes could neither avoid nor solve’ (Althusser, 
pp. 97, 99). Althusser, though, claimed that this confrontation did not amount to the 
telic confrontation of ‘Capital and Labour’ anticipated by Marxist ‘science’. For in 
Russia this confrontation derived from an infinitude of minor confrontations, including 
between the constituent elements of ‘Capital’ and ‘Labour’ themselves. Given how 
much of the country’s economy was ‘backward’, the Russian revolution could not have 
occurred between these two super-agents, and so the situation giving rise to it could not 
have been ‘determin[ed] in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production’ 
(Althusser, p. 111). Moreover, Althusser finds that this situation was hardly an 
exception to a rule, and that contrary to Marxist orthodoxy,  ‘the economic dialectic is 
never active in the pure state’, and that ‘the idea of a ‘pure and simple’ non-
overdetermined contradiction’ is therefore ‘meaningless, abstract, senseless’ 
(Althusser, p. 113). Under no circumstances does social structure simplify into two 
opposing camps, reflecting the contradiction in economic relations between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Instead, the apparent simplicity of a revolutionary 
situation belies its overdetermined nature, the fact that it has arisen from a multitude of 
smaller contradictions, and that it is therefore a product of much more than ‘the 
contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production, 
essentially embodied in the contradiction between two antagonistic classes’ (Althusser, 
p. 99).  
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and waiting passively for the revolution to occur by itself.97 As Young notes, 
though, no such conservatism could adequately respond to the challenge of 
Fascism’s ascendancy to the authority of orthodox Marxist ‘science’, a development 
that ‘seemed to have stopped in its tracks the long march of the progress of reason, 
and its liberating enlightenment ideals, of which Marxism was the fullest political 
development.’98 In its long march to socialism, History appeared to have ‘deviated’ 
or ‘gone wrong’, and the working classes had forsaken their historical ‘mission’ to 
establish global socialism.99 Yet it was ultimately Stalinism – an ‘irrevocable split 
between theory and practice’ – that appears to have stripped this conception of 
‘History’ of all credibility, ‘the conundrum being that if Marxism is true, as it claims 
that it is, how did the first Marxist state end up as Stalinist?’100 According to Young, 
the subsequent task of ‘explain[ing] Marxism’s ‘detour’ from itself’101 was initiated 
with Jean-Paul Sartre’s first Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), after which a 
gradual critique of Marxist ‘science’ – in particular its Hegelian foundations – 
unfolded through the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Louis 
Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
among others.102 It is this critique that White Mythologies chronicles, from Sartre to 
Spivak.  
                                            
97 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 16. 
98 Young, p. 7. 
99 Young, p. 7. 
100 Young, p. 26. 
101 Young, p. 26. 
102 In tracing this debate back to the 1890s ‘crisis of Marxism’, Laclau and Mouffe also 
include Rosa Luxemburg, Georges Sorel, Antonio Gramsci, Claude Lefort, Paul 
Hindess and Barry Hirst as major contributors to a subsequent, increasing awareness of 
society’s thoroughgoing contingency. Elsewhere, Oliver Marchart has traced this 
debate to Martin Heidegger’s critique of ontology in Being and Time; Marchart 
subsequently refers to this debate as ‘Left Heideggerianism’, as well as ‘post-
foundationalism’, and identifies Hannah Arendt, Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, Alain Badiou, Marcel Gauchet, Jacques Rancière, Julien Freund, Cornelius 
Castoriadis and Zygmunt Bauman, as well as Laclau and Mouffe, as all having 
contributed to this movement. Marchart also identifies Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt as a 
particular influence upon post-foundationalism, and Mouffe often draws upon 
Schmitt’s infamous, adversarial definition of ‘politics’ in outlining her notion of 
‘antagonism’. I will explore the relevance of post-foundational political thought to both 
‘the West’ and ‘the postcolonial’ in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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In particular, Young attends to how this task increasingly entailed arguing 
for the irreducible complexity and variety of human social organisation, whose 
forms would always escape both the analyst’s comprehensive understanding and 
their attempts at rationalisation. This critique of Marxist ‘historicism’, therefore, 
also entailed asserting that the object of historical analysis – in this case, a given 
social formation – is equally a product of that analysis. For insofar as they must 
render it coherent and meaningful, this object is to some extent a product of the 
analyst’s highly selective and purposeful choice of material from the overwhelming 
infinitude of historical data.103 This inquiry into the analyst’s relation to their object 
– Young argues – led to the deconstruction not just of the truth-claims of Marxist 
historicism, but also of their ‘Hegelian’ foundations, which they shared with 
‘European thought’ in general. Subsequently, for Young, the critique of Marxist 
historicism entails an indictment of the entire ‘European’ philosophical tradition, in 
which,  
when knowledge or theory comprehends the other, then the alterity of 
the latter vanishes as it becomes part of the same [...] In all cases the 
other is neutralized as a means of encompassing it: ontology amounts 
to a philosophy of power, an egotism in which the relation with the 
other is accomplished through its assimilation into the self.104 
For Young, it is no mere coincidence that this ‘ontological imperialism’ or 
‘imperialism of theory’ developed in the context of Europe’s colonial expansion 
during the nineteenth century. Thus, insofar as orthodox Marxism lays claim to an 
exhaustive knowledge of human social organisation, its subsequent, ‘universalizing 
narrative of the unfolding of a rational system of world history is simply a negative 
                                            
103 The irreducible infinitude of history was asserted by Claude Lévi-Strauss, in his critique 
of Sartre’s attempts to reconceive history in a totalist sense, as ‘a totalization of 
totalizations’. In this manner, Sartre sought to retain a totalist yet simultaneously 
heterogeneous understanding of history, according to which ‘the dialectic of history is 
not a metaphysical law, ‘some powerful unitary force revealing itself behind History 
like the will of God’’, but rather a ‘law of totalization which creates several 
collectivities, several societies, and one history – realities, that is, which impose 
themselves on individuals; but at the same time it must be woven out of millions of 
individual actions’ (Young, p. 32). Lévi-Strauss – according to Young – responded by 
asking ‘[h]ow total […] can the totalization be? Can it include every historical fact? 
History names the process of constituting historical facts, and, particularly, of their 
selection. A history that included everything would amount to chaos’ (Young, p. 45).  
104 Young, p. 13. 
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form of the history of European imperialism.’105 The critique of totalities therefore 
prompted the pursuit of a ‘new type of knowledge [...] that can analyse plural 
objects as such rather than offering forms of integrated understandings that simply 
comprehend them within totalizing schemas.’106  
For Young, this latter endeavour has amounted to ‘the decentralization and 
decolonization of European thought – insofar as it is ‘incapable of respecting the 
Being and meaning of the other’, and to the extent that its philosophical tradition 
makes ‘common cause with oppression and with the totalitarianism of the same’.’107 
In turn, this deconstruction of ‘the sovereign self of Europe’108 has also led to the 
deconstruction ‘of the concept, the authority, and assumed primacy of the category 
of, ‘the West’.’109 The categories of ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ here are clearly used to 
refer to ‘hyperreal’ or ‘imaginary figures’, whose ‘sociological actuality’ has been 
contested by the interruption of imperialism’s triumphal, self-flattering narratives by 
counter-histories that attest to a very different, unpalatable and largely repressed 
imperial legacy. As for Said, so for Young, as ‘geographical and cultural entities – 
to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as 
“Orient” and “Occident” [along with ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’, of course] are man-
made.’110 Thus, it is specifically ‘the West’ as ‘colonial fiction’ – that triumphal, 
flattering yet heavily sanitised self-image of European modernity as the telos of 
human social evolution – whose ‘assumed primacy’ and subsequent ‘authority’ 
deconstruction deconstructs, according to Young.  
However, as itself a contribution towards these counter-histories, White 
Mythologies also exemplifies how these counter-histories give rise to that counter-
articulation – the ‘other West’ – that recasts the ‘assumed primacy’ of the ‘Hegelian 
West’ as an effect of Europe’s violent imperial legacies. Young’s ‘West’, therefore, 
is already homonymous, functioning in a manner that both remains strictly within 
                                            
105 Young, p. 2. 
106 Young, p. 11. 
107 Young, p. 18. 
108 Young, p. 17. 
109 Young, p. 19. 
110 Said, Orientalism, pp. 4-5. 
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and exceeds the discursive. Thus, when Young remarks that Hegel’s ‘philosophical 
structure [...] mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic 
absorption of the non-European world by the West’111, the category here refers to 
something more than a mere discursive figure. Nevertheless, what form this extra-
discursive referent may take is just as unclear as it is in Gilroy’s After Empire, for 
precisely the same reason. For Young does just as little to explicitly distinguish this 
‘other West’ from the ‘Hegelian West’. Of course, this lack of distinction might be 
intentional, insofar as it conveys the fact that we simply cannot address the 
‘Hegelian West’ without reference to the imperial legacy that it helped enable, and 
vice versa. Nevertheless, it remains that ambiguities arise from this lack of 
distinction, especially considering the totalist nature of Young’s articulation of ‘the 
West’. So, for example, when Young hails deconstruction as the imminent 
‘dissolution of ‘the West’’112, the fact that he does not explicitly delineate what he 
means by ‘the West’ makes it unclear whether this dissolution applies as much to the 
‘geopolitical West’ as it does to the ‘Hegelian West’.  
I have argued above that Gilroy’s potentially reductive, essentialist 
articulation of ‘the West’ is offset by his comparatively non-essentialist approach to 
the post-9/11 resurgence of British nationalism. This approach creates a tension 
regarding the supposedly inherent imperiality of ‘the West’ implicit in his 
articulation of the term, a tension that Gilroy does not appear to resolve or even 
directly address. For if ‘the West’ is inherently imperialist, then it becomes unclear 
to what extent Britain is a ‘Western’ country, considering how its complex socio-
politics have given rise to a spontaneous, cosmopolitan multiculture that is radically 
at odds with the British establishment’s imperialist aspirations. Gilroy might not be 
entirely unaware of this ambiguity, given his concession that After Empire is riven 
by a ‘tension between cosmos and polis, global and local, worldly and parochial 
angles of vision.’113 Thus, Gilroy’s close engagement with socio-politics at a local 
level yields complexities that challenge – albeit implicitly – the apparent ideological 
                                            
111 My emphases. 
112 Young, p. 20. 
113 Gilroy, p. xi. 
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unanimity of a wider social aggregation.114 In contrast, no such challenge occurs in 
White Mythologies, precisely because no such juxtaposition occurs either, between 
the general consistency of Young’s ‘West’ and evidence of underlying social 
complexities. Again, this juxtaposition is unlikely as long as Young’s concerns 
remain strictly epistemological, and do not involve engaging with socio-politics. 
Nevertheless, given how Young posits Hegel’s ‘philosophical structure’ as an 
intellectual by-product of European imperialism, terms like ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ 
clearly exceed their epistemological senses. Indeed, in White Mythologies, these 
categories function precisely as Lazarus describes, as place names used 
‘metonymically to designate social and political agencies.’115  
Furthermore, we might contend that Young’s usage of these categories 
‘serves in addition to mystify’ these agencies, in the manner describes by Lazarus 
with respect to how postcolonial critics use that of ‘the West’. I have suggested 
above that Gilroy’s articulation of ‘the West’ does not convey a sense that ‘Western 
civilisation’ exists independently of discourse. Even if his articulation of the term 
touches upon its civilisational sense, Gilroy consistently, explicitly associates this 
sense with the widespread imposition of a government-orchestrated cultural 
inflexibility, and degradation of civil liberties in ‘Western’ countries. Thus, for 
Gilroy, as with Said, ‘Western civilisation’ is at most a discourse that enables these 
repressive political agendas, rather than a mere social fact. In contrast, it remains 
unclear whether or not Young articulates ‘the West’ – or even ‘Europe’, for that fact 
– as a ‘civilisation’. The singularity of Young’s ‘West’ is unproblematic as long as 
his discussion maintains a strictly epistemological scope – as long as the category 
references an ‘imaginary figure’ rather than a ‘region of the world’. In this case, we 
simply cannot approach any indication that ‘Western civilisation’ exists beyond 
discourse – such as in patterns of socio-political or socio-economic activity – as 
evidence that it exists independently of discourse. Thus, as with Said, the manner in 
                                            
114 As with Said’s ‘contrapuntal’ awareness, we can compare this tension between ‘global 
and local’ in After Empire with Chakrabarty’s distinction between History 1 and 
History 2s, insofar as the latter ‘always modify and interrupt the totalizing thrusts of 
History 1’ (Chakrabarty, p. 254). Thus, we might argue that the ‘local’ in After Empire 
– namely, British socio-politics – functions to ‘modify and interrupt the totalizing 
thrusts’ of Gilroy’s monolithic, undifferentiated articulation of ‘the West’, preventing 
us from simply assuming that Gilroy ultimately subscribes to a totalising logic.  
115 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
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which Young relates this epistemological concern to a geopolitical context means 
that such terms as ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ become homonymous, which Young 
never explicitly acknowledges. It is this lack of acknowledgement that is at the root 
of these categories’ ambiguous, totalist articulations in White Mythologies, along 
with the corresponding lack of differentiation between the terms’ disparate, albeit 
interrelated senses.  
As with Gilroy, it may well be that Young is implicitly aware of how he 
articulates these terms as totalities, given that it goes against his own critique of 
totality as a reliable way of understanding social composition. Thus, considering its 
minimalism, Young’s ‘West’ may be deliberately unrepresentative of any complex 
social reality obtaining in the ‘geopolitical West’. Indeed, Young specifies that 
‘European thought’ is being ‘decentraliz[ed] and decoloniz[ed]’ […] insofar as it is 
‘incapable of respecting the Being and meaning of the other’, and to the extent that 
its philosophical tradition makes ‘common cause with oppression and with the 
totalitarianism of the same’.’116 Careful to avoid imputing that Europe’s 
‘philosophical tradition’ is thoroughly complicit in oppression and totalitarianism, 
Young specifies that the process of its ‘decentralization and decolonization’ 
addresses specifically those aspects of its paradigms that render it ‘incapable of 
respecting the Being and meaning of the other’. Nevertheless, Young proceeds to 
use the term ‘Europe’ to refer to this potentially rather particular aspect of European 
culture, and so the specificity of his concerns remains somewhat unobvious. Hence 
the necessity of a diversified terminology, one that distinguishes between the various 
senses in which the scope of analyses like Young’s use such terms as ‘Europe’ and 
‘the West’. 
For without this diversified terminology, Young’s articulation of ‘the West’ 
might well be construed as exemplifying what Lazarus – following Jürgen 
Habermas – claims is  
an “anarchist strain in contemporary thought which does not critique 
the pseudo-universalism of the conventionally received theory of 
modernity […] but instead performs a strange double disavowal. 
First, it asserts that the conventional theory is the only one to have 
been elaborated in the modern West – that all modern Western 
thought has in fact been modernist, Eurocentric, and rationalist. Then 
it moves, on the basis of this false inference, to disavow modernity, 
                                            
116 My emphases. 
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Europe, rationality – and behind these, of course, universalism – 
themselves, as all inherently imperialistic and totalitarian.117 
As we have already seen in my Introduction to this thesis,118 Lazarus finds that this 
kind of conclusion, which ‘draws no distinction between the ideas of, say, Marx and 
Carlyle, Kipling and Multatuli, Lévi-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss’ to be ‘too blunt an 
instrument, too reductive and undiscriminating.’119 Nonetheless, Lazarus observes 
this ‘double disavowal’ throughout postcolonial studies, with the first ‘disavowal’ 
manifesting as 
the desire to “provincialize Europe” – that is, to dismantle 
Eurocentrism by demonstrating that the enabling concepts upon which 
it has been founded are not (or at least are not all, or are not always) 
“obvious” or “transparent” or “universal” or positively “true”, as is 
invariably supposed within the Eurocentric imaginary, but are instead 
situated, contingent, the products of specific projects, and contexts.120 
What Lazarus describes here approximates the effort to recast the ‘Hegelian West’ 
as the ‘other West’, the product of those postcolonial counter-histories that have 
challenged the validity of the triumphal official narratives of European imperialism, 
U.S. exceptionalism and ‘Western’ geopolitical ascendancy. However, the second 
disavowal – according to Lazarus – manifests in a more radical gesture, which 
consists in the argument that, within the problematic of “modernity,” 
there is no space or act or utterance which is not Eurocentric. The 
argument is that it is necessary to break with all the traditions of 
modern thought in order to break with their Eurocentrism, for modern 
thought is constitutively Eurocentric.121 
It is unclear to what extent Young subscribes to this second, seemingly 
fundamentalist gesture in White Mythologies. On one hand, to contend that 
European thought is constitutively, hence thoroughly, irreversibly imperialist is to 
foreclose the very possibility of its ‘decolonisation’, a possibility that for Young 
deconstruction embodies. On the other hand, though, Young suggests that ‘the West’ 
is practically unthinkable in anything other than a position of ‘primacy’, insofar as 
                                            
117 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 58. 
118 See pages 6-7 above. 
119 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 16. 
120 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 59. 
121 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 59. 
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today’s deconstruction of the category’s ‘authority’ and ‘assumed primacy’ entails 
its imminent ‘dissolution’ altogether. As with Gilroy, so for Young, if ‘the West’ 
were ‘decoloniz[ed]’, then it would no longer be ‘Western’, since what makes it 
‘Western’ in the first place is its imperiality.  
It seems unlikely that Young would subscribe to this second gesture, given 
his scepticism towards the analytical utility of the category of totality in White 
Mythologies. For if he did, then the book’s critique of Said’s Orientalism becomes 
rather ironic, insofar as Young observes that Said’s own totalist account of 
Orientalist thought forecloses his own ability to resist its misconstructions of Middle 
Eastern peoples. Thus, Young observes that in Orientalism,  
Said wants to hang on to the individual as agent and instigator while 
retaining a certain notion of system and of historical determination. 
He must do the latter in order to argue for the existence of such a 
thing as ‘Orientalism’ at all, but on the other hand he must retain a 
notion of individual agency in order to retain the possibility of his 
own ability to criticize and change it.122 
For Young, Said is never able to fully resolve this tension, or adequately explain 
how, ‘if Orientalism as a discursive structure is so determining on this long history 
of writers about the East, how […] he [can] escape himself’.123 If we consider 
Young as subscribing to Lazarus’s second gesture, then a similar ambiguity arises 
concerning how Young himself is able to critique an otherwise thoroughly 
imperialist intellectual tradition from within that tradition itself. We must assume, 
therefore, that in order to avoid this foreclosure, Young does not subscribe to this 
second gesture, an assumption that re-opens the possibility that his articulation of 
‘the West’ is intentionally minimalist; that it does not purport to encapsulate all 
senses of the term; and subsequently that it does not totalise ‘Western society’. 
Young’s ‘West’, therefore, appears to be strictly epistemological, and only 
becomes problematic if we consider it to reference something that extends beyond 
discourse. In short, Young’s ‘West’ comes to stand in for epistemic imperiality, a 
will to power that underlies the ‘will to comprehend’ that drives all ‘European 
thought’. Clearly, referring to this will to power as ‘the West’ denotes an attempt to 
historicise it, to trace its advent to a specific cultural and political context. It 
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remains, though, that this approach effectively renders ‘the West’ into an expressive 
totality, whose all-determining essence is a congenital, irrepressible will to power. 
Of course, Young’s ‘West’ hardly deserves this critique if all it amounts to is an 
epistemological marker, a figure that is only ever meant to be as ‘hyperreal’ as 
Chakrabarty’s ‘Europe’. Indeed, we might argue that Lazarus’s second ‘gesture’ 
posits an equally ‘hyperreal’ account of ‘modernity’, ‘Europe’, and ‘the West’, 
albeit a ‘hyperreality’ that largely goes unacknowledged. For if postcolonial critics 
like Young claim that ‘the West’ is thoroughly, invariably imperialist, then it 
becomes unclear how they themselves can avoid succumbing to the ‘ontological 
imperialism’ that underpins the entire ‘Western’ intellectual tradition.  
Hence Saeed Ur-Rehman’s critique of postcolonial studies, which in many 
respects resembles Young’s critique of the ‘Hegelian’ foundations of ‘Western’ 
knowledge. According to Ur-Rehman,  
One may argue that post-colonial theory re-appropriates the 
theoretical terminology of the West but, still, it is impossible to deny 
that it also constructs a prescriptive model for post-colonial literary 
and cultural productions as well as for their exegesis […] In this way, 
post-colonial theory creates its own exclusions that exist in ex-
colonized societies.124 
In particular, Ur-Rehman laments the manner in which the discipline often assumes 
‘that the major concern of the literatures from erstwhile colonized societies is the 
resistance to the absent colonizer’, an assumption that ‘also produces its own 
others.’125 Such excluded, marginalised or othered subjectivities include those that 
reflect the fact – according to Ur-Rehman – that ‘the West is not the only source of 
repression and [that] there are other pre-colonial and post-colonial social realities 
that may have nothing to do with Western hegemony.’126 As long as they continue to 
claim that ‘the West [is] always oppressing and the East [is] always oppressed by the 
West, always struggling against the hegemony of the West and free from indigenous 
oppressive technologies’,127 postcolonial critics will ironically reinscribe ‘the West’ 
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as the subject of history. As such, a ‘‘true’ post-colonial perspective on literature’ 
will never be ‘achieved because the Western episteme remains the dominant 
episteme.’128 Subsequently, Ur-Rehman concludes that ‘[p]ost-colonial theory, 
because of its fixation with the centre and the periphery, does not have the flexibility 
to speak for all the cultural realities that exist in ex-colonized societies. When post-
colonial theory does not always lead to the colonial/post-colonial centre, the post-
colonial project will be decolonized.’129  
Whether postcolonial criticism remains fixated with ‘the centre and the 
periphery’ is debatable. Indeed, we could argue that the discipline’s diversity today 
is a product of efforts to avoid reducing the complexity of postcolonial cultures and 
societies to this rigid model. Many of the various, recent calls for ‘reconstructing’, 
‘reconceptualising’, or ‘rerouting’ the category of ‘the postcolonial’ are driven by a 
desire to ‘move beyond narrow definitions of postcolonial studies and, frankly, 
beyond the usual suspects’,130 to resist a ‘tendency towards sedimentation of 
concerns’,131 or even to redress a perceived ‘lack [of] accountability to the realities 
of the contemporary world-system’.132 Either way, Ur-Rehman’s assertion of the 
need to ‘decolonize’ postcolonial theory is reminiscent of Young’s account of 
deconstruction as ‘the decolonization of European thought’, as well as Lazarus’s 
observation that postcolonial critics in general share a ‘genuinely progressive desire 
to contribute to the decolonisation of knowledge’.133 In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I 
will explore in detail how postcolonial critics have responded to critiques such as 
Ur-Rehman’s – how they have pursued that ‘new type of knowledge’ that Said calls 
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for, through which one might ‘analyse plural objects as such rather than […] simply 
comprehend[ing] them within totalizing schemas.’ However, in the course of 
pursuing this ‘decolonization of European thought’ or the ‘Western’ intellectual 
tradition, studies such as White Mythologies give rise to an articulation of ‘the West’ 
that is arguably even further removed from the social complexities that might obtain 
within the ‘geopolitical West’, than is the ‘other West’.  
For insofar as it stands in for epistemic imperiality, ‘the West’ serves as a 
paradigmatic antithesis to ‘the postcolonial’, if we understand the latter as a 
disciplinary aegis uniting a variety of critical initiatives that collectively pursue the 
‘decolonization of knowledge’, albeit in a multitude of different ways. Lazarus 
shares this understanding of the term ‘the postcolonial’, given his remark that ‘[t]he 
project of ‘unthinking Eurocentrism’ is […] arguably the only project that all 
scholars active in the field would agree that they hold as a common aspiration.’134 
Hence the discipline’s current heterogeneity, with respect to both its objects of study 
and its chosen interpretive frameworks. Bhabha has contended that ‘[t]he 
postcolonial perspective resists the attempt at holistic forms of social 
explanation’;135 we may only add that this endeavour has led to a correspondingly 
heterogeneous methodological profile. Indeed, Bhabha’s claim to defining ‘[t]he 
postcolonial perspective’ is in itself contentious, since the discipline’s heterogeneity 
arguably cannot be reduced to a single perspective, or rather one that is not 
contingent at best. However, if critics like Young are able to reduce ‘the West’ to a 
singular, imperialist intention, then the category clearly serves as an antithetical 
paradigm – the ‘Other West’, as it were – to that of ‘the postcolonial’, a ‘constitutive 
outside’136 by which to define the latter term as a ‘new type of knowledge’, the 
product and the vehicle of the ‘decolonization of European thought’. However, in 
this capacity, it remains important to acknowledge the disparities between this 
‘Other West’ and ‘Western society’ or the ‘geopolitical West’. For reducing the 
latter two to a singular intention goes against the emphasis in postcolonial studies – 
at least according to Bhabha – on avoiding ‘holistic forms of social explanation’. 
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Thus, as anything other than an ‘imaginary figure’, a totalised ‘West’ is anomalous 
within the pluralist logic of ‘the postcolonial’. Indeed, in my next chapter, I will 
look towards Spivak’s own efforts to ‘analyse plural objects as such’ for a way of 
challenging a totalised, singular, monolithic account of ‘Western’ society, culture, 
and – most importantly – consciousness, experience, and intention.  
Conclusion 
As we draw attention to how today’s geopolitical hierarchy emerged from a history 
of violence, suffering, and injustice, we should avoid assuming that the ‘virtual unity 
of purpose’ among those who have benefitted along the way has only ever occurred 
spontaneously. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how a totalising logic persists in 
singular, unitary articulations of ‘the West’ by three critics who otherwise eschew 
this logic, in the face of historical or sociological evidence of disunities within ‘the 
West’ itself. I have traced how this totalist articulation of ‘the West’ is least 
problematic wherever the term references something as ‘imaginary’ as 
Chakrabarty’s ‘hyperreal Europe’ – something whose existence is largely restricted 
to discourse. However, as I have demonstrated in the cases of Said and Gilroy, the 
category’s singularity becomes problematic as soon as it references something that 
exists beyond discourse, especially if that ‘something’ is a social aggregation or 
‘polity’. For wherever a totalist articulation of ‘the West’ encompasses a polity, that 
polity is articulated as a self-contained, homogeneous collective. As Young 
establishes, the critique of totality as a reliable paradigm for understanding the 
semblance of unity, stability, and coherent of a given social aggregation, has cast 
considerable doubt on whether such a self-contained, homogeneous social bloc 
could ever occur spontaneously, or rather uncoercively.  
 In my next chapter, I will consider how we might invoke this critique of 
totality in order to further question the ‘sociological actuality’ of a singular, 
homogeneous articulation of ‘Western society’, as well as the spontaneity of Said’s 
‘imperial consensus’. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how we might attribute 
this homogenisation to a slippage between ‘the West’ as a social bloc and ‘the West’ 
as the intention that gives rise to European imperialism, U.S. exceptionalism, and 
neoliberal globalisation. I have suggested that we can begin to redress this slippage 
by more explicitly outlining what we mean when we use the term ‘the West’, such 
as by distinguishing between the various senses of the term by using subcategories, 
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as I have done throughout this chapter. As I will demonstrate in my next chapter, we 
cannot attribute Lazarus’s’ ‘disposition to homogenisation’ solely to this lack of a 
diversified terminology, and so we cannot entirely redress it simply by 
distinguishing more explicitly between the multiple senses of terms like ‘the West’. 
As such, a diversified terminology is only a starting-point towards a more nuanced 
understanding of the conditions, institutions, and strategies that give rise to the 
‘virtual unity of purpose’ that Said claims underpins ‘Western’ imperial power, past 
and present. 
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Chapter 2 
‘Power’, ‘resistance’, and ‘opposition’ 
 
A self-contained, coherent, internally-undifferentiated social bloc – that is, a totality 
– cannot occur spontaneously, or rather uncoercively. In my previous chapter, I 
argued against using the term ‘the West’ as if its meaning were self-evident, without 
delineating what one means whenever one uses it. I demonstrated how such usages 
encourage the assumption that whatever unity obtains in ‘Western society’ is both 
absolute and spontaneous, as if ‘the West’ were indeed a totality. In this chapter, I 
explore how we might redress this assumption, by pursuing a way of reconceiving 
Edward W. Said’s notion that ‘Western society’ is gripped by a ‘virtual unity of 
purpose’1 in support of ‘Western’ imperialism, without suggesting that that unity of 
purpose is spontaneous. For redressing this assumption cannot simply entail 
registering the ‘many and manifest differences’2 between and within the constituent 
societies of the ‘geopolitical West’, or between individual ‘Westerners’. For Said 
himself acknowledged how ‘one must always be at great pains to show that different 
imaginations, sensibilities, ideas, and philosophies’3 obtain across these societies. 
And yet as we have seen, Said has been accused of ‘cavalierly disregard[ing]’ these 
differences, evincing in the process a ‘disposition to homogenisation’4 that – in my 
opinion – obscures how it is possible for this ‘virtual unity of purpose’ to overcome 
these differences. Thus, simply ignoring these disunities risks recapitulating to a 
totalist or essentialist logic, ‘mystify[ing]’ both the ‘social ground’5 of imperial 
power and the ways in which Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ contributes towards 
sustaining that power. Conversely, though, simply emphasising these ‘many and 
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5 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, in Marxism, Modernity and 
Postcolonial Studies, ed. by Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 44.  
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manifest differences’ risks overlooking all that ways in which this ‘virtual unity of 
purpose’ does obtain across ‘Western society’, even if it obtains at the level of 
‘structuring assumptions’ informing how ‘Westerners’ perceive the world and 
themselves.  
 This notion of ‘structuring assumptions’ resonates with Raymond Williams’s 
definition of ‘hegemony’, as something that entails reinscribing ‘the pressures and 
limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural 
system’ as ‘the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.’6 
Central to this definition is a correlation between ‘official consciousness’ and 
‘practical consciousness’, in which the unruly, infinitely complex content of one’s 
individual experiences of the world seem to corroborate the systematic, regulated 
terms of ideology. As I noted, though, Williams’s distinction between ‘official’ and 
‘practical consciousness’ suggests that the two never fully co-align, that the latter 
always exceeds the former on account of its irreducibly, infinitely complex form and 
content. In this chapter, I explore how this disjuncture between ‘official’ and 
‘practical consciousness’ provides a way of understanding Said’s ‘virtual unity of 
purpose’ as being anything but spontaneous – as instead a product of the coercive 
disciplining in the consciousness, experience, intention, and practice of those who 
participate in that ‘imperial consensus’. Indeed, I demonstrate how two of Said’s 
principal influences – Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci – both theorised 
collective modes of belonging and agency according to a similar disjuncture 
between the consciousness and intentions of an individual, and the terms of 
whatever collective they belong to, whether a society, a community, an identity, or a 
political movement.  
 For both Foucault and Gramsci, no human collective occurs spontaneously, 
at least as a group of individuals whose consciousness, experience, and intentions 
are completely interchangeable, both with each others’ and with those of the group. 
This equivalence can only be the product of disciplining and coercion, even in cases 
where an individual eagerly, voluntarily, or ‘positively’7 subscribes to a collective. 
                                            
6 Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 
110.  
7 Williams, p. 118.  
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For if one’s individual consciousness, experience, and intentions always exceed the 
terms of any collective, then subscribing to one always entails what Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak calls ‘self-metonymisation’. In other words, to be recognised as 
belonging to a collective, one must take 
the part [of oneself] that seems to agree [with the terms of the 
collectivity] [...] to stand for the whole. I put aside the surplus of my 
subjectivity and metonymise myself, count myself as the part by 
which I am connected to the particular predicament so that I can claim 
collectivity, and engage in action validated by that very collective.8 
Collective identities never exhaustively articulate one’s consciousness, experience, 
intentions, and practices, and so there is always an ‘unassimilable excess’9 that one 
must disavow if one wishes to continue being recognised as belonging to a particular 
collective. In this chapter, I highlight a similar implication in Foucault’s claim 
regarding the ubiquity of both power and resistance, and Gramsci’s description of 
how a ‘collective will’ becomes ‘universal and total’10 through the ‘policing 
function’11 of the political party.  
 Spivak’s notion of ‘self-metonymisation’ suggests that all forms of collective 
identification – including self-identification – are at some level misidentification, 
since something always exceeds one’s efforts to identify oneself as a member of a 
collective. As such, Spivak’s notion of occupying ‘a position of identity’12 might 
well apply more generally than Spivak acknowledges, given how she associates this 
notion almost exclusively with that of the ‘subaltern’. As I will demonstrate below, 
Spivak’s infamous declaration that ‘[t]he subaltern cannot speak’13 is especially 
                                            
8 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, in 
Postcolonial Studies, 8, 4 (2005), p. 480.  
9 Young, Robert J.C., White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1990), p. 136.  
10 Gramsci, ‘Brief Notes on Machiavelli’s Politics’, in Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, ed. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1973), p. 129.  
11 Gramsci, ‘The Political Party’, in Hoare and Nowell Smith eds., p. 155.  
12 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, in Postcolonial 
Studies, 8, 4 (2005), p. 476. 
13 Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. by 
Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 308.  
- 87 - 
vulnerable to misconception. Yet accusations against Spivak of being ‘unnecessarily 
deterministic and politically pessimistic’14 are understandable when considering how 
she addresses the problematic of political inarticulacy15 via only its most extreme 
instances. For Spivak’s preferred example of this inarticulacy is the uneducated 
Third World woman – usually lower-caste Indian – who is either a peasant or a 
‘subproletarian’ employed by transnational capital, and whose lack of education 
confines her to ‘traditional’ social structures, including patriarchal ones. According 
to Spivak, this demographic is ‘doubly in shadow’ since, ‘[o]n the other side of the 
international division of labor, the subject of exploitation [the Third World peasant 
or ‘subproletarian’] cannot know and speak the text of female exploitation’.16 
Existing accounts of what constitutes ‘the subject of exploitation’ cannot apprehend 
this figure as anything more or other than a worker, such as a female worker. 
Subsequently, these discourses overlook an entire dimension of her exploitation, as a 
woman, and so this exploitation goes unaddressed and – by extension – unredressed.  
 Despite exploring subalternity via reference to this particular demographic, 
Spivak herself has claimed that ‘[t]he subaltern has no ‘examples’’,17 in the sense 
that the subaltern ‘is not the empirical peasant or tribal in any straightforward sense 
that a populist program of history writing may want to imagine.’18 ‘Subaltern’ is not 
the name of a demographic, but rather of a problematic, one that has mostly plagued 
attempts to apprehend, articulate, or ‘represent’ ‘popular’ forms of consciousness, 
but which is not entirely restricted to particular sections of society, as I will 
                                            
14 Moore-Gilbert, Bart, ‘Spivak and Bhabha’ in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, ed. 
by Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford, Malden MA: Blackwell, 2000), p. 464.  
15 By ‘political inarticulacy’ I do not mean an inability to understand politics, but rather an 
inability to articulate oneself – or rather aspects of one’s experience – using existing 
political conventions, owing to the inadequacy of these conventions to do so. This 
inadequacy renders one ‘inarticulate’ in the sense that one cannot articulate oneself in 
ways that others recognise as the appropriate ‘voice’ of a legitimate political subject, 
with legitimate political demands. 
16 Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, p. 288.  
17 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 484.  
18 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 94; the ‘populist 
program of history writing’ that Chakrabarty has in mind here is, of course, the 
Subaltern Studies collective founded by Ranajit Guha, with which Chakrabarty and 
Spivak were both affiliated.  
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demonstrate towards the end of this chapter. Thus, as Dipesh Chakrabarty notes, this 
problematic does not apply ‘exclusively to socially subordinate or subaltern groups, 
nor to minority identities alone. Elite and dominant groups can also have subaltern 
pasts to the extent that they participate in life-worlds subordinated by the “major” 
narratives of the dominant institutions.’19 To be sure, the socio-economic and 
political consequences of this problematic vary profoundly between disparate 
demographics.  I do not wish to detract, therefore, from the incomparable extent to 
which Spivak’s Third World female peasant or ‘subproletarian’ is ‘removed from all 
lines of social mobility’.20 Nevertheless, I find that Spivak’s subaltern embodies a 
disjuncture – between individual consciousness, collective or ‘official’ narratives, 
and the analyst’s interpretive framework – that, by other accounts, inevitably obtains 
throughout any given social or political unit, whether a society, a polity, a nation, a 
class, an ethnicity, a race, a gender, a political ideology, or an analytical framework.  
 As such, in this chapter I consider whether Spivak’s approach to the task of 
‘making’ the subaltern ‘speak’ – not substantively, but rather as something that 
exceeds existing interpretive frameworks, and so demonstrates their limits – affirms 
this more general ‘inarticulacy’. Again, though, I do not wish to claim that somehow 
we are all ‘subalterns’ in the strict sense of a profoundly disenfranchised, 
impoverished, and exploited demographic. Instead, I demonstrate how the 
problematic of accessing or representing subaltern concsciousness is by no means 
restricted to the most disempowered sectors of society, as if we had full, unrestricted 
access to the consciousness of relatively empowered demographics. Chakrabarty 
might agree, given that his distinction between ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ suggests 
that all categories and interpretive frameworks are incapable of apprehending the 
entire range of social form, content, and experience, including individual, collective, 
‘popular’, and ‘elite’ forms of consciousness. Chakrabarty defines ‘History 1’ as 
referring to the universal claims of concepts and traditions derived from 
Enlightenment capitalist modernity, according to which social forms that appear to 
be unique to a specific locale nonetheless remain ‘some kind of an effect of capital’, 
on the basis that all social form derives from ‘a deeper and more determining level, 
                                            
19 Chakrabarty, p. 101.  
20 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, pp. 475-76.  
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the level at which the capitalist mode of production creates abstract space.’21 Noting 
how this narrative subscribes to the historicist, ‘“first in Europe and then elsewhere” 
structure of time’,22 Chakrabarty proposes an alternative, non-Eurocentric way of 
conceiving these unique, localised forms, as evidence of ‘the undertow of singular 
and unique histories, my history 2s, as always arresting the thrust of such universal 
histories and producing the concrete as a combination of the universal logic of 
History 1 and the heterotemporal horizons of innumerable History 2s.’23  
Chakrabarty’s ‘History 2’, therefore, entails the whole range of social forms, 
discourses, practices, traditions, values, relations, experiences, and consciousnesses 
that cannot be incorporated into the singular, all-encompassing, universal narrative 
of capitalist or secular modernity, and which therefore ‘constantly [interrupt] the 
totalizing thrust of History 1’,24 or rather its endeavour to incorporate absolutely 
everything. Thus, according to Chakrabarty, we may grasp whatever distinctiveness 
obtains in any given locale as a compromise between ‘the totalizing thrust of History 
1’ and the arresting effect upon that thrust of innumerable ‘History 2s’ that cannot 
be translated into the terms of – and thus incorporated into – ‘History 1’. In my 
previous chapter, I argued that totalist articulations of ‘the West’ in postcolonial 
studies are best understood as referring to something similar to Chakrabarty’s 
‘hyperreal Europe’. As such, I argue in this chapter that this perpetual interplay 
between ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ provides a way of redressing the conflation – 
described in my previous chapter – between a totalist, hence unitary articulation of 
‘the West’ and the constituent societies of the ‘geopolitical West’. For if 
Chakrabarty’s ‘hyperreal Europe’ embodies his ‘History 1’, then to conflate this 
‘imaginary figure’ with ‘the region of the world we call “Europe”’ is to suggest that 
the latter is somehow a site in which ‘the universal logic of History 1’ is not 
interrupted by ‘the heterotemporal horizons of innumerable History 2s.’ Indeed, this 
                                            
21 Chakrabarty, p. xvi.  
22 Chakrabarty, p. 7.  
23 Chakrabarty, p. xvi.  
24 Chakrabarty, p. 66.  
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conflation suggests that no such ‘History 2s’ exist within this region, an assumption 
that would capitulate to Lazarus’s ‘disposition to homogenisation’.25 
 Thus, if we are to redress this conflation, then we must acknowledge the 
possibility that innumerable ‘History 2s’ intersect the constituent societies of the 
‘geopolitical West’ as much as anywhere else, even if this ‘heterotemporality’ is 
obscured by a more immediate semblance of unity and, moreover, equivalence with 
Chakrabarty’s ‘History 1’. I am certainly not the first to call for a greater awareness 
of the many ways in which this geopolitical space is fractured, contested, and 
overdetermined. As I have noted above, both Said and Lazarus insist upon the 
importance of acknowledging ‘different imaginations, sensibilities, ideas, and 
philosophies’,26 the ‘many and manifest differences’27 that otherwise fracture 
‘Western society’. I wish to extend these arguments further, though, by suggesting 
that it is equally important to acknowledge that ‘Western society’ is fractured by 
more than just manifest differences. For attending only to manifest differences – that 
is, differences that are readily observable using existing interpretive frameworks – 
encourages the assumption that wherever such recognisable fractures are absent, 
social unity is entirely spontaneous.  
For example, Benita Parry has warned against apprehending Said’s ‘virtual 
unity of purpose’ without reference to the substantial class divisions that otherwise 
fractured Victorian society, socio-economically, politically, culturally, and 
ideologically. According to Parry, these divisions were historically overcome by 
way of the very same colonial discourse whose ‘histrionic and hyperbolic rhetoric’ 
has been roundly deconstructed by critics like Spivak and Homi K. Bhabha, but 
                                            
25 Frederick Cooper argues similarly, that Chakrabarty’s articulation of secular modernity as 
‘decidedly singular and decidedly European’ has the ‘pleasant irony’ of rendering 
Europeans as ‘the people without history, a tag formerly reserved for the victims of 
their colonial endeavors. European history, from Denis Diderot to Jacques Derrida, is 
flattened into a single post-Enlightenment era. A reference to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel stands in for a European history reduced to the claim of progress’ (Cooper, 
Frederick, ‘Postcolonial Studies and the Study of History’, in Postcolonial Studies and 
Beyond, ed. by Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton and Jed Esty 
(Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 407). Given Chakrabarty’s claim 
that he is uninterested in ‘the region of the world we call ‘Europe’’, I wonder whether 
Cooper overstates the irony of Chakrabarty’s argument here. 
26 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62. 
27 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15. 
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which was equally ‘addressed to both the native and the metropolitan subject’.28 In 
this capacity, this discourse ‘offer[ed] to the English an imaginary mapping of their 
situation’, one that ‘invoked working-class women as proud mothers of empire and 
working-class men as natural rulers of lower races’.29 Given her particular attention 
to how colonial discourse addressed the British working classes, Parry emphasises 
how this address anticipated ‘metropolitan’ dissent along pre-existing class 
antagonisms, thus ‘inducing social conformity and class defence at home, and racial 
arrogance and bellicosity abroad.’30 Parry here attends to how British colonial 
discourse interpolated a demographic that was already visibly predisposed towards 
opposing the British establishment on account of other grievances, in this case class 
exploitation. The implication, though, is that British imperialism was under no 
pressure to actively solicit the consent of other, less aggrieved demographics, as if 
we can deduce these demographics’ political and ideological self-alignments – their 
intentions – solely from their socio-economic status or position, within both 
localised and global economic structures.  
Without refuting them entirely, in this chapter I demonstrate how such 
deductions foreclose the possibility of heterogeneous consciousnesses obtaining in 
places that we might not have anticipated within received interpretive frameworks. It 
is towards the ‘recuperation’ of such unrecognisable forms of consciousness that 
Spivak elaborates her notion of ‘learn[ing] to learn from below, from the subaltern, 
rather than only study[ing] him(her)’.31 In this chapter, I argue that this practice 
encompasses a more general ‘lesson’ or implication, concerning not just our 
inability to completely apprehend the subaltern’s consciousness, but also that of 
individual consciousness as such, regardless of wherever that consciousness derives 
within a given configuration of social power. For if all ‘[h]istories of capital […] 
cannot escape the politics of the diverse ways of being human [which Chakrabarty 
                                            
28 Parry, Benita, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 34. 
29 Parry, p. 34. 
30 Parry, p. 34.  
31 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 482 (emphasis in 
original).  
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collectively refers to as his ‘History 2’]’,32 then consciousness always  exceeds what 
we observe or anticipate within the pre-existing interpretive frameworks that come 
under the rubric of ‘History 1’, including ‘analytical history’.33 This sense of the 
irreducibility of consciousness resonates with Foucault’s controversial claim that 
resistance to power is as ubiquitous as power itself,34 that in fact ‘it is the absence of 
resistance which is impossible.’35 If postcolonial critics – like Said – register no 
resistance to imperialism within the ‘geopolitical West’ itself, then it is because they 
proceed according to a very different understanding of what resistance entails, to 
that which informs Foucault’s claim here.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how Foucault’s understanding of resistance 
resonates with Chakrabarty’s account of how subaltern consciousness has the effect 
of ‘stubborn knots that stand out and break up the otherwise evenly woven surface 
of the fabric’,36 the ‘fabric’ being the otherwise coherent, exhaustive and thoroughly 
systematic social analysis that falls under Chakrabarty’s ‘History 1’. In both cases, 
resistance is the disruptive effect of ‘the odd term in relations of power’,37 ‘odd’ in 
the sense that it does not, or rather cannot be made to accommodate those relations, 
at least without disrupting and rearranging them. Crucially, resistance here does not 
immediately denote opposition, but rather dissonance; not a refusal of incorporation 
but rather an inability to be incorporated within those relations of power. Resistance 
here is mere incommensurability, and subsequently need not denote an act of 
outright opposition to prevailing relations of power. In decoupling resistance from 
opposition, though, I do not wish to downplay the necessity of opposing imperialism 
to the task of overcoming it. Instead, I wish to establish the preconditions that make 
opposition more likely. I will demonstrate in Chapter 3 of this thesis how, if we are 
to encourage opposition among the principal beneficiaries of imperialism, then we 
                                            
32 Chakrabarty, pp. 70-71.  
33 Chakrabarty, p. 71.  
34 Foucault, Michel, History of Sexuality, Volume I: The Will to Knowledge, trans. by 
Robert Hurley (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1998), pp. 92-96.  
35 Young, p. 87 (emphasis in original).  
36 Chakrabarty, p. 106.  
37 Foucault, p. 96.  
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must allow for the possibility that these preconditions obtain in places where we 
might not have anticipated them in existing interpretive frameworks, including 
among those beneficiaries. In this chapter, I explore how we can identify 
unanticipated sites of resistance, albeit resistance not necessarily as opposition, but 
rather as dissonance.  
To begin with, I demonstrate how we might attribute Said’s totalising 
articulation of ‘metropolitan’ socio-politics to a conflation between resistance and 
opposition. Ironically, despite distancing himself from Foucault after Orientalism, 
Said’s account of ‘Western’ socio-politics became increasingly ‘Foucauldian’, at 
least as Said interpreted Foucault’s contention that ‘[p]ower is everywhere’.38 In his 
efforts to redress his neglect in Orientalism of ‘counter-hegemonic voices’,39  in 
Culture and Imperialism Said only addressed instances of resistance that occurred 
among Europe’s colonial subjects. The apparent absence of ‘counter-hegemonic 
voices’ in the ‘metropolis’ itself suggests an absence of resistance that corresponds 
to how Said interprets Foucault’s above contention, an interpretation that otherwise 
prompted Said to distance himself from Foucault. I suggest that Said continued to 
register no evidence of ‘counter-hegemonic voices’ in the ‘metropolis’, because he 
continued to equate resistance with opposition. This understanding of resistance 
becomes even more apparent when considering how Said resolved the tension in 
Orientalism between ‘recogniz[ing] individuality’40 – that is, ‘the determining 
imprint of individual writers’41 – and apprehending Orientalist discourse as a ‘vast 
anonymous collectivity’,42 on account of its impressive ‘internal consistency’.43 
Said’s way of resolving this tension was to articulate it in despotic terms that 
                                            
38 Foucault, p. 93.  
39 Porter, Dennis, ‘Orientalism and its Problems’, in The Politics of Theory, ed. by Francis 
Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iverson and Diana Loxley (Colchester: University of 
Essex Press, 1983), p. 181.  
40 Said, Edward W., Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 9.  
41 Said, Orientalism, p. 23.  
42 Said, Orientalism, p. 155.  
43 Said, Orientalism, p. 5.  
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resemble those in which he would later apprehend the ‘national domestic consensus’ 
in support of U.S. military belligerence in Culture and Imperialism.44  
I do not find this to be an adequate resolution, though, insofar as it suggests 
that the tension between ‘individuality’ and the systematic strictures of Orientalist 
discourse obtained only wherever a writer consciously, explicitly sought to 
distinguish themselves against the ‘vast anonymous collectivity’ of that discourse. In 
fact, Said’s despotic articulation of this tension subscribes to his conviction – 
according to Young – that Orientalism’s ‘internal consistency’ can only be disrupted 
or brought into crisis by ‘the intervention of the outsider critic, a romantic alienated 
being battling like Byron’s Manfred against the totality of the universe.’45 In this 
respect, Said’s resolution of this tension corresponds to his theological’ insistence on 
‘hang[ing] on to the individual as agent and instigator while retaining a certain 
notion of system and of historical determination.’46 Young may have a point when 
arguing that Said ‘must retain a notion of individual agency in order to retain the 
possibility of his own ability to criticize and change it.’47 However, I find it rather 
unfair to attribute this tension in Orientalism – between ‘the particular [and] the 
universal, and thus [between] free will [and] necessity’48 – solely to Said’s 
insistence on ‘hav[ing] it both ways’,49 and thus as reflecting nothing more than 
theoretical inconsistency or even stubbornness on Said’s part. For a similar tension 
informs Foucault’s assertion that both power and resistance are ‘everywhere’ – a 
tension between the irreducibly infinite ‘positive’ form and content of society, and 
any attempt to corral that content into a more systematic, regulated, coherent form, 
whether by the ‘administrators, managers, and technocrats of what [Foucault] calls 
                                            
44 See Chapter 1 of this thesis, p. 53. 
45 Young, p. 136.  
46 Young, p. 134.  
47 Young, p. 134.  
48 Young, p. 134.  
49 Young, p. 134.  
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disciplinary power’,50 or by other agencies, including ones that formally oppose 
themselves to these ‘official’ authorities.  
The problem, then, lies not with the fact that Orientalism is beset by this 
tension, but rather with how Said attempts to resolve it – that is, by apprehending the 
ways in which ‘individualists’ like Gustave Flaubert and Richard Burton conformed 
to Orientialist orthodoxy in despotic terms, as if the latter was imposed upon these 
writers ‘against the[ir] informed will’.51 Alternatively, we might approach this 
tension between individuality and discursive anonymity as evidence of ‘odd term[s] 
in relations of power’ that act like Chakrabarty’s ‘History 2s’, those ‘stubborn knots 
that stand out and break up the otherwise evenly woven surface of’ his ‘History 1’. 
By identifying disruptive elements in the otherwise conformist writings of Flaubert 
and Burton, Said encounters something that resembles Foucault’s understanding of 
resistance as dissonance or friction, more so than Said’s own. Nevertheless, Said is 
only able to perceive this resistance-as-friction wherever a writer openly, explicitly 
denounces some aspect of Orientalist orthodoxy, which suggests that he is only able 
to apprehend resistance as opposition.  
After demonstrating how Said equates resistance with opposition, I consider 
how we might establish the existence of ‘odd terms’ even in those places where we 
might not expect to find them within existing interpretive frameworks. I begin by 
demonstrating how Gramsci – whom Said looked towards for a solution to 
Foucault’s ‘theoretical overtotalisation’52 of power – equally articulated collective 
modes of social belonging as being internally differentiated, and therefore sustained 
only through the exclusion of social elements that would disrupt the holistic integrity 
of those collectives. For Gramsci, the process of establishing a ‘collective will’ that 
encompasses otherwise disparate, potentially conflicting groups and interests is 
invariably a double moment. For any group or interest can only be incorporated into 
                                            
50 Said, ‘Foucault and the Imagination of Power’, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. by 
David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 150.  
51 Goonatilake, Susan, ‘Cultural Imperialism: A Short History, Future, and a Postscript from 
the Present’, in Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural 
Domination, ed. by Bernd Hamm and Russell Smandych (Peterborough ON: 
Broadview Press, 2005), p. 33.  
52 Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (London: Vintage, 1983), p. 179.  
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a ‘collective will’ by removing from it anything that would put it into conflict with 
other constituent groups or interests, such as certain claims, interests, beliefs, 
practices, identities, or values. Otherwise, the ‘collective will’ would be riven 
internally by dissonance and disunity. In short, what Gramsci describes resonates 
with Spivak’s notion of ‘self-metonymisation’ described above, as the repression of 
all the ways in which one exceeds the terms of a given collective in order to be 
recognised as belonging to it. Taking my cue from Foucault’s contention regarding 
the ubiquity of both power and resistance, as well as from Gramsci’s concession that 
all ‘collective wills’ exclude as much as they include, I argue that Spivak’s approach 
to the dilemma of rendering the subaltern articulate provides a way of perceiving the 
exclusionary aspect in this synecdochal process by which one is incorporated into a 
‘collective will’. In this manner, I challenge Said’s conviction that the ‘internal 
consistency’ of Orientalist discourse, no less than the lack of ‘demurral’ from an 
imperialist worldview in the contemporary ‘West’, simply denotes a total absence of 
‘odd terms’ – that this consistency corresponds to a unitary, internally 
undifferentiated ‘unity of purpose’ that occurs spontaneously, noncoercively across 
‘Western society’.  
2.1  Edward Said and Michel Foucault on ‘power’, ‘resistance’ and 
‘opposition’ 
Said’s objections to Foucault’s claim that ‘[p]ower is everywhere’53 are both well-
known and controversial in postcolonial studies. According to Lazarus, Said’s usage 
of Foucault in Orientalism has given rise to a ‘multifarious scholarship […] that 
finds Orientalism wanting not because of any supposed weaknesses in the argument 
it puts forth, but for programmatic reasons – that is, because it falls short of 
Foucauldian orthodoxy’.54 Arguing that much of this scholarship ‘tend[s] to accord 
Foucault’s key concepts and ideas the status of scripture, such that Said’s heterodox 
use of them is understood and frowned upon as heretical’, Lazarus objects – rather 
glibly, it must be said – to this apparent ‘reprobation of [Said] as an idolater in the 
                                            
53 Foucault, p. 93.  
54 Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
p. 189.  
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cathedral of St Michel’55. For ‘[n]othing could be more inimical to Said’s own deep-
set commitment to secular criticism (and perhaps to Foucault’s own intellectual 
practice also)’.56 I agree with Lazarus here only insofar as these commentaries 
prescribe an unconditional deferral to Foucault’s work. Otherwise, I profoundly 
disagree with Lazarus’s own way of accounting for Said’s infamously ambivalent 
stance regarding Foucault: namely, by claiming that ‘in Orientalism, Said attempted 
to talk the Foucauldian talk – even though he had no intention of walking the 
Foucauldian walk – because he hoped through this means to reach his prospective 
readership, to make the greatest possible impact on their judgements and 
sensibilities.’57  
For one thing, we might well agree that Said in Orientalism drew upon 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) and Discipline and Punish (1975) 
solely in order to ‘associate the book with the ascendancy of post-structuralist 
approaches at the beginning of the 1980s, to flatter the many readers at that time 
who favoured post-structuralism’.58 Yet we must still explain why Said’s analysis of 
‘metropolitan’ or ‘Western’ socio-politics in Culture and Imperialism so strongly 
resembles Foucault’s account of the ubiquity of power, at least as Said describes this 
account in his various critiques of Foucault from 1983 onwards. For as I noted in my 
previous chapter, Said in this later book often found the ‘epic scale of United States 
                                            
55 Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious, p. 189.  
56 Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious, p. 189.  
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58 Spencer, Robert, Cosmopolitan Criticism and Postcolonial Literature (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 174; Spencer proceeds from here to claim that Said’s 
‘unnecessary and misleading’ recourse to Foucault in Orientalism served ‘to obscure 
the book’s largely materialist presentation of Orientalism as an ideology susceptible to 
critique and transformation’ (Spencer, 174). Considering how Spencer here aligns 
himself with Lazarus regarding Said’s intellectual debt to Foucault, his claim on Said 
for the ‘materialists’ renders rather ironic Lazarus’s very fair observation that, ‘within 
postcolonial studies, ‘Edward Said’ is both the name of a particular scholar and also the 
site of a dispute or battle over meaning, with deep consequences for the field itself’ 
(Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious, p. 184). Simply put, both Lazarus and 
Spencer seem unaware of how their own accounts of Said’s position regarding ‘post-
structuralist approaches’ are no less contestable than those of other claims made on 
Said in this ‘dispute or battle over meaning’, insofar as both claim to know the ‘real’ 
Said as opposed to that version of Said that arises from post-structuralist ‘misreadings’. 
My own account of Said in this thesis makes no claim to any such authenticity: instead, 
I only wish to point out Said’s misreading of Foucault.   
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global power and the corresponding power of the national domestic consensus’,59 to 
be just as total and insurmountable as he found the scale and ‘internal consistency’ 
of Orientalist discourse in Orientalism. Indeed, if Said articulated ‘metropolitan’ 
socio-politics in increasingly despotic, totalitarian terms in Culture and Imperialism, 
then this analysis only became more ‘Foucauldian’ in the years between 1978 and 
1993.  
During this period, Said vocally distanced himself from Foucault’s 
‘profoundly pessimistic view’ that ‘there is an unremitting and unstoppable 
expansion of power favouring the administrators, managers, and technocrats of what 
he calls disciplinary power. Power, [Foucault] writes in his last phase, is 
everywhere. It is overcoming, co-opting, infinitely detailed, and ineluctable in the 
growth of its domination.’60 Karlis Racevskis notes that Said’s ‘interpretation of 
Foucault is fixated on one theme: the disciplinary or carceral society in which the 
mechanisms of power are so entrenched that resistance becomes futile.’61 Indeed, 
Said was so fixated on this one particular aspect of Foucault’s work, that he mostly 
ignored the ways in which Foucault sought to affirm ‘the precariousness, the 
impending transformations, and the contingency of social structures rather than their 
necessity or immobility.’62 Thus, it is more accurate to state that Said’s analysis of 
‘metropolitan’ socio-politics increasingly resembled Said’s own understanding of 
Foucault’s account of the ubiquity of power, an understanding that Said derived 
from a rather selective reading of Foucault. For although Foucault did indeed 
contend that ‘[p]ower is everywhere’, he also maintained that ‘[w]here there is 
power there is resistance’, in the sense that ‘points of resistance are everywhere in 
the power network’, rather than solely in one ‘single locus of Great Refusal’, some 
singular ‘source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.’63  
                                            
59 Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 391.  
60 Said, ‘Foucault and the Imagination of Power’, pp. 150-51.  
61 Racevskis, Karlis, ‘Edward Said and Michel Foucault: Affinities and Dissonances’, in 
Research in African Literatures, 36, 3 (Fall 2005), p. 91.  
62 Racevskis, p. 91.  
63 Foucault, p. 95-96.  
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 The weakness of Said’s critique of Foucault, though, extends beyond this 
apparently selective reading. For I find that Said ignored Foucault’s contention 
regarding the ubiquity of both power and resistance on the basis of a misreading of 
what Foucault meant by ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ in the first place. To be sure, 
Foucault’s own definition of ‘power’ is frustratingly vague, given his attention 
primarily to how it is used to ‘discipline’ or actively, coercively mould individuals 
in ways that are conducive towards those who already wield it. State power often 
proves to be the paradigmatic instance of this instrumental form of power 64 for 
Foucault, especially as it is used to enforce compliance with state authority among 
those who might otherwise oppose it. Insofar as ‘power’ for Foucault is state power, 
Said is correct to question the extent to which this power’s expansion into all aspects 
of social life is ‘unremitting and unstoppable’. However, Foucault’s contention that 
‘[p]ower is everywhere’ suggests a rather different understanding of ‘power’, one 
that resonates with accounts of the constitutive role of power in establishing and 
maintaining a given society – or indeed any form of collectivity, including a political 
movement – as a stable, coherent unit.  
Oliver Marchart identifies many such accounts with a strain of political 
thought that draws upon what he calls ‘post-foundationalism’, a philosophical 
project that encompasses the post-war ‘interrogation of metaphysical figures of 
foundation – such as totality, universality, essence, and ground.’65 In particular, 
Marchart identifies the constitutive role of power with the figures of Claude Lefort 
and Ernesto Laclau, both of whom reconceive political, judicial and sovereign 
                                            
64 The following discussion will distinguish between two ‘modes’ of power: ‘instrumental 
power’ and ‘constitutive power’. By ‘instrumental power’ I mean the deliberate, 
calculated exertion of power, for whatever end, in whatever way and with whatever 
consequences. Simply put, ‘instrumental power’ can be referred to an agent who exerts 
it. Subsequently, by ‘constitutive power’ I mean more diffuse instances of power that 
obtain not due to the efforts of an agent to accrue power for themselves, but rather 
simply in a given social aggregation or historical conjuncture. It will become clear in 
the following discussion that any adequate account of the unity, cohesiveness or 
stability of a given social aggregation must acknowledge the inevitability, even the 
necessity of power in sustaining that unity.  
65 Marchart, Oliver, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, 
Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 2; for 
discussions of various moments in this critique – as outlined with specific reference to 
orthodox Marxism by Laclau and Mouffe, and more generally by Young – see Chapter 
1 of this thesis, pp. 69-73.  
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authority according to a scenario in which these forms of authority can no longer 
justify themselves according to any such ‘metaphysical figures of foundation’. For 
both Lefort and Laclau, any attempt to ground sovereign authority in any of these 
foundations was exposed as contingent, and thus contestable, upon the epochal 
moment of what Lefort calls the ‘democratic revolution’, a moment that emerged 
spectacularly with the beheading of Louis XVI of France in 1793. For Lefort, in this 
moment,  ‘[t]he linkage between the earthly realm and the transcendent legitimatory 
ground of society, formerly incorporated in the king’s body, [was] finally broken in 
the moment of the disincorporation of the king’ himself.66 Marchart explains that for 
Lefort, ‘[w]hat is staged by that spectacle is not only the decapitation of [Louis’s] 
earthly body, but also the disincorporation of the mystical, transcendent body of the 
king, which leaves the place of power empty’, that is, ‘freed of any positive or 
substantial content’.67 Power is no longer fixed to any particular person or 
institution, and can therefore be claimed by anyone.   
 This decoupling of power from certain, suitably qualified persons clearly 
opens up the possibility of dissolving unjust configurations of power, such as that of 
eighteenth-century monarchical France. Nonetheless, Lefort argues that, from the 
moment of this decoupling, ‘every regime – democratic or not – will have to come 
to terms with the absence of an ultimate ground and with the unbridgeable chasm of 
division that opens up in place of such a ground.’68 Lefort, though, maintains that 
‘[t]he fact that such a single ground disappears […] does not imply the 
disappearance of the questions of social institution’,69 since ‘if we did not have any 
stable ground, any guiding principle’ or ‘any certainty regarding our social affairs – 
then everything would be allowed. We would be in total confusion, without any 
orientation and deprived of any symbolic framework within which we could position 
ourselves.’70 The democratic revolution might well have deprived all instances of 
political, judicial, and sovereign authority of any claim to an ultimate, immutable 
                                            
66 Marchart, p. 95.  
67 Marchart, p. 95.  
68 Marchart, pp. 95-96.  
69 Marchart, p. 105 (emphasis in original).  
70 Marchart, p. 104.  
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legitimating ‘ground’ that exists beyond human influence. Yet it remains that social 
unity, stability and coherence can only be established by limiting what can be 
‘allowed’. This imposition of limits – Lefort argues – is itself an act of power, one 
that society depends upon for its stability and coherence, insofar as ‘power offers 
society a ‘point of reference’’71 by which individuals can orient themselves socially 
and symbolically. As Laclau and Chantal Mouffe contend, the necessity of such 
points of reference – or nodal points, as Laclau and Mouffe call them – is apparent 
when considering that ‘a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is 
the discourse of the psychotic.’72  
For Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points are established via ‘hegemonic 
articulation’,73 a process in which a social or political bloc is founded by ‘arrest[ing] 
the flow of differences’ between its innumerable constituent elements, differences 
that – being equally innumerable – otherwise threaten to dissolve that bloc’s unity 
entirely.74 ‘Arresting’ these differences is achieved by ‘construct[ing] a centre’75 – a 
point of reference – which, by subordinating each of these elements to itself, 
establishes unity between them in the form of their shared relation of subordinacy to 
this centre or ‘nodal point’.76 Thus, for Laclau and Mouffe, establishing a nodal 
point is invariably an exertion of power, insofar as whoever establishes a nodal point 
effectively establishes how a society and everyone in it are to comprehend 
themselves and the wider world.77 Williams might agree, given his assertion that the 
                                            
71 Marchart, p. 103.  
72 Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2014), p. 99. 
73 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 100.  
74 For an explanation of how Laclau and Mouffe come to assert the infinite number of these 
constituent elements, see my Introduction to this thesis, note 78, p. 20. 
75 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 99.  
76 Laclau and Mouffe’s primary example of this process is the claim, in certain strands of 
Marxism, that a society’s form is ‘determin[ed] in the last instance by the (economic) 
mode of production’, which influences all other ‘superstructural’ determinants, 
regardless of the extent of their ‘relative autonomy [...] and their specific effectivity’ 
(Althusser, p. 111).  
77 Williams makes a similar contention when describing how ‘what the dominant has 
effectively seized is indeed the ruling definition of the social’ (Williams, p. 125). 
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notion of ‘hegemony’ ‘relat[es] the ‘whole social process’ to specific distributions of 
power and influence’, rather than only to those particular social practices, 
institutions and relations that are self-evidently meant to facilitate the exertion of 
executive power.78 Williams, though, maintains a largely instrumental understanding 
of power, according to which ‘hegemony’ remains a way of grasping certain, 
relatively innocuous modalities of executive power. In contrast, for Laclau and 
Mouffe, as for Marchart and Lefort, ‘society’ as an intelligible entity or context is 
inconceivable without the role of power in ‘arrest[ing] the flow of differences’ 
between a society’s constituent elements. In short, without power, there is no social 
stability – indeed, there is no society itself.  
When Foucault argues that ‘[p]ower is everywhere’, what he means by 
‘power’ is comparable to this constitutive understanding of power, as having an 
indispensable role in ‘grounding’ ‘society’ in order to render it legible, coherent, and 
stable. As with Williams, though, Foucault is primarily interested in tracing how this 
constitutive power consolidates existing, uneven distributions of social power within 
a given social bloc and, moreover, how this power is deliberately exerted – 
instrumentalised – in order to sustain this hierarchy. As such, Foucault does not 
emphasise the indispensability of power for social stability, given his efforts to 
establish the contingency of any such stability, by demonstrating how it is not 
guaranteed by any arresting factor that extends beyond society, and thus beyond 
human influence. Hence Foucault’s contention that ‘[w]here there is power there is 
resistance’ – not in the sense of the defiant opposition of the power that is enshrined 
in the state, its institutions and its apparatuses, but rather in the sense of the constant 
friction that persists between individual elements, even after their incorporation into 
a social or political bloc via hegemonic articulation. For this incorporation never 
manages to completely eliminate the infinitude of differences that exist between 
these elements, in which case any hegemonic articulation is contingent, precarious, 
and always at risk of total dissolution.  
                                            
78 Williams, p. 107; by ‘executive power’ I mean institutionally recognised, codified and 
formalised instances of instrumental power – in other words, particular forms and 
remits of instrumental power as delimited by the executive authority attached to a 
particular office, such as the office of monarch, president, director, manager, teacher, 
or doctor.  
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Thus, Foucault defines these ‘resistances’ as ‘the odd term in relations of 
power’ that ‘are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite’, and which are 
‘distributed in irregular fashion’ rather than orbiting one singular, inevitable ‘source 
of all rebellions’.79 As I have noted above, this friction is comparable to the 
dissonance that Chakrabarty posits between ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’. Indeed, 
both Foucault and Chakrabarty use the image of a knot to visualise how elements 
that – for whatever reason – cannot be incorporated into a particular social or 
symbolic order disrupt the harmony or regularity of that order.80 Thus, if Said found 
that Foucault ‘never discuss[es] the resistances that always end up dominated by the 
system he describes’,81 then it is because he maintained a very different 
understanding of what constituted ‘resistance’ to that which prompted Foucault’s 
assertion that resistance, like power, is ‘everywhere’. In short, whereas Said retained 
a necessary, causal relation between ‘resistance’ and ‘opposition’, Foucault did not. 
That Said retained a causal relation – not to say one of synonymy – between 
these two terms becomes clear when considering his attempt with Culture and 
Imperialism to redress his neglect in Orientalism of resistance to European and U.S. 
imperialism. Said mostly acknowledges resistance that occurred in colonial settings 
in this later book. Thus, Said maintains that ‘there was scarcely any dissent, any 
departure, any demurral’ from an imperialist worldview in the ‘metropole’ itself; on 
the contrary, ‘there was virtual unanimity that subject races should be ruled, that 
they are subject races’.82 As I mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, James Clifford 
attributes Said’s inattention to ‘counter-hegemonic voices’83 in Orientalism to his 
use of discourse analysis, a methodology that ‘is always in a sense unfair to authors. 
                                            
79 Foucault, p. 96; compare this refutation of any such ‘single locus of Great Refusal’ with 
Laclau and Mouffe’s contention that what appear to be immutable, insurmountable 
‘datums’ or points of reference are in fact nodal points that are contingent, and which 
therefore do not guarantee either social or political unity, or any particular 
meaning.Moreover, if society lacks any fixed points, then revolution proceeds from no 
specific site, such as a contradiction in relations of production. The task, then, is to 
establish what social and political circumstances give rise to revolutionary change. 
80 Foucault, p. 96; Chakrabarty, p. 106.  
81 Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic, p. 177.  
82 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62.  
83 Porter, p. 181.  
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It is not interested in what they have to say or feel as subjects but is concerned 
merely with statements as related to other statements in a field.’84 Clifford attributes 
the relative absence of ‘odd terms’ in Said’s account of ‘Western’ socio-politics to 
his methodology. As Young notes, though, in Orientalism, Said had sought to 
‘praise those [Orientalist] scholars who are both methodologically self-conscious 
and sensitive to the material before them, that is, to experience itself’.85 Thus, 
wherever Said highlights exceptional instances of a ‘sceptical critical consciousness’ 
that is not ‘blind to human reality’, he registers an internal dissonance within the 
otherwise ‘consistent’ discursive structure of Orientalism, something that Clifford 
overlooks.  
This dissonance takes the form of a disjuncture between a writer’s 
subscription to Orientalist orthodoxy, and aspects of their personal experiences of 
‘the Orient’ that do not entirely correspond to that orthodoxy. Often these 
experiences are of an immutable common ‘humanness’ that – according to Said – 
bridges the otherwise profound gap between ‘Orientals’ and their ‘Western’ 
observers, and which gives rise to exceptional moments in which the latter identify 
with the former ‘sympathetically’. Young quickly points out that Said largely 
ignores the possibility that ‘human experience’ is never unmediated, even for those 
who experience it first-hand, given that it is ‘always experienced, analysed and 
given meaning through forms of knowledge that will themselves be already 
ideological’, and therefore ‘cannot be posited as prior to knowledge as such.’86 One 
such form of knowledge, of course, is Said’s own humanistic conviction in that 
immutable ‘humanness’ that overrides any spurious compartmentalisation of ‘the 
human community’87 according to artificial categories of race, nation, gender, 
culture, class, or ‘civilisation’. According to Young, Said all too easily presumes the 
immutability of certain of his own foundational assumptions and principles, taking 
for granted their claims to universality. Nonetheless, as Young notes, Said’s desire 
to acknowledge those exceptional cases in which personal experience departs from 
                                            
84 Clifford, James, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, 
Literature, and Art (Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 270.  
85 Young, p. 132.  
86 Young, p. 132.  
87 Young, p. 131-32.  
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Orientalist orthodoxy, casts doubt upon the extent to which Orientalism really is as 
much of a totality as Said claims. After all, opposing ‘a consciousness derived from 
experience’ to a ‘totalizing culture’ makes it unclear how ‘that consciousness or 
experience [could have] been produced outside that culture if it is indeed totalizing’, 
if that culture incorporates absolutely everyone and everything.88  
As Young observes, Said is well aware of this ambiguity, given his 
recognition – early on in Orientalism – of how difficult it would be for him ‘to 
recognize individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means 
passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context’.89 It is debatable 
whether Said manages to reconcile these seemingly antithetical demands by the end 
of Orientalism. Either way, his preferred solution is to articulate an individual 
writer’s subscription to the ‘impersonal’ strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’, in terms 
of being forcibly coerced into doing so ‘against the[ir] informed will’.90 In the 
process, it becomes unclear whether individual Orientalists could have ever broken 
out of these strictures. Moreover, Said presents conflicting accounts of the will of 
Orientalists like Flaubert and Burton, who vacillate between paragons of humanistic 
sympathy and dutiful ‘voice[s] of Empire’.91 The following discussion of 
Orientalism will suggest that Said approached Flaubert and Burton as if they were 
‘odd terms’, ‘stubborn knots that stand out and break up the otherwise evenly woven 
surface of’ Orientalist discourse, although he only did so because they consciously 
distinguished themselves against the ‘the uniformed teachers who ran Europe and 
European knowledge with such precise anonymity and scientific firmness.’92 Thus, 
Said registered resistance within Orientalist discourse only wherever an individual 
Orientalist explicitly opposed the institutional pressures upon ‘anonymity’. 
Nonetheless, Said’s accounts of how Orientalism eventually ‘reduced’ writers like 
Flaubert and Burton ‘to the role of imperial scribe’,93 cast doubt over whether only 
                                            
88 Young, p. 137.  
89 Said, Orientalism, p. 9.  
90 Goonatilake, p. 33.  
91 Said, Orientalism, p. 196.  
92 Said, Orientalism, p. 194.  
93 Said, Orientalism, p. 197.  
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those writers who consciously resisted Orientalist orthodoxy were subject to 
experiences that did not corroborate it. This friction between individual experience 
and Orientalist orthodoxy, therefore, might weill have been more prevalent than 
Said suggests, and so he only notices it among ‘non-conformists’ like Flaubert and 
Burton because he equates resistance with opposition.  
According to Said, Flaubert and Burton purposely wrote against a 
‘regimented’ Orientalist tradition in which ‘everything but “learning” had been 
squeezed out’, leaving no room for ‘a sense of immediacy, imagination, and flair’.94 
Said contrasts writers like Flaubert – whose accounts of ‘the Orient’ were derived 
from actually visiting ‘Oriental’ locales like the Levant – from the ‘wholly bookish 
Orientalism’ of figures like Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan, who mostly just 
refined existing accounts in Europe itself without claiming ‘any particular expertise 
with the Orient in situ’.95 Said further distinguishes between three strains of those 
writers who, like Flaubert, could ever make such a claim: 
One: the writer who intends to use his residence [in ‘the Orient’] for 
the specific task of providing professional Orientalism with scientific 
material, who considers his residence a form of scientific observation. 
Two: the writer who intends the same purpose but is less willing to 
sacrifice the eccentricity and style of his individual consciousness to 
impersonal Orientalist definitions. These latter do appear in his work, 
but they are disentangled from the personal vagaries of style only with 
difficulty. Three: the writer for whom a real or metaphorical trip to the 
Orient is the fulfillment [sic] of some deeply felt and urgent project. 
His text therefore is built on a personal aesthetic, fed and informed by 
the project. In categories two and three there is considerably more 
space than in one for the play of a personal – or at least non-
Orientalist – consciousness[.]96 
As Said discusses case examples of each of these categories, it becomes clear that he 
is pursuing evidence of unmediated ‘experience’ that might justify his belief – 
contrary to Foucault, apparently – in ‘the determining imprint of individual writers 
upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive 
formation like Orientalism.’97 Thus, as an example of the first category, Said finds 
                                            
94 Said, Orientalism, p. 189.  
95 Said, Orientalism, p. 156.  
96 Said, Orientalism, pp. 157-58.  
97 Said, Orientalism, p. 23.  
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that in his Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (1836), Edward William 
Lane succeeded in ‘literally abolish[ing] himself as a human subject’ by refusing to 
integrate into Egyptian society – such as by declining the offer of an Egyptian wife – 
thus ‘preserv[ing] his authoritative identity as a mock participant and bolster[ing] 
the objectivity of his narrative.’98 Otherwise, ‘had he become one of them, [Lane’s] 
perspective would no longer have been antiseptically and asexually lexicographical’ 
or ‘scientific’, since ‘[u]seful knowledge such as his could only have been obtained, 
formulated, and diffused by such denials.’99 Lane might legitimately claim personal 
experience of ‘the Orient in situ’, yet this experience was curtailed from the start by 
certain, well-established Orientalist principles. Thus, even before he subjected his 
account to ‘considerable editing’ – even while maintaining that it was ‘a work of 
immediate and direct, unadorned and neutral, description’100 – Lane’s initial 
encounters with ‘Oriental’ society were shaped according to his conviction that 
‘such uniform accreditation as clothed the work of Orientalist scholarship, not 
personal testimony nor subjective impressionism, meant Science.’101  
The second two categories are addressed simultaneously via the examples of 
Flaubert and Burton, both of whom – Said argues – were ‘fully aware of the 
necessity of combat between [themselves] and the uniformed teachers who ran 
Europe and European knowledge with such precise anonymity and scientific 
firmness.’102 Thus, whereas Lane’s initial experiences of ‘Oriental’ society were 
marked by his retention of the position of the distant, Archimedean observer, Said 
finds that Flaubert and Burton represent a more immediate, or rather less mediated 
experience. Indeed, according to Said, ‘Burton took the assertion of personal, 
authentic, sympathetic, and humanistic knowledge of the Orient as far as it would go 
                                            
98 Said, Orientalism, p. 164; Lane eventually married a Greek-Egyptian woman in 1840, 
apparently several years after having bought her as a slave.  
99 Said, Orientalism, p. 164.  
100 Said, Orientalism, p. 159.  
101 Said, Orientalism, p. 191; indeed, Said’s treatment of Lane corroborates Young’s claim 
that individual experience ‘always experienced, analysed and given meaning through 
forms of knowledge that will themselves be already ideological’, and therefore ‘cannot 
be posited as prior to knowledge as such’ (Young, p. 132).  
102 Said, Orientalism, p. 194.  
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in its struggle with the archive of official European knowledge about the Orient.’103 
Nonetheless, Said maintains that ‘[i]n no writer on the Orient so much as in Burton 
do we feel that generalizations about the Orient […] are the direct result of 
knowledge acquired about the Orient by living there, actually seeing it firsthand, 
truly trying to see Oriental life from the viewpoint of a person immersed in it.’104 
Despite striving to both ‘use his Oriental residence for scientific observation and not 
easily to sacrifice his individuality to that end’,105 ultimately Burton’s ‘individuality 
perforce encounters, and indeed merges with, the voice of Empire, which is itself a 
system of rules, codes, and concrete epistemological habits.’106  
In order to reconcile it with his admiration for Burton as an ‘individualist’, 
Said apprehends this merger as evidence of some kind of ‘formidable mechanism 
[...] operat[ing] specifically (and effectively) upon personal human experiences that 
otherwise contradicted’ the strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’. The task, then, is to 
establish what happened to those particular experiences – ‘where they went and what 
forms they took, while they lasted.’107 Said, though, provides very little evidence 
that Flaubert and Burton’s personal experiences ever did contradict these strictures 
in any way. Ultimately, Said suggests that the experiences of both writers mostly 
corroborated the claims of ‘bookish Orientalism’, and what distinguished them from 
precursors like Sacy and Renan was merely their claim to have experienced ‘the 
Orient’ first-hand, rather than solely through the European archive. Said’s quest for 
unmediated experience in Flaubert and Burton yields no more evidence of ‘odd 
terms’ disrupting the ‘internal consistency’ of Orientalist discourse, than does the 
‘bookish Orientalism’ that they purportedly wrote against. Only Karl Marx offers 
compelling evidence of this friction between the regularity of received ideology and 
individual experiences that might have contradicted its truth-claims. Said notes that 
‘Marx’s humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people, are clearly engaged’.108 
                                            
103 Said, Orientalism, p. 197.  
104 Said, Orientalism, p. 196.  
105 Said, Orientalism, p. 197.  
106 Said, Orientalism, p. 196.  
107 Said, Orientalism, p. 156 (emphases in original).  
108 Said, Orientalism, p. 154.  
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Yet even Marx’s ‘style pushes us right against the difficulty of reconciling our 
natural repugnance as fellow creatures to the sufferings of Orientals’ under violent, 
oppressive colonial rule, with the historical necessity of that rule to the achievement 
of global socialism.109 Ultimately, Said finds that Marx returns to the ‘classically 
standard image’ of a diminished ‘Orient’ desperately needing revitalisation via 
European colonial tutelage.110  
Marx’s recourse to a banal, ‘Romantic Orientalist vision’,111 though, 
suggests to Said ‘that something happened before the labels took over’, before ‘[a]n 
experience was dislodged by a dictionary definition’.112 In many of these case 
examples, Said describes this recourse to the standard tropes of ‘bookish 
Orientalism’ in despotic terms that are comparable to how he conveys the 
manipulation of U.S. public opinion towards the end of Culture and Imperialism. 
Thus, in Marx’s case, Said speaks of how ‘[t]he vocabulary of emotion dissipated as 
it submitted to the lexicographical police action of Orientalist science and even 
Orientalist art.’113 Similarly, Burton’s ‘assertion of personal, authentic, sympathetic, 
and humanistic knowledge of the Orient’ is a ‘struggle with the archive of official 
European knowledge about the Orient.’ Indeed, Said describes Burton as ‘a rebel 
against authority’,114 whose work ‘was meant to be testimony to his victory over the 
sometimes scandalous system of Oriental knowledge’.115 Yet Burton was ultimately 
‘reduced […] to the role of imperial scribe’ by Orientalism’s ‘regulated college of 
learning’.116 As for Flaubert, Orientalism’s insistence upon ‘impersonal academic 
rules of procedure’ rendered it an ‘imposed discipline’ that Flaubert fought to 
                                            
109 Said, Orientalism, p. 153.  
110 Said, Orientalism, p. 154.  
111 Said, Orientalism, p. 154.  
112 Said, Orientalism, p. 155.  
113 Said, Orientalism, p. 155 (my emphases).  
114 Said, Orientalism, p. 195.  
115 Said, Orientalism, p. 196.  
116 Said, Orientalism, p. 197.  
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resist.117 At the very end of Orientalism, Said remarks that ‘Orientalism failed to 
identify with human experience, failed also to see it as human experience.’118 
However, the despotic language in which Said conveys these ‘exceptions’ or 
‘interesting complications’119 to the ‘internal consistency’ of Orientalist discourse 
leaves it unclear whether this failure lies with the Orientalists themselves, or with an 
oppressive ‘bookish Orientalism’ whose impositions the individual Orientalist was 
largely unable to resist.  
Said’s recourse to this despotic language of forcible submission to ‘bookish 
Orientalism’ may well overstate the extent to which Lane, Flaubert, and Burton’s 
personal experiences diverged from the claims of Orientalist orthodoxy. Again, as 
Young notes, Said does not consider the possibility that experience itself is never 
unmediated, or ‘prior to knowledge’ or ideology. Indeed, we might critique Said 
here for too readily presuming that the tension in Flaubert and Burton obtains 
between ‘actual experience of the Orient and knowledge of what is Oriental’ – that 
is, ‘experience itself’ – and the regulated, impersonal and systematic strictures of 
‘bookish Orientalism’. In fact, Said demonstrates that what distinguishes Flaubert 
and Burton is their endeavour to directly experience something that nonetheless 
largely existed within the European archive, to corroborate the truth-claims of that 
archive by ‘witnessing’ it first-hand, in ‘the Orient’ itself. Said provides no evidence 
that either of these writers ever did experience anything that prompted them to 
question the authority of ‘bookish Orientalism’s’ claims regarding the nature of 
either ‘Oriental’ societies or peoples, or Europe’s colonial regimes in ‘the Orient’. 
We might attribute this lack of evidence either to Said’s use of discourse theory – 
whose limitations Clifford highlights above – or to the possibility that, like Lane, 
Flaubert and Burton excised from their accounts certain experiences of ‘terrestrial 
reality’120 that conflicted with the claims of ‘bookish Orientalism’. As I will 
demonstrate shortly, this latter explanation correlates not just with Foucault’s 
contention that both power and resistance are ubiquitous, but also with the 
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implications of several accounts of hegemonic articulation, including those of 
Gramsci and Williams. Moreover, this explanation correlates with Spivak’s notion 
of ‘self-metonymisation’ as well.   
This correlation, though, raises the question of how prevalent such excisions 
were among Orientalists, along with the tension between individual experience and 
the regulated, impersonal, and systematic strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’. Said 
establishes Burton’s individuality by contrasting him with Alexander William 
Kinglake, whom Said claims capitulated entirely to ‘a public and national will over 
the Orient’, since there is no evidence to suggest that he ever ‘struggled to create a 
novel opinion of the Orient; neither his knowledge nor his personality was adequate 
for that’.121 I cannot claim sufficient knowledge of Kinglake to be able to challenge 
Said’s appraisal of him here. However, Said’s distinction between Kinglake the 
conformist and Burton the ‘individualist’ seems arbitrary, given the paucity of 
textual evidence that Said musters in support of his claim, coupled with the brevity 
of the comparison itself. Indeed, this distinction seems all the more dubious when 
Said describes how Burton’s narrative persona ‘merges’ with ‘the voice of Empire’, 
effacing any trace of his individuality. Simply put, Said leaves it unclear whether or 
not all Orientalists experienced a disjuncture between the claims of ‘bookish 
Orientalism’ and their own, individual experiences of ‘terrestrial reality’ in ‘the 
Orient’ itself, no matter how conscious they were of that disjuncture. 
Said’s discussion of Flaubert and Burton demonstrates a perceptiveness in 
Orientalism towards the existence of ‘odd terms’ that disrupt the ‘internal 
consistency’ of Orientalist discourse, albeit in the form of the individual’s awareness 
of that consistency and the anonymity it imposes upon them as individual writers. In 
this respect, Said’s account of the ‘disciplinary power’ of Orientalist discourse is 
actually closer to Foucault than has been allowed by those critics of Orientalism 
whom Lazarus derides for findingthat Said ‘falls short of Foucauldian orthodoxy’. 
Ironically, this account is closer to Foucault than even Lazarus himself allows, when 
claiming that Said was anything but a ‘Foucauldian’. Said may register little dissent 
against either Orientalism or European imperialism, and might well be criticised for 
overstating the extent to which ‘every European, in what he could say about the 
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Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric.’122 
However, with Flaubert, Burton, and Marx, Said registers a potential dissonance 
between individual experience and the strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’ – a 
friction that, with Flaubert and Burton, Said articulates in terms of opposition and 
eventual, forcible interpolation, but which nonetheless resonates with Foucault’s 
understanding of ‘resistance’ as outlined above. It is unclear, though, to what extent 
Said finds that this dissonance obtains throughout all Orientalist discourse, in the 
same way that for Foucault ‘resistance’ is as ubiquitous as ‘power’. For Said largely 
observes this dissonance in seemingly exceptional cases. As such, it becomes 
unclear whether we might attribute Kinglake’s apparent lack of originality, for 
example, to the very same ‘imaginative pressures […] institutions and traditions [or] 
cultural forces’123 that ultimately ‘reduced’ Burton ‘to the role of imperial scribe’. 
If in Orientalism Said articulated these pressures in terms of the forcible 
limitation of what an individual writer could accomplish within a rigidly-defined 
discourse, in Culture and Imperialism he gives no indication that the ‘imperial 
consensus’ spanning all of British society was sustained by a similar set of 
pressures. Said’s discussion of Joseph Conrad is an exception; for despite his 
‘residual imperialist propensities’, Conrad was nonetheless aware of the fact that ‘if, 
like narrative, imperialism has monopolized the entire system of representation […] 
your self-consciousness as an outsider can allow you actively to comprehend how 
the machine works, given that you and it are fundamentally not in perfect synchrony 
or correspondence.’124 Thus, for Said, Conrad’s ‘explicit references to the outside’ in 
Heart of Darkness (1899) point ‘to a perspective outside the basically imperialist 
representations provided by Marlow and his listeners’, demonstrating in the process 
how ‘[b]eing on the inside shuts out the full experience of imperialism, edits it and 
subordinates it to the dominance of one Eurocentric and totalizing view’.125 Yet 
although this perspective allowed Conrad to grant the infamously ‘impenetrable’ 
Congo interior ‘an autonomy of its own’, he was unable – in Said’s opinion – to 
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perceive this impenetrability as evidence that the Congo’s ‘non-European ‘darkness’ 
was in fact a non-European world resisting imperialism so as one day to regain 
sovereignty and independence, and not, as Conrad reductively says, to reestablish 
the darkness.’126 Nonetheless, Said registers this resistance as a spectral presence-as-
absence in Heart of Darkness, one that refuses to be muted quite as easily as the 
personal experiences of ‘the Orient’ that were ‘squeezed out’ of so much Orientalist 
writing by the discipline’s rigid doxa, at least according to Said.    
Conrad, though, is the sole exception to a rule that Said otherwise establishes 
comprehensively in Culture and Imperialism, according to which resistance to 
imperialism only emerged among colonial populations – that is, ‘outside’ the 
apparently closed circuit that is imperialist ideology. Other than in Conrad, Said 
finds no evidence of ‘odd terms’ in the numerous other European or ‘Western’ 
writers he discusses, as if ‘disciplinary power’ really was ‘unremitting and 
unstoppable […] in the growth of its domination’, at least as it was exerted and 
consolidated in the ‘metropole’. In this respect, Said’s articulation of his ‘imperial 
consensus’ in Culture and Imperialism is actually closer to how Young describes his 
totalised articulation of Orientalism in the earlier book. Given his engagements with 
exceptional cases like Flaubert, Burton, and Marx in Orientalism, in Culture and 
Imperialism Said’s analysis conveys an even greater sense that ‘Western’ 
imperialism is riven by ‘no internal conflict that can be exploited, no heterogeneity, 
no contradictory logics, no totalization that always requires supplementation, no 
writing that runs away with an unassimilable excess.’127 It therefore becomes all the 
more necessary in Culture and Imperialism for Said to ‘demand a counter-intention 
from outside the system for any resistance.’128  
Thus, in rather ironic fashion, Said’s approach in Culture and Imperialism 
only further corresponds in many ways to his own, reductive understanding of 
Foucault’s account of the ubiquity of power, even as he responds to charges of 
ignoring anti-imperialist resistance in Orientalism. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, 
only in the final chapter of this later book does Said begin to register the possibility 
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that a discrepancy exists between imperialist ideology and individual citizens. Even 
here, though, Said’s analysis subscribes to what he himself perceives is Foucault’s 
‘theoretical overtotalization’ of the ‘unremitting and unstoppable expansion of 
power’, insofar as he perceives no possibility of seeing beyond what the U.S. mass 
media – and, by extension, the U.S. government – allows one to see. Said might 
have declared that he ‘wouldn’t go so far as saying that Foucault rationalized power, 
or that he legitimized its dominion and its ravages by declaring them inevitable’.129 
Yet by the end of Culture and Imperialism, Said risks conveying a no less 
‘profoundly pessimistic view’ concerning the ubiquity or final victory of power in 
‘the West’, and therefore risks opening himself up to a similar charge as that which 
he had levelled at Foucault.  
2.2  Edward Said and Antonio Gramsci on spontaneous totalisation 
Following Orientalism, Said looked towards Gramsci for a way of affirming the 
possibility of alternative sensibilities to ‘Western’ imperialism. For unlike Foucault 
– Said argues – Gramsci believed that ‘there is always something beyond the reach 
of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society’ – something that 
‘makes change possible, limits power in Foucault’s sense, and hobbles the theory of 
that power.’130 Given this conviction, Gramsci would have found Foucault’s 
‘theoretical overtotalization’ of power ‘uncongenial. He would certainly appreciate 
the fineness of Foucault’s archeologies but would find it odd that they make not 
even nominal allowance for emergent movements, and none for revolutions, 
counterhegemony, or historical blocks [sic].’131 In itself, Said’s account of 
Gramsci’s thinking here is mostly unobjectionable. Nonetheless, I find that this 
account grossly overstates the divergence between Gramsci and Foucault’s thinking. 
For one thing, Foucault’s ‘archaeologies’ might themselves be considered 
investigations into the ‘internal’ structure and composition of ‘hegemonic 
articulations’ as defined above by Laclau and Mouffe. Indeed, Foucault’s definition 
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of ‘power’ in the first volume of his History of Sexuality encompasses the 
‘strategies’ through which ‘force relations’ ‘take effect, [and] whose general design 
or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation 
of the law, in the various social hegemonies.’132 This definition renders Said’s 
appraisal of Foucault’s theory of power all the more ironic, given Said’s contention 
that ‘[w]hat one misses in Foucault is something resembling Gramsci’s analyses of 
hegemony, historical blocks, ensembles of relationship done from the perspective of 
an engaged political worker for whom the fascinated description of exercised power 
is never a substitute for trying to change power relationships within society.’133 To 
repeat Racevskis’s argument, Foucault sought to affirm ‘the precariousness, the 
impending transformations, and the contingency of social structures rather than their 
necessity or immobility’,134 just as much as Gramsci. 
 More importantly, though, Said’s recourse to Gramsci’s thinking did little to 
dissuade him from articulating Europe, ‘the West’, or the ‘metropolis’ – whether as 
a society, a culture, a consciousness, or an intention – as a homogeneous, 
undifferentiated unit that occurs spontaneously. Said presented his turn to Gramsci 
as a way of redressing the fact that in Orientalism, he ‘said nothing about the 
possibility of resistance’ to Orientalist orthodoxy, an oversight that he directly 
attributed to Foucault’s influence on his methodology.135 Given his claim, though, 
that for Gramsci ‘there is always something beyond the reach of dominating 
systems’, it is clear that Said continued to understand resistance solely as the 
interruption of these systems from ‘beyond’ them. The implication, then, is that 
these systems suffer from no internal conflicts, heterogeneities, or contradictory 
logics.136  Hence Said’s claim that Conrad’s ‘self-consciousness as an outsider’, his 
‘extraordinarily persistent residual sense of his own exilic marginality’ – as a Polish 
immigrant publishing in his third language – is what gave him his exceptional ability 
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‘to comprehend how the machine [of imperialist representation] works’.137 This 
ability was exceptional because British imperialism had effectively ‘monopolized 
the entire system of representation’, to such an extent that ‘[b]eing on the inside 
shuts out the full experience of imperialism, edits it and subordinates it to the 
dominance of one Eurocentric and totalizing view’.138 
 Said, then, might well have attested to Gramsci’s conviction that the reach of 
‘dominating systems’ is never all-encompassing, never total. Yet he continued to 
articulate the ‘virtual unity of purpose’ that he observed in contemporary ‘Western 
society’ precisely as if such systems had managed to saturate that society 
comprehensively, totally. Funnily enough, this articulation does accord with 
Gramsci’s notion of the ‘integral’ or ‘ethical State’, a conjuncture ‘that tends to put 
an end to the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create a technically and 
morally unitary social organism.’139 For Gramsci, no state-form is ‘ethical’ if it is 
not intended to ‘raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and 
moral level’140 – that of the ruling classes. Much of Gramsci’s political thought 
aspires towards this vision of a ‘technically and morally unitary social organism’. 
Hence his preoccupation with how to render a ‘collective will [...] universal and 
total’,141 how to produce a unity of purpose or consciousness that cuts across the 
multitude of social divisions underlying complex modern industrial societies, like 
those of interwar Europe. It is debatable whether Gramsci shared Foucault’s 
conviction in the ubiquity of resistance, as an inevitable disjuncture and subsequent 
friction between the irreducibly infinite ‘positive’ content of ‘the social’ and the 
integral, regulated, systematic terms in which power renders ‘the social’ coherent 
and legible. Nonetheless, it is just as debatable whether Gramsci believed that there 
could ever be a total absence of this friction – a perfect alignment between state and 
popular will, between ruling and subordinate classes, and between ‘practical 
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consciousness’ and ‘official consciousness’, or what Gramsci calls ‘technique-as-
work’ and ‘technique-as-science’.  
 For even in its most optimistic moments, Gramsci’s vision of a ‘technically 
and morally unitary social organism’ concedes that this unity could be neither 
spontaneous nor absolute, under any circumstances. Hence Gramsci’s interests in 
how education and ‘intellectual activity’ shape the structure of a society, including 
its social relations. Hence also Gramsci’s concession that no ‘political and legal 
order’ can ever expect to enjoy only the ‘“spontaneous” consent [of] the great 
masses of the population’ – spontaneous in the sense of being given without any 
solicitation, persuasion, or coercion. As we saw in my Introduction to this thesis, 
Guha found that substituting ‘Persuasion’ for Gramsci’s original term ‘consensus’ 
better reflected how Gramsci understood the practicalities of ruling by consent over 
coercion. Moreover, this substitution also better reflected how that ‘liberal absurdity 
[...] of the idea of an uncoercive state’ runs counter to ‘the basic drive of Gramsci’s 
own work’.142 The following discussion of Gramsci will return to that porous 
distinction between ‘consensus’ and ‘coercion’ proposed in my Introduction to this 
thesis, in order to highlight how for Gramsci popular consent is not always 
‘spontaneous’ as defined above. As a result, neither is the kind of ‘moral and 
intellectual’ unity that characterises Gramsci’s ‘ethical state’. Instead, this unity 
must be both encouraged and enforced, by both soliciting popular consent, and 
‘policing’ those groups that withhold their consent, for whatever reason.  
 Moreover, in his reflections on the role of education and of intellectuals in 
establishing this unity, Gramsci suggests that even the most ‘spontaneous’ consent 
does not always indicate a perfect alignment between the will of the group in 
question, and the ‘collective will’ that they subscribe to in the act of consent. 
Gramsci does not entirely foreclose the possibility of a perfect alignment between 
the two. Hence his notion of ‘progressive elements’ that embody the ‘vital forces of 
history’,143 social groups whose ‘particular conception[s] of the world’ and 
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‘conscious line[s] of moral conduct’144 come together as a ‘collective will’ that can 
eventually become ‘universal and total’.145 Two obstacles, though, prevent any 
‘collective will’ from becoming ‘universal and total’ spontaneously. The first 
obstacle are ‘reactionary social elements’, groups that are ‘dispossessed’ whenever a 
new ‘political and legal order’ is established, after a previously subordinate group 
‘conquers’ the state and refashions it according to their will. The second obstacle are 
‘those elements which have not yet reached the level of civilisation which’ this 
newly-dominant social group ‘can be seen as representing’,146 along with its newly-
established ‘political and legal order’. In order to overcome these obstacles, a 
‘collective will’ must give rise to a political party that can ‘keep the dispossessed 
reactionary forces within the bounds of legality’, and ‘raise the backward masses to 
the level of the new legality.’147  
 These two functions roughly correspond to Gramsci’s distinction between 
‘coercion’ and ‘consensus’ respectively, and Gramsci’s interest in education and 
‘intellectual activity’ are central to how he figures the latter of these functions. For 
Gramsci, one significant reason why Italian society between the two world wars not 
‘a technically and morally unitary social organism’ was the country’s education 
system. Gramsci explains how the system was divided ‘into classical and vocational 
(professional) schools [...] the vocational school for the instrumental classes, the 
classical school for the dominant classes and the intellectuals.’148 The ‘classical 
school’ taught ‘a humanistic programme of general culture based on the Græco-
Roman tradition’, and which perpetuated ‘the general and traditionally unquestioned 
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prestige of a particular form of civilisation.’149 The ‘vocational school’ itself was 
subdivided into ‘a whole system of specialised schools [...] to serve entire 
professional sectors, or professions which [were] already specialised and defined 
within precise boundaries.’150 These divisions had two effects on the composition of 
Italian society. Firstly, the division between ‘classical and vocational (professional) 
schools’ gave rise to ‘the function of intellectuals’, according to which only 
‘particular conception[s] of the world’ and ‘conscious line[s] of moral conduct’ were 
deemed ‘intellectual’. These particular ‘form[s] of intellectual activity’ were 
weighted towards ‘intellectual elaboration’ rather than ‘muscular-nervous effort’ – 
abstraction over practical application, and holistic overviews rather than attention to 
minutiae. These emphases led those who were of ‘the function of intellectuals’ – 
Gramsci’s ‘traditional intellectuals’ – to ‘think of themselves as “independent”, 
autonomous, endowed with a character of their own’,151  without any connection to 
any other social group or ‘function’.  
To an extent, this latter claim was borne out by the fact that for the most part, 
the abstractions of the ‘traditional intellectuals’ were not derived from the 
‘muscular-nervous effort’ of any of the ‘instrumental classes’, whose ‘particular 
conception[s] of the world’ and ‘conscious line[s] of moral conduct’ were derived 
from the comparatively specialised, technical curricula of the ‘vocational 
(professional) school’. Yet for Gramsci, ‘traditional intellectuals’ were merely the 
‘deputies’ of the ‘dominant social group’,152 consolidating their dominance by 
‘exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.’153 
Again, Gramsci’s definition of these ‘functions’ roughly corresponds to his twin 
concepts of ‘consensus’ and ‘coercion’ respectively. Thus, ‘social hegemony’ here 
entails ‘“spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this 
consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which 
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the dominant group enjoys’.154 By ‘political government’ Gramsci means the 
‘apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline on those 
groups who do not “consent” either actively or passively’. These coercive 
apparatuses are unnecessary as long as ‘the general direction imposed on social life 
by the dominant fundamental group’ – through the efforts of its ‘deputies’, the 
intellectuals – enjoys a ‘general and traditionally unquestioned prestige’ among ‘the 
great mass of the population’. Yet no ‘dominant social group’ can hope to rely 
solely on these coercive apparatuses to maintain their dominance. For a dominant 
group that finds itself ‘exercising coercive force alone’ is beset by a ‘“crisis of 
authority”’, insofar as it ‘has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but only 
“dominant”’, because ‘the great masses have become detached from their traditional 
ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously’.155 This ‘rift 
between popular masses and ruling ideologies’ cannot ‘be “cured” by the simple 
exercise of force’,156 for doing so only further compounds the ‘crisis of authority’, 
by turning the ‘great masses’ even further against the dominant group and their 
intellectual ‘deputies’.  
For Gramsci, the division of the Italian education system into ‘classical and 
vocational (professional) schools’ had led to a ‘rift between popular masses and 
ruling ideologies’. For the two ‘schools’ imparted completely different ‘form[s] of 
intellectual activity’. As such, the ‘classical school’ produced ‘traditional 
intellectuals’ whose ‘intellectual activity’ has absolutely no basis in the ‘muscular-
nervous effort’ of the ‘instrumental classes’, and thus bore no relevance to their 
‘particular conception[s] of the world’ and ‘conscious lines of moral conduct’. 
Meanwhile, the ‘vocational (professional) school’ imparted no singular, general, or 
over-arching ‘form of intellectual activity’ that would unite the ‘instrumental 
classes’, that would cut across all the ‘particular conception[s] of the world’ 
pertaining to every specialised ‘function’ undertaken by these groups. Hence the 
second effect of this divided education system on the composition of Italian society: 
the lack of political or ideological unity between the disparate ‘instrumental classes’. 
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This system, then, could hardly hope to ‘put an end to the internal divisions of the 
ruled, etc., and to create a technically and morally unitary social organism.’ 
Moreover, as the ‘deputies’ of Italy’s ‘dominant social group’ – the bourgeoisie – 
Gramsci’s ‘traditional intellectuals’ upheld a ‘general direction imposed on social 
life’ that was in no way responsive to the will of the ‘instrumental classes’, nor did it 
cater to their interests.  
The ‘instrumental classes’, though, were unable to challenge this ‘political 
and legal order’ by themselves, precisely because their highly specialised and 
technical education had both divided them between their myriad social functions, 
and deprived them of the ‘forms of intellectual activity’ that were recognisably 
‘political’. Gramsci, therefore, envisioned a reformed education system based upon 
his ‘common school, or school of humanistic formation [...] or general culture’,157 
which would merge the ‘classical’ and ‘vocational (professional) schools’, 
abstraction and practical application. Thus, ‘in addition to imparting the first 
“instrumental” notions of schooling – reading, writing, sums, geography, history’ – 
the common school would also ‘deal with [...] “rights and duties”, with the first 
notions of the State and society as primordial elements of a new conception of the 
world which challenges the conceptions that are imparted by the various traditional 
social environments, i.e. those conceptions which can be termed folkloristic.’158 The 
‘common school’ would provide each ‘instrumental class’ not only with the 
knowledge and skills necessary for the fulfilment of its particular social function, 
but also ‘an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the 
social and political fields.’159 In the process, the ‘common school’ would lead to a 
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greater ‘moral and intellectual’ ‘coincidence of the rulers and the ruled’, by 
‘ensuring for each non-ruler a free training in the skills and general technical 
preparation’ for both work and government, as if they were both workers and 
legislators.160  
This educational reform, though, was a component of a ‘political and legal 
order’ that had yet to be established, and which would only be established after the 
‘instrumental classes’ ‘conquered’ the Italian state. Yet the ‘instrumental classes’ 
could not hope to do so as long as they lacked any ‘moral and intellectual’ unity, 
owing to how their highly specialised educations had imparted to each of them a 
very ‘particular conception of the world’. Gramsci’s corrective here was his call for 
‘a new stratum of intellectuals’ tasked with  
the critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in 
everyone at a certain degree of development, modifying its 
relationship with the muscular-nervous effort towards a new 
equilibrium, and ensuring that the muscular-nervous effort itself, in so 
far as it is an element of a general practical activity, which is 
perpetually innovating the physical and social world, becomes the 
foundation of a new and integral conception of the world.161 
This ‘new type of intellectual’ would familiarise themselves with the ‘particular 
conception of the world’ and ‘conscious line of moral conduct’ pertaining to each 
‘instrumental class’. These ‘organic intellectuals’ would then translate this 
‘technique-as-work’ into ‘technique-as-science’,162 establishing its role as an 
‘element’ in the wider social conjuncture, in relation to those of other such 
‘elements’.163 This process of translation would impart to the ‘instrumental classes’ 
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accord with what the intellectuals understood to be ‘political’ practice. As a result, the 
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a heightened awareness of their place within wider society, including their rights and 
obligations as citizens. Meanwhile, the ‘organic intellectuals’ would bring together 
their knowledge of the ‘particular conception[s] of the world’ and ‘conscious line[s] 
of moral conduct’ obtaining among the ‘instrumental classes’, in order to produce a 
plausible vision of ‘a technically and morally unitary social organism’ – an ‘integral’ 
or ‘ethical state’ that would ‘put an end to the internal divisions of the ruled’.  
 The ‘organic intellectuals’ would then mobilise the ‘instrumental classes’ by 
soliciting their ‘“spontaneous” consent’ to this vision, thus giving rise to a 
‘collective will’ that would unify the ‘instrumental classes’, and eventually become 
‘universal and total’. In short, Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectuals’ are the ‘intermediary 
element’ in his schematic of the ‘triumphant’ political movement. In order to 
succeed in ‘conquering’ the state, Gramsci contends that a political movement must 
entail three basic ‘elements’. The first is the ‘mass element, composed of ordinary, 
average men, whose participation takes the form of discipline and loyalty, rather 
than any creative spirit or organisational ability.’164 According to Gramsci, this first 
element is ‘a force [only] in so far as there is somebody to centralise, organise and 
discipline them. In the absence of this cohesive force, they would scatter into an 
impotent diaspora and vanish into nothing.’165 Because this first ‘element’ lack any 
‘organisational ability’ of their own, two more elements become necessary if this 
first is to become an effective, indeed an irresistible political force. The second 
                                                                                                                           
movement’s actions and articulations of their cause appeared nonsensical to the 
intellectuals, precisely because they broke away from a commonsensical definition of 
what ‘politics’ entailed. As we shall soon see, the more recent distinction between 
‘politics’ and ‘the political’ makes much the same point about conventional definitions 
of what ‘politics’ entails, as Gramsci does when critiquing this attribution of the 
Lazzaretti movement to Lazzaretti’s apparent mental instability. As Jacques Rancière 
notes, ‘[i]f there is someone you do not wish to recognize as a political being, you 
begin by not seeing him as the bearer of signs of politicity, by not understanding what 
he says, by not hearing what issues from his mouth as discourse’ (Rancière, ‘Ten 
Theses on Politics’, in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans,. by Steven 
Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 38). Similarly, these claims that 
Lazzaretti was mad resonate with Laclau and Mouffe’s that in all its forms, meaning 
depends on fixity, and that ‘a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is 
the discourse of the psychotic’ (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 99). Hence Laclau and Mouffe’s 
insistence on the necessity of nodal points for society to exist, and thus of power to 
establish and maintain these nodal points.  
164 Gramsci, ‘The Political Party’, p. 153.  
165 Gramsci, ‘The Political Party’, p. 152.  
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element is the ‘principal cohesive element, which centralises nationally and renders 
effective and powerful a complex of forces which left to themselves would count for 
little or nothing.’166 The third is an ‘intermediate element, which articulates the first 
element with the second and maintains contact between them, not only physically 
but also morally and intellectually.’167 
It is not entirely clear what or who each of these ‘elements’ are, and we can 
only provisionally identify them with notions elaborated elsewhere in Gramsci’s 
Prison Notebooks. Given its fractured nature, the first ‘element’ is most likely the 
‘instrumental classes’, given their initial lack of a general grasp of the social 
conjuncture, and of their individual functions in relation to those of other groups. 
Meanwhile, the second ‘element’ might well be that unifying vision of ‘a technically 
and morally unitary organism’, of ‘a complex element of society in which a 
collective will, which has already been recognised and has to some extent exerted 
itself in action, begins to take concrete form.’168 The third ‘element’, then, are 
Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectuals’, who through their ‘active participation in practical 
life, as constructor[s], organiser[s], [and] “permanent persuaders”’, facilitate the 
‘collective will [in its] tend[ency] to become universal and total.’ Together, the 
second and third ‘elements’ comprise Gramsci’s ‘political party’, whose role it is to 
be the direct expression of a unity of purpose that emerges among the ‘great mass of 
the population’. Without the authority conferred by the consenting ‘instrumental 
classes’; without a ‘mass element’, a political party cannot hope to ‘conquer’ the 
state, and is as inconsequential as a disunified ‘mass element’ is ineffectual.  
For Gramsci, then, no ‘collective will’ ever becomes ‘universal and total’ 
spontaneously; equally, no society ever becomes ‘a technically and morally unitary 
organism’ of its own volition. In both cases, unity can only arise and then endure 
through the active interventions of  a unifying agency – a political party; a state – in 
how ‘the great mass of the population’ perceive the world, themselves, and those 
around them. So much accords with Said’s claim in Orientalism that ‘all academic 
knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated 
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by, the gross political fact’.169 Very early on in Orientalism, Said acknowledges 
Gramsci’s ‘useful analytic distinction between civil and political society, in which 
the former is made up of voluntary (or at least rational and noncoercive) affiliations 
like schools, families, and unions, the latter of state institutions (the army, the police, 
the central bureaucracy) whose role in the polity is direct domination.’170 Moreover, 
Said suggests that this distinction is often blurred, given how ‘political society [...] 
reaches into such realms of civil society as the academy and saturates them with 
significance of direct concern to it.’171 Said’s Orientalists, then, are the intellectual 
‘deputies’ of European imperial interests. Indeed, the claims among Said’s 
Orientalists that their knowledge of the ‘Orient’ was ‘scientific’ – that is, 
disinterested – are comparable to the claims among Gramsci’s ‘traditional 
intellectuals’ to being ‘autonomous and independent of the dominant social 
group.’172 Just as Gramsci challenges this assumption by claiming that ‘traditional 
intellectuals’ were merely the ideological ‘deputies’ of the bourgeoisie, so Said 
challenges the claims of Orientalists to being practitioners of ‘pure’ knowledge, by 
retracing ‘the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when 
[Orientalist] knowledge is produced.’173 
What remains unclear, though, is how the Orientalists came to be the 
intellectual ‘deputies’ of European imperial interests – whether their ‘recruitment’ 
was spontaneous or coerced. Said’s disparate accounts of how the ‘gross political 
fact’ ‘imposed’ itself upon Flaubert, Burton, and Kinglake largely subscribes to 
something like Gramsci’s distinction between ‘coercion’ and ‘consensus’ 
respectively. Thus, Flaubert and Burton tried their best to resist the enforced 
anonymity of ‘bookish Orientalism’, but were ultimately ‘reduced to the role of 
imperial scribe’ by that mysterious, ‘formidable mechanism of omnicompetent 
definitions’, that ‘lexicographical police action of Orientalist science’174 that 
                                            
169 Said, Orientalism, p. 11. 
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172 Gramsci, ‘The Formation of the Intellectuals’, p. 7. 
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submitted even Marx to its ‘romantic Orientalist vision’. In contrast, Kinglake’s 
writings give no indication that his consciousness and experience – let alone his 
intentions and practices – diverged from the claims of ‘bookish Orientalism’. 
According to Said, Kinglake’s ‘particular conception of the world’ and ‘conscious 
line of moral conduct’ was indistinguishable from the ‘technique-as-science’ that 
was Orientalist orthodoxy. If we think of Orientalism as a ‘collective will’, then, 
Kinglake belonged to the ‘progressive elements’, while Flaubert and Burton 
belonged to those elements that ‘do not “consent” either actively or passively’’, and 
who must therefore be kept ‘within the bounds of legality’ by the ‘apparatus of state 
coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline’ upon non-consenting groups.  
Gramsci might be sceptical towards the possibility of establishing ‘a 
technically and morally unitary organism’, in which every ‘individual can govern 
himself without his self-government thereby entering into conflict with political 
society – but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement.’175 
Yet as I mentioned above, Gramsci does maintain the possibility that an individual’s 
‘particular conception of the world’ and ‘conscious line of moral conduct’ 
corresponds entirely to ‘general direction imposed on social life by the dominant 
fundamental group’. The question, though, is whether for Gramsci this 
correspondence is anything more than a theoretical possibility – whether he 
genuinely believes that the subjective experience of individuals belonging to his 
‘progressive elements’ does not exceed the terms of the ‘collective will’. Ultimately, 
there is no clear answer to this question, only the implication that if a ‘collective 
will’ becomes ‘universal and total’ through the efforts of ‘organic intellectuals’ to 
‘educate’ the ‘instrumental classes’, then it is a product of ‘technique-as-science’, 
more so than of ‘technique-as-work’. Gramsci leaves it unclear whether his ‘organic 
intellectuals’ could ever manage to close the gap between ‘technique-as-work’ and 
‘technique-as-science’ entirely, such that the former would never need to be 
‘translated’ into the latter, since the two would be identical. For Gramsci’s ‘organic 
intellectuals’ are ‘permanent persuaders’; as the third, ‘intermediary element’ of 
Gramsci’s ‘triumphant’ political movement, their task of ‘maintain[ing] contact’ 
between the first and second ‘elements’ is permanent, never-ending. Moreover, 
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these two ‘forms of intellectual activity’ are very different: ‘technique-as-work’ is 
specialised and practical, ‘technique-as-science’ general and abstract.  
This disjuncture between these two forms of ‘intellectual activity’ leaves 
open the possibility that ‘the great masses [might] become detached from their 
traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they [are encouraged] to believe’ 
by the ‘organic intellectuals’, in their role as the ‘deputies’ of the dominant social 
group. Hence Said’s claim that for Gramsci,  ‘there is always something beyond the 
reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society’ – 
something that ‘makes change possible, limits power in Foucault’s sense, and 
hobbles the theory of that power.’176 Hence also Williams’s claim that ‘no mode of 
production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture 
ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human 
intention.’177 Instead, these various ‘modes of domination […] select from and 
consequently exclude the full range of human practice.’178 It is among those 
excluded practices that alternative and oppositional hegemonic formations arise, and 
so just as for Said, so for Williams, change can only be imagined as a possibility 
when we contend that ‘there is always something beyond the reach of dominating 
systems’. This contention resonates with Gramsci’s account of the role of the 
political party and the ‘apparatus of state coercive power’, in either ‘“legally” 
enforce[ing] discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or 
passively’, or ‘rais[ing] the backward masses to the level of the new legality.’ There 
will always be groups whose ‘particular conception of the world’ and ‘conscious 
line of moral conduct’ diverges – to whatever extent – from that of the ‘collective 
will’ or ‘general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group’.  
Moreover, Gramsci’s reflections on the role of education and his ‘organic 
intellectuals’ in imposing that ‘general direction’ impute that this divergence can 
never be entirely mitigated. For there will always be a gap between ‘technique-as-
work’ and ‘technique-as-science’, no matter how deeply the latter is based in 
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‘technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive 
and unqualified level’.179 Given how a ‘collective will’ can only become ‘universal 
and total’ by being derived from ‘technique-as-science’, it will always be at a 
remove – however minimal – from all forms of ‘technique-as-work’. With this 
claim, then, comes the implication that even Gramsci’s ‘progressive elements’ 
evince ‘particular conceptions of the world’ and ‘conscious lines of moral conduct’ 
that do not correspond entirely to the ‘technique-as-science’ of the ‘organic 
intellectuals’, and by extension, the ‘collective will’ itself. Even among these 
embodiments of ‘the vital forces of history’,180 there might be ways of experiencing 
the world that are at odds with how the ‘collective will’ makes sense of the world 
and that experience. Thus, a ‘collective will’ ‘select[s] from and consequently 
exclude[s] the full range of human practice’ obtaining not only among ‘reactionary’ 
and ‘backward elements’, but also among the ‘progressive elements’ themselves. 
Hence Williams’s claim that the irreducibly infinite complexity of ‘practical 
consciousness’ always exceeds the structured, coherent terms of ‘official 
consciousness’. Gramsci might continue to aspire towards ‘a technically and morally 
unitary social organism’ that ‘tends to put an end to the internal divisions of the 
ruled’. Yet as he explores the practical obstacles to such unity, it becomes 
increasingly unlikely that anyone of us could ever ‘govern [ourselves] without [our] 
self-government thereby entering into conflict with political society’. For even those 
of us who consent the most ‘spontaneously’ to the ‘general direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group’, must be continually ‘persuaded’ to 
do so by those ‘permanent persuaders’, the ‘organic intellectuals’.  
Gramsci, therefore, does allow Said to continue totalising ‘the West’ – 
whether as a society, a culture, a consciousness, or an intention – without 
foreclosing the possibility either of something ‘beyond’ this totality, or of resistance 
in the form of an oppositional intention that intervenes from that ‘beyond’.  Said, 
though, departs from Gramsci insofar as he imputes that this totality occurs 
spontaneously, even as he acknowledges all the internal fractures and antagonisms 
that jeopardise the unity of the ‘geopolitical West’. In Orientalism, Said looked to 
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Gramsci’s distinction between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’, ‘consensus’ and 
‘coercion’, in order to maintain that the ‘internal consistency’ of Orientalist 
discourse hardly reflected the spontaneous unity of ‘Western consciousness’.  In 
contrast, throughout most of Culture and Imperialism, Said articulates the ‘imperial 
consensus’ encompassing all of ‘Western society’ as if it were indeed spontaneous – 
as if it had somehow managed to become ‘universal and total’ without the need for 
the ‘policing function’ of a political party, a state, or any other apparatus of 
instrumental power. Gramsci might maintain the belief that a ‘collective will’ can 
become ‘universal and total’, yet he concedes that this totalisation cannot occur 
spontaneously, and can only be accomplished by actively soliciting the consent of 
‘the great mass of the population’. Moreover, this process cannot but entail 
influencing how ‘the great mass of the population’ perceive the world and their 
interests, which in turn entails dissuading them from other ‘conceptions of the 
world’ and ‘conscious lines of moral conduct’, especially those that do not comply 
with the ‘collective will’.  
Thus, although Gramsci never lets go of the possibility that a ‘collective 
will’ can incorporate everyone within a given social aggregation, it remains that any 
such ‘collective will’ is still established, maintained, and extended by continually 
‘select[ing] from and consequently exclud[ing] the full range of human practice.’ No 
‘collective will’, therefore, can ever incorporate everything within a given social 
conjuncture, and so its claim to being ‘universal and total’ can only ever be a 
pretence – precarious, contingent, and thus  capable of being disputed and 
challenged. Gramsci might not entirely agree with Foucault that resistance is 
‘everywhere’, that Foucault’s ‘odd terms’ or Chakrabarty’s ‘History 2s’ obtain 
everywhere within a social conjuncture. No less than Foucault, though, Gramsci 
attests to the contingency of any form of human collectivity. If ‘technique-as-work’ 
and ‘technique-as-science’ can never completely converge, then all ‘collective wills’ 
are beset by ‘internal conflicts’, ‘heterogeneities’, and ‘contradictory logics’ that 
arise from ‘unassimilable excesses’ obtaining among their constituent elements, 
rather than solely beyond them. It is because of these excesses that Gramsci’s 
‘organic intellectuals’ are ‘permanent persuaders’ who must continually, actively 
‘maintain contact’ between the ‘great mass of the population’ and that vision of a 
‘technically and morally unitary [social] organism’. After Orientalism, Said turned 
to Gramsci as an alternative to Foucault’s ‘theoretical overtotalization of power’, 
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only to impute in Culture and Imperialism that the ‘moral and intellectual’ unity of 
‘the West’ is thoroughly spontaneous. As I have demonstrated here, on this account, 
Said departs no less from Gramsci than he does from Foucault.  
2.3  ‘Politics’, ‘the political’, and ‘the postcolonial’: Gayatri Spivak 
and the ‘subaltern’ as problematic 
For both Foucault and Gramsci, collective unity is never spontaneous, whether in a 
society, a community, a group identity, an ideology, or a political movement. 
Instead, any such collective exists only as long as power disciplines or ‘educates’ 
those who subscribe to it. So far in this chapter, I have explored how Foucault and 
Gramsci offer a way of reconceiving Said’s ‘virtual unity of purpose’ that avoids 
assuming that it occurs spontaneously. It remains unclear, though, how we might 
demonstrate the existence of resistance-as-dissonance among those who subscribe to 
this ‘imperial consensus’. Having established the theoretical ubiquity of Foucault’s 
‘odd terms’, Young’s ‘unassimilable excesses’, and Chakrabarty’s ‘History 2s’, we 
must now consider how we might ‘empirically’ observe them in places where either 
an apparent lack of dissonance would indicate their absence, or one would not 
expect to find them within existing interpretive frameworks. To begin with, we must 
acknowledge that an apparent lack of evidence that would indicate the presence of 
‘odd terms’ does not in itself establish their absence, non-existence, or impossibility. 
As such, we must reconsider what kind of evidence might indicate the presence of 
‘odd terms’ in cases where they otherwise appear to be absent. This argument may 
well sound farfetched, yet a very similar contention arises within many other 
avenues of inquiry in postcolonial studies.  
In particular, this contention is at the very heart of the debate surrounding the 
figure of the ‘subaltern’, a heavily contested concept that has mutated considerably 
from its original significance as a military term to refer to junior officers. According 
to Marcus E. Green, Gramsci used the term to refer to social groups that ‘are 
subordinated to the power, will, influence, leadership, and direction of a dominant 
group or a ‘single combination’ of dominant groups.’181 Given how ‘class is a major 
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element of his understanding of power and subordination’,182 these groups are often 
Gramsci’s ‘instrumental classes’, including the urban proletariat and rural agrarian 
peasantry. Green, though, warns against a common assumption that for Gramsci, 
‘subaltern’ and ‘proletarian’ were interchangeable. Green traces this assumption 
back to David Arnold’s unsubstantiated claim in 1984 that Gramsci used ‘subaltern’ 
as a euphemism for ‘proletarian’, in order to evade Fascist prison censors.183 Given 
Arnold’s founding involvement in the Subaltern Studies project, this ‘censorship 
thesis’ was popularised by other scholars associated with the group, including 
Spivak and Ranajit Guha. Green’s close reading, though, categorically emonstrates 
how Gramsci used both ‘subaltern’ and ‘proletarian’ right up until his death, often 
side by side in the same passage of writing. Clearly, then, the two categories had 
different functions even for Gramsci.  
Moreover, Gramsci did not use ‘subaltern’ in a strictly socio-economic 
sense. For what rendered one a ‘subaltern’ was not one’s place within the myriad 
modes of production, but rather one’s place in a network of social relations that was 
determined by far more than economic structures.184 If ever Gramsci gave the 
impression to the contrary, then it is only because the category of ‘subaltern’ 
emerged from his engagements with the dispersion and subjugation of his 
‘instrumental classes’ as a political force. Otherwise, Green states that Gramsci used 
the term in reference 
to slaves [when discussing classical Roman society], peasants, 
religious groups, women, different races, the popolani (common 
people) and popolo (people) of the medieval communes, the 
proletariat, and the bourgeoisie prior to the Risorgimento as subaltern 
groups. In his separate analyses, Gramsci never reduces subordination 
to a single relation, but rather conceives subalternity as an 
intersectionality of the variations of race, class, gender, culture, 
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religion, nationalism, and colonialism functioning within an ensemble 
of socio-political and economic relations.’185 
Clearly, then, Gramsci’s ‘subaltern’ anticipated Spivak’s ‘reasonable and rarefied 
definition of the word’, as being in a position that is ‘removed from all lines of 
social mobility’, ‘where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the 
formation of a recognisable basis of action.’186 Gramsci’s subaltern might well have 
been unrecognisable, yet according to Green, Gramsci nonetheless contended that 
‘subaltern groups do not necessarily lack political power by definition.’187 Gramsci’s 
subaltern was subordinated merely to the will of another group, which in itself did 
not equate to total disempowerment. Hence Green’s contention that for Gramsci, 
that ‘a subaltern group’s level of subordination is relative to its level of political 
organization, autonomy, and influence upon dominant groups and dominant 
institutions.’188  
In contrast, Spivak’s subaltern has absolutely no political organisation, no 
autonomy, and no influence upon any group, let alone those which are dominant. 
Spivak is perhaps best known in postcolonial studies for declaring in 1988 that ‘[t]he 
subaltern cannot speak’,189 a statement that as I will demonstrate here, is highly 
misleading, and has in fact been continually misconstrued by her detractors. I have 
already mentioned how for Lazarus, Spivak ‘fetishiz[es] difference under the rubric 
of incommensurability’, foreclosing any possibility that we might have of 
apprehending ‘the social aspirations and forms of consciousness of “the people”’. 
Lazarus is not alone in objecting to Spivak on this account. Similarly, according to 
Bart Moore-Gilbert, much of Spivak’s work has responded to Said’s implication in 
Orientalism that ‘power and discourse is possessed entirely by the colonizer’,190 by 
exploring ‘the degree to which the (post-)colonial subaltern [...] enjoys agency’.191 
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Yet in many respects, Moore-Gilbert finds that ‘[w]hile seeking to correct an 
obvious lacuna in Orientalism, Spivak’s work on the subaltern nonetheless in some 
ways reinforces the substance of her mentor’s arguments.’192 Hence Moore-Gilbert’s 
remark that Spivak ‘might justifiably be considered to be unnecessarily deterministic 
and politically pessimistic.’193 I find that Lazarus and Moore-Gilbert overstate the 
extent to which Spivak renders ‘popular’ or ‘subaltern’ forms of consciousness 
inaccessible to the analyst or the activist. For Spivak’s emphasis is on the subaltern’s 
inability to form ‘a recognisable basis of action’, which is not to say that we can 
never apprehend this basis, or that this inability forecloses every possibility of the 
subaltern ever accessing any ‘lines of social mobility’. The subaltern is 
incommensurable only because existing interpretive frameworks are as yet unable to 
apprehend their consciousness as consciousness, their practice as practice.  
The task of apprehending subaltern consciousness as consciousness, 
therefore, demands that we adjust these frameworks in order to accommodate 
diverse modes of consciousness and practice that we are as yet unable to anticipate 
within them. Rather than a licence for ‘[political] pessimi[sm]’, the subaltern’s 
incommensurability demands that we address the limits of how we understand 
‘action’, ‘consciousness’, even ‘politics’. Spivak generally elaborates her 
understanding of the term via reflections on its usage by the Subaltern Studies 
project, with which both Spivak and Chakrabarty were affiliated, and which was 
founded by Ranajit Guha. Yet even in Gramsci, we see how the subaltern is marked 
by a sense of irreconcilability with certain interpretive frameworks, such as those 
which Gramsci associates with ‘the function of intellectuals’. For as we have seen, 
Gramsci’s ‘instrumental classes’ are ‘subaltern’ because their ‘particular 
conceptions of the world’ and ‘conscious lines of moral conduct’ are not always of 
much use to the task of political organisation. Hence Gramsci’s claim that the 
‘instrumental classes’ can only ‘conquer’ the state if they are organised by a political 
party made up of ‘organic intellectuals’. We have also seen, though, that Gramsci 
remained uncertain over whether the ‘organic intellectuals’ could ever completely 
translate the ‘technique-as-work’ of the ‘instrumental classes’ into ‘technique-as-
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science’ – whether something in the former was irreducible to the relatively general, 
abstract terms of the latter. Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectual’ was a ‘“permanent 
persuader”’ precisely because their ‘technique-as-science’ always remained at a 
remove – however slight – from the ‘technique-as-work’ of the ‘instrumental 
classes’.  
 Gramsci, thought, was not as concerned as Spivak is by this apparently 
permanent gap between ‘technique-as-work’ and ‘technique-as-science’, between 
the intellectuals’ ‘form[s] of intellectual activity’ and those of ‘non-intellectual’ 
groups. The goal of Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectual’ was not to close this gap 
entirely, so much as to align ‘technique-as-work’ and ‘technique-as-science’ close 
enough to enable dialogue between the two, one that would give rise to an effective 
‘moral and intellectual’ unity between the disparate ‘non-intellectual’ groups. That a 
total, integral unity between ‘technique-as-work’ and ‘technique-as-science’ can 
never be achieved was, for Gramsci, no obstacle to mobilising ‘non-intellectual’ 
groups into a political force whose ‘triumph’ would be inevitable. As we shall see, a 
very similar implication arises from Spivak’s distinction between the categories of 
‘the subaltern’ and ‘the popular’. Yet this implication is generally overshadowed in 
Spivak by her emphasis on that gap that will always exist between ‘technique-as-
work’ and ‘technique-as-science’, and which will always prevent the former being 
fully apprehended on its own terms within the terms of the latter.  
This emphasis might well have arisen from the fact that Spivak mostly 
discusses the term ‘subaltern’ as it was used by the Subaltern Studies group. Thus, 
we see how this emphasis marks Guha’s objection – in his Elementary Aspects of 
Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (1983) – to Eric Hobsbawm’s characterisation 
of the Santal rebellion as ‘prepolitical’.194 According to Chakrabarty, Hobsbawm’s 
argument was prompted by the fact that the Santal understood and articulated their 
defiance of the British Raj as the fulfilment of the divine will of Thakur, one of their 
gods. Hobsbawm, therefore, subscribed to a rather restricted, ‘modernist’ or 
‘secularist’ definition of ‘the political’, given how he described the Santal as 
‘prepolitical’ on the basis of their continued belief in ‘the agency of gods, spirits, 
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and other supernatural beings’.195 As Chakrabarty notes, Guha’s objection 
demonstrates how he ‘was prepared to suggest that the nature of collective action by 
peasants in modern India was such that it effectively stretched the category of the 
“political” far beyond the boundaries assigned to it in European political thought.’196 
Hobsbawm excluded the Santal from ‘the political’ not because they themselves 
were not political, but rather because Hobsbawm could not recognise their practices 
as being ‘political’. Rather than adapt his understanding of what could be considered 
‘political’, though, Hobsbawm chose to preserve it, which could only have been 
possible if he excluded the Santal from the category of ‘the political’ entirely, as an 
‘unassimilable excess’.197  
 For Chakrabarty, the Santal exemplify what he calls ‘subaltern pasts’, modes 
of social existence that cannot be rationalised or ‘adequate[ly] theoriz[ed]’198 in 
secular-modernist modes of thought, and which are therefore synonymous with 
Chakrabarty’s ‘History 2s’.199 Rather than crippling our ability to grasp these modes 
of social existence, though, their incommensurability within secular-modernist 
modes of thought – such as professional historiography – ‘act as a supplement’ to 
the latter, ‘helping to show what [their] limits are.’200 Thus, by ‘calling attention to 
the limits of historicizing’, these ‘subaltern pasts’ ‘help us distance ourselves from 
the imperious instincts’ of secular-modernist thought, including ‘the idea that 
                                            
195 Chakrabarty, p. 12.  
196 Chakrabarty, p. 12.  
197 Compare Guha’s critique of Hobsbawm here with Gramsci’s of how Italian intellectuals 
had dismissed David Lazzaretti as a madman: see note 162, p. 122 above. As Green 
notes, Gramsci’s account of Lazzaretti casts doubt over whether he used the term 
‘subaltern’ all that differently to Guha and the other Subaltern Studies scholars.  
198 Lazarus, ‘Introducing postcolonial studies’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Postcolonial Literary Studies, ed. by Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 9.  
199 Indeed, Chakrabarty actually uses his metaphor of ‘stubborn knots that stand out and 
break up the otherwise evenly woven surface of the fabric’ when outlining what he 
means by ‘subaltern pasts’, rather than ‘History 2’ as I have implied elsewhere in this 
chapter. 
200 Chakrabarty, p. 112.  
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everything can be historicized or that one should always historicize.’201 This latter 
claim is reminiscent of Young’s contention – discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis – 
that European thought is permeated by an ‘ontological imperialism’, given that its 
‘universalizing narrative of the unfolding of a rational system of world history is 
simply a negative form of the history of European imperialism.’202 Chakrabarty, 
though, is hardly claiming anything as totalising and fatalistic as what Young claims 
here. For one thing, Chakrabarty maintains that concepts derived within secular-
modern thought – such as rationality, universality and the ‘generalized and 
necessarily disembodied observer’203 – have proven indispensable in enabling the 
disempowered to pursue justice and demand rights. Instead, the ‘imperious instincts’ 
that Chakrabarty’s ‘subaltern pasts’ warn us against are tendencies to reduce 
‘heterogeneities’ to some ‘principle that speaks for an already given whole’.204  
These ‘subaltern pasts’, then, always manage to be ‘beyond’ or in excess of 
that ‘already given whole’, demonstrating how what we expected or anticipated is 
never all that there is, and how we should be prepared to reassess our received 
understandings when encountering the unexpected, rather than simply reducing the 
latter to the former. This attention to forms of consciousness and practice that 
disclose the limits of received categories and analytical frameworks may well 
account for the ‘culturalist emphasis’205 that Lazarus perceives – and often laments 
– in postcolonial studies. Lazarus notes that postcolonial criticism has generally 
taken up approaches to ‘popular consciousness’, ‘popular practice’, and ‘popular’ 
‘forms of representation’ that are ‘derived not from sociology or political economy 
but from the more culturally inflected disciplines of history and anthropology’.206 As 
a result, Lazarus finds that the discipline has largely disregarded much of 
the pioneering work in sociology or political economy or development 
studies [that is] aimed at the recovery and adequate theorization of 
                                            
201 Chakrabarty, p. 112.  
202 Young, p. 2.  
203 Chakrabarty, p. 119.  
204 Chakrabarty, p. 107.  
205 Lazarus, ‘Introducing postcolonial studies’, p. 9 (emphasis in original).  
206 Lazarus, ‘Introducing postcolonial studies’, p. 9 (my emphasis).  
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popular consciousness and popular practice […] insurgent sociologies, 
new approaches in political economy, mould-breaking developments 
in anthropology, feminist and environmentalist work in all sectors of 
the social sciences, and so on.207  
The implication here is that if critics like Spivak have concluded that subaltern 
consciousness is inaccessible, on account of its incommensurability, then it is 
because their preference for critical frameworks derived from allegedly208 ‘more 
culturally inflected’ disciplines like history and anthropology, has simply left them 
ill-equipped for ‘adequately’ recuperating ‘popular consciousness and popular 
practice’. Subaltern consciousness is not incommensurable as such: instead, this 
impression merely reflects the insufficiency of these frameworks to the task of 
‘adequate[ly] theoriz[ing]’ them. The solution, therefore, is to abandon these 
approaches in favour of recent, ‘mould-breaking’ alternatives derived from 
sociology, political economy, and development studies.  
Once again, I profoundly disagree with Lazarus here. We might well be able 
to ‘adequately’ apprehend ‘popular consciousness and popular practice’ within 
existing critical frameworks. However, dismissing approaches that explore the 
inadequacy of these frameworks for apprehending all forms of consciousness and 
practice, risks compounding the inarticulacy of anyone who exhibits forms that 
those frameworks are as yet unable to comprehend as consciousness or as practice. 
In short, dismissing the problematic of subalternity as addressed in ‘culturalist’ 
terms risks compounding the status of subalternity itself, along with the 
underprivilege, exploitation, disenfranchisement, or discrimination that it often leads 
to across the world. A ‘culturally inflected’ approach attends to amorphous forms of 
                                            
207 Lazarus, ‘Introducing postcolonial studies’, p. 9 (emphasis in original).  
208 I find it highly questionable to what extent ‘history’ is ‘culturally inflected’ compared 
with sociology, political economy and development studies, considering how much of 
history is given to studying the history of society and societies, politics and economics. 
Furthermore, blaming postcolonial critics’ incapacity to ‘recover’ or ‘adequate[ly] 
theor[ise]’ ‘popular consciousness and popular practice’ completely ignores the fact 
that Subaltern Studies was a historiographical attempt at such recuperations. Certainly, 
this attempt had mixed results, but Lazarus’s contempt for the subsequent concession 
that ‘popular consciousness and popular practice’ always exceeds our critical 
frameworks frankly conveys an obstinate refusal to even consider the methodological 
lessons that Subaltern Studies yielded, and which are outlined by Chakrabarty – in 
Provincializing Europe – and Spivak – in ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, ‘Subaltern 
Studies: Deconstructing Historiography’ and ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern 
and the Popular’.  
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consciousness and practice; amorphous in the sense that they do not conform to the 
relatively determinate209 categories of sociology, political economy, and 
development studies including the category of ‘politics’ itself. Thus, by attending to 
these amorphous forms, this approach demonstrates the limits of these categories, 
the ways in which they are insufficient to the task of ‘adequate[ly] theoriz[ing]’ all 
consciousness and practice obtaining among those demographics that conventionally 
fall into the category of ‘the popular’.  
As something that exceeds existing categories and interpretive frameworks, 
the subaltern is comparable to the notion of ‘the political’ as opposed to that of 
‘politics’. According to Marchart, this dyad – which he calls the ‘political 
difference’210 – is central to the postfoundational political thought of Lefort, Laclau, 
Mouffe, and Jacques Rancière, among others. The distinction primarily describes 
two ways of comprehending politics, including what it is, what it does, what it is for, 
and what forms of consciousness and practice it encompasses. Thus, on one hand, 
‘politics’ restricts politics to certain forms of consciousness and practice that one 
must necessarily assume in order to participate in certain institutions, organisations, 
or ‘spheres’ of ‘the social’ – the state, parliament, elections, trade unionism, and 
civil society, for example. As a result, by identifying certain practices and 
institutions, as well as certain forms of consciousness as being ‘political’, ‘politics’ 
effectively ‘depoliticises’ other spheres of society, and thus other forms of 
consciousness and practice. Indeed, ‘politics’ depoliticises politics itself, insofar as it 
establishes one particular definition of what politics is, what its purpose is, and who 
can legitimately participate in it. Subsequently, for Rancière, any such 
compartmentalisation amounts to ‘a privatization of politics’ itself, an ‘appropriation 
                                            
209 Note here that I do not mean ‘determinist’, a pejorative term that imputes reductive 
inflexibility. Neither do I discount the possibility that sociology, political economy, and 
development studies can break the mould, in order to more adequately grasp unfamiliar 
forms of consciousness, experience, will, intention, and practice. My point here, then, 
is that it is one thing to argue against accusations that these disciplines are determinist; 
it is another thing entirely, though, to claim that their adaptability enables us to 
exhaustively apprehend anyone’s subjective experience. No matter how adaptable these 
disciplines might be, I maintain that what Lazarus calls a ‘culturalist’ sensibility 
provides a useful way of testing the limits of new adaptations.  
210 Marchart, p. 4.  
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by small oligarchies’211 who reduce political conflict ‘into problems to be resolved 
by learned expertise and the negotiated adjustment of interests.’212 Political disputes 
become disputes over how best to resolve particular grievances, reducing politics to 
the mere task of identifying the most appropriate solution to such grievances, and 
restricting access to politics to those who are best qualified for this task: Rancière’s 
‘learned experts’, his ‘small oligarchies’.  
In contrast, if ‘politics’ defines politics as something that is conducted in a 
certain way, to certain ends, and by those with certain qualifications, then ‘the 
political’ defines politics as something that ‘cannot be restricted to a certain type of 
institution, or envisaged as constituting a specific sphere or level of society’.213 In its 
most immediate sense, ‘the political’ defines politics as a dispute over how to define 
politics itself – what it is, what it consists of, what it does, what it is supposed to 
achieve, and who can participate in it. The process of establishing these parameters, 
though, inevitably involves establishing some kind of ‘definition’ of ‘the social’ 
itself, insofar as one defines politics – its purpose, its methods – according to the 
requirements or priorities of those who must suffer its consequences, whether gladly 
or otherwise. As a result, the definition of politics upheld by those who seem best 
qualified to conduct politics becomes just one of a multitude of disparate, competing 
definitions. Subsequently, whereas ‘politics’ defines politics as something in which 
only those who are suitably qualified can participate, ‘the political’ defines politics 
as something in which everyone – without any exception – can participate, without 
having to claim any qualification or competency whatsoever. ‘The political’, 
therefore, eschews any attempt to define politics according to strict criteria, whether 
they be moral proscriptions against certain kinds of demands or actions; 
philosophical treatises that prescribe what politics ‘really’ is or is ‘really’ about; or 
sociological accounts of what social grievances ‘rationally’ take priority over others. 
Any such reductive definition of politics is merely an attempt to establish a ‘ground’ 
or ‘point of reference’ that can guide the task of rendering society coherent and 
                                            
211 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, in Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural 
Studies, 21, 4 (December 2007), p. 563.  
212 Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, in Dissensus (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2010), p. 71.  
213 Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London, New York: Verso, 1993), p. 3.  
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manageable. Subsequently, ‘the political’ defines politics as a dispute over not only 
the most appropriate way of defining politics itself, but also the most appropriate 
way of ‘grounding’ or defining society in general.  
For those figures that Marchart identifies with his ‘post-foundational 
political thought’ – including Lefort, Laclau, Mouffe, and Rancière – we can never 
hope to resolve this latter dispute over how best to ‘ground’ society. As Rancière 
contends, no matter how comprehensively and accurately one manages to ‘count [...] 
the parts of the population’214 – to apprehend the structure, content, and composition 
of a given society – there will always be something that one leaves out, a ‘part of 
those without part’.215 This exclusion or mere oversight of the ‘uncounted’216 can 
only jeopardise the authority of one’s ‘count’, and by extension any political 
authority one derives from it. Subsequently, one can either ‘recount’ ‘the parts of the 
population’ or sustain the current ‘count’, by formalising the exclusion of the 
‘uncounted’. The latter move often entails formally disenfranchising the 
‘uncounted’, refusing to recognise any obligation to them as legitimate ‘parts’ of 
society, with legitimate demands upon it. This latter response to this supplementary 
‘part’ is what Rancière refers to as ‘the police’, by which he means ‘not a social 
function but a symbolic constitution of the social’, something whose ‘essence [...] 
lies neither in repression nor even in control over the living’, but rather ‘in a certain 
way of dividing up the sensible.’217 Rancière contends that this ‘partition of the 
sensible’, this ‘dividing-up of the world [...] and of people [...], the nemeïn upon 
which the nomoi of the community are founded [...] should be understood in the 
double sense of the word: on the one hand, as that which separates and excludes; on 
the other, as that which allows participation.’218 As with Lefort, Williams, Laclau, 
and Mouffe – as well as with Gramsci, as I have outlined above – so for Rancière, a 
‘community’ can only be ‘founded’ by way of both inclusion and exclusion, by way 
                                            
214 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 33.  
215 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 35.  
216 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 33.  
217 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 36.  
218 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 36.  
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of distinguishing those who can participate from those who cannot, or those 
practices that constitute ‘participation’ from those that do not.  
By referring to this ‘symbolic constitution of the social’ or ‘partition of the 
sensible’ as ‘the police’, Rancière risks encouraging a serious misconstruction, 
according to which the act of partitioning ‘the sensible’ is always a despotic, 
totalitarian one. Indeed, Rancière often discusses this notion of partitioning ‘the 
sensible’ via reference to scenarios in which law enforcement agencies impose or 
uphold a ‘political and legal order’ ‘against the informed will’219 of a defiant public. 
Moreover, Rancière associates this exclusion of the ‘uncounted’ by the prevailing 
‘partition of the sensible’ with attempts to extinguish politics itself, to enforce an 
‘end of politics’, by which he means ‘not the accomplishment of the ends of politics 
but simply a return to the normal state of things – the non-existence of politics.’220 
As Rancière acknowledges, this phrase – ‘the end of politics’ – is not his own, but 
rather one that gained currency within a contemporary, influential ‘sociological 
thesis’ that  
posits the existence of a state of the social in which politics no longer 
has any necessary reason for being; whether this is because it has 
accomplished its ends by bringing this state into being (the exoteric 
American Hegelian-Fukuyama-ist version) or because its forms are no 
longer adapted to the fluidity and artificiality of present-day economic 
and social relations [...] The thesis thus amounts to asserting that the 
logical telos of capitalism entails the extinction of politics.221 
As his allusion to Francis Fukuyama indicates, the ‘sociological thesis’ Rancière 
describes here is that which proclaimed the ‘end of history’ following the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Rancière often associates his notion of ‘the police’ with 
the emphasis on ‘consensus’ that gripped international and domestic policy across 
the world after this event, ‘as the appropriate name for a world that was no longer 
structured by any radical division and no longer offered any radical alternative’222 to 
the rampant, increasingly unchecked neoliberalisation of national and international 
social, economic, and political policy.  
                                            
219 Goonatilake, p. 33.  
220 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 42.  
221 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 43.  
222 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, pp. 565-66.  
- 142 - 
For its champions, ‘consensus’ meant ‘a modern form of government whose 
task is to locate providers of expertise, arbitration and negotiation between diverging 
groups and interests in order to avoid conflicts.’223 In contrast, for Rancière, the 
principle entailed ‘a global re-configuration of the space of the community’, a 
restriction of that space  
solely to the interplay of state mechanisms with combinations of 
social energies and interests. This restriction entails the dismissal of 
all supplements, the steady identification of the political people with 
the count of the parts of the population. Consensus says: there is a 
multiplicity of groups, interests, values and aspirations in our society, 
but there is only one sensory reality that is given to all of us in the 
same way, only one sense that can be made of that given reality, and 
only one particular set of possibilities allowed by it.224 
This refusal to tolerate a ‘radical alternative’ to neoliberal globalisation was recast as 
prudent submission to the inevitable, ‘allow[ing] our governments to appear as the 
mere agents of global necessity and to be legitimized by both their impotence and 
their competence: they are legitimized because they can’t do anything other than 
what can be done, and they are legitimized because they do all that can be done.’225 
Rancière’s ‘police’, therefore, is heavily associated with the function of sustaining a 
worldwide ‘partition of the sensible’ that in turn consolidates neoliberal 
globalisation, by ‘fram[ing] a world where the supplementary activity of political 
subjects has no place’226 – that is, by formalising the exclusion of the ‘uncounted’ 
from the prevailing ‘count of the parts of the [global] population’. The ‘uncounted’ 
here incorporates not only those demographics that have not benefited from 
neoliberal globalisation, but also those who oppose this new regime, regardless of 
how much they have benefited from it.  
 In this respect, Rancière’s ‘police’ is reminiscent of Gramsci’s ‘regressive’ 
political party, which ‘carr[ies] out its policing function in order to conserve an 
outward, extrinsic order which is a fetter on the vital forces of history’, an order 
‘which has been superseded’ by a newly-emergent ‘collective will’, and which has 
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225 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 566.  
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therefore become ‘anti-historical’.227 Nonetheless, even Gramsci’s ‘progressive’ 
political party ‘carr[ies] out a policing function’, one that is necessary if the party’s 
‘mass element’ is to become a unified, organised, irresistible ‘force’.228 For 
Gramsci, what renders a political party ‘regressive’ is not its recourse to ‘policing’ 
the ‘great mass of the population’ as such, but rather the intention behind this 
recourse. A similar implication arises from Rancière’s definition of politics as ‘a 
conflict between one sensible order and another’,229 an ‘opposition between logics 
that count the parties and parts of the community in different ways.’230 For Rancière, 
politics occurs whenever the prevailing ‘count’ is challenged by an alternative that 
incorporates those who are ‘uncounted’ in that prevailing ‘count’. However, it 
remains that this alternative ‘count’ is still a ‘count’, a ‘partition of the sensible’ that 
is no less likely to have overlooked or omitted certain other ‘parts of the population’.  
Hence Rancière’s conviction that there can never be an ‘end of politics’. For 
even if this alternative superseded the prevailing ‘count’, its ‘triumph’ would not 
entail any such ‘extinction’, since there will always be a section of the population 
that goes ‘uncounted’, even in the most comprehensive ‘count’. To somehow put an 
end to politics, therefore, is not to find some lasting solution to all social problems, 
disagreements, and antagonisms. Instead, putting an end to politics entails 
establishing a totalitarian regime, one that formalises the omission of the 
‘uncounted’ as exclusion, as a refusal – rather than a mere failure – to acknowledge 
the regime’s obligation to take seriously their grievances, their consciousness, their 
practice.231 As such, the misconstruction I mentioned above pertains to the negative 
connotations of Rancière’s notion of ‘the police’ and of partitioning ‘the sensible’. 
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For Rancière, the goal of politics is not an ‘end of the police’ and of the exclusion of 
the ‘uncounted’, since no ‘count’ can ever include everyone and everything, in much 
the same way as Williams’s ‘dominant cultures’.  
 Unlike Mouffe, Rancière never uses Marchart’s dyad of ‘politics’ and ‘the 
political’, yet his own dyad of ‘police’ and ‘politics’ articulates a very similar 
distinction. On one hand, Marchart’s ‘politics’ and Rancière’s ‘police’ refer to a way 
of conceiving politics and society as having limits, in which case it is entirely 
possible to comprehensively or ‘adequately’ ‘count’ what exists within those limits. 
On the other hand, Marchart’s ‘the political’ and Rancière’s ‘politics’ refer to a way 
of conceiving politics and society as being quite literally limitless in its irreducible 
infinitude. As such, the second term in both dyads – ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ – 
draws attention to how the first term can only apprehend politics and society as 
being limited, by ‘select[ing] from and consequently exclud[ing] the full range of 
human practice.’232 As distinguished from ‘the popular’, the category of ‘subaltern’ 
– I believe – functions in precisely the same way as this second term in these two 
dyads. As something that exceeds existing critical frameworks, including those that 
– supposedly – ‘adequately theorize’ ‘popular consciousness and popular practice’, 
‘the subaltern’ approximates Rancière’s ‘uncounted’, the supplementary ‘part of 
those without part’ that these frameworks omit when conducting their own ‘partition 
of the sensible’.233  
It is important, therefore, to avoid conflating ‘the subaltern’ with ‘the 
popular’, for the former attends to forms of consciousness and practice that the latter 
cannot ‘adequately theorize’. To simply presume that no such amorphous forms 
exist is effectively to formalise their oversight as exclusion, within critical 
                                            
232 Williams, p. 125.  
233 Again, on this point we might distinguish Spivak’s subaltern from Gramsci’s. For the 
latter goes ‘uncounted’ only within ‘the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group’, within the dominant group’s own, ‘particular conception 
of the world’ and ‘conscious line of moral conduct’. Gramsci’s subaltern, then, may 
well be ‘counted’ in some other ‘conception of the world’, in which case what makes 
them a subaltern is the fact that this other ‘sensible order’ has yet to become dominant. 
In contrast, Spivak’s subaltern goes ‘uncounted’ in all such orders – no one as yet 
recognises this subaltern, not even those who contest the prevailing ‘sensible order’ in 
the name of ‘the part of those without part’. Whereas Gramsci’s subaltern might well 
belong to a recognisable identity or category, Spivak’s belongs to no such category 
whatsoever.  
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frameworks that otherwise adequately apprehend forms that are recognisably 
‘popular’. Lazarus may well be correct to argue that it is indeed possible to 
adequately ‘recover’ or ‘theor[ise]’ ‘popular consciousness and popular practice’. 
However, in countering Spivak’s apparent foreclosure of our ability to access the 
subaltern’s consciousness, Lazarus conflates ‘popular consciousness and popular 
practice’ with that of the subaltern. As Spivak points out, though, the subaltern – or 
at least the ‘reasonable and rarefied definition of the word’234 that interests her – is 
far from synonymous with the idea of ‘the popular’. For the latter term invariably 
denotes a collective identity or collective mode of belonging. In contrast, the former 
is based around ‘singularity’, in the sense of ‘life as pure immanence’,235 pertaining 
to something that is not in some way the repetition of something larger, like a 
‘universal law’ or a collective identity.  
The singular cannot be categorised without becoming a repetition of the 
category itself and all other instances or examples of that category. As a result, 
Spivak’s subaltern-as-singular cannot form ‘a recognisable basis of action’ because 
that basis – along with the action it enables – cannot be made to correspond to any 
available category, and thus recognised as an instance of that category. To be able to 
claim to have ‘adequately’ ‘recovered’ or apprehended the subaltern’s 
‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, ‘will’, or ‘practice’, one must be able to recognise it 
as consciousness, experience, will, or practice. Thus, any such claim invariably 
apprehends the subaltern as something other than a subaltern. For making such a 
claim is to recognise the subaltern as an agent with a recognisable grievance, 
interest, or demand. Moreover, as a recognised, recognisable agent, we will have 
recognised the subaltern’s practice as articulating that demand, and thus as an 
articulation of a demand, as articulacy, as indicating that the subaltern has spoken. 
Yet because they ‘cannot speak’ as long as they cannot form ‘a recognisable basis of 
action’, the subaltern would not ‘speak’ as a subaltern, but rather as whatever we 
‘recognise’ them as, whether as a woman, a citizen, a worker, a human, ‘the people’, 
or indeed a category that we must invent in cases where what we observe is 
irreducible to all existing categories. 
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Thus, paradoxically, even when we have ‘recognised’ the subaltern as any of 
these categories – and thus allegedly dispelled their subaltern status – we must bear 
in mind the ways in which this ‘recognition’ is actually misrecognition, as we 
apprehend the subaltern’s consciousness and experience solely as an instance of 
whatever category we ‘recognise’ them as. Lazarus, therefore, is correct to insist that 
existing critical frameworks are capable of adequately apprehending ‘popular 
consciousness and popular practice’, but only with respect to forms of 
consciousness and practice that correspond to what we understand to be the category 
of ‘the popular’. Because ‘the subaltern’ is not synonymous with ‘the popular’, this 
contention does not establish the adequacy of those frameworks for ‘theorising’ 
subaltern consciousness and practice. Nonetheless, to insist upon this inadequacy 
hardly forecloses the possibility of emancipating the subaltern, of alleviating them of 
their subaltern status and lending them truly effective agency. Instead, this insistence 
forecloses the possibility of fully, comprehensively grasping subaltern 
‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, ‘will’, and ‘practice’ in their own terms. This 
foreclosure draws attention to how the subaltern can only become an agent by 
assuming an identity or subject-position that is already recognisable – having 
already been recognised – but which will always be inadequate to the task of 
exhaustively articulating their subjective experience. As Spivak attests, no one can 
claim the identity of ‘subaltern’ for themselves – ‘[n]o one can say ‘I am a 
subaltern’ in whatever language’236 and remain a subaltern. Of course, there are 
innumerable demographics across the world today that could legitimately claim to 
being unable to form ‘a recognisable basis of action’. However, it remains that 
successfully ‘claiming’ that grievance and thus being recognised as a ‘subaltern’ 
requires performing some kind of recognisable action, in which case the successful 
claimant would cease to be a subaltern in the very moment in which they are 
‘recognised’ as one.  
Spivak’s category of the ‘subaltern’, therefore, suggests that something 
always exceeds existing categories like ‘the popular’, in much the same way as 
Foucault’s ‘odd terms’ jar with power’s regulated vision of a stable, coherent 
society. For all their similarities, though, Spivak’s rendition of the subaltern-as-
supplement and Foucault’s of resistance-as-dissonance also have their differences. 
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For one thing, whereas the latter describes something that is socially ubiquitous, that 
is ‘everywhere’, the former derives from Spivak’s analyses of social, cultural, 
political and juridical forms that exist on just one ‘side’ of the so-called 
‘international division of labour’ – that is, the ‘other side’,237 the ‘Third World’. I 
wonder, though, whether this apparent rootedness within a particular historical 
conjuncture is due to the fact that Spivak’s original interest in the term ‘subaltern’ 
came from her engagements with the work of the Subaltern Studies group, which 
largely attended to India.238 Spivak has claimed that, ‘given the active circuit of 
socialized capital, it is hard for us to think of a genuine subaltern in the First 
World.’239 Nonetheless, if subalternity pertains to something that exceeds the remit 
of existing categories, then to claim that it obtains only in particular social 
conjunctures is to claim that these categories are adequate to the task of 
comprehensively articulating all forms of consciousness, experience, intention, and 
practice that obtain in other social conjunctures.  
                                            
237 Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, p. 288.  
238 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 476.  
239 Spivak, ‘Negotiating the Structures of Violence’, in The Post-Colonial Critic: 
Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. by Sarah Harasym (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 142; in a much later article, Spivak would remark that, as she 
‘search[ed] [for] the subaltern’ in the years following the publication of ‘Can the 
Subaltern Speak?’, the category ‘kept moving down the social strata’, a ‘downward 
trajectory [that] came to relate to home working, permanent casuals, more orthodox 
doubts of the Marxist analysis of the female laboring body as the agent of production’ 
(Spivak, ‘Scattered speculations’, p. 481). Whether Spivak ever ‘found’ the subaltern is 
unclear, given her contention in the same essay that ‘[t]he subaltern has no ‘examples’’ 
(Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 484). Again, 
Spivak’s subaltern departs from Gramsci’s on this note. For on one hand, like Gramsci, 
Spivak has arguably ‘found’ plenty of ‘subalterns’, albeit insofar as they are 
‘uncounted’ within prevailing ‘sensible orders’. Hence her emphasis on female 
peasants or sub-proletarians in rural India, subjected to ‘traditional’ and patriarchal 
social structures. (See pp. 131-32 above for a list of some of the subaltern groups 
Gramsci identified.) Yet the uncertainty over whether she has ever found the 
‘Subaltern’ reflects Spivak’s understanding of the term in a singular sense, as a position 
without any identity whatsoever, and which accords with no known category. Indeed, 
according to this highly rarefied understanding, Spivak will never ‘find’ the 
‘Subaltern’, because as soon as she purports to have found it, she will have identified it 
as something other than a subaltern, and so she will have redressed its lack of recourse 
to any existing identity.  
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This claim resembles Guha’s that the ‘metropolitan bourgeoisie [...] 
professed and practiced democracy at home’,240 in almost direct antithesis to their 
autocratic rule throughout colonial South Asia. If the subaltern acquires agency by 
‘cathecting’ a recognised identity and yet in some respects remain a ‘subaltern’ – 
insofar as that identity cannot articulate every aspect of their consciousness, 
experience, will, or practice – then it becomes possible that the problematic that the 
category of ‘subaltern’ addresses obtains in all cases of ‘cathecting’ a collective, 
hence recognised identity. We might even argue that this wider applicability extends 
not just to all cases of ‘cathecting’ identities like ‘worker’ or ‘people’, but even to 
cases of ‘cathecting’ relatively ‘privileged’ identities, such as those of ‘middle 
class’, ‘beneficiary’, ‘white’, or ‘man’ as idealised in the discourses of 
heteronormative masculinity. For example, if Said claims that orthodox Orientalism 
‘squeezed out’ ‘everything but “learning”’, then we might think of Burton’s 
reduction to ‘the voice of Empire’ not as enforced conformity to those strictures 
‘against [his] informed will’, so much as Burton ‘cathecting’ the identity of the 
Orientalist, the European, or the ‘coloniser’.  
As I have already discussed above, Said approaches Burton’s reduction to 
‘the voice of Empire’ as evidence of some kind of ‘mechanism operat[ing] 
specifically (and effectively) upon personal human experiences that otherwise 
contradicted’241 the strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’. I concluded my discussion 
of Gramsci by considering whether this ‘mechanism’ resembled the process of 
selective incorporation as described above, a process whose exclusionary nature 
resembles Spivak’s notion of ‘cathexis’, the act of embodying or inhabiting a 
collective identity or category. According to Spivak, this act is synecdochal: it 
involves taking ‘the part [of oneself] that seems to agree’ or correspond with the 
terms of the assumed identity ‘to stand for the whole [of oneself]. I put aside the 
surplus of my subjectivity and metonymise myself, count myself as the part by 
which I am connected to the particular predicament so that I can claim collectivity, 
and engage in action validated by that very collective.’242 In order to be recognised 
                                            
240 Guha, p. 4.  
241 Said, Orientalism, p. 156 (emphases in original).  
242 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 480 (my 
emphasis).  
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as ‘belonging’ to a collective – as a repetition of a category – one must identify the 
part of oneself that corresponds to the terms of that collective as the whole of 
oneself, excising or ‘putting aside’ in the process the remainder, the ‘surplus’ that 
cannot be reduced to those terms – the ‘unassimilable excess’. In precisely the same 
way, Burton ‘put aside’ those ‘personal human experiences that otherwise 
contradicted’, that were irreducible to the strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’. The 
‘mechanism’ leading to this excision, therefore, might well be something like 
Spivak’s process of ‘self-metonymisation’.  
It still remains unclear, though, whether only those ‘individualists’ like 
Burton ‘metonymised’ themselves in this manner, or whether all Orientalists equally 
did so. For if conformists like Kinglake lacked any ‘personal human experiences’ 
that diverged from or contradicted Orientalist orthodoxy, then we would have no 
reason to assume that they equally had to ‘metonymise’ themselves in order to 
conform to that orthodoxy. Again, though, Said provides very little evidence that 
‘non-conformists’ like Burton ever had any such experiences, and so we have little 
more reason to assume that their reduction to ‘the voice of Empire’ did indeed entail 
‘self-metonymisation’. Said is unable to sustain his distinction between Burton and 
Kinglake as long as he is unable to establish where Burton’s ‘personal human 
experiences’ went, or rather ‘what forms they took, while they lasted’.243 For this 
inability renders Said unable to demonstrate that Burton ever did have any such 
experiences in the first place, and that Kinglake did not. We thus return to the 
dilemma with which I introduced the current section of this chapter – the dilemma 
concerning how to demonstrate a presence using existing critical frameworks that 
are unable either to recognise that presence as such, or to even comprehend it as 
something that is possible.  
Of course, what I am suggesting here is a rather different way of explaining 
the apparent absence of ‘personal human experiences’ of ‘the Orient’ in ‘non-
conformist’ accounts like those of Burton and Flaubert. For whereas Said claims that 
these experiences are simply absent or ‘squeezed out’, I am suggesting that they 
only appear to be absent, because Said cannot perceive any evidence of them within 
his chosen interpretive framework. At the very least, though, Said does notice that 
                                            
243 Said, Orientalism, p. 156 (emphases in original).  
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curious manner in which ‘personal human experiences’ are somehow ‘squeezed out’ 
– the oddity of how a wholly ‘bookish Orientalism’ seems corroborated by 
‘terrestrial reality’ itself, despite all the ways in which the former allegedly 
misrepresents the latter. We can read this observation in two ways. Either Flaubert 
and Burton’s accounts of ‘the Orient’ are haunted by something like that presence-
as-absence that Said notes throughout Conrad’s Heart of Darkness; or it is Said’s 
analysis that is haunted by this presence-as-absence, insofar as he ignores ‘odd 
terms’ in these accounts in favour of emphasissing how both writers ultimately 
subscribe to ‘the voice of Empire’. As such, whenever he notes the curious absence 
of ‘odd terms’ in Flaubert and Burton’s accounts, what he observes is the limits of 
his own interpretive framework, the moment in which he unduly homogenises 
European experiences of ‘terrestrial reality’ in ‘the Orient’.  
In this respect, Said might be accused of succumbing to an ‘imperious 
instinct’244 in the sense that, rather than ‘stay[ing] with heterogeneities’, instead he 
‘reduce[s] them to [an] overarching principle that speaks for an already given 
whole.’245 I am not suggesting that either Flaubert and Burton were ‘counter-
hegemonic voices’, or that they were ‘reduced [...] to the role of imperial scribe’ 
‘against the[ir] informed will’, as if they were opposed to European imperialism as 
much as Orientalist ‘anonymity’. No doubt Said was correct to insist that Orientalist 
orthodoxy in no way corresponded to ‘terrestrial reality’. Yet we would surely then 
observe a tension in Flaubert and Burton’s accounts of ‘terrestrial reality’, between 
the details of their experiences of that reality and the strictures of ‘bookish 
Orientalism’, even if they were both ‘reduced [...] to the role of imperial scribe’. 
Rather than a deliberate, defiant violation of those strictures, this tension would 
indicate how the former simply cannot be reduced to the terms of the latter, no 
matter how hard Flaubert and Burton try. We would observe this irreducibility in the 
form of Foucault’s ‘odd terms’, Young’s ‘unassimilable excesses’, and 
Chakrabarty’s ‘stubborn knots’, or what Spivak calls ‘misfits in the text’, ‘moments 
                                            
244 Chakrabarty, p. 112.  
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of transgression’, or ‘critical moments’’246 – details that do not conform to a wider 
pattern, and which the pattern therefore cannot explain.   
As we have seen, Rancière would refer to these irreducible details as ‘the 
part of those without part’, ‘supplements’ that disturb the ‘stable distribution of 
places, identities, functions and competencies’247 that – as a result – can only be 
maintained by excluding this ‘part’ of the ‘uncounted’. This exclusion of the 
‘uncounted’ is what Rancière means by ‘consensus’, a state of harmony in which 
everyone is ‘in his or her place, with the occupation suited to his or her place and the 
name fitting that occupation.’248 Thus, as soon as the ‘uncounted’ protest their 
exclusion, they step ‘out of place’,249 disrupting that ‘stable distribution of places, 
identities, functions and competencies’, and inciting what Rancière calls dissensus. 
Rancière provides numerous definitions of this term that do not always co-align, as I 
will explore in my next chapter. Generally, though, dissensus for Rancière describes 
a situation that arises whenever ‘there is something wrong in the picture, when 
something is not at the right place. There is dissensus when we don’t know how to 
designate what we see, when a name no longer suits the thing or the character that it 
names, etc.’250 ‘Dissensus’ arises whenever existing interpretive frameworks cannot 
categorise something or someone, or recognise them according to existing identities. 
Once again, Rancière’s notion of the ‘uncounted’, or the ‘part of those without part’, 
resonates with Spivak’s figure of the subaltern.251  
                                            
246 Spivak, ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography’, p. 21.  
247 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561.  
248 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561.  
249 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 559.  
250 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560.  
251 Throughout this thesis, my emphasis when reading Rancière is on how to go ‘uncounted’ 
is to be deprived of agency. Yet this status is not always one of disempowerment. An 
especially apt example of ‘dissensus’ from postcolonial studies is Frantz Fanon’s 
account of how a revolutionary national consciousness takes form in the cultural 
practices and productions of colonised peoples. Initially, native cultural forms calcify 
under colonial rule. National culture ‘becomes a set of automatic habits, some 
traditions of dress and a few broken-down institutions. Little movement can be 
discerned in such remnants of culture [...] The poverty of the people, national 
oppression and the inhibition of culture are one and the same thing’ (Fanon, Frantz, 
The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 
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Indeed, this comparability helps establish how Spivak manages to ‘observe’ 
subaltern consciousness, and how we might ‘observe’ ‘odd terms’ in places where 
they otherwise appear to be absent, unlikely, or impossible within existing 
frameworks. For as long as Rancière’s ‘uncounted’ are excluded from the prevailing 
‘partition of the sensible’, they cannot be observed – except via the dissensus that 
arises wherever they step ‘out of place’. In the same way, Spivak’s ‘misfits in the 
text’ or ‘moments of transgression’ indicate the presence of something that 
theoretically should not be there, according to existing frameworks. Indeed, 
Foucault’s ‘odd terms’, Young’s ‘unassimilable excess’, and Chakrabarty’s 
‘stubborn knots’ all indicate something very similar – a presence that was 
unanticipated, and which is therefore as yet unnameable and unexplainable. Of 
course, what Said observes in Flaubert and Burton is an unanticipated absence rather 
than a presence, a dearth of dissensus in the form of a disjuncture between their 
accounts of ‘terrestrial reality’ and the claims of ‘bookish Orientalism’. However, 
there is dissensus as long as Said is unable to explain this absence – as long as he 
cannot establish where Burton and Flaubert’s ‘personal human experiences’ went, 
‘what forms they took, while they lasted’,252 or identify that ‘formidable mechanism 
[...] operat[ing] specifically (and effectively) upon [those] personal human 
experiences’. According to Said, these experiences have stepped ‘out of place’.  
Of course, Flaubert and Burton themselves hardly step ‘out of place’, given 
how they excise certain ‘personal human experiences’ from their accounts of 
‘terrestrial reality’ in order to conform to the strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’. On 
the contrary, both writers remain squarely in the place of the ‘disinterested’ 
Orientalist observer, sustaining in the process Orientalism’s own ‘stable distribution 
of places, identities, functions and competencies’ by refusing to allow ‘terrestrial 
                                                                                                                           
191). Gradually, though, as ‘the Negro comes to an understanding of himself, and 
understands the rest of the world differently,’ (my emphasis) so native customs and 
crafts take on new, more vivid, more colourful, and more innovative forms. In 
response, the occupying power condemns these developments ‘in the name of a rigid 
code of artistic style and of a cultural life which grows up at the heart of the colonial 
system. The colonial specialists do not recognize these new forms and rush to the help 
of the traditions of the indigenous society’ (Fanon, p. 195 (my emphasis)).  These new 
cultural forms disrupt the ‘stable distribution of places, identities, functions and 
competencies’ of the European specialist in the native culture, and the natives 
themselves effectively step ‘out of place’ as dictated within that ‘sensible order’.  
252 Said, Orientalism, p. 156 (emphases in original).  
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reality’ – including ‘Orientals’ themselves – to depart from Orientalist orthodoxy in 
ways that would disrupt that particular ‘partition of the sensible’. However, insofar 
as Said finds this absence remarkable, then we might argue that neither Flaubert nor 
Burton’s ‘personal human experiences’ were reducible to the strictures of ‘bookish 
Orientalism’. Thus, despite their efforts to conform to those strictures, the very 
absence of these experiences denotes a disavowed yet irrepressible presence – the 
presence of an ‘unassimilable excess’, of evidence of how ‘terrestrial reality’ is too 
infinitely complex to be reduced to the tidy regularities of Orientalist orthodoxy. 
Again, it may be the case that this absence obtains in Said’s analysis of these 
accounts, rather than the accounts themselves. Either way, this presence-as-absence 
suggests that neither Flaubert nor Burton’s consciousness or experience coincided 
perfectly with Orientalist orthodoxy. Moreover, if Said finds no evidence of 
‘personal human experiences’ that diverged from Orientalist orthodoxy in the 
writings of ‘conformists’ like Kinglake, then I see no reason to doubt that this 
absence equally indicates a presence-as-absence. Once again, we cannot conclude 
from the absence of ‘odd terms’ in Kinglake’s accounts, that his consciousness and 
experience of ‘terrestrial reality’ did not exceed the strictures of ‘bookish 
Orientalism’, even if he by no means intended to acknowledge this disjuncture.  
 Thus, if Flaubert, Burton, and Kinglake’s accounts of ‘terrestrial reality’ are 
marked by dissensus, then it reflects a disjuncture between consciousness and 
experience on one hand, and will and intention on the other – between an awareness 
that ‘terrestrial reality’ exceeds the strictures of ‘bookish Orientalism’, and a desire 
to corroborate those strictures nonetheless. This dissensus arises because ‘the 
Orient’ refuses to stay in its place as dictated by Orientalist orthodoxy. However, if 
they are indeed aware of this refusal – however much they do not acknowledge it – 
then Flaubert, Burton, and Kinglake are equally ‘out of place’. As such, their 
excisions of ‘personal human experiences’ that jar with Orientalist orthodoxy are 
efforts to step back into place, as much as they are efforts to put ‘the Orient’ back 
into its place. We can therefore avoid totalising the individual Orientalist’s 
consciousness and experience of ‘terrestrial reality’, by assuming that a disjuncture 
exists between the two, just as much as between that reality and ‘bookish 
Orientalism’. Wherever we observe such absences, what we observe is not a 
spontaneous totality, but rather ‘self-metonymisation’, as defined above by Spivak. 
In my next chapter, I will demonstrate how this principle becomes important not just 
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methodologically, but also politically. For the possibility of challenging the 
ascendancy of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ depends on there being a disjuncture 
between that consensus and the individual consciousness and experience of those 
who subscribe to it. In short, we should never assume that the latter does not exceed 
the former, under any circumstances.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have pursued a way of reconceiving Said’s ‘virtual unity of 
purpose’ without assuming that it occurs spontaneously, as if all ‘Westerners’ were 
congenitally imperialist. Building on Williams’s distinction between ‘official 
consciousness’ and ‘practical consciousness’, I have looked towards Foucault and 
Gramsci for ways of reconciling Said’s claims that this unity is often absolute, with 
the fact that – as Said acknowledged – ‘Western society’ is also deeply divided. I 
have suggested that, in light of these fractures, we must understand this ‘imperial 
consensus’ not as something that occurs spontaneously, but rather as something that 
persists only as long as there is an apparatus of instrumental power that sustains it, 
by actively disciplining or coercing those who participate in it. For both Foucault 
and Gramsci, no form of collective unity ever occurs spontaneously, whether in a 
society, a collective identity, or a political movement. Thus, in the absence of a 
disciplining agency performing a ‘policing function’, such collectives can only 
dissolve under the pressure of the myriad of differences between their constituent 
elements. One implication, of course, is that one’s individual consciousness, 
experience, intentions, and practices might never correlate perfectly with whatever 
collective one might subscribe to. Hence Spivak’s contention that subscribing to any 
given collective entails ‘self-metonymisation’, the disavowal of aspects of oneself 
that exceed the terms of the collective in question.  
 No collective, therefore, ever manages to totalise itself, in the sense of 
incorporating every aspect of everyone in a given polity – not even Said’s ‘imperial 
consensus’. There is always an ‘unassimilable excess’ that haunts even the most 
expansive or ‘total’ ‘consensus’, an ‘odd term’ or ‘stubborn knots that stand out and 
break up the otherwise evenly woven surface of the fabric’253 that is the seemingly 
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total, spontaneous, and undifferentiated ‘collective will’. Gramsci’s ‘policing 
function’, therefore, serves a similar purpose to that of Rancière’s ‘police’ – the 
‘dismissal of all supplements’ that, having stepped ‘out of place’, disrupt the 
prevailing ‘stable distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’. 
Spivak’s notion of ‘self-metonymisation’ describes a very similar effect, although 
here the ‘policing’ agent is oneself, rather than some exterior agency, like a state, a 
political party, or a ‘ruling class’. If the logic of ‘consensus’ never prevails 
absolutely – as Rancière argues – then these ‘supplements’ never disappear entirely. 
Thus, just as Foucault claims that ‘it is the absence of resistance which is 
impossible’,254 so I argue that an apparent absence of ‘odd terms’ merely indicates 
the inadequacy of existing interpretive frameworks to perceive them.  
To this end, I have suggested that Said’s distinction between ‘individualist’ 
Orientalist writers like Flaubert and Burton, and conformists like Kinglake is 
potentially false. For Said does little to establish that the ‘imaginative pressures […] 
institutions and traditions [or] cultural forces’255 that ‘reduced’ the former ‘to the 
role of imperial scribe’ did not act upon the latter in equal measure. Indeed, Said 
derives this distinction from Flaubert and Burton’s conscious efforts to resist being 
‘literally abolish[ed]’ as individual ‘human subject[s]’ by these pressures, rather 
than from textual evidence that indicates that these two writers were subject to 
‘personal human experiences’ that conformists were not. If Said ever finds evidence 
of equivocation in the otherwise ‘anonymous’ edifice of Orientalist ‘Science’, he 
only does so wherever a writer explicitly opposes something about Orientalism. 
Thus, if Said attributes the ‘internal consistency’ of Orientalist discourse to an 
absence of ‘odd terms’, then he does so because he equates ‘resistance’ with 
‘opposition’. In the process, Said overlooks forms of resistance-as-friction that arise 
from the dissonance between ‘personal human experience’ and Orientalist 
orthodoxy, ‘practical consciousness’ and ‘official consciousness’. 
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Chapter 3 
Consent, subjectivity, and excess 
We should avoid assuming that existing interpretive frameworks can ever be capable 
of exhaustively apprehending the consciousness, experience, intentions, and 
practices of any given individual or group. In my previous chapter, I argued that we 
should avoid this assumption with respect to individual consciousness, experience, 
intention, and practice as such, rather than solely among the most impoverished, 
disenfranchised, and marginalised demographics. In this chapter, I argue that the 
prospect of successfully challenging the ascendancy of Edward W. Said’s ‘imperial 
consensus’1 rests on us avoiding this assumption. After all, to claim that this 
consensus exhaustively articulates the consciousness, experience, intentions, and 
practices of those who subscribe to it, is to apprehend it as something that – unlike 
Raymond Williams’s ‘dominant culture’ – does not ‘select from and consequently 
exclude the full range of human practice.’2 Subsequently, this understanding posits 
this ‘imperial consensus’ as being entirely free of any remainder or ‘unassimilable 
excess’3 that would indicate that those who subscribe to it are subject to something – 
an experience, perhaps, or a value, an idea, a belief, a subliminal awareness – that 
cannot be made to comply with an imperialist worldview. In short, to claim that 
Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ fully represents the subjectivities of all who participate 
in it is to apprehend the latter synecdochally, just as Spivak argues with respect to 
the category of ‘the popular’.4 
 In this chapter, I argue that this remainder is the necessary condition that 
makes it possible for us to challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of this ‘imperial 
                                            
1 Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 62. 
2 Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 
125. 
3 Young, Robert J.C., White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 135-36. 
4 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, ‘Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular’, in 
Postcolonial Studies, 8, 4 (2005), 480; For a discussion of the synecdochal effect of 
social categories like ‘the popular’, see Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 144-46. 
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consensus’. For this remainder is what prompts those who participate in this 
‘consensus’ – or indeed, any ‘sensible order’,5 ‘collective will’,6 ‘dominant culture’7 
or ‘hegemonic formation’8 – to experience what Jacques Rancière calls ‘dis-
identification’, a moment of rupture in which an individual suddenly no longer 
identifies with either their ‘place’ within the ‘stable distribution of places, identities, 
functions and competencies’9 outlined within a prevailing ‘sensible order’,10 or with 
that order itself. If political authority is hegemonic wherever it enjoys voluntary 
popular consent, then we can only challenge this form of authority by encouraging 
those who consent to ‘dis-identify’ in this manner. So far in this thesis, I have 
established how Said’s account of imperialism’s ascendancy among ‘Westerners’ – 
along with more general claims among postcolonial critics concerning the 
‘structuring assumptions’11 underpinning all ‘Western’ thought – resembles various 
accounts of hegemonic articulation, including those of Antonio Gramsci, Raymond 
Williams, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Oliver Marchart. Despite their 
obvious differences, each of these thinkers attests that any totalist articulation of 
society, community, identity, or consciousness cannot possibly encompass ‘the full 
range of human practice’, and can only be sustained by exteriorising – that is, 
excluding – anything that exceeds the terms of the totality. However, all of these 
thinkers maintain that society is much too complex for a straightforward, inside-
outside, included-excluded opposition to ever occur spontaneously, without the 
                                            
5 Rancière, Jacques, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, in Continuum: Journal of Media & 
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active organisation of both the distribution of matter – including bodies and their 
physical environment – and its symbolic inscriptions. Society itself, therefore, will 
never fully correspond to such oppositions and totalisations.  
 According to Rancière, the ascendancy of a ‘sensible order’ is challenged 
only whenever someone ‘dis-identifies’ from it. Rancière defines ‘dis-identification’ 
as a status of occupying a ‘gap’ or ‘interval between identities’ that reflects a 
‘difference between the voice and the body’,12 between one’s allotted place within 
an ascendant ‘stable distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’, 
and one’s own, independent perception of oneself. This difference indicates that the 
latter is irreducible to the former. Rancière maintains that this difference can occur 
anywhere, among anyone. Indeed, any apparent absence of this disjuncture is by no 
means spontaneous. Instead, this absence denotes the active maintenance of ‘an 
identity between law and fact, such that the former becomes identical with the 
natural life of society’.13 Rancière maintains that no such identity ever occurs 
spontaneously; that a coincidence between ‘law and fact’ exists only as long as the 
possibility of ‘dis-identification’ is minimised. Yet since ‘law and fact’ never 
coincide spontaneously, ‘dis-identification’ always remains possible, no matter how 
improbable. As such, to assume that an apparent absence of ‘dis-identification’ 
denotes its impossibility, is to contribute to the ascendancy of a prevailing ‘sensible 
order’, by compounding its own foreclosure of the possibility of challenging its 
claim to ‘an identity between law and fact’.  
 To challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’, 
then, we must encourage those who subscribe to it to ‘dis-identify’ from it instead, 
which in turn demands that we avoid assuming that that consensus exhaustively 
articulates their consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices. Instead, we 
                                            
12 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, in October, 61, ‘The Identity in 
Question’ (Summer 1992), p. 62. 
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must assume that subscribing to that ‘imperial consensus’ requires one to 
‘metonymise [one]self’, as outlined by Spivak. That is, to subscribe to an imperialist 
‘sensible order’ is to take ‘the part [of oneself] that seems to agree’ with the terms of 
that order ‘to stand for the whole’; to ‘put aside the surplus of [one’s] subjectivity 
and [...] count [one]self’ entirely as that particular part.14 Encouraging ‘dis-
identification’, then, entails encouraging the opposite of this disavowal of ‘the 
surplus of [one’s] subjectivity’. For in contrast to this disavowal, to ‘dis-identify’ is 
to embrace that surplus. According to Rancière, ‘dis-identification’ is ‘the denial of 
an identity given by another, given by the ruling order of policy’,15 out of a sense 
that that identity inadequately articulates one’s consciousness, experience, 
intentions, and practices. Thus, wherever one subscribes to imperialism’s ‘sensible 
order’ by ‘metonymis[ing one]self’, one is equally capable of ‘dis-identifying’ from 
that order instead. If claiming any collective identity is always an act of ‘self-
metonymisation’ – as Spivak suggests – then it is always possible to encourage ‘dis-
identification’ instead. As a result, to claim otherwise; to assume that it is impossible 
to encourage ‘dis-identification’ among those who subscribe to a given ‘sensible 
order’ or collective identity, is to compound that subscription.  
 Here it becomes politically disabling to assume that any such ‘sensible order’ 
exhaustively articulates the consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices of 
those who subscribe to it; that the conditions that would prompt them to ‘dis-
identify’ from it instead are therefore absent; and that encouraging them to do so is 
therefore impossible. Hence my insistence that anyone who wishes to challenge the 
hegemonic ascendancy of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ must assume that the 
subjectivities among those who subscribe to it exceed its terms. Clearly, though, 
assuming the ubiquity of this excess is not enough to challenge that hegemonic 
ascendancy. We must equally address what it is that prompts one to favour 
disavowing that excess and subscribing to imperialism. Undoubtedly, every 
individual instance of this disavowal is prompted by a unique and complex 
combination of disparate factors. My point in this chapter, though, is that if we were 
to enumerate these factors, we must not overlook that assumption that the 
                                            
14 Spivak, ‘Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular’, p. 480. 
15 Ranciere, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
- 160 - 
consciousness, experience, intentions, or practices of anyone who subscribes to 
Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ do not exceed its terms. A critical practice that is 
informed by this assumption can only contribute to the hegemonic ascendancy of 
that consensus, since it cannot imagine anyone subscribing to that consensus being 
capable of ‘dis-identifying’ from it instead. In my previous chapter, I warned against 
too readily assuming that anyone who subscribes to a collective identity or ‘sensible 
order’ do not exceed its terms in any way, albeit solely as a theoretical or 
methodological principle. In this chapter, though, I will argue that this principle is 
no less important politically – that is, as a principle for effective practice as well as 
cogent theory. 
 It might be objected that the ethical imperative to unconditionally oppose 
imperialism, on the basis of its fundamentally, self-evidently, irredeemably unjust 
nature, already provides an adequate means of encouraging one to ‘dis-identify’ 
from Said’s ‘imperial consensus’. No doubt this imperative is a compelling rationale 
for opposing imperialism, yet surely it should be clear by now that this imperative 
alone has so far failed to compel everyone to actively, unconditionally pursue the 
thorough dissolution of imperialism. For one thing, as Spivak and Albert Memmi 
have various shown, subscribing to this imperative, even to the point of ‘dis-
identifying’ from imperialism, do not always lead to productive or even resolute 
opposition. In many cases, it can induce a sense of paralysis and uncertainty instead. 
Spivak and Memmi respond in different ways to this paralysis, and in this chapter I 
will explore how these responses indicate an appropriate, effective way of resolving 
it. For Memmi, this paralysis indicates that anyone who benefits from imperialism 
cannot possibly contribute meaningfully to its dissolution, that ‘the colonizer who 
refuses’ is beset by an ‘impossible historical situation’. For anyone who ‘participates 
in and benefits from those privileges which [they] half-heartedly denounce’,16 is 
caught in ‘a contradiction which [...] depriv[es them] of all coherence and all 
tranquillity.’17 Ultimately, Memmi finds that a ‘colonizer who rejects colonialism 
                                            
16 Memmi, Albert, The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. by Howard Greenfeld (London: 
Earthscan, 2003), p. 64. 
17 Memmi, p. 64. 
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does not find a solution for his anguish in revolt’, and invariably ‘resigns himself to 
a position of ambiguity’18 that he cannot hope to resolve.  
 No doubt objecting to whatever one benefits from leads to a contradiction 
between intention and practice. Yet I disagree with Memmi’s claim here that 
because of this contradiction, no such objection can ever have integrity or even be 
sincere. Memmi’s portrait of ‘the colonizer’ usefully registers multiple intentions 
among European colonial settlers, even though he is pessimistic regarding the 
realistic options available to his ‘colonizer who refuses’. Moreover, this pessimism 
is borne out of a sense that the dissenting coloniser’s political paralysis derives not 
from an underlying affinity with the colonial regime, but rather from Memmi’s own 
conviction that political integrity depends on a perfect alignment of practice with 
intention. No doubt this is ultimately the case, yet Memmi does not allow for a 
gradation of integrity that would acknowledge, and thus encourage, objections 
among the colonisers that might lead to more effective ways of challenging colonial 
rule. For Memmi, only a thoroughly coherent, unambiguous, and consistent subject-
position can facilitate active, unconditional opposition to injustice. As such, for 
Memmi, only the colonised can actively oppose colonialism, and so it is pointless to 
encourage the European colonisers to do so as well.  
In her 2003 Introduction to The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957), Nadine 
Gordimer dismissed this argument as a ‘failure of vision’19 that prevented Memmi 
from recognising that ‘there was a minority of colonizers, mainly of the Left 
spectrum, who identified themselves with the position that colonialism was unjust, 
racist and anti-human, and were prepared, first, to act against it along with the great 
mass force of the colonized’.20 Gordimer points out several instances where the 
privileged circumstances of ‘the colonizer who refuses’ did not prevent historical 
beneficiaries of colonial rule from actively opposing colonial regimes. Memmi 
appears to be mistaken, therefore, in believing that only those occupying a 
thoroughly consistent subject-position can contribute meaningfully to overcoming 
                                            
18 Memmi, p. 89. 
19 Gordimer, Nadine, ‘Introduction’, in Memmi, p. 38. 
20 Gordimer, p. 39 (emphasis in original). 
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colonialism. Moreover, by collapsing his distinction between ‘the colonizer who 
refuses’ and ‘the colonizer who accepts’, Memmi risks foreclosing any effort to 
encourage those that benefit from colonialism to oppose it nonetheless. The risk here 
is one of self-corroboration, of discouraging anyone from challenging the 
hegemonic ascendancy of colonialism among those who benefit from it, and thus 
compounding the relative absence of opposition to it among these beneficiaries, 
which in turn discourages one from trying to redress that absence, and so on. I find 
that Memmi’s distinction between ‘the colonizer who refuses’ and ‘the colonizer 
who accepts’ is crucial to avoiding this feedback effect. No doubt Memmi was right 
to point out how the distinction was hardly borne out in reality. Nonetheless, 
however much it ever holds true or not, collapsing this distinction risks invalidating 
the very notion that someone who benefits from imperialism might object to it. In 
short, this distinction suggests that beneficiaries of imperialism are subject to diverse 
forms of consciousness, experience, intentions, and practice, many of which might 
be incompatible with, if not antithetical to imperialism.  
This chapter will begin by exploring a curious situation that Spivak has 
described in numerous interviews and has confronted on several occasions, in which 
her more privileged students – typically ‘bourgeois white male[s]’21 – claim to be 
unable to participate in seminar debates. According to Spivak, this claim is 
prompted by the students’ desire not to speak as ‘bourgeois white males’, coupled 
with a sense that they cannot speak as anything else. Elsewhere, Spivak is generally 
scornful towards this ‘sort of breast-beating’,22 given her suspicion that it often 
serves as an alibi, an empty gesture ‘that is left behind at the threshold and then 
business goes on as usual’,23 thus ‘stop[ping] the possibility of social change’.24 
Spivak, though, takes these students’ claims seriously, as reflecting both a genuine 
awareness of how their privilege impedes as much as it empowers, and a 
                                            
21 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, in The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, 
Strategies, Dialogues, ed. by Sarah Harasym (London, New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 
62. 
22 Spivak, ‘The Intervention Interview’, in Harasym ed., p. 121. 
23 Spivak, ‘The Intervention Interview’, p. 121. 
24 Spivak, ‘The Intervention Interview’, p. 121. 
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subsequent, no less genuine desire to be ‘politically-correct’.25 Hence Spivak’s 
suggestion that the students ‘actively investigate’, even ‘develop a certain degree of 
rage against the history that has written such an abject script for [them] that [they] 
are silenced’.26 Quite clearly, this response risks equating the students’ apparent 
inarticulacy to the ‘loneliness’27 of Spivak’s subaltern, a category that – as we saw 
in my previous chapter – often identifies an inability to ‘speak’ with only particular 
demographics.28 Hence her claim in a 1987 interview that, ‘given the active circuit 
of socialized capital, it is hard for us to think of a genuine subaltern in the First 
World.’29 What interests me here, then, is whether Spivak’s allusion to subalternity 
when making sense of her students’ silence, indicates that being unable to ‘speak’ is 
not something that only the most thoroughly disenfranchised demographics 
experience. Insofar as it derives from occupying ‘a position without identity’,30 I 
wonder whether this inability to ‘speak’ applies more generally, as something that 
derives merely from the absence of an established, recognised identity or discourse, 
and which can therefore be experienced as much by the relatively privileged and 
empowered – perhaps even the ‘dominant’ – as by Spivak’s ‘subalterns’. 
I will consider whether the paralysis of Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’ 
arises from a similar absence, one that Memmi perpetuates by ultimately refusing to 
distinguish this figure from that of ‘the colonizer who accepts’. We can apprehend 
this absence by playing upon an ambiguity in Rancière’s account of ‘dis-
identification’ as the inaugural moment of what Rancière means by ‘politics’. As we 
saw in my previous chapter, Rancière defines ‘politics’ as ‘a conflict between one 
sensible order and another’,31 an ‘opposition between logics that count the parties 
                                            
25 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, p. 62. 
26 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, p. 62. 
27 Spivak, ‘Practical Politics of The Open End’, in Harasym ed., p. 103; ‘Negotiating the 
Structures of Violence’, in Harasym ed., p. 142. 
28 See p. 87 above. 
29 Spivak, ‘Negotiating the Structures of Violence’, p. 142.  
30 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 476. 
31 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560. 
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and parts of the community in different ways.’32 Elsewhere, though, Rancière 
defines the concept in a rather different way, as arising whenever ‘there is something 
wrong in the picture, when something is not at the right place […] when we don’t 
know how to designate what we see, when a name no longer suits the thing or the 
character that it names, etc.’33 In both definitions, ‘politics’ arises from a lack, from 
the absence of a suitable ‘name’ for that ‘something’ that supposedly does not 
belong where it is. The distinction, therefore, lies in where these definitions locate 
that lack. In both cases, this lack equally obtains in the prevailing ‘partition of the 
sensible’. However, in the former definition, ‘politics’ occurs as a dispute between 
this prevailing ‘partition’ and another that suffers from no such lack, an alternative 
‘sensible order’ that has found a suitable ‘name’ for that ‘something’. In contrast, 
the latter definition conveys a general absence of a suitable ‘name’, as if even these 
alternative ways of ‘count[ing] the parties and parts of the community’ have yet to 
find an adequate way of ‘designat[ing] what we see’, but which we are unable to 
‘name’ within the prevailing ‘sensible order’.  
Once again, we observe parallels between Rancière’s account of ‘politics’ 
and Spivak’s of the subaltern, as discussed in my previous chapter. Spivak, though, 
is unable to ‘think of a genuine subaltern in the First World’ given the subaltern’s 
inability to access ‘those narratives of nationalism, those narratives of 
internationalism, nationalism, secularism, all of those things’.34 There is no ‘genuine 
subaltern’ on ‘this’ side of ‘the international division of labor’ because together 
these narratives are capable of articulating all forms of consciousness, experience, 
intention, and practice that might ever occur in ‘this’ ‘First World’. In contrast, 
Rancière’s latter definition of ‘politics’ suggests that there is always ‘something’ 
that no existing narrative is able to articulate adequately. I propose that the silence 
that Spivak’s students claim to suffer reflects a similar lack to that which Rancière 
articulates in this latter definition of ‘politics’ – a lack of an adequate way of 
articulating the experience of being a ‘dis-identified beneficiary’. It is this lack that 
Memmi compounds when concluding that ‘the colonizer who refuses’ is no different 
                                            
32 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 35. 
33 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560 (my emphasis). 
34 Spivak, ‘Negotiating the Structures of Violence’, p. 142. 
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to ‘the colonizer who accepts’. In this chapter, I argue for the necessity of sustaining 
this distinction, even as envisaging a possibility, rather than describing an already-
existing reality.  
The latter half of this chapter will explore some literary portraits of the 
individual experience of benefitting from the misfortunes of others. Each of these 
portraits in some way objects to the structures that give rise to these misfortunes, 
and in some cases the beneficiaries they portray are ‘colonizers who refuse’, 
although they are paralysed by the contradiction Memmi describes above. My 
readings will demonstrate how overcoming this paralysis depends on retaining 
Memmi’s distinction between ‘the colonizer who refuses’ and ‘the colonizer who 
accepts’; or rather, more precisely, on leaving open the possibility that ‘colonizers’ – 
or indeed anyone who benefits from the suffering of others – are subject to forms of 
consciousness, experience, intention, and practice other than those of a ‘colonizer 
who accepts’. I will begin by exploring how Jamaica Kincaid registers the limits of 
her own characterisation of white tourists in the Caribbean, in her extended essay A 
Small Place. Kincaid’s antagonistic mode of addressing the reader in the second 
person as a selfish, ignorant, complacent white tourist visiting Antigua, initially 
appears to agree with Memmi that all ‘colonizers’ are ‘colonizers who accept’. 
According to various critics, including Lindsay Pentolfe Aegerter and Rhonda 
Frederick, this is exactly what many readers of A Small Place presume.  
Yet as Aegerter, Frederick, and Lesley Larkin variously demonstrate, 
Kincaid very subtly addresses her reader as someone who is not just a tourist, whose 
consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices may well exceed those of the 
tourist persona as defined by Kincaid. As such, Kincaid establishes that her mode of 
addressing her reader as a ‘tourist’ so defined is synecdochal. In claiming that no 
tourist is ever just a tourist, Kincaid asserts that tourists are subject to variances of 
consciousness, intentions and practices, and might even be aware of the malign 
consequences their activities as tourists have for native Antiguans. For Aegerter, 
Frederick, and Larkin, this mode of address opens up the possibility of encouraging 
Kincaid’s assumed reader to object to the global structures that given rise to 
Antigua’s destitution and institutional dysfunction. Yet as I will demonstrate, 
Kincaid’s affirmation of this possibility is subtle enough to be easily missed, and a 
careless reader can easily misconstrue A Small Place as refusing to distinguish ‘the 
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colonizer who refuses’ from ‘the colonizer who accepts’. Hence the hostile 
responses to the essay among Aegerter and Frederick’s students, who ‘dis-identify’ 
from Kincaid’s ‘you’ – the ignorant, selfish white tourist – without addressing, and 
in turn redressing, the ways in which they share the consciousness, intentions, and 
practices of Kincaid’s selfish, ignorant white tourists.  
So misconstrued, A Small Place refuses to recognise variances of 
consciousness or purpose among those who benefit most from today’s uneven global 
conjuncture. As with Memmi, so with Kincaid – albeit on a careless, superficial 
reading – there is ultimately no such thing as a ‘colonizer who refuses’. My readings 
of Orwell, Naipaul, and Courtemanche will demonstrate how refusing to 
acknowledge such variances only compounds the very paralysis that leads Memmi 
to refuse to distinguish the intentions of ‘the colonizer who refuses’ from ‘the 
colonizer who accepts’ in the first place. In various ways, all three writers echo 
Memmi’s claim that a ‘colonizer who refuses’ must settle for ‘a position of 
ambiguity’, yet they disagree over how extensively this ambiguity undermines the 
integrity of that refusal, and so frustrates their ability to actively, productively 
oppose colonialism. In his non-fictional reflections on his experiences as a 
policeman in colonial Burma, Orwell demonstrates categorically how his 
consciousness, experience, and intentions conflicted with the ‘sensible order’ of 
British imperialism, and yet he felt unable to realign his practices accordingly. 
Similarly, Naipaul’s contempt for ‘white liberals [who] interfer[e] in, and 
romanticiz[e], other societies, about which they know little and from which they can 
safely flee the consequences of their interference’, gives little sense that they could 
ever reconcile their practices with their professed intentions. Naipaul has been 
severely critiqued for his pessimism over the prospect of achieving a fully 
independent, stable, prosperous Third World. This pessimism extends to Naipaul’s 
inability to imagine a ‘colonizer who refuses’ ever managing to do so actively, 
effectively, and with integrity. The dysfunction and destitution throughout the 
postcolonial world indicates that the damage caused by European colonialism is 
simply irreparable, as does the continuing complacency of those who benefit from 
this dysfunction.  
Orwell’s paralysis and Naipaul’s pessimism both derive from the absence of 
something like Memmi’s distinction between ‘the colonizer who refuses’ and ‘the 
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colonizer who accepts’ – that is, a lack of recognition that a variance of purpose 
obtains among those who benefit the most from colonial rule and its postcolonial 
legacies. On a careless reading, it is a comparable lack that provokes the hostile 
response of Aegerter and Frederick’s students to A Small Place. Similarly, in his 
fictional memoir of the 1994 Rwandan genocide A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali, 
Courtemanche’s protagonist Bernard Valcourt seems unable to make sense of, and 
thus act upon his ‘dis-identification’ from his fellow white expatriates, most of 
whom are as selfish and complacent as Kincaid’s white tourists. As with Orwell, 
Valcourt clearly testifies to a variance of consciousness, intention, and to some 
extent practice among Rwanda’s expatriate community; yet he initially identifies 
himself in ways that collapse these variances, and undercut his own ‘dis-
identification’ from the other expats. Valcourt does so – I argue – partly because like 
Orwell, he does not know how else to identify himself. Like Orwell, Valcourt has 
recourse to no other, more suitable way of identifying himself, and so he mostly just 
agonises over his compromised integrity, rather than finding more effective ways of 
intervening in the events that lead to the genocide.   
In different ways, all four of these writers contend that those who benefit 
from the misfortunes of others – whether through colonialism or its postcolonial 
continuations – exhibit variances of consciousness and intention, no matter whether 
they also exhibit a corresponding variance of practice. Kincaid’s critical audience, in 
particular, have been perceptive to the subtle ways in which this contention informs 
her manner of addressing her tourist-reader in A Small Place. Towards the end of 
this chapter, I will contrast this critical response to how critics have read Bret Easton 
Ellis’s American Psycho, a satirical yet metafictional exploration of the subjective 
experience of being a ‘yuppie’, or more precisely a member of Wall Street’s 
financial elite during the zenith of so-called ‘late capitalism’. Clearly, turning to 
American Psycho is to depart from the typical range of literature discussed in 
postcolonial studies, given how this novel does not address the economic structures 
underpinning its yuppie characters’ considerable privileges on a global scale. 
Kincaid, Naipaul, and Courtemanche illustrate how endemic injustices occurring in 
a particular locale – Antigua, the Caribbean, and Rwanda respectively – derive from 
global economic structures that subordinate them to other locales, including North 
America, Western Europe, and China. In contrast, these transnational connections 
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barely register in American Psycho, and the global is present only in the form of 
economic migrants from Asia and South America that Ellis’s yuppies encounter in 
Manhattan, where the novel mostly takes place.   
We cannot let this marginality of the global, though, fool us into thinking 
that American Psycho is of no relevance to the task of adequately understanding 
‘what imperialism is and how it works’.35 For as Edward S. Herman and Noam 
Chomsky illustrate, towards the end of the twentieth century, U.S. government 
policy became increasingly aligned with U.S. corporate power.36 Ellis’s Wall Street 
corporate elite, therefore, orchestrate and benefit from a global conjuncture that, 
being marked by the U.S.A.’s military belligerence and gross economic inequality, 
is comparable to that which prevailed at the height of European imperialism.37 
                                            
35 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, in Marxism, Modernity and 
Postcolonial Studies, ed. by Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 54. 
36 Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), pp. 13-14. 
37 As discussed in my Introduction to this thesis, the ‘manifestly undiminished 
consequences of imperialism’ continue to haunt postcolonial studies, rendering its 
moniker anachronistic. For Lazarus, ‘the years since 1968 [...] have borne witness not 
to any putative transcendence or leaving behind of capitalist modernity but, on the 
contrary, to a consolidation of the historical patterns of bourgeois class domination’ 
(Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 19). Robert Spencer has more recently echoed this claim, 
finding that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 ‘made starkly visible an imperialist 
project that has not, as our field’s moniker suggests, been drawing to a close but has on 
the contrary been expanding American hegemony, extending corporate power and 
hijacking international institutions of governance’ (‘Edward Said and the War in Iraq’, 
in New Formations, 59 (Autumn 2006), p. 52). Curiously enough, the considerable 
media discourse on yuppies during the 1980s traced the phenomenon back to economic 
shifts that occurred around the same time as Lazarus’s resurgence of imperialist 
‘bourgeois class domination’. Yuppies were in fact a tiny minority of the so-called 
‘baby boomers’, a generation of roughly 78 million Americans born between 1946 and 
1964. Media commentators regularly reminded their readers that not all ‘boomers’ 
were yuppies, and that indeed the majority of their generation had seen a decrease in 
average wages between 1962 and 1985. Subsequently, the fortunes of yuppies were 
distinguished from those of ‘New Collars’, the U.S.A.’s ‘new, post-industrial working 
class which entered the work force when the manufacturing sector was stagnating and 
millions of jobs were emerging in the service sector’ (Will, George F., ‘New Collars: 
New Values’, in Newsweek, November 24, 1986, p. 100). Described as being ‘to the 
'80s and '90s what blue collars were to the '40s and '50s’, ‘New Collars’ apparently did 
‘not think they [were] wealthier than their parents but [did] think they [were] happier, 
more able to do interesting things, more able to pursue satisfaction rather than merely 
money inc areers, freer to do what  they want.’ And yet this new sector were said to 
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American Psycho, though, explores how this conjuncture manifests solely in 
Manhattan at the end of the 1980s, and offers very little sense of the global 
consequences of the activities of Ellis’s yuppies. Ellis, though, often alludes to the 
wider world, mostly to illustrate how ignorant his yuppies are of it. The marginality 
of the global, therefore, becomes significant, given how American Psycho is told 
from the perspective of its first-person narrator-protagonist Patrick Bateman. In 
short, American Psycho is a story about global capitalism as experienced by a Wall 
Street yuppie. The novel explores how the orchestrators and principal beneficiaries 
of global capitalism perceive the world, including global capitalism itself. In the 
process, Ellis considers how aware these people are of the suffering they inflict on 
others, both within and beyond Manhattan; how they respond to that awareness; and 
how their responses are conditioned by something like Herman and Chomsky’s 
‘propaganda machine’,38 that informal process through which the mass media 
control what information becomes available to the general public.  
In contrast to A Small Place, critics have mostly read American Psycho as 
affirming that yuppies are nothing other than yuppies, and that there is therefore no 
hope of encouraging them to fight against the structures that give rise to their 
excessive wealth. Patrick himself is generally regarded to epitomise the yuppie 
mentality: he certainly aspires to epitomise yuppie success, and in many respects he 
already does, being a good-looking, intelligent yet unremarkable W.A.S.P.39 from a 
                                                                                                                           
‘have a sense of vulnerability because their alternative futures could vary dramatically’. 
What Lazarus claims were the U.S.A.’s resurgent imperialist ventures abroad, 
therefore, went hand-in-hand with the gradual demise of the country’s post-war 
domestic consensus between capital and labour. Directing both were the U.S. corporate 
elite, among whom the most publicly prominent in the 1980s were the yuppies.  
38 Herman and Chomsky, p. lix. 
39 An acronym for ‘White Anglo-Saxon Protestant’. According to Eric Kaufmann, the 
category denotes an ethnic group in U.S. society that has historically perceived U.S. 
national identity as ‘coterminous with its own identity’, to the point of marking other 
‘white’ ethnicities – including Irish and Jewish immigrants – as off-centre categories 
(Kaufmann, Eric, ‘The dominant ethnic moment: Towards the abolition of 
‘whiteness’?’, in Ethnicities, 6.2 (2006), pp. 234-35). The category’s centrality extends 
beyond cultural hegemony, with ‘WASP dominance and normativity [being] accorded 
actual legal status’ as early as the writing of the U.S. Constitution in 1790 (Myser, 
Catherine, ‘Differences from Somewhere: The Normativity of Whiteness in Bioethics 
in the United States’, in The American Journal of Bioethics, 3.2 (Spring 2003), 3). For 
a cultural history of this ethnic identity – and more recent challenges to its cultural 
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wealthy background, educated at Harvard and working for a Wall Street 
stockbroker. Patrick eats at trendy restaurants and frequents exclusive nightclubs. 
His dress sense is expensive and impeccable, and so is his tan. He regularly sleeps 
with supermodels, and his contempt for women is outmatched only by his disdain 
for anyone who isn’t rich, young, white, heterosexual, able-bodied, and socially-
conservative. For most critics, even Patrick’s claims to being a serial killer 
compounds his exemplary status as ‘Everyyuppie’.40 After all, just as Patrick-the-
yuppie regurgitates ‘a mixture of GQ and Stereo Review and Vanity Fair and 
Fangoria’,41 so Patrick-the-serial-killer re-enacts the modus operandi of historical 
and fictional serial killers, reinforcing our sense that – as David Eldridge claims – 
Patrick ‘has no identity beyond that which he consumes.’42  
It remains, though, that simply by claiming to be a serial killer, Patrick 
distinguishes himself – quite spectacularly – from his peers, almost all of whom 
appear to be nothing more or less than stereotypically shallow, selfish, ignorant, 
materialistic yuppies.43 Thus, even if he fails to convince us that he is indeed a serial 
killer, we must ask what motivates Patrick to try to do so in the first place. Elizabeth 
Young was the first to notice how often a case of mistaken identity occurs 
throughout American Psycho, owing to the fact that all the novel’s yuppie characters 
look almost exactly the same.44 David Roche attributes this merging of characters to 
                                                                                                                           
hegemony within U.S. society – see Eric P. Kaufmann, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-
America (Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
40 Young, Elizabeth, ‘The beast in the jungle, the figure in the carpet: Bret Easton Ellis’s 
American Psycho’, in Elizabeth Young and George Caveney, Shopping in Space: 
Essays on American “Blank-Generation” Fiction (London: Serpent’s Tail, 1992), p. 
103. 
41 Eldridge, David, ‘The Generic American Psycho’, in Journal of American Studies, 42, 1 
(2008), p. 27. 
42 Eldridge, p. 27. 
43 I say ‘appear to’ because Ellis reveals almost nothing about the private lives of Patrick’s 
peers. For all we know, every one of the novel’s yuppie characters might well be serial 
killers, or involved in some other moral, legal, or social transgression. Indeed, as I will 
discuss below, at least one of these characters is a closet homosexual, a heinous 
departure from the yuppies’ heteronormative value system.  
44 For Young, this conceit – which runs throughout American Psycho – serves to emphasise 
‘deindividualization in contemporary society’, and to ‘obliterate rather than to define 
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the slavish adherence among Patrick and his peers to a personal etiquette that 
dictates in such minute detail how a yuppie should eat, dress, talk, and shop that it 
effaces any trace of their individuality. Roche, therefore, contends that Patrick’s 
homicidal alter ego provides him with a sense that, despite conforming to the 
etiquette, there remains a part of him that ‘originally signif[ies] prior to the symbolic 
order’,45 an immutable essence that cannot conform to the etiquette’s prescribed 
image of yuppie perfection that he and his peers otherwise strive to embody.  
If Patrick tries to convince us that he is more than a yuppie, then his efforts 
to embody this image amount to ‘self-metonymisation’. I will explore, therefore, 
how Patrick exceeds the yuppie stereotype as defined by Ellis and his critical 
audience, before considering why he would then wish to articulate this excess by 
torturing women, homosexuals, dogs, rats, and street dwellers to death. Let me be 
clear here: Patrick is in no way a ‘colonizer who refuses’. Neither is he a closet 
champion of the rights of anyone who is not a rich, young, white, heterosexual, able-
bodied, socially conservative man. Compared with Kincaid, Ellis is certainly much 
less optimistic regarding the prospect of influencing the consciousness, experience, 
intentions, and practices of those who benefit the most from, and in some cases 
orchestrate today’s uneven global conjuncture. I look to American Psycho, then, not 
as a guide for staging this intervention, but rather as a warning against relying too 
much on stereotypes. For in their eagerness to condemn his prejudicial nature, critics 
have largely ignored how Patrick is not a yuppie, in almost direct contrast to how 
Kincaid’s critics have picked up on those subtle moments in which she addresses 
tourists as something other than a tourist.  
                                                                                                                           
character in the traditional sense’ (Young, p. 103). As Young notes, right at the end of 
the novel, the plot ‘eventually turns upon the impossibility of anyone distinguishing 
one character form another.’ Having somehow escaped a police manhunt after shooting 
dead a saxophonist on a Manhattan street, Patrick leaves a full confession of his 
murders on his lawyer’s answering machine. After not hearing back, he confronts his 
lawyer – Harold Carnes – at a bar, only for Harold to mistake him for someone called 
‘David’, then someone else called ‘Donaldson’ (Ellis, Bret Eason, American Psycho 
(London: Picador, 1991), pp. 387-88). Harold eventually claims to having recently had 
dinner with someone that Patrick claims to have killed several months previously. In 
this moment, it becomes clear that if he is indeed a serial killer, Patrick can continue 
on, shielded from the law by the total lack of fixed identity throughout his yuppie 
circles.  
45 Roche, David, ‘Reading the Body in Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho (1991): 
Confusing Signs and Signifiers’, in GRAAT On-Line, 5.1 (2009), p. 127. 
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Comparing A Small Place to Terry McMillan’s How Stella Got Her Groove 
Back, Frederick notes how the latter novel’s third-person portrait of a tourist 
‘provides a character on which readers can heap criticisms’.46 In contrast, by 
‘[r]emoving the mediating character’ and making ‘you’ the subject of her critique, 
‘Kincaid makes it difficult and [...] unproductive for readers to shift 
responsibility.’47 Similarly, Young notes how the media controversy that greeted the 
initial publication of American Psycho was partly motivated by a sense that Patrick’s 
crass, selfish materialism was all too familiar to the journalists that reviewed the 
novel in the leading newspapers, along with the U.S. publishing industry’s corporate 
elites. Judging by their own responses to the novel, though, I wonder whether Ellis’s 
academic audience are no less anxious to ‘dis-identify’ themselves from the novel’s 
central figure, Patrick, in the same way as McMillan’s readers distinguish 
themselves from Stella. Simply put, the subject of Ellis’s critique of the 1980s and 
‘all the clichés of the decade in the West – the rampant self-serving greed, relentless 
aggression and one-upmanship; the manic consumer overdrive, exhaustion, wipe-out 
and terror’48 – is not ‘you’.  
By exploring how Patrick amounts to more than these clichés, I will suggest 
that American Psycho has as much to say about its audience – particularly those 
readers who are socially-mindful – as it does about 1980s consumer society. By 
ignoring evidence that he is more than a yuppie, and that – moreover – he is 
marginally aware of this fact, critics like Young apprehend Patrick synecdochally, 
within an interpretive framework that cannot recognise multiple forms of 
subjectivity among yuppies. Insofar as he goes unrecognised as anything other than 
a yuppie, Patrick therefore occupies ‘a position without identity’, although as I will 
establish below, his homicidal alter ego is an effort to articulate that position within 
the terms of a recognised identity. By no means, though, should we celebrate 
Patrick’s recourse to this particular identity, which instead serves to highlight a 
                                            
46 Frederick, Rhonda, ‘‘What If You're an 'Incredibly Unattractive, Fat, Pastrylike-Fleshed 
Man’’? Teaching Jamaica Kincaid's A Small Place’, in College Literature, 30.3 (2003), 
p. 16. 
47 Frederick, p. 16. 
48 E. Young, p. 88. 
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general inability or refusal within the novel itself to acknowledge the possibility that 
yuppies are not just yuppies, or that they could ever be something other than a 
yuppie. Patrick is certainly not a subaltern, nor even a ‘colonizer who refuses’, in the 
sense of being opposed to an unjust configuration of social power that he otherwise 
benefits from. As such,  my reading of American Psycho will serve to decouple the 
notion of occupying ‘a position without identity’ from that of being ‘removed from 
all lines of social mobility’49 – in short, inarticulacy from subalternity. 
3.1  Spivak, ‘silence’, and ‘subalternity’ 
For Spivak, these two notions imply one another, given how she approaches the first 
wherever it entails having recourse to no identity whatsoever. Quite literally, 
Spivak’s subaltern ‘is removed from all lines of social mobility’, since they are 
unable to form any ‘recognizable basis of action.’50 It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
Spivak refrains from directly comparing the claims of her ‘bourgeois white male’ 
students that their privilege prevents them from being able to ‘speak’ in seminars, 
with this understanding of subalternity. For even though she takes these claims 
seriously, these students clearly have recourse to a number of identities – not least of 
which is that of the ‘bourgeois white male’ – that are not only recognised and thus 
articulate, but which also underpin their political, economic and other forms of 
social agency. These students may feel ‘silenced’ by their privilege as ‘bourgeois 
white males’, yet they can hardly claim to be ‘subalterns’ in Spivak’s ‘reasonable 
and rarefied definition’ of the term, as being ‘removed from all lines of social 
mobility’, bar none. I wonder, though, whether the students’ claims question the 
extent to which the subaltern alone can find themselves occupying or at least 
claiming ‘a position without identity’. For although these students clearly occupy a 
position with identity – given that Spivak identifies them as ‘bourgeois white males’ 
– what they mean when claiming that they ‘can’t speak’ may well be that they 
cannot ‘speak’ as anything other than a ‘bourgeois white male’. In short, these 
claims reflect a claim upon another position, one that might indeed be ‘a position 
without identity’: that of someone who is a ‘bourgeois white male’ and more 
                                            
49 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 475 (my emphasis). 
50 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 476. 
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besides, whose consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices are not entirely 
reducible to those of ‘bourgeois white males’.  
At the very least, a ‘bourgeois white male’ claiming that he ‘can’t speak’ 
distinguishes his practices from what Spivak might understand to be typical of 
‘bourgeois white males’. The question, then, is what else to identify him as, given 
that he is not a subaltern, on account of his recourse to at least one identity, which in 
turn is a composite of at least three others – ‘bourgeois’, ‘white’, and ‘male’ – all of 
which are themselves heterogeneous. Spivak outlines her response to these claims as 
they arise in her classroom, a response which – although insightful and sympathetic 
– leaves it unclear whether Spivak ever manages to find a more adequate way of 
identifying the claimants. Spivak describes how, ‘[i]n that situation[,] 
I say to them: “Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the 
history that has written such an abject script for you that you are 
silenced?” Then you begin to investigate what it is that silences you, 
rather than take this very deterministic position – since my skin colour 
is this, since my sex is this, I cannot speak […] From this position, 
then, I say you will of course not speak in the same way about the 
Third World material, but if you make it your task not only to learn 
what is going on there through language, through specific 
programmes of study, but also at the same time through a historical 
critique of your position as the investigating person, then you will see 
that you have earned the right to […] be heard.51 
The question remains, though: what will the claimants ‘have earned the right to [...] 
be heard’ as? At most, this response encourages the claimants to remedy their 
silence by exploring, and then disclosing, how their constitution as ‘speaking’ 
subjects only allows them to ‘speak’ in certain ways. The students therefore ‘speak’ 
by drawing attention to how they cannot ‘speak’ – to wit, how they cannot speak as 
anything other than a ‘bourgeois white male’. I cannot see, though, how this 
disclosure is any different to the original complaint, and how it therefore remedies 
the students’ professed inarticulacy. Spivak may well be aware of this ambiguity, 
given her suggestion that the claimant ‘develop a certain degree of rage against the 
history that has written such an abject script for you that you are silenced’. Spivak’s 
antagonistic phrasing here is reminiscent of how Rancière describes ‘dis-
identification’ as ‘the denial of an identity given by another, given by the ruling 
                                            
51 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, p. 62 (emphasis in original). 
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order of policy’,52 owing to one’s perception of a ‘difference between [one’s] voice 
and [one’s] body’.53 By claiming inarticulacy, Spivak’s students attest to a similar 
difference, a disjuncture between either their consciousness or their intentions and 
their constitution as ‘speaking’ subjects. This disjuncture may well provoke ‘a 
degree of rage against the history’ that has constituted them as ‘speaking’ subjects, 
but only as long as they cannot reconstitute themselves in a manner that enables 
them to ‘speak’ in other ways. Moreover, this ‘rage’ will persist as long as others 
fail to recognise them as whatever they might try to reconstitute themselves as. For 
if articulate speech is recognisable speech,54 then as long as ‘bourgeois white males’ 
are ‘heard’ as nothing other than ‘bourgeois white males’, they will be unable to 
‘speak’ as anything else, even if they tried to do so. Hence my above question: after 
having disclosed ‘what it is that silences’ them, what will Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white 
male’ students ‘have earned the right to [...] be heard’ as?  
 In short, it remains unclear whether Spivak believes that the students are 
indeed capable of ‘speaking’ as anything other than a ‘bourgeois white male’, of 
claiming anything other than a ‘script’ that they find inadequately articulates their 
consciousness, experience, and intentions, maybe even their practices. By 
suggesting that they enumerate all the ways in which this ‘script’ ‘silences’ them, 
Spivak acknowledges how these students are more than just ‘bourgeois white 
males’, and that claiming otherwise is to identify them synecdochally. This 
enumeration, then, casts doubt on the students’ statement that ‘I am only a bourgeois 
white male, I can’t speak’.55 The statement is clearly nonsensical, since the students 
can clearly ‘speak’, albeit as ‘bourgeois white males’. Thus, a more accurate claim 
would be that the students ‘can’t speak’ as anything else, as anything other than a 
‘bourgeois white male’. These ‘bourgeois white males’ are ‘silenced’ because they 
are more than ‘bourgeois white males’ – because the second ‘I’ in the statement is 
                                            
52 Ranciere, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, in October, 61, ‘The Identity in 
Question’ (1992), p. 62. 
53 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
54 For a brief discussion of articulacy and recognisable speech in Gramsci, Rancière, and 
Laclau and Mouffe, see Chapter 2, note 162, page 162.   
55 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, p. 60 (my emphasis). 
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not quite the same as the first. In Rancière’s terms, the students have somehow 
‘arrive[d] as a supplement’ to an otherwise ‘stable distribution of places, identities, 
functions, and competencies’, a ‘partition of the sensible’ that ‘defines which places 
are inside and which are outside, which bodies are in the right place and which in 
the wrong one, which names fit those places and bodies and which do not.’56 The 
statement ‘I am only a bourgeois white male, I cannot speak’ conveys how the 
category of ‘bourgeois white male’ no longer adequately describes the students’ 
subject-positions, the sum total of their consciousness, experience, practice and – 
most importantly – their intentions.  
 Either way, if we find the statement ‘I am only a bourgeois white male, I 
can’t speak’ to be nonsensical, then it is only because it breaks with what Rancière 
calls our ‘commonsense’, our ‘topography of the common, determining what objects 
are given as common objects, what spaces are visible as spaces for discussion about 
common objects, what subjects are counted as able to perceive those objects and to 
make statements and decisions about them.’57 The statement suggests – however 
unfairly – that Spivak’s seminars unfold according to a ‘commonsense’ that – at 
least according to the students – does not ‘count’ ‘bourgeois white males’ as being 
anything other than ‘bourgeois white males’. Spivak’s response initially appears to 
contest this assumption, given her proposal of one way in which ‘bourgeois white 
males’ can demonstrate the category’s inadequacy to the task of fully articulating 
their subjectivities. I find, though, that according to this proposal, the students can 
only participate by enumerating the ways in which they cannot ‘speak’ as long as 
they participate as ‘bourgeois white males’ – that is, the ways in which this 
‘commonsense’ ‘counts’ ‘bourgeois white males’ as nothing else. Spivak’s proposal, 
then, does little more to redress a lack that had already been registered when the 
students initially claimed that they were unable to ‘speak’ – namely, the lack of an 
alternative to the category of ‘bourgeois white male’, one that would distinguish 
those ‘bourgeois white males’ whose consciousness or intentions exceed that 
                                            
56 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561. 
57 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561; this ‘topography’ is roughly equivalent 
to what Rancière refers to elsewhere as ‘the partition of the sensible’, ‘the police’ and 
‘consensus’.  
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category from anyone who exhibits no such excess, and who is therefore ‘only a 
bourgeois white male’.58  
In this respect, the discrepancy between the statement’s two ‘I’s – the first of 
which speaks ‘only [as a] bourgeois white male’, while the second ‘can’t speak’ at 
all – suggests that the second ‘I’ signifies ‘a position without identity’, insofar as 
even the students seem unable to recognise it as something distinct from the position 
signified by the first ‘I’. Again, in Rancière’s terms, the students occupy an ‘interval 
between identities’, a ‘gap’ that exists ‘between names, identities, cultures, and so 
on.’59 In short, the students have ‘dis-identified’ themselves from that identity which 
has been given to them ‘by another, given by the ruling order of policy’. Rancière is 
unclear over whether this denial is always prompted by the adoption of another 
identity, one that is somehow more ‘right’ than that which is provided by ‘the ruling 
order of policy’. For according to Rancière, ‘“right” names’ are always ‘names that 
pin people down to their place and work’,60 and so they always proceed from a 
‘stable distribution of places, identities, functions, and competencies’ that ‘wants 
everybody to be in his or her place, with the occupation suited to his or her place and 
the name fitting that occupation.’61 Thus, one can only adopt another identity if one 
exists elsewhere, in another ‘partition of the sensible’ that has incorporated what has 
proven to be an ‘unassimilable excess’ for ‘the ruling order of policy’. 
As such, wherever it entails adopting an existing alternative identity, ‘dis-
identification’ gives rise to the first of Rancière’s two definitions of ‘politics’ 
outlined above – that is, ‘politics’ as ‘a conflict between one sensible order and 
another’,62 an ‘opposition between logics that count the parties and parts of the 
                                            
58 Of course, if group categories and identities are always unable to exhaustively apprehend 
individual consciousness and will – as I argue throughout this thesis – then no one can 
ever be ‘only a bourgeois white male’.  
59 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
60 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
61 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561. 
62 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560. 
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community in different ways.’63 Thus, if no such alternative identity exists, then 
‘dis-identification’ cannot occur as a double moment, as both ‘the simple assertion 
of an identity’ and, ‘at the same time, the denial of an identity given […] by the 
ruling order of policy.’ This unnamed or unnamable excess, then, gives rise to the 
second of Rancière’s two definitions of ‘politics’, as a mere ‘displacement or a break 
in a given set of places and identities’ that is irresolvable as long as ‘we don’t know 
how to designate what we see’, as long as we are unable to find a name that ‘suits 
the thing or the character that it names, etc.’64 Wherever no such name exists, ‘dis-
identification’ gives rise to something that is nonsensical, not just within the ‘ruling 
order of policy’, but within all existing ‘partitions of the sensible’ or 
‘commonsenses’, including those that supposedly incorporate the so-called ‘part of 
those without part’,65 those ‘parties and parts of the community’66 that exceed the 
‘count’ of the ‘ruling order of policy’. It is in this sense that the statement ‘I am only 
a bourgeois white male, I can’t speak’ is nonsensical. For the statement ‘I am only a 
bourgeois white male’ denotes the total absence of a name that suitably distinguishes 
‘bourgeois white males’ who more than just ‘bourgeois white males’ from those 
who are just ‘bourgeois white males’.  
Of course, just because one might be more than just a ‘bourgeois white 
male’, should not distract one from how one is still in many respects a ‘bourgeois 
white male’, even if they had recourse to another recognised identity. Providing such 
alternatives, then, cannot allow these students to completely disavow their status as 
‘bourgeois white males’. Without alternative identities, though, we subscribe to a 
self-corroborating, circular logic that cannot accommodate any variance of 
consciousness, intention, or practice among ‘bourgeois white males’ that might 
induce them to ‘dis-identify’ themselves from that identity. ‘Bourgeois white males’ 
are just ‘bourgeois white males’, just as for Memmi ‘colonizers’ are just 
‘colonizers’. For anyone who wishes to ‘disclose the construction of the signifying 
                                            
63 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 35. 
64 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560 (my emphasis). 
65 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 33. 
66 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, p. 35. 
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system [whether it be patriarchy or colonial discourse] and thereby deprive it of its 
mandate to rule’,67 subscribing to such tautologies can only be counterproductive, 
insofar as it risks affirming aspects of that very system. Memmi may well be correct 
when claiming that ‘the colonizer who accepts’, ‘who agrees to be a colonizer’ 
evinces ‘a more logical attitude, materially more coherent than the tormented dance 
of the colonizer who refuses and continues to live in a colony.’68 However, to 
conclude on this basis that ‘to be a colonialist is the natural vocation of a colonizer’ 
– ‘colonialist’ here meaning ‘a colonizer who agrees to be a colonizer’69 – is to 
submit to that ‘failure of vision’ that Gordimer observes in Memmi’s bleak account 
of ‘the colonizer who refuses’. To some extent, Spivak avoids a similar ‘failure’ 
when encouraging her students to think of their ‘silence’ in terms of how they are 
constituted as ‘speaking’ subjects – that is, in a way that does not naturalise the 
category of the ‘bourgeois white male’ and thus succumb to what she calls, 
‘somewhat derisively, chromatism: basing everything on skin colour – “I am white, I 
can’t speak” – and genitalism: depending on what kind of genitals you have, you can 
or cannot speak in certain situations.’70 
Nevertheless, if the students are to participate by enumerating all the ways in 
which they cannot participate – on account of their being ‘bourgeois white males’ – 
then this exercise merely establishes how the category of ‘bourgeois white male’ 
                                            
67 Parry, Benita, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 26. 
68 Memmi, p. 89. 
69 Memmi, p. 89; Memmi’s taxonomy of ‘the colonizer’ is complex, partly because he 
articulates various figures only to assert that they effectively do not exist. The two most 
obvious such figures are ‘the colonizer who refuses’ and ‘the colonial’, the ‘European 
living in a colony but having no privileges, whose living conditions are not higher than 
those of a colonized person of equivalent economic and social status’, and who ‘is a 
benevolent European who does not have the colonizer’s attitude toward the colonized’ 
(Memmi, p. 54). Quite literally as soon as Memmi outlines this latter figure, he 
immediately states that, ‘despite the apparently drastic nature of the statement: a 
colonial so defined does not exist, for all European in the colonies are privileged’ 
(Memmi, p. 54). As a result of these various negations, Memmi outlines a ‘convenient 
terminology’ that distinguishes between disparate sub-demographics among the 
colonisers themselves, only to collapse all such distinctions as he gradually establishes 
that all Europeans living in colonies equally participate in the exploitation of the native 
populations.  
70 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, p. 62. 
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cannot exhaustively articulate their consciousness or intentions. Moreover, if this is 
the only way they can participate, then doing so simply registers the ‘topography of 
the common’ that prevails over Spivak’s classroom lacks more adequate, recognised 
alternative ways of identifying themselves. If the students are to resolve their 
inarticulacy, they must be able to pursue something other than the identity of a 
‘bourgeois white male’. If succumbing to ‘chromatism’ or ‘genitalism’ amounts to 
‘the kind of breast-beating which stops the possibility of social change’,71 then 
viable alternatives to statements like ‘I am only a bourgeois white male, I can’t 
speak’ are clearly necessary if social change is to remain possible. Spivak does not 
describe what effect her response to this statement has upon her ‘bourgeois white 
male’ students, and so it remains unclear how effective the response is at enabling 
them to pursue a different ‘script’. Indeed, I wonder whether the response even 
encourages the students to pursue alternative ‘scripts’, or whether Spivak finds that 
any such exercise would be pointless, out of a belief that ‘bourgeois white males’ 
are simply unable to claim any other ‘script’.  
I find it unlikely that Spivak would maintain any such belief, given how she 
has extended her claim elsewhere that ‘[o]ne must be vigilant against simple notions 
of identity’72 to apply equally to conventionally privileged, dominant, hegemonic, or 
‘central’ identities – like ‘bourgeois’, ‘white’, and ‘male’ – as to identities like 
‘worker’, ‘woman’, ‘Indian’, or ‘Third World’. Hence her contention that ‘the 
moment you say, “This is a white position”, again you are homogenizing’,73 
collapsing all distinctions between individual whites – in a word, totalising whites. 
Yet simply enumerating all the ways in which one’s constitution as a  ‘bourgeois 
white male’ prevents one from ‘speaking’ seems to me inadequate as a response to 
such homogenising tendencies. At most, this enumeration enables one to affirm that 
one is by no means ‘only a bourgeois white male’; that they are something else as 
well; and that if they wish to affirm this excess, then they must pursue an identity 
that more adequately articulates their individual consciousness, experience, 
intentions, and – where applicable – their practices. This enumeration, then, is not an 
                                            
71 Spivak, ‘The Intervention Interview’, in Harasym ed., p. 121. 
72 Spivak, ‘Strategy, Identity, Writing’, p. 38. 
73 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, p. 60. 
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end in itself, but rather a starting point, one that leads to or enables something else: 
the pursuit of a more adequate identity for oneself. However, we risk foreclosing 
this pursuit wherever we maintain that ‘bourgeois white males’ are incapable of 
reconstituting themselves as anything else. In turn, if we are unable to allow for this 
capability, then we foreclose the possibility of ‘dis-identifying’ from the structures 
that underpin the privilege of ‘bourgeois white males’, and thus ‘depriv[ing]’ those 
structures of their ‘mandate to rule’. Simply put, the capacity of ‘bourgeois white 
males’ to ‘speak’ as anything else and in any other way, depends as much on our 
willingness to acknowledge in them that capacity.  
Of course, if we are to sustain ‘the possibility of social change’, then we 
cannot simply recognise this capacity as a potential, since we would risk providing 
an alibi for any ‘bourgeois white males’ who do not actively seek to fulfil it. I will 
address this complacency more fully in my next chapter. However, I believe it is 
important that we do not assume that such complacency is inevitable – that 
‘bourgeois white males’ are incapable of aligning their practices, including how they 
‘speak’, with their professed intentions, should those intentions depart from those 
which are typical of ‘bourgeois white males’. We cannot deny that all privileged 
individuals who ‘dis-identify’ from the structures that underpin their privilege 
invariably assume an ‘illogical’, ‘materially incoherent’ position. Nonetheless, 
neither should we conclude that this ‘tormented dance’ can only ever indicate a lack 
of integrity or even authenticity. If we are unable to recognise the privileged as 
being capable of ‘dis-identifying’ from the structures that underpin their privilege, 
then we subscribe to a circular, tautological, self-corroborating, totalist logic that 
forecloses any possibility of challenging the hegemonic integrity of those structures, 
by hampering any endeavour to encourage ‘dis-identification’ among those whose 
consent to these structures renders them hegemonic.  
3.2  Identity and privilege in Jamaica Kincaid’s A Small Place 
Kincaid’s A Small Place is notorious for its mode of directly addressing the reader in 
the second person, as an accomplice in the tourist industry’s impoverishment of 
Antiguan society and corruption of its public institutions. Ostensibly, this mode of 
address subscribes to reductive stereotype, ‘simple notions of identity’ that 
homogenise ‘white positions’, and which Spivak warns against above. Thus, as 
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Frederick notes, unless they ‘are Antiguan (or of Antiguan descent),’ Kincaid’s 
readers ‘have to be “incredibly unattractive, fat, pastrylike-fleshed” people; Kincaid 
does not allow them any other option.’74 Unsurprisingly, Frederick, Aegerter, and 
other critics writing on A Small Place have described how their ‘mainstream 
students’75 generally ‘dis-identify’ themselves from this reader-tourist persona, 
dissociating themselves from the touristic attitudes Kincaid critiques, along with 
their implication in the forces that subject Antigua to poverty, corruption, and 
dependency. Thus, Aegerter describes how ‘[w]hen power enters the playing field’, 
her students’ ‘desires for a common humanity often give way to something else. 
Irritation. Impatience. A wish that “they’d just get over it” so that everyone could 
just get on with their lives, not having to bother with trying to work out where they 
fit in this overwhelming picture of global oppressions.’76 A Small Place, therefore, 
provides a useful counterpoint to the case of Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white male’ 
students, whose claims to being unable to ‘speak’ reflects a desire to ‘speak’ as 
something other than ‘bourgeois white males’. For whereas Spivak’s students still 
identify themselves as that which they otherwise ‘dis-identify’ from, Aegerter’s 
students do not identify in any way with Kincaid’s tourist-reader.  
 According to Frederick, Kincaid anticipates, even encourages this initial 
response, as part of a didactic strategy not only to conscientise her reader to their 
implication in Antigua’s social and political dysfunction, but also to redress that 
implication by dissuading them from ever wishing to become tourists again. This 
latter effort depends on ‘dis-identification’, but can only be effective if Kincaid’s 
reader first identifies with her unflattering portrait of selfish, ignorant, complacent 
white tourists. Frederick, therefore, critiques how Aegerter responds to her students’ 
initial hostility to A Small Place, how she draws her students’ attention to moments 
where Kincaid looks towards points of contact and identification between herself, 
Antiguan ‘natives’, and her vile, ‘ugly’ tourist addressee. In effect, Aegerter 
mitigates her students’ resistance by accommodating their anxiety to ‘dis-identify’ 
                                            
74 Frederick, p. 6 (emphasis in original).  
75 Aegerter, Lindsay Pentolfe, ‘A Pedagogy of Postcolonial Literature’, in College 
Literature, 24.2 (1997), p. 142. 
76 Aegerter, p. 142. 
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from the figure of Kincaid’s tourist. Yet as Frederick notes, ‘Kincaid’s writing 
prevents readers from distancing themselves from the text and her criticisms’, and so 
‘actively works against a strategy that encourages students to find “points of 
identification[”]’.77 Frederick finds that, by attending solely to points of 
identification, Aegerter allows her students to avoid ‘an analysis of power’,78 or the 
task of ‘work[ing] out where they fit in this overwhelming picture of global 
oppressions.’  
If anything, by allowing her students to ‘dis-identify’ from the abject figure 
of Kincaid’s tourist, Aegerter reinforces existing power structures that allow her 
students to dictate the political priorities of postcolonial literature. For Aegerter’s 
emphasis on points of identification recasts A Small Place as something that satisfies 
her students’ desire for ‘benign celebrations of racial and cultural diversity’ that 
nonetheless affirm a ‘common humanity’ undercutting ‘all racial, economic, and 
cultural boundaries’.79 In turn, this manoeuvre only compounds her students’ 
hostility towards ‘harsh and quite scathing indictments of the kind of pernicious 
inequalities that characterize the institutions and processes of slavery, apartheid, and 
colonization’, as well as their dismissal of ‘[r]esistance to racism, and rage and 
resentment expressed over past and present oppressions’ as ‘examples of “reverse 
racism.”’80 Frederick agrees with Aegerter that, to an extent, A Small Place attests to 
points of identification and convergence between ‘native’ and ‘tourist’. For example, 
Kincaid readily acknowledges how  
every native of every place is a potential tourist, and every tourist is a 
native of somewhere. Every native everywhere lives a life of 
overwhelming and crushing banality and boredom and desperation 
and depression [...] Every native would like to find a way out, every 
native would like a rest, every native would like a tour.81 
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Frederick, though, insists on the importance of recognising how these moments 
accentuate – rather than mitigate – the obvious differences between tourists and 
Antiguan ‘natives’. Thus, Kincaid immediately undercuts this particular 
commonality by pointing out how ‘some natives – most natives – cannot go 
anywhere. [...] They are too poor to escape the reality of their lives [...] they envy 
you, they envy your ability to leave your own banality and boredom’.82 United in 
their common desire to escape their comparable ennui as ‘natives’, tourists are 
nonetheless distinguished from native Antiguans by their ‘privileged place of power 
(white-skin privilege, class privilege, and “first world” privilege)’.83 To emphasise 
their commonalities, therefore, is to detract from how Kincaid’s anger towards the 
reader’s ‘unexamined role in oppressive relationships’ is a ‘legitimate anger’.84 
 Moreover, to expunge A Small Place of this anger is to rob it of its agency: 
after all, that this anger makes students feel uncomfortable reflects how ‘Kincaid-
the-author is the agent to whom students/readers must respond’,85 contrary to how 
Aegerter’s students would prefer it. Frederick remarks that Kincaid’s agency – along 
with her readers’ discomfort – derives from ‘her ability to destabilize readers’ 
established ways of knowing themselves.’86 Frederick contrasts Kincaid’s direct, 
second-person mode of addressing her reader as an ‘incredibly unattractive, fat, 
pastrylike-fleshed’ tourist, with Terry McMillan’s third-person portrait of Stella, a 
tourist who visits Jamaica solely for the purpose of ‘get[ting] her “groove” back’ – 
that is, sleeping with as many black Jamaican men with ‘big flapping dicks’ as she 
can find, perpetuating in the process racist stereotypes and perceptions of the 
Caribbean as nothing more than a tourist resort that allows middle-class 
holidaymakers to indulge in exoticised sexual fantasies.87 As Frederick notes, by 
presenting this unsavoury portrait of touristic excess in the third person, McMillan 
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makes it easier for her readers to distinguish themselves from Stella, and so avoid 
exploring what complacent attitudes, prejudices, and desires they share with her, no 
matter how unwittingly. In contrast, ‘where McMillan provides a character on which 
readers can heap criticisms, Kincaid offers “you”’; and so by ‘[r]emoving the 
mediating character, Kincaid makes it difficult [...] for readers to shift 
responsibility.’88 Kincaid’s antagonistic mode of addressing her reader is a claim on 
agency, and so the extent of her reader’s discomfort or outright hostility is a direct 
measure of the success of that claim. After all, by refusing to absolve Aegerter’s 
students of culpability for Antigua’s social deprivation – or at least sidestep this 
issue – Kincaid sets the terms in which they enter into dialogue with her, and so the 
students’ resistance reflects an anxiety over losing the power to set those terms 
entirely by themselves. 
This mode of address, though, goes beyond a mere claim to, and subsequent 
exertion of agency. As Frederick notes, ‘Kincaid is not solely interested in attacking 
white people or otherwise making them “feel bad.”’89 Having so forcefully 
caricatured the selfish, complacent ignorance of tourists – especially white tourists 
from North America and, ‘worse’,90 Europe – Kincaid nonetheless anticipates 
charges of ‘reverse racism’, and acknowledges how her mode of addressing her 
reader is synecdochal; how a tourist is never just a tourist, precisely because one 
becomes a tourist. For Kincaid, ‘you’ the tourist are an ‘ugly human being’,91 but 
only insofar as ‘you’ are a ‘tourist’. Otherwise, Kincaid attests that ‘you are not an 
ugly person ordinarily’92 – that is, when ‘you’ are not a tourist. Instead, ‘ordinarily, 
you are a nice person, an attractive person, a person capable of drawing to yourself 
the affection of other people (people just like you), a person at home in your own 
skin’, although ‘you’ are also prone to a sense of ‘dismay and puzzlement [that is] 
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natural to you, because people like you just seem to be like that’.93 It is this ‘awful 
feeling of displacedness’, coupled with ‘your’ inability ‘to look too far inward and 
set yourself aright, because being ordinary is already so taxing,’ that prompts ‘you’ 
to become ‘a person visiting heaps of death and ruin and feeling alive and inspired at 
the sight of it; to being a person lying on some faraway beach, your stilled body 
stinking and glistening in the sand’94 – in short, that ‘ugly human being’, a tourist.  
This distinction, though, is no mere concession to avoid being accused of 
reactionary stereotyping. As Frederick notes, by claiming that tourists are never just 
tourists, Kincaid envisions the possibility of discouraging her reader from 
compounding the disadvantages of native Antiguans – or indeed the natives of any 
tourist hotspot, anywhere in the world – by indulging themselves in the exotic 
mythos, promoted by the tourist industry, that portrays Antigua as an untainted 
tropical paradise. Kincaid makes much of how, ‘since you are on holiday, since you 
are a tourist, the thought of what it might be like for someone who had to live day in, 
day out in a place that suffers constantly from drought’, along with poverty, political 
corruption, and enforced servitude bordering on modern-day slavery, ‘must never 
cross your mind.’95 The imperative here indicates a fervent desire to sustain that 
mythos as outlined in tourist brochures, even when encountering a ‘real’ Antigua 
that does not entirely correspond to that impossibly idealised image. What is 
notable, though, is how the imperative ‘must’ implies its own failure – how the 
tourist cannot help but notice the drought, poverty, corruption, and servitude 
bordering on slavery. Otherwise, Kincaid would have claimed that these issues 
‘don’t ever cross your mind’ instead.  
Kincaid states that ‘North American and English peoples abandon complex 
selves and complex lives to become, simply, tourists’, and that, as a result, 
‘“tourists” often are not “whole”’, insofar as ‘they do not want to be reminded of the 
home – and problems – they left behind. In fact, they attempt to escape into 
Antigua’s paradisiacal “reality.”’96 It remains unclear, though, how completely these 
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people manage to abandon the complexity of their ‘whole’ selves, given how often 
they notice the real Antigua failing to live up to that escapist fantasy. Despite their 
efforts to assume such a simplistic persona, tourists evince a consciousness whose 
complexity continues to exceed that persona, and which therefore interrupts their 
attempts to live out the tourist brochure fantasy described above. Indeed, given this 
consciousness, it is not only Antigua that fails to live up to that fantasy, but also the 
tourist themselves. Frederick argues that, having been made to confront ‘thoughtless 
(unthinking) behavior and [...] the connections between individual experience and 
social, economic, and political issues’, ‘[r]eaders of A Small Place cannot merely 
“go on vacation” without acknowledging the contexts in which they circulate.’97 If 
this disregard for such connections is what makes one a ‘tourist’, then anyone who 
reads A Small Place arguably cannot ever be a tourist afterwards. After reading A 
Small Place, one can never be a tourist, even if one goes on holiday to somewhere 
like Antigua, for after reading A Small Place, one cannot help but be aware of how 
the simple act of going on holiday in Antigua implicates one in the island’s social 
dysfunction.  
A Small Place, therefore, does not necessarily present the tourist-reader with 
an entirely unfamiliar portrait of Antigua, even though this portrait does not 
correspond to that found in travel brochures. Despite themselves, the tourist-reader 
already sees what the brochures omit, without even having to read A Small Place. 
Moreover, Kincaid suggests that the tourist-reader also suspects their implication in 
what they see, given ‘that slightly funny feeling you have from time to time about 
exploitation, oppression, domination’, a feeling that ‘you’ struggle to repress by 
allowing ‘yourself’ to be convinced that ‘the West got rich not from the free (in this 
case meaning got-for-nothing) and then undervalued labour, for generations, of the 
people like me you see walking around you in Antigua but from the ingenuity of 
small shopkeepers in Sheffield and Yorkshire and Lancashire, or wherever’.98 
Similarly, it might never occur to ‘you’ the tourist-reader that the native Antiguans 
do not like ‘you’, yet ‘[s]till, you feel a little uneasy. Still, you feel a little foolish. 
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Still, you feel a little out of place.’99 Even though they mostly go unacknowledged, 
it is these anxieties that prompt ‘you’ to regurgitate a familiar narrative of how 
native Antiguans  
are not responsible for what you have; you owe them nothing; in fact, 
you did them a big favour, and you can provide one hundred 
examples [...] If it were not for you, they would not have Government 
House, and Prime Minister’s Office, and Parliament Building and 
embassy of powerful country.100 
Kincaid’s ‘you’ becomes equivocal here, as it shifts from addressing the reader as an 
‘ugly’ tourist to addressing them as the subject of a narrative that insists on the 
generally beneficial nature of European colonial rule for those who were made to 
endure it. This shift denotes Kincaid’s anticipation of her reader’s ‘dis-
identification’ from her unsavoury portrait of white tourists, and so the equivocality 
of ‘you’ here denotes the reader’s suspension between two identities – their 
occupation of an ‘interval between identities’101 – which for Rancière is the very 
nature of ‘dis-identification’. As such, this equivocality reflects a battle between two 
identities: Kincaid’s ‘ugly’, selfish, complacent tourist that compounds the sorry lot 
of ‘native’ Antiguans; and the noble European, whose selfless benevolence is plain 
to see in Antigua’s modern public institutions. Yet Kincaid’s repeated reversion to 
this narrative throughout A Small Place suggests that that battle never ends; that this 
narrative never manages to dispel that ‘slightly funny feeling [...] about exploitation, 
oppression, domination’ entirely. Instead, this narrative becomes a mantra whose 
repetition betrays its failure to convince even the tourist themselves. All this 
narrative accomplishes is displacing alternative narratives that not only acknowledge 
Antigua’s social deprivation, but also the tourist’s implication in it. Yet no such 
alternative narrative is required for the tourist to register – albeit unconsciously – the 
possibility of their implication.  
Life as a tourist, therefore, is invariably much more complicated than ‘you’ 
want it to be, such is the effort of either ignoring all the ways in which the real 
Antigua departs from the brochure fantasy, or of disavowing ‘your’ implication in 
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that reality. As a result, Kincaid asks if it is ‘any wonder, then, that on your return 
home you feel the need of a long rest, so that you can recover from your life as a 
tourist?’102 No tourist ever manages to fully become a ‘tourist’. Indeed, ‘being’ a 
‘tourist’ entails constantly, actively reconstituting oneself according to the terms of 
the ‘tourist’ role – that is, taking ‘the part that seems to agree’ with that role ‘to 
stand for the whole [...] put[ting] aside the surplus of [one’s] subjectivity and 
metonymis[ing] [one]self’, identifying all of oneself solely according to that part 
that corresponds to the role of the ‘tourist’.103 That surplus, though, constantly 
returns, as that irrepressible, ‘slightly funny feeling [...] about exploitation, 
oppression, domination’. Whereas the above, placatory narratives of European 
imperial benevolence attempt to dispel this suspicion, A Small Place affirms it 
instead. Kincaid, though, goes further, as if to recognise how simply establishing the 
hollowness of those placatory narratives cannot by itself mitigate their appeal. 
Although it encompasses that disavowed surplus – that ‘ugliness’ that the tourist 
suspects of themselves, but never admits to – Kincaid seems aware of how this 
affirmation comes at the cost of a further disavowal. For the hostility among 
Aegerter and Frederick’s students to Kincaid’s abject portrait of ‘ugly’ white 
tourists, may well be provoked by a sense that she allows for no capacity in white 
tourists – or, indeed, whites in general – to respond in a progressive manner to the 
grim realities of Antiguan society and its tourist industry.  
Hence the conditional tone in which Kincaid attests that ‘[i]f you go to 
Antigua as a tourist, this is what you will see.’104 As Larkin notes, by 
‘denaturaliz[ing] tourism as the mode of travel to Antigua’ this opening tone implies 
‘that what you will see depends upon the role in which you travel,’ which in turn 
‘leaves open the possibility that readers might take up an alternative role and an 
alternative interpretive practice.’105 Larkin observes how, towards the end of A 
Small Place, Kincaid hints towards one such alternative role and practice. Having 
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noted parallels between slavery and modern tourism, between the slave-master and 
the white tourist, Kincaid claims that,  
once you cease to be a master, once you throw off your master’s 
yoke, you are no longer human rubbish, you are just a human being, 
and all the things that adds up to. So, too, with the slaves. Once they 
are no longer slaves, once they are free, they are no longer noble and 
exalted; they are just human beings.106 
Larkin notes that this is ‘a dangerous way to end A Small Place. It appears to offer 
readers an escape from the relentless identification with tourism, racism, 
imperialism, and slavery Kincaid has thrust upon them, no doubt renewing the faith 
of some readers in the anthem of multiculturalist universalism’.107 At the very end, 
Kincaid risks curtailing the radical agency of her polemic by appearing to satisfy the 
demand among Aegerter’s students, for a narrative that celebrates a ‘common 
humanity’ that transcends ‘all racial, economic, and cultural boundaries’. Kincaid, 
though, makes it very clear here that this common humanity can never exist as long 
as there are ‘masters’ and ‘slaves’, ‘tourists’ and ‘natives’. Moreover, one cannot 
simply disavow one’s status as a ‘master’ or a ‘tourist’ and expect the ‘slaves’ and 
the ‘natives’ to recognise one as a ‘human’. For by doing so, one dictates the terms 
in which one is recognised by others, an arrangement that renders one a ‘master’. 
Kincaid’s reader can be something other than her ‘ugly’ tourist, but – paradoxically 
– only if they first agree that they are in fact ‘ugly’ tourists. After all, this 
recognition cedes to Kincaid equal agency within the dialogue between reader and 
writer, tourist and native, master and slave, white and black. To refuse this gesture is 
to simply revert to an unequal dialogue between these interlocutors, in which case 
one remains a ‘master’.  
 How effectively A Small Place encourages this readerly response, though, is 
unclear. For the fact that Aegerter and Frederick must find ways of leading their 
students beyond their initial hostility, suggests that Kincaid’s antagonistic manner of 
addressing her reader risks eclipsing her far more subtle affirmation of their capacity 
for a progressive response to that address, and to the grim realities of post-
independence Antigua. Clearly, A Small Place demands ‘active reading [...] making 
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the point that effective reading is neither passive nor private.’108 Moreover, A Small 
Place does not offer its reader an opportunity to simply ‘go on vacation’, in the 
sense of suspending a complex mode of existence for the relatively simple one of 
being a ‘tourist’. A Small Place constantly confronts the reader not only with the 
‘real’ Antigua, but also with the reader’s own complexities and – by extension – 
their own capacity for a different attitude towards Antigua, perhaps even towards 
tourism in general. Nonetheless, compared with her aggressive interpellation of her 
reader as an ‘ugly’ tourist, Kincaid’s affirmation of their complexity is incredibly 
subtle, and so is easily overlooked. Indeed, this subtlety replicates how the realities 
of Antigua haunt the edges of the tourist’s consciousness, as that ‘slightly funny 
feeling [...] about exploitation, oppression, domination’ described above. If 
disavowing that shadowy awareness equally entails ‘put[ting] aside the surplus of 
[their] subjectivity’, then the subtlety with which Kincaid affirms the existence of 
that surplus mirrors the structure of the tourist’s own subjectivity. For Kincaid may 
well affirm the existence of this surplus, and so indicate the synecdochal manner in 
which she addresses her reader as a ‘tourist’. Yet wherever it eclipses those fleeting 
moments in which Kincaid indicates that no tourist is ever just a ‘tourist’, this 
synecdochal address risks mirroring, and thus corroborating, the tourist’s own ‘self-
metonymisation’.  
 Of course, any such eclipse is due to careless reading. As such, A Small 
Place has as much to say about readers as it does about tourists. Moreover, I do not 
mean to blame Kincaid for the hostile responses to A Small Place described by 
Aegerter and Frederick. Instead, I am concerned merely with establishing how the 
text could provoke these responses, despite both anticipating and working to redress 
them. On a careless reading, A Small Place acknowledges little possibility of 
productively intervening in the consciousness, intentions, and practices of anyone 
who becomes, or wishes to become a tourist. Their experience of Antigua in situ 
might diverge from the Antigua they encounter in tourist brochures. Yet Kincaid 
suggests that those placatory narratives of European imperial benevolence, and the 
superiority of ‘Western civilisation’, provide tourists with an appealing way of both 
acknowledging the hardships facing native Antiguans, and disavowing their own 
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role in sustaining the structures that give rise to those hardships. On a careless 
reading, therefore, A Small Place leaves one with a choice between these placatory 
narratives and Kincaid’s alternative narrative; between the benevolent European 
bequeathing civilisation upon the Antiguans, and Kincaid’s ‘ugly’, selfish, ignorant, 
complacent, obnoxious white tourist.  On a careless reading, A Small Place offers no 
third alternative, having exposed the hollowness of the first identity, and having 
challenged the reader to prove themselves to be unworthy of the second.  
The careless reader, therefore, is suspended in the ‘interval’ between the 
identities of the ‘master’ and the ‘tourist’, both of which Kincaid renders abject. 
This schematic offers no way for the reader to be recognised as something other than 
either of these figures. As we have seen, this refusal is intentional, insofar as any 
reader who does not identify themselves as Kincaid’s ‘master’ cannot reconstitute 
themselves as anything else. Yet without the interventions of an Aegerter or a 
Frederick – in order to highlight how Kincaid looks beyond this choice between 
‘master’ and ‘tourist’ – it is easy to see how a reader who ‘dis-identifies’ from what 
appear to be all available identities might respond with ‘irritation’, ‘impatience’, 
even hostility to A Small Place, no matter how unfairly. The subtlety with which 
Kincaid affirms the reader’s capacity to be something other than a ‘master’ or a 
‘tourist’, suggests a relative absence of a third identity that would acknowledge a 
variance of purpose among those who are ‘masters’ on account of their privileged 
position within global political-economic structures, such as by recognising those 
‘masters’ who do not identify with the political priorities that sustain those 
structures. As Larkin reminds us, ‘the political persuasion of a reader (her 
anticolonialism or antiracism) [...] [cannot] absolve her from material and social 
responsibility’, and Kincaid’s antagonistic manner of addressing her privileged 
tourist-reader does not ‘indict only the subject of the neo-colonial narrative but, also, 
the material relations that enable it, relations within which all readers read.’109 
Kincaid’s ‘you’ encompasses not just those who identify themselves with Larkin’s 
‘subject of the neo-colonial narrative’, but also those who ‘dis-identify’ from it, 
since this distancing can all too easily become a disavowal of one’s implication in 
systemic injustices that one otherwise objects to. Again, one can become something 
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other than a ‘master’ only after one acknowledges how one is a ‘master’, despite 
oneself. Given the subtlety with which she conveys this idea, wherever it is 
overlooked, Kincaid’s habit of addressing her reader solely as a ‘master’ might 
appear to disregard the possibility that her addressee is more than a ‘master’, leaving 
them with no way of registering their divergent intentions, and thus frustrating 
Kincaid’s otherwise hopeful endeavours in A Small Place.  
3.3  ‘Dissensus’ and ‘dis-identification’ in George Orwell’s Burmese 
non-fiction 
A Small Place leaves Kincaid’s more careless readers feeling uncomfortable because 
she seemingly refuses to acknowledge any variance of intention among anyone who 
is, or who is likely to become, a tourist visiting somewhere like Antigua. Having 
‘destabilize[d] [their] established ways of knowing themselves’, Kincaid – again, on 
a careless reading – seems unable to imagine that those of her readers who ‘dis-
identify’ themselves from her touristic ‘you’ could ever find any such stability 
again, such as by finding a way of having Kincaid recognise them as something 
other than this ‘you’. A Small Place leaves its more careless readers suspended in a 
state that resembles the second of Rancière’s two definitions of ‘politics’ outlined 
above. Given their ‘dis-identification’ from Kincaid’s touristic ‘you’, her reader is 
not entirely in their allotted place within the ‘stable distribution of places, identities, 
functions and competencies’110 that informs A Small Place. Yet because Kincaid 
deprives us of a more appropriate way of identifying her ‘dis-identified’ reader, we 
find ourselves in a position where ‘we don’t know how to designate what we see’.111 
The ‘name’ of ‘tourist’ as defined by Kincaid – ‘incredibly unattractive, fat, 
pastrylike-fleshed’ – ‘no longer suits the thing or the character that it names’, yet we 
have no other way of ‘naming’ the addressee of Kincaid’s ‘you’. To reiterate, 
Kincaid’s readers ‘have to be “incredibly unattractive, fat, pastrylike-fleshed” 
people; Kincaid does not allow them any other option.’ Yet whatever hostile 
responses A Small Place provokes from its readers is precisely due to this apparent 
refusal of another option. 
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 A similar refusal is what prompts Gordimer to accuse Memmi of 
succumbing to a ‘failure of vision’,112 and what prompts Memmi himself to 
conclude that ‘the colonizer who refuses’ cannot ever hope to ‘find a solution for his 
anguish in revolt’, given that his will always be ‘a position of ambiguity’. Similarly, 
although she does not exactly ‘refuse’ them other options, their absence is what 
prompts Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white male’ students to claim that they ‘can’t speak’. 
My next three readings will demonstrate how Orwell, Naipaul, and Courtemanche 
portray the ‘anguish’ of a ‘colonizer who refuses’ as deriving from this lack – which 
in Naipaul’s case becomes a refusal – of alternatives to being a ‘colonizer who 
accepts’. Having established how for Kincaid such alternatives are possible because 
‘tourists’ and ‘masters’ and never just ‘tourists’ and ‘masters’, I will explore how 
Orwell, Naipaul, and Courtemanche echo this claim that variances of consciousness, 
experience, intention, and sometimes practice obtains among those who benefit most 
from today’s uneven global conjuncture. In each case these beneficiaries are white 
citizens of either the imperial ‘metropolis’ or Lazarus’s ‘core capitalist nation-
states’.113 These beneficiaries readily acknowledge how the suffering they witness in 
the colonial and postcolonial worlds is a product of the same structures that also give 
rise to their own privileges and mobility. Moreover, they object to these structures, 
although they struggle with how their implication in what they object to puts them in 
that ‘position of ambiguity’ that so thoroughly disables Memmi’s ‘colonizer who 
refuses’. Orwell, Naipaul, and Courtemanche, therefore, all portray a white 
beneficiary of injustice agonising over their integrity as objectors to injustice. For 
reasons that I will explore here, the three writers differ over whether these 
beneficiaries can ever get beyond this impasse and oppose injustice with any form of 
integrity. Yet in all three cases, this impasse prevents the beneficiaries in question 
from aligning their practices with their professed intentions, such as by actively 
pursuing an end to injustice.   
 In his essay on British colonial rule in Burma, ‘Shooting and Elephant’, 
Orwell describes his own experience of being caught in this impasse. Moreover, 
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Orwell’s recollection of this impasse emphasises his frustration over his own 
inability to identify himself as anything other than an executor of British colonial 
authority. As the title suggests, the essay recounts a generally rather mundane 
incident in which Orwell – who at the time was sub-divisional police officer of 
Moulmein, a town in lower Burma – shot dead a rampaging elephant that had killed 
local livestock and a Dravidian coolie. Orwell introduces the account with a general 
overview of the growing antipathy among Burma’s native population towards not 
only British rule, but Europeans in general, including Orwell. Thus, Orwell 
describes how ‘[a]s a police officer I was an obvious target and was baited whenever 
it seemed safe to do so. When a nimble Burman [sic] tripped me up on the football 
field and the referee (another Burman) looked the other way, the crowd yelled with 
hideous laughter. This happened more than once.’114 Orwell recalls a personal 
response that was equivocal. On one hand, he found this baiting to be ‘perplexing 
and upsetting. For at that time I had already made up my mind that imperialism was 
an evil thing [...] Theoretically – and secretly, of course – I was all for the Burmese 
and all against their oppressors, the British.’115 Moreover, given his role in 
upholding British imperial authority over Burma, Orwell claims to have felt 
‘oppressed [...] with an intolerable sense of guilt.’116 
 On the other hand, though, Orwell’s daily, petty humiliations by the 
Burmese, ‘the sneering yellow faces of young men that met me everywhere, the 
insults hooted after me when I was at a safe distance, got badly on my nerves.’117 
Despite ‘theoretically’ siding with the Burmese, Orwell nonetheless admits to 
having ‘thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a 
Buddhist priest’s guts’,118 given how the priests tormented him more than anyone 
else. Orwell describes how his ‘whole life, every white man’s life in the East, was 
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one long struggle not to be laughed at’,119 one long struggle to retain a shred of 
dignity and self-respect. When confronting the elephant, Orwell remarks that his 
greatest fear was not of being ‘pursued, caught, trampled on and reduced to a 
grinning corpse’ like the Dravidian coolie.120 As much as he feared being killed in 
this manner, what would have been worse was meeting this end before two thousand 
Burmese natives who had come to watch him kill the elephant, and who would have 
laughed at the sight of his untimely, undignified demise. ‘That would never do’, 
Orwell flatly declares.121  
 Indeed, Orwell claims to having felt compelled against his will to shoot the 
elephant by his desire to ‘avoid looking like a fool’ in the eyes of his native 
audience.122 Initially, given how its ‘attack of ‘must’ was already passing off’,123 
Orwell hoped to simply watch over the elephant until its Burmese mahout came to 
retrieve it. Yet because they ‘had seen the rifle and were all shouting excitedly that I 
was going to shoot the elephant’, Orwell quickly realised that his native audience 
now ‘expected it of me and I had got to do it’.124 Orwell therefore noticed how there 
had been an ironic inversion of power. For in this moment, Orwell resembled ‘the 
conventionalized figure of a sahib’,125 a ‘white man with his gun, standing in front 
of the unarmed native crowd’, and so we might expect that he had been ‘the leading 
actor of the piece’,126 his authority conveyed by – and acknowledged by the 
Burmese as – all the typical signs of British superiority. Instead, Orwell found 
himself to be ‘an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces 
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behind.’127 Like every Englishman in the colonies, he had become ‘a sort of hollow, 
posing dummy’,128 his authority derived from a clichéd spectacle of embodying ‘the 
conventionalized figure of a sahib’. No doubt this figure corresponds to that which 
Memmi describes: ‘the colonizer as a tall man, bronzed by the sun, wearing 
Wellington boots, proudly leaning on a shovel [...] laboring selflessly for mankind, 
attending the sick, and spreading culture to the nonliterate [...] a noble adventurer, a 
righteous pioneer.’129 According to Memmi, this image was nothing more than a 
myth that never ‘correspond[ed] to reality’, and which – moreover – served to 
obscure that reality, by concealing the purely economic motives of colonialism 
under the guise of the ‘colonizer’s’ ‘cultural and moral mission’.130 
 In short, this ‘conventionalized image of a sahib’ originally served to 
consolidate European authority over colonised peoples by rendering it benign, by 
reinscribing colonialism as both a natural consequence of Europeans’ inherent 
superiority over non-European peoples, and a benevolent, selfless, charitable ‘moral 
mission’. Yet what Orwell realises is that, insofar as his authority was derived from 
a ‘conventionalized’ spectacle of European stature, he was unable to then exert that 
authority in ways that departed from the spectacle, such as by sparing the elephant’s 
life. For the European colonialist’s authority depended on his colonial subjects 
acknowledging him as a figure of authority, which he solicited by fashioning 
himself into a recognisable figure of authority. Here the colonialist’s power over the 
colonised native becomes less absolute than it might appear. For in order to be 
recognised by the native as a figure of authority, the colonialist must conform to 
what Homi K. Bhabha calls ‘the rules of recognition’,131 the signs that the colonised 
take to signify colonial authority. Wherever a colonialist does not conform to these 
rules, their authority goes unrecognised among the colonised, who as a result neither 
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acknowledge nor comply with it. Contrary to his own desire, therefore, the European 
colonialist did not enjoy absolute, unconditional authority over the colonised native: 
instead, he was required to 
spend his life in trying to impress the ‘natives,’ and so in every crisis 
he has got to do what the ‘natives’ expect of him. He wears a mask, 
and his face grows to fit it. A sahib has got to act like a sahib; he has 
got to appear resolute, to know his own mind and do definite 
things.132 
Just as for Kincaid one becomes a ‘tourist’, so for Orwell one becomes a ‘sahib’, by 
conforming to a predetermined role. In both cases, the adopted identity is 
synecdochal: it does not exhaustively represent the consciousness, experience, or 
intentions of those who adopt it. Wherever they heckle him, the Burmese address 
Orwell as a British imperialist, and in this incident with the elephant, they expect to 
see a British ‘sahib’ deal with the situation as they would expect a British ‘sahib’ to 
do so. Orwell, though, would rather not resolve the problem like a British ‘sahib’, 
for much the same reason as he finds it ‘perplexing and upsetting’ to be heckled by 
the Burmese as an imperialist. In both cases, it becomes clear that Orwell is neither 
just a ‘sahib’ nor is he just an imperialist; moreover, the Burmese address him as a 
representative of an imperial order that he has by now ‘dis-identified’ himself from.  
Again, this mode of address is comparable with how Kincaid addresses her 
reader, and so Orwell finds it ‘perplexing and upsetting’ for precisely the same 
reason that provokes Kincaid’s reader to respond to her mode of address with 
impatience, irritation, and hostility. For in both cases, this mode of address does not 
acknowledge a variance of purpose between the addressee and that which they are 
being addressed as, whether a rapacious imperial order or a no less rapacious tourist 
industry. What distinguishes Orwell from Kincaid’s touristic ‘you’, though, is how 
his ‘intolerable sense of guilt’ conveys a readiness to examine his ‘role in oppressive 
relationships’, and to acknowledge his own, ‘privileged place of power’ in an 
‘overwhelming picture of global oppressions’. Unlike Kincaid’s ‘you’, Orwell 
confronts his own ‘slightly funny feeling [...] about exploitation, oppression, 
domination’, rather than bury it deep within him. Hence his refusal to respond to the 
Burmese by trying to convince himself of the benignity of the imperial venture he 
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represents, unlike Kincaid’s ‘you’. And yet despite this refusal; despite having 
already concluded that ‘imperialism was an evil thing’, and that the 
‘conventionalized image of a sahib’ was nothing but a fraud, Orwell continued to 
derive a sense of personal dignity from the extent to which the Burmese respected 
his authority as a ‘sahib’, even to the point of valuing his dignity more than the life 
and wellbeing of an elephant. Ironically, despite being disgruntled with how the 
Burmese natives refused to acknowledge how his intentions diverged from those of 
British imperialism, Orwell nonetheless responded to this refusal by acting as if 
there were no such divergence. In the process, Orwell repeated what he claims was 
their metonymisation of him, as if to corroborate it.  
It becomes unclear, then, why Orwell should have turned back to this 
fraudulent, ‘conventionalized image of a sahib’; why he should have sought solace 
from the heckles of the Burmese natives in the very thing that they identified him as, 
and which he allegedly ‘dis-identified’ himself from. Part of the answer may well lie 
in the very fact that the Burmese refused to acknowledge any possibility that his 
intentions diverged from those of British imperialism, coupled with the fact that 
Orwell himself ‘could get nothing into perspective. I was young and ill-educated and 
I had had to think out my problems in the utter silence that is imposed on every 
Englishman in the East.’133 Here we have yet another ‘dis-identified beneficiary’ 
claiming to be silenced in his predicament, unable to articulate or make coherent his 
position as an objector to the suffering of others who nonetheless benefits from it. 
As a ‘sahib’, as a colonial police officer, Orwell was clearly anything but silenced, 
except insofar as he could ‘speak’ as an opponent of imperialism, including through 
his actions. Clearly, this silence is no less ‘imposed’ on him by the Burmese, who 
refuse to acknowledge any possibility that he might be anything more than a 
European imperialist. Orwell, then, is caught in ‘a conflict between one sensible 
order and another’,134 an ‘opposition between logics that count the parties and parts 
of the community in different ways.’135 On one hand is the ‘sensible order’ of 
British imperialism, according to which Orwell represents the benign intentions of 
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an imperial order whose ascendancy derives not from the despotic violence of 
colonial dominion, but rather from the natural superiority of white Europeans, 
including Orwell. On the other hand is Burmese ‘anti-European feeling’,136 
according to which Orwell represents an unwelcome foreign presence that has so far 
failed to secure the natives’ total, unconditional obedience. Unlike Kincaid’s reader-
tourist – at least according to Kincaid – Orwell does not respond to the latter by 
convincing himself of the former. Neither does he entirely align himself with the 
latter, though, given its refusal to acknowledge Orwell’s own refusal to convince 
himself of the former.  
As a result, both ‘sensible orders’ give us no way of identifying Orwell, and 
we are left unable ‘to designate what we see’.137 Simultaneously, that Orwell himself 
‘could get nothing into perspective’ suggests an absence of other ‘sensible orders’ 
that could articulate his growing doubts over the legitimacy of Britain’s imperial 
venture.  As we have seen, for Kincaid a ‘master’ cannot become anything else 
until they identify themselves as a ‘master’, and so it is necessary to initially address 
a ‘master’ as if they were nothing else, in order to encourage this self-identification. 
Just as for Kincaid this mode of address is a claim to agency, so for the Burmese 
their heckling and harassment of Europeans living in Burma were small exertions of 
agency. Subsequently, just as the discomfort of Kincaid’s reader is a barometer of 
her agency, so too is Orwell’s perplexity a measure of the Burmese people’s ability 
to challenge the colonial order, albeit at a microscopic, quotidian level. One effect of 
these small acts of resistance was to compound Orwell’s equivocality regarding 
imperialism and his role in it, to the point where he became a ‘colonizer who 
refuses’. It is debatable whether Orwell ultimately found himself unable to get 
beyond the paralysis that so thoroughly entraps Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’. 
Yet in ‘Shooting an Elephant’ Orwell suggests that the Burmese mode of addressing 
him as an imperialist did not immediately compel him to openly declare his 
opposition to imperialism, or at least to respond in a way that more clearly conveyed 
the departure between his professed intentions and those of imperialism. Again, as 
with Kincaid, I do not mean to blame the Burmese themselves for this outcome. 
                                            
136 Orwell, p. 31. 
137 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560. 
- 201 - 
Indeed, their manner of addressing Orwell as a thoroughgoing imperialist was an 
absolutely necessary way of both interrupting the colonial order – by claiming 
agency for themselves – and putting pressure on Orwell to find ways of redressing 
his complicity in that order, to align his practice with his professed opposition to it.  
As a result, if I am to ‘blame’ anything, then it is Orwell’s own inability to 
‘get [any]thing into perspective’, to make enough sense of his ambiguous position as 
a ‘colonizer who refuses’ as to find ways of aligning his actions with his professed 
intentions. This inability may well have been compounded by the absence of a 
‘sensible order’ that registered multiple intentions and ambivalent perspectives on 
the legitimacy of British imperial rule – or even the possibility of such variances – 
among those whose role it was to maintain it, or in whose name it was maintained. 
As I have already claimed, a similar absence is what prompts Spivak’s ‘bourgeois 
white male’ students to declare that they ‘can’t speak’. Just as Spivak’s students can 
only identify themselves positively as ‘bourgeois white males’, so Orwell can only 
identify himself positively as a ‘sahib’, at least within his immediate circumstances. 
No doubt there is a case against Orwell of a latent attachment to the colonial order: 
hence his desire to take out his anger and confusion on the Buddhist priests who 
taunt him, to punish the colonised for his inability to resolve the contradiction he 
faces as a ‘colonizer who refuses and continues to live in a colony.’138 Nonetheless, 
such attachments may well be a symptom of that contradiction, coupled with the 
absence of a ‘sensible order’ that could reconcile the inconsistency of opposing 
something one benefits from, and one’s implacable opposition to it. As it stands, 
Orwell’s response to the Burmese seemingly corroborates Memmi’s claim that all 
‘colonizers who refuse’ eventually resign themselves to the colonial order, thus 
becoming ‘colonizers who accept’. And yet unlike Memmi’s ‘colonizer who 
refuses’, and unlike Kincaid’s touristic ‘you’, Orwell resigns himself to ‘act[ing] 
like a sahib’ knowing full well how fraudulent the act is. Whereas it troubles 
Kincaid’s ‘you’ as little more than a ‘slightly funny feeling [...] about exploitation, 
oppression, domination’, this knowledge ‘oppresses’ Orwell ‘with an intolerable 
sense of guilt.’ Moreover, whereas Kincaid’s ‘you’ strives to metonymise 
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themselves by assuming a touristic persona, Orwell ‘act[s] like a sahib’ knowing full 
well that this persona is at odds with his individual consciousness and intentions.  
3.4 Pessimism and the limits of ‘self-metonymisation’ in V.S. 
Naipaul’s Guerrillas 
It remains, though, that Orwell’s ‘dis-identification’ does not lead him beyond the 
‘tormented dance’ of Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’. Orwell, therefore, might 
well share Memmi’s pessimism towards the prospect of a ‘dis-identified beneficiary’ 
ever actively, effectively contributing to the dissolution of whatever they ‘dis-
identify’ themselves from. A careless reader might say the same about Kincaid, 
given how her subtle suggestions that tourists and ‘masters’ are never just tourists 
and ‘masters’ are easily eclipsed by the contrary implication of her antagonistic, 
deliberately reductive mode of addressing her reader. In this respect, a careless 
reader might misconstrue A Small Place as presenting a cynical, disenchanted, and 
doubtful perspective on the capacity of ‘masters’ becoming something else, 
comparable to that which marks much of Naipaul’s writing. Contrary to Frederick 
and Larkin, St Lucian poet Jane King finds that A Small Place offers the Caribbean 
‘anger and insult and little else’, and that Kincaid is therefore no less guilty than 
Naipaul of the ‘sin’ of ‘despair, offering no hope to the Caribbean.’139 King has little 
objection to this appraisal of Naipaul, given her impression that The Middle Passage 
– Naipaul’s travelogue of his 1961 tour of the Caribbean – is ‘written in the tradition 
of a particular – mostly English – genre of travel writing [...] Its general tone is a 
wry, dry, humorous one which is perhaps more typical of the British Isles than of the 
Caribbean.’140 As such, King can see how ‘in describing Caribbean shame in the 
tones of its former imperial master [Naipaul] must be seen as having gone over to 
the enemy’;141 as having ‘allowed himself quite consciously to be turned into a 
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witness for the Western prosecution’, condemning ‘non-Whites [as] the cause of all 
our problems, not the overly maligned imperialists”’.142  
Naipaul’s politics have always been widely debated, his ‘writings and their 
idiomatic inflections [...] simultaneously celebrated and castigated with descriptions 
that range between “objective” or “ahistorical,” “unsentimental” or “culturally 
ignorant,” “unafraid” or “hysterical.”’143 In response to those who dismiss him as ‘a 
despicable lackey of neo-colonialism’ who, ‘with brahminical disdain, has 
consistently sought to preserve himself from “the corruption of causes”’,144 
Naipaul’s defenders have emphasised his equal disdain towards revolutionary 
demagogues and the old imperial powers, along with the subsequent ‘anger at 
injustice, irresponsibility and irrationality’ that his ‘seemingly detached 
understatement’ belies.145 All too often, Naipaul’s fierce criticism of postcolonial 
regimes, coupled with his enthusiasm for secular modernity, is taken as evidence of 
his ‘kowtowing to the West’146 in ways that completely disregard how he traces the 
failures of these regimes to the consequences of European colonial rule, including 
the postcolonial world’s continuing, forcible subordination by the former colonial 
powers and the U.S.A.147 A symptom of this subordinacy is the persistence of ‘white 
liberals interfering in, and romanticizing, other societies, about which they know 
little and from which they can safely flee the consequences of their interference.’148 
Given their ignorance, self-interest, and mobility, Naipaul’s white liberals are 
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comparable to Kincaid’s white tourists in A Small Place, even though the former’s 
intentions are avowedly very different to the latter’s. Naipaul’s liberals enter the 
Third World hoping to do good by helping others, while Kincaid’s tourists travel to 
the Caribbean simply to escape the complexities, challenges, and disappointments of 
their own lives. Underlying this difference, though, is a comparable desire for 
personal fulfilment, and a common assumption that ‘other’ locales will 
accommodate that desire.  
Hence Naipaul’s derisive portrait of white social justice warriors in 
Guerrillas, a novel that revolves around three figures who avowedly commit 
themselves to redressing the chronic poverty and corruption of an unnamed149 
Caribbean island, in apparent contrast to the duplicities and self-preservation of 
everyone around them. Jimmy Ahmed leads an agricultural commune that is secretly 
a front for anti-government guerrillas lurking in the hinterland. Of African and 
Chinese descent, Jimmy first gained prominence as a Black Power figurehead in 
England where he was educated, before being deported back home amid allegations 
of rape, although his public prominence had also attracted unwanted attention 
among the far right. Jimmy’s commune is funded by various multinational 
corporations, including Sablich’s, a firm that originated from the slave trade. In its 
efforts to improve its image, Sablich’s also hire Peter Roche, an activist who was 
tortured and deported by the South African government for his involvement in the 
anti-Apartheid struggle. Roche has published a memoir of his experiences in 
custody, which is what attracted Jane to him, who joins him soon after he arrives on 
the island. A young, middle-class Englishwoman, Jane initially sees in Roche a 
figure that will be at the epicentre of a global upheaval that will sweep away the 
existing world order, a convulsion that Jane has anticipated for years, but which has 
yet to occur.  
As we have seen, Kincaid’s tourist-reader absolves themselves of any 
implication in the grim realities of Antiguan society, by recasting their privilege as a 
happy consequence of ‘Western’ cultural superiority, rather than of the exploitation 
of ‘non-Western’ peoples. Naipaul’s white liberals in Guerrillas are more 
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comparable to Orwell, then, insofar as they readily acknowledge how their privilege 
comes at the expense of other people’s suffering. Thus, whereas Kincaid must 
remind her reader that their ability to leave the drudgery of their daily lives – 
however temporarily – comes at the cost of denying that ability to someone else, 
Jane is already aware of ‘how lucky she was to be able to decide to leave. Not many 
people had that freedom: to decide, and then to do. It was part of her luck; in 
moments like this she always consoled herself with thoughts of her luck. She was 
privileged’.150 Like Orwell, though, Naipaul suggests that this awareness cannot by 
itself induce a more effective, unconditional commitment to dissolving the structures 
that underpin one’s privilege. Yet unlike Orwell, Naipaul sees absolutely no 
sincerity in the ‘tormented dance’ of ‘the colonizer who refuses’. For in Jane’s case 
her awareness of her privilege brings comfort: she constantly puts herself at ease by 
reminding herself of how she can escape from the island, and so avoid getting swept 
away in the coming crisis. Moreover, this ability to leave absolves Jane of ‘mak[ing] 
a whole of her attitudes or actions’,151 of outlining ‘a complete and coherent 
personality’152 or political philosophy for herself. Free of this obligation, Jane is able 
to disregard the ‘contradiction between what she d[oes] and sa[ys] and what she 
fe[els]’, between her ‘knowledge of her own security and her vision of decay, of a 
world running down’, a world in which ‘she move[s] from one crisis to another’,153 
but which will eventually be undone by what she believes is an all-encompassing, 
unavoidable crisis.  
 This apocalyptic vision drives Jane to attach herself to men whom she 
believes will be at the centre of this global convulsion. What initially attracted Jane 
to Roche was her sense that he had ‘a vision, like hers, of her own world about to be 
smashed, and that [...] it was to some new and as yet unsuspected centre of world-
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disturbance that he was going’.154 Hoping she would find herself at ‘the centre of the 
world’, at the flashpoint of this disturbance, Jane joins Roche on the island after he 
has established himself there. Upon arrival, though, she quickly notices how Roche 
has been absorbed into the comfortable yet complacent, self-interested lifestyle of 
the Ridge, an affluent suburb of the island’s capital city – perhaps its only city – 
situated high above the loud and dirty streets, and ringed by police checkpoints. Jane 
is dismayed to find that on the Ridge ‘the talk was of departure, of papers being 
fixed for Canada and the United States’.155 She soon realises that in fact she has 
‘come to a place at the end of the world, to a place that ha[s] exhausted its 
possibilities’,156 and whose troubles will not spill out and pitch the wider world into 
the crisis she has anticipated. Jane had left London out of frustration with everyone 
around her who ‘spoke of crisis [but who] were themselves placid, content with their 
functions, existing within their functions, trapped, part of what they railed 
against.’157 She is disappointed, therefore, to find that Roche is no less trapped by 
that which he opposes, ‘a refugee on the island [...] an employee of his firm; he 
belonged to a place like the Ridge; he was half colonial.’158  
 Jane is not alone in suspecting Roche’s political integrity. After the island is 
briefly engulfed in political crisis, Roche agrees to be interviewed on a radio show 
hosted by his friend Meredith Herbert, a conniving politician who never bothers to 
hide his cynicism. The interview quickly descends into an interrogation of Roche’s 
political integrity, given his decision to return to England, since ‘[r]ecent events 
have made [him] feel like a stranger.’159 Meredith avowedly understands Roche’s 
frustration with the situation on the island, especially with how that situation has 
prevented him from doing ‘creative work’.160 Yet Meredith expresses this 
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understanding with wryness bordering on contemptuous sarcasm, remarking that 
‘you’re washing your hands of us. I feel we’ve let you down. I feel you haven’t 
enjoyed your time with us.’161 Meredith addresses Roche here as if dutifully 
responding to a customer services complaint. Roche’s experience on the island has 
not lived up to his expectations, and his disappointment is comparable to that of the 
tourist whose holiday is ruined by rain in A Small Place.162 In both cases, the reality 
has not lived up to the promised product: in response, Meredith sarcastically offers 
his regrets on behalf of everyone on the island who has let Roche down.  
 Having conceded that the island has failed to enable Roche to fulfil a 
personal fantasy, Meredith turns the tables on him by considering whether this 
failure equally stems from Roche’s own lack of any coherent ‘framework of political 
belief’.163 Again, this lack initially attracted Jane to Roche, insofar as he 
appeared to her as a doer [...] He talked little; he had no system to 
expound; but simply by being what he was he enlarged her vision of 
the world. He seemed to make accessible that remote world, of real 
events and real action, whose existence she had half divined; and 
through him she felt she was being given a new idea of human 
possibility.164 
Yet Meredith exposes the crippling consequence of this lack when suggesting that 
for Roche ‘work is important. You aren’t too concerned about results.’165 Hence the 
minimal impact of his guerrilla activities in South Africa, ‘[t]earing up a railway, 
bombing a power-station’, which ultimately came to little more than a ‘gesture’.166 
Meredith is astonished at how Roche could have ‘risked so much for so little’,167 and 
Roche himself claims to be ‘amazed now at the things we tried to do. I suppose we 
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led too sheltered lives. We exaggerated the effect of a bomb.’168 Yet if Roche has 
failed to achieve a sense of personal fulfilment on the island, then Meredith finds 
that this frustration is due to his continuing naïveté, his indifference to the 
consequences of his actions, given his belief that ‘gestures’ alone will vouch for his 
integrity. This indifference allows Roche to disregard how Jimmy exaggerates the 
effect of his commune, even as he claims that he never shared Jimmy’s belief in a 
‘revolution based on land’, which he suspected was ‘anti-historical’, given how 
‘[a]ll over the world people are leaving the land to go to the cities’ instead.169 
Equally, Roche’s indifference towards ‘results’ allows him to justify his association 
with Sablich’s, despite their obvious investment in the current regime. Roche 
justifies himself here on a realist basis, claiming that ‘[i]f you start probing too much 
and you look for absolute purity, you can end up doing nothing at all’;170 that ‘[y]ou 
have to work with what is there.’171 Better to work towards social justice under the 
aegis of the former colonial ‘master’, than to do no such work at all. Hence Roche’s 
objection against any claim that he ‘had to keep to a straiter [sic] path than anybody 
else. I’m not on display. I don’t know why people here should think that.’172 
Similarly, Roche asks why anyone ‘should want me to hold out hope’173 for the 
prospect of meaningful change: in response, Meredith states that ‘[w]e have a 
special attitude to people who take up our cause. It is unfair, but we tend to look up 
to them.’174  
Gradually, Meredith exposes how Roche has sought ‘a kind of personal 
peace’175 on the island with little regard for the consequences of his involvement in 
Jimmy’s commune for the islanders; how for Roche the islanders themselves are 
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inconsequential, compared with his desire for personal fulfilment. This disregard 
shows in Roche’s indifference to whether the islanders might look to him for hope, 
as well as his decision to leave the island having failed to find that fulfilment. 
Previously, Roche had scornfully noted how Jane’s ability to leave the island 
absolved her of having to fashion for herself ‘a complete and coherent personality’. 
Under Meredith’s interrogation, though, Roche grudgingly admits that he is no less 
capable of escaping the consequences of his actions by leaving, and that this ability 
to ‘drop out’ compromises his own political integrity. After all, ‘[o]nly very rich 
people in very rich countries drop out. You can’t drop out if you’re poor.’176 Like 
Jane, Roche seems to be aware of the privilege that Kincaid’s tourist-reader is 
apparently ignorant of: the privilege of being able to extract oneself from the 
troubles of one’s immediate circumstances. As we have seen, for Kincaid redressing 
this ignorance opens up the possibility of encouraging ‘masters’ and ‘tourists’ to 
become something else. In contrast, Naipaul’s white liberals are very much aware of 
this privilege; moreover, they ‘dis-identify’ themselves from such ‘master’ figures 
as Meredith, Ridge residents Harry de Tunja and Mrs Grandlieu, and Sablich, the 
slaver and plantation owner whose legacy Sablich’s never manage to shake off, 
despite supporting Jimmy’s commune and hiring Roche. Yet Naipaul continually 
undercuts this ‘dis-identification’ by demonstrating how Jane and Roche are no less 
self-interested than these figures. Both are conscious of how their privileges 
compromise their political integrity, how they are both caught in a ‘contradiction 
between what [they do] and sa[y] and what [they feel]’, yet for Naipaul this ‘slightly 
funny feeling’ offers neither Jane nor Roche any hope of becoming anything other 
than the ‘masters’ that they are, and that they wish they weren’t.  
As a result, Guerrillas corroborates those charges against Naipaul of 
‘offering no hope to the Caribbean’.177 Indeed, Roche’s indifference to anyone who 
looks to him as a source of hope suggests that in fact Naipaul is well aware of how 
denying hope has ‘a real force in the world’,178 and real consequences for those 
whose lot might otherwise appear to be hopeless. In this respect, Meredith’s 
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interrogation of Roche might well articulate a ‘slightly funny feeling’ of Naipaul’s 
own, one that troubles his fatalistic belief that ‘secure white European liberals’179 
cannot ever hope to become anything other than the ‘masters’ they despise. For if 
Roche’s indifference to the hope of others renders him complacent, then surely 
Naipaul’s conviction that white liberals cannot hope to redress their complacency 
renders him just as complacent as Roche. Indeed, surely then Naipaul’s more 
general doubt over the prospect of achieving a fully independent, stable, prosperous, 
egalitarian, and liberal Third World only further suggests that he is just as guilty of 
the complacency that marks both Roche and Jane. According to Bruce King, 
Naipaul ‘has often implied that his perspective is not that of a secure white European 
liberal preoccupied by historical guilt’,180 a claim that seems corroborated by his 
evident ‘dislike of white liberals interfering in, and romanticizing, other societies, 
about which they know little and from which they can safely flee the consequences 
of their interference.’181 Naipaul is certainly not ignorant of the societies he writes 
about, and he hardly romanticises or interferes in them, unless we consider his 
damning appraisals of how postcolonial nation-states have fared since formal 
decolonisation to be a form of interference. After all, insofar as they offer no hope to 
these nations, these appraisals have no less of ‘a real force in the world’, and real 
consequences for those who are subjected to the ‘injustice, irresponsibility and 
irrationality’182 that they document. Moreover, given that he documents these 
nations as a visitor from elsewhere, Naipaul is just as ‘lucky’ as Jane and Roche in 
his ability to leave, and so to avoid whatever consequences his refusal of hope might 
have for the people whose misery he so viscerally captures.  
In many ways, it is no doubt unfair to compare Naipaul to the ‘secure white 
European liberals’ whose complacency he critiques. Yet Naipaul himself invites this 
comparison through the various parallels between himself and his white liberal 
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characters in Guerrillas, particularly Jane. For one thing, Naipaul’s pessimism 
towards the prospect of achieving a fully independent, stable, and prosperous Third 
World is often attributed to a ‘philosophy of life’183 whose fatalism is comparable to 
Jane’s ‘casual nihilism’, her millenarian vision of ‘the coming crash and the 
disintegration of systems’.184 Hence Serafin Roldan-Santiago’s claim that, rather 
than his ‘disgust towards the people and situations in the Caribbean that [he] wants 
to document’, the disdainful tone of The Middle Passage instead reflects Naipaul’s 
‘philosophical assumption on the underlying premises of life in general.’185 This 
personal philosophy amounts to 
a vision of the futility of life, especially in the post-colonial world. 
Lost colonials roaming across the post-colonial landscape, searching 
for a sense of identity, lost in a world that marginalizes them; their 
final destiny being desolation and dereliction. This Naipaulian 
philosoph[y] [...] constructs a deep pessimism about the world and its 
inhabitants who are viewed as totally absorbed in futility. Man is 
striving to understand his existence, trying to grasp it and find its 
rationale, but is failing at it. [...] It is not Naipaul’s bad intentions and 
meanness; it is the existential pessimism and nothingness, this 
driving, psychic force that permeates his writings.’186 
Naipaul’s writing often expresses a panic-stricken, nauseous vision of the world as 
beset by ‘decay and all that it can gather: dissolution, futility, corruption, and 
demise.’187 His ‘unforgiving [...] relentlessly cruel, misogynist, [and] damning’188 
portrait of Jane, therefore, becomes ironic, given how similar this vision of decay is 
to Jane’s own vision of a world that is sliding into crisis and decline. Moreover, 
according to Roldan-Santiago, Naipaul attributes the futility of a fully independent, 
stable, and prosperous Third World not to ‘[“]the oppressors of mankind. The enemy 
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is not simply slavery or colonialism; it is life itself, mankind itself” [...] It is the 
existential condition of humanity’,189 an immutable law of life that undercuts history 
itself. Similarly, the reassurance Jane finds in her ability to leave the island 
whenever she wants, to return to London, is undercut by her belief that, although she 
‘would be safe in London [...] she would be safe in the midst of decay.’190 Given her 
initial belief that the island would be ‘the setting of action that would undo the 
world’,191 Jane sees between the island’s instability and London’s decline a 
common, global dynamic. As such, even if she manages to escape the island’s 
troubles, there is no escaping this wider, irreversible crisis. 
 In short, Jane’s belief in a global dynamic of decay that affects everywhere, 
is comparable to Naipaul’s conviction in ‘decay [...] dissolution, futility, corruption, 
and demise’ as an all-encompassing, ‘existential condition of humanity’. As Roche 
wryly notes, underlying Jane’s apocalyptic vision is the security of ‘the certainties, 
of class and money, of which, in London, she had seemed so ignorant.’192 Again, 
Naipaul is by no means ignorant of how he enjoys a similar security, at least 
compared with most people living in the Third World. Yet the parallel between his 
pessimism and Jane’s millenarianism imputes that Naipaul’s political integrity is no 
less questionable than Jane’s. As a result, another parallel emerges between Naipaul 
and Jane. For just as Jane’s questionable integrity undercuts her ‘dis-identification’ 
of herself from the vapid, selfish Ridge mentality, the parallels discussed so far 
between Jane and Naipaul undercut’s Naipaul’s own ‘dis-identification’ of himself 
from ‘secure white European liberals’ like Jane. As a result, Guerrillas may well 
present ‘a cast of characters confused by their missions and arrogant in their 
ignorance’; unable ‘to grasp anything but their own misplaced vanities’, they may 
well be ‘earnest but vapid and sometimes dangerously deluded’ in their ‘pietistic 
political and “moral” self-righteousness’, often to the point of ‘caus[ing] more 
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damage than anything else’.193 Yet underlying this damning verdict on white liberals 
and black revolutionaries in the postcolonial Caribbean, is a nagging uncertainty on 
Naipaul’s part over his own political integrity, owing to a sense that he has more in 
common with these characters than he would care to admit. Naipaul’s ‘dis-
identification’ from liberals like Jane and Roche is troubled by a ‘slightly funny 
feeling’ that he is no better than they are, and that he is hardly in a position, 
therefore, to judge them so severely.   
Like Kincaid and Orwell, Naipaul suggests that ‘masters’ can be subject to 
forms of consciousness and intention other than those that define them as ‘masters’. 
Unlike Kincaid, though, Naipaul maintains that ‘masters’ cannot ever be anything 
other than ‘masters’, even if they want to be something else entirely. Yet although 
this pessimism resembles Orwell’s, Naipaul’s is much more deterministic: Orwell 
does not address the prospect of ‘masters’ becoming something else, and although 
he does not explicitly affirm its possibility, neither does he explicitly claim 
otherwise, like Naipaul does. And yet, given how in many ways he is a ‘master’, 
Naipaul himself seems unsettled by his own determinism, just as Orwell finds the 
heckling of the Burmese ‘perplexing and upsetting’. For Naipaul’s disdain towards 
complacent white liberals like Jane and Roche suggests that he himself exceeds the 
terms in which he defines the ‘master’, even if that excess only consists of his 
awareness that pessimism is something ‘[o]nly very rich people in very rich 
countries’ get to enjoy; that only the privileged can afford ‘to be cynical about the 
future, about the politicians and the politics.’194 This awareness would suggest that 
Naipaul is too quick to conclude that ‘masters’ can only ever be ‘masters’, and that 
Naipaul himself suspects as much. This tension persists throughout Guerrillas, 
arguably because Naipaul’s pessimism prevents even him from reconstituting 
himself as something other than a ‘master’. As a result, Naipaul deprives himself of 
any hope that his own ‘dis-identification’ from his own ‘master’ figure might lead to 
something more productive than his deterministic belief, in the futility of pursuing 
the goal of a truly independent, stable, and prosperous Third World. No wonder, 
then, that so many critics claim that ‘in describing Caribbean shame in the tones of 
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its former imperial master [Naipaul] must be seen as having gone over to the 
enemy’.195 Nonetheless, such claims arguably overlook Naipaul’s equivocality over 
his own status as a ‘master’, just as a careless reading of A Small Place overlooks 
those subtle moments where Kincaid attests that tourists are never just ‘tourists’, and 
that they are therefore capable of becoming something else entirely. Naipaul himself 
is not just a ‘master’ as he defines the category, and so he himself testifies to the 
possibility that ‘masters’ are never just ‘masters’, contrary to his own claims.  
3.5 Disputing a ‘master’s’ identity in Gil Courtemanche’s A Sunday 
at the Pool in Kigali 
A similar equivocality troubles Bernard Valcourt, protagonist of Gil 
Courtemanche’s novelised memoir of the Rwandan genocide, A Sunday at the Pool 
in Kigali. A disenchanted Quebecois journalist, Valcourt lives in Kigali’s Hôtel des 
Milles-Collines, a haven for European and North American expatriates from the 
poverty, violence, and disease that chokes the surrounding streets, much like the 
Ridge in Guerrillas. Valcourt is openly disdainful towards most of his fellow 
expatriates, who gladly co-operate with the country’s Hutu Power regime, even as 
they learn of the imminent genocide. Those expats who do not compete in golf 
tournaments with corrupt politicians spend their time unwinding in the hotel bar 
before taking a prostitute back to their room. Valcourt resists the prostitutes’ 
advances – although he occasionally sleeps with their madam, Agathe – and 
generally keeps himself to himself, ‘observ[ing] these things and not[ing] them 
down, muttering as he does so, sometimes angrily, sometimes with tenderness, but 
always audibly. For all anyone knows or imagines, he’s writing about them’.196 As 
with Jane in Guerrillas, the thought of returning to Canada does occur to Valcourt, 
and many of his Rwandan friends advise, even urge him to leave rather than risk 
becoming embroiled in the brewing violence. Having grown fond of Rwanda, 
though, Valcourt insists on staying, especially after he becomes romantically 
involved with Gentille, a young waiter famous around the hotel for her beauty.  
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Although officially classified as a Hutu, Valcourt confesses that ‘[i]f an 
anthropologist needed a photograph to illustrate the archetype of the Tutsi woman, 
he would have shown him Gentille’s.’197 In fact, Gentille is both, her Hutu great-
great-grandfather having arranged for his children to marry Tutsis, given how the 
Tutsis enjoyed considerable social advantages over the Hutus under German, then 
Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda. Valcourt initially resists Gentille’s advances out of 
astonishment that she could ever be attracted to a jaded, cynical white man roughly 
thirty years her senior. Her attraction, though, derives from the fact that Valcourt has 
never ‘touched her on the sly, or as if by accident’; neither has he ‘done what all the 
other customers did when signing their chits, saying, “I’ll be in my room all 
evening,” showing her their key to make sure she memorized the room number’,198 
even though she is not a prostitute. Gentille is just as famous for turning down all 
such advances as she is for her beauty, provoking the ire of the many patrons she 
rejects. Valcourt, therefore, is ‘firmly convinced that if he did have a chance to lift 
Gentille’s blue skirt up to her navel, it was because he was not like the others who 
never hid the way they ate her up’.199 It remains, though, that ‘[l]ike all the others 
she mistrusted and avoided, he was undressing her, fucking her every time he looked 
at her.’200 As a result, despite being ‘the only White who’s never asked 
[her]...to...you know what I mean’, Valcourt admits to Gentille that he is ‘not 
completely different from the customers around the pool. I...I want...I want you too, 
you know.’201 
Gentille and Valcourt’s initially hesitant courtship captures Valcourt’s efforts 
to distinguish himself from his fellow debauched expatriates, to establish how he is 
‘not like the others’. In doing so, though, Valcourt readily acknowledges how he is 
like the others, echoing Kincaid’s claim that ‘masters’ cannot be anything else until 
they at least identify themselves as ‘masters’. Thus, Valcourt is dismayed when 
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Gentille tells him that ‘I’d like to be loved by a nice White like you’, suspecting that 
what she means is ‘a White like any other. A promise of wealth, maybe a visa for 
somewhere else; and if the blessed Holy Virgin answered her prayer, marriage with 
a White and a house in a cold country, a clean one.’202 In response, he tells her that 
‘I don’t want to be a White who gives gifts. If you want to leave, I can help you get 
a visa, but you don’t need to sleep with me.’203 Such responses leave Gentille 
bemused as to how ‘[h]e hadn’t understood at all’204 what she was trying to tell him. 
Valcourt continues to allow his awareness of his comparative wealth and advantage 
to get between them, and Gentille becomes increasingly frustrated by his apparent 
inability to ‘understand anything because you complicate everything. You think, you 
take notes [...] You talk and you argue. When the others laugh out loud and shout in 
fun, you just smile. When you laugh you don’t make any noise, or hardly. When you 
get drunk, you do it alone in your room.’205 She tries once again to reassure him that 
her attraction is founded on how ‘you’d always been polite and nice, nothing else, 
just polite and nice.’206 ‘And White...and rich’, Valcourt responds, prompting 
Gentille to wonder once again at his failure to ‘understand what seemed so simple to 
her’.207 
In contrast to Kincaid’s tourist-reader, Valcourt readily identifies himself as 
a ‘master’, which for him is the figure of the debauched, complacent white 
expatriate for whom Rwanda offers itself in much the same way as Antigua and 
Naipaul’s island offer themselves to white tourists and liberals respectively: as a 
space that exists solely for one’s personal fulfilment or wellbeing, and where the 
consequences of one’s actions for the ‘locals’ are of little concern. In many respects, 
though, Valcourt is not a ‘master’ so defined. Indeed, he identifies himself as a 
‘master’ precisely in order to avoid succumbing to a common habit among the other 
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‘masters’, who court Rwandan women by offering – often insincerely – to take them 
away from the country’s endemic poverty, corruption, violence, and disease. In 
short, by identifying himself as a ‘master’ in order – paradoxically – to avoid 
succumbing to the practices of ‘masters’, Valcourt establishes that he is in fact 
something more than a ‘master’, that his consciousness, experience, intentions, and 
practices are not reducible to the ‘master’ type. What frustrates Gentille, then, is that 
her attraction to Valcourt is founded on her perception that he is not just a ‘master’, 
and that he resists her efforts to identify him – and thus to prompt him to identify 
himself – as something else. By downplaying his ‘dis-identification’ from his fellow 
expatriates, Valcourt prevents it from leading to something more productive than 
this agonising over his integrity, in much the same way as Naipaul is left in a cul-de-
sac of self-doubt by disavowing his own ‘dis-identification’ from ‘secure white 
European liberals’ who are ‘confused by their missions and arrogant in their 
ignorance’.   
As with Orwell, though, we cannot allow Valcourt’s professed ‘dis-
identification’ to distract us from all the ways in which he remains a ‘master’, even 
if his ‘dis-identification’ entails acknowledging precisely as much. Indeed, Makau 
Mutua finds that Valcourt and Gentille’s courtship follows a disturbing, racialised 
sexual politics, in which ‘African men are savage beasts who commit genocide, and 
rape and infect women with AIDS, while the white in the story is the epitome of 
tenderness, loving caresses, and sexual ecstasy. If that is not the epitome of racism, 
then I do not understand the word.’208 Certainly, in his efforts to convey how 
Valcourt is ‘not like the others’, Courtemanche often strays into the implausible, 
such as when Valcourt manages to bring Gentille to orgasm simply by telling her he 
loves her.209 Moreover, Gentile distinguishes Valcourt not only from the other white 
expatriates, but also from black Rwandans, who have generally taken advantage of 
her solely for sex. What she asks of Valcourt is ‘to be loved like a White woman, 
like in movies where all you see are caresses and long kisses, bouquets of flowers 
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and men suffering from broken hearts.’210 Yet the novel’s distinction between 
‘black’ sex and ‘the White people’s love’211 is more complicated than Mutua allows, 
given how brutally the expatriates treat the hotel’s prostitutes, who describe how the 
Belgians are ‘coarse and brutal’, how they ‘insult us while they shoot their wad and 
tell us we don’t deserve any better, that we’re all sluts’, while the French ‘rape and 
take. They don’t talk and when they pay they fling the money on the bed 
contemptuously.’212 Indeed, straight after Gentille asks Valcourt to teach her ‘the 
White people’s love’, they witness a Belgian diplomat in the next room throwing a 
Tutsi prostitute from his fourth-floor balcony, much to the indifference of those 
expats swimming in the pool below. ‘Do you still want me to teach you the White 
people’s love?’ Valcourt asks Gentille.  
An obvious rejoinder here is that by treating Rwandan women so brutally, 
the expats effectively indulge in what for Courtemanche is still primarily black’ sex. 
Indeed, Valcourt himself subscribes to something like Mutua’s binary logic, when 
responding to Gentille’s request to teach her ‘white’ love, by telling her that ‘I can 
only teach you my own, and sometimes it’s pretty black.’213 Courtemanche himself 
may well subscribe to this binary logic, which then becomes a symptom of his 
‘master’ status, of which he may well be painfully aware.214 Even so, the expats’ 
indulgence in ‘black’ sex accentuates their wider collusion in Rwanda’s gradual, 
painful disintegration under the strain of the AIDS epidemic, ethnic violence, and 
structural adjustment programmes. Courtemanche makes it very clear that Rwandan 
men are ‘savage beats who commit genocide’ insofar as the international community 
allows them to be: so too with their habit of ‘rap[ing] and infect[ing] women with 
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AIDS’. Valcourt’s proficiency in ‘the White people’s love’, therefore, primarily 
serves to distinguish him from his fellow expats rather than Rwandan men, in 
exactly the same way as his outraged documentation of their co-operation with the 
Rwandan government. ‘Black’ sex is just another symptom not only of Rwandan 
social deprivation, but also of the complacent hypocrisy of the various powerful 
nations who count themselves as Rwanda’s ‘friends’, but who turn a blind eye to its 
deprivation, even as they congratulate themselves as paragons of freedom, 
democracy, and human rights, including women’s rights. Valcourt’s refusal to sleep 
with prostitutes, then – even to the point of rebuffing Gentille – goes hand in hand 
with his efforts to avoid becoming complicit in the forces that sustain Rwanda’s 
more general social ills.  
Mutua’s point, though, still stands: as a portrait of African men, A Sunday at 
the Pool in Kigali remains open to charges of racism. As a result, if Courtemanche is 
guilty of complacency, it is because he establishes Valcourt’s integrity solely in 
relational terms. Valcourt is a man of integrity because he is ‘not like the others’, 
even if what distinguishes him is his ready acceptance that in many ways he is in 
fact no different. Courtemanche’s emphasis on this difference, though, risks 
eclipsing how Valcourt’s integrity is otherwise undermined by his comparability 
with those whom he so strongly ‘dis-identifies’ himself from. Nonetheless, 
Courtemanche seems aware of this risk from the very beginning. The opening 
chapter of A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali presents a tableau that sets the scene in 
which the events leading to the genocide will unfold. The tableau outlines key 
factors leading to the genocide, including government corruption, Hutu extremism, 
and the complacency of Rwanda’s expatriate community, including the United 
Nations, international development groups, diplomats, and European missionaries. 
As it unfolds, the scene continually draws attention to Valcourt himself, who sits at 
the bar and ‘scribbles feverishly. He describes the scene with indignation, adding 
some notes about the outrageousness of African corruption, but he does not stir.’215 
The extent of Valcourt’s implication in what he describes shifts continually. 
Towards the end of the chapter, Courtemanche notes how ‘[t]he vaguely surrealistic 
play being acted out at the pool day after day ceased to interest [Valcourt] some time 
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ago. The plot is heavy-handed and the characters behave as predictably as in a TV 
soap opera.’216 The televisual conceit here separates Valcourt from the scene around 
him, rendering him a distant, passive, uninvolved spectator. Yet earlier in the 
chapter, Courtemanche describes how at six o’clock, ‘around the pool all the actors 
in the daily cocktail-hour ritual will have taken their places on stage in the same 
production as yesterday. And Valcourt will play his role, like all the others.’217 
Either Courtemanche cannot decide whether or not Valcourt is part of the ‘vaguely 
surrealistic play’ he observes, or he questions the subtext of Valcourt’s claim to 
spectator status – that spectators are removed from the scene – by incorporating the 
spectator’s ‘role’ into the play.  
According to Michael Keren, A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali forcefully 
conveys the ambiguous position of the bystander, who ‘cannot escape a degree of 
responsibility’ for events like a genocide, no matter ‘[w]hether [they] have full 
information about [it] or just scattered information, whether it occurs close to home 
or in some remote country, whether [they] have the will to intervene but not the 
power, or the power and not the will’.218 Moreover, Keren contends that this 
responsibility is universal, since everyone is a bystander. After all, given today’s 
‘almost instant global communications [...] “we are all co-presenters witnessing, 
even if only through the media, the genocides, ethnic cleansing and other 
manifestations of extreme racism that besmirch the contemporary world”’.219 
Genocides have never occurred ‘“out there,” on a different planet inhabited by 
devils’.220 Yet the impression that they do is one that absolves one of that universal 
responsibility, and so such atrocities will keep occurring until ‘we’ all accept that 
they do so within ‘our own political reality’.221 No doubt Courtemanche’s critique of 
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the international community in the novel supports Keren’s argument, along with his 
emphasis on how the ‘vaguely surrealistic play being acted out by the pool day after 
day’ encompasses Valcourt, the outraged spectator. Courtemanche asserts that 
Valcourt’s ‘powerlessness did not make him an accomplice; his presence here did 
not indicate his approval or even his indifference. Much as he might like to be a 
general, he was only a solitary onlooker, and he could act only as such, a man 
alone.’222 Yet neither Valcourt’s disapproval nor his inability to avert the genocide 
singlehandedly, can possibly exonerate him of his implication in the circumstances 
that lead Rwanda into genocide. As a Rwandan friend says to him, ‘[y]ou watch us, 
you take notes, you write reports, you write articles. While we die with you 
watching us all the time, you live, you thrive. I like you […] but don’t you get a 
feeling sometimes, that you’re living off our death?’223 
Such statements prompt Valcourt to reflect on his previous experience as a 
foreign correspondent, ‘earn[ing] his bread and butter from wars, massacres and 
famines.’224 In particular, Valcourt compares his present circumstances with his 
memories of returning to Montreal from Ethiopia, where he had been reporting on 
the famine of 1983-85. Valcourt recalls that, upon his return, ‘nothing was the way it 
had been before.’225 Struggling to articulate what had changed, Valcourt had found 
that 
[a] small, thinking mine [had] exploded in his brain, muddling the 
right and left hemispheres, scattering the neurons of reason and 
feeling, transforming an efficient old order into a kind of boiling 
magma that mixed up everything […] He wanted to shout out loud all 
he had seen, experienced, discovered, but had only half said because 
he’d been sticking to the cautious language of journalism […] He 
tried to make a few people uncomfortable and had some success. 
Without realizing, and especially without wishing to, he’d fixed 
himself on the fringe of society that matters and does not forgive 
those that leave it. He discovered this little by little, one 
                                            
222 Courtemanche, p. 107. 
223 Courtemanche, p. 180. 
224 Courtemanche, p. 182. 
225 Courtemanche, p. 151. 
- 222 - 
disappointment after another, one rebuff after another, then, what was 
worse, one evidence of indifference after another.226 
Valcourt’s previous efforts to document human suffering had little success in 
redressing the public and official indifference that led to the failures of the 
international community to prevent it. Yet in Rwanda Valcourt mostly continues 
trying to make everyone around him feel uncomfortable, and although he often 
manages to do so, his efforts achieve little else. Unfazed, Valcourt ploughs on, if 
only because ‘he could not lose all hope. No death, no massacre had ever made him 
lose hope for man […] in the name of something he had not managed to define, […] 
he had to carry on. And carrying on meant looking straight ahead and walking, 
walking.’227 Again, this determination is what attracts Gentille to Valcourt, who 
‘live[s] like an animal guided by instinct. As if your eyes are closed and your ears 
are blocked, but there’s a secret compass inside you that always directs you to the 
small and forgotten, or impossible loves, like ours. You know you can’t do anything, 
that your being here won’t change a thing, but you keep going anyway.’228  
Valcourt’s refusal to resign himself to pessimism and hopelessness is 
admirable, just as Naipaul’s failure to offer hope to the Third World invites critique. 
Yet we see here how ‘knowing’ that he cannot prevent the genocide from happening 
risks becoming an alibi that allows Valcourt to simply carry on ‘play[ing] his role’ 
of ‘the solitary onlooker’, in that ‘vaguely surrealistic play being acted out at the 
pool day after day’, without compromising his integrity. For as much as his eyes are 
closed and his ears are blocked to government lies, the fact that Valcourt continues 
playing this part suggests that equally his eyes are closed and ears blocked to his 
own failure to interrupt the play, and even to the fact that the play has somehow 
incorporated its ‘interruption’ into itself. By accepting that he cannot possibly divert 
Rwanda from its descent into genocidal violence, Valcourt has no reason to look for 
more effective ways of doing so, including more effective ways of interrupting the 
expatriates’ ‘vaguely surrealistic play’ by making them acknowledge ‘the fire and 
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screams rising from the hell they had created’229 in the streets below. Just like Roche 
in Guerrillas – at least according to Meredith – Valcourt has ‘allowed [him]self to 
become the conscience of [his] society’,230 whether that society is Rwanda’s white 
expat community, or the wider international community.  
 Valcourt, then, resembles Roche and Jane insofar as he ‘sp[eaks] of crisis’, 
while ultimately seeming ‘placid, content with [his] functions, existing within [his] 
functions, trapped, part of what [he] rail[s] against.’231 Hence his readiness to 
identify himself as a ‘master’. Yet this self-identification paradoxically indicates that 
Valcourt is not just a ‘master’, given how readily he acknowledges his implication in 
the forces that inflict so much suffering on the Rwandan people. In contrast, the 
other white expatriate ‘masters’ are indifferent towards this suffering, not to mention 
their responsibility for causing it. Nonetheless, Valcourt’s astonishment at this 
indifference is significant here, given how it implies a firm conviction that the 
expats are indifferent, not ignorant. Whenever the serenity of a Kigali evening is 
broken by the sound of gunfire or – more commonly – an exploding grenade, 
Valcourt is convinced that everyone around him hears it, even though they barely 
flinch. Similarly, the ‘play’ that unfolds every day around the hotel pool is ‘vaguely 
surreal’ because Valcourt refuses to believe that everyone involved knows nothing 
of the violence, poverty, and disease that surrounds them, or even of how their 
activities in Rwanda have contributed to it all. The play is ‘surreal’ because it defies 
reality and beggars belief that it somehow continues uninterrupted, despite ‘the fire 
and screams rising from the hell [the expats] had created’ in the streets below. 
Moreover, Valcourt’s efforts to interrupt the play depend on the assumption that 
those involved do in fact see the fire and hear the screams, along with the gunfire, 
the exploding grenades, and – eventually – the piles of bodies that choke Kigali’s 
streets. In short, if Valcourt manages to make anyone around him feel 
uncomfortable, he does so by provoking in them a ‘slightly funny feeling [...] about 
exploitation, oppression, domination’ that they otherwise bury deep within them, but 
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which constantly lurks at the edges of their consciousness as an irrepressible 
experience.  
 What distinguishes Valcourt from the other expats, then, is his refusal to 
disavow this ‘slightly funny feeling’. As such, Valcourt testifies to a variance of 
purpose among the white expatriate ‘masters’ in Kigali, along with their capacity to 
see beyond what a ‘master’ typically sees, and what they claim to see. Just as 
Naipaul himself puts pressure on the veracity of his own, pessimistic claim that a 
variance of purpose among ‘masters’ cannot lead to a corresponding variance of 
practice, so Valcourt’s refusal to overlook the suffering around him indicates that he 
is more than the ‘master’ that he identifies himself as, when initially rebuffing 
Gentille. Moreover, given his incredulous response to the indifference around him, 
Valcourt is clearly convinced that he is by no means the only white expat in Kigali 
who can see the malign consequences of the international community’s activities in 
Rwanda. The task, therefore, of redressing the complacency that prevents Rwanda’s 
expatriate community from intervening in the genocide, demands encouraging a 
similar refusal among them. Valcourt’s own efforts to do so largely fail, no doubt 
because he is unable to singlehandedly overcome the considerable factors that allow 
the expats to disavow their role in letting the genocide happen. It remains unclear 
whether Courtemanche can imagine ever overcoming these factors, whether he 
shares Naipaul’s pessimistic belief that these factors are simply too big for anyone to 
challenge them successfully. A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali offers no answer here: 
at most, the novel asserts that ‘masters’ see more than they would if they were 
nothing more than ‘masters’, and that they are therefore never just ‘masters’, even if 
they desire to be nothing else.  
 Whether Courtemanche believes that white expatriates can become anything 
else is equally unclear, and this uncertainty might well explain why Valcourt never 
manages to identify himself positively except as a ‘master’, which as we have seen 
is a misnomer, given that in the very act of identifying himself as such, Valcourt 
establishes that he is not just a ‘master’. Moreover, this uncertainty might well 
explain why Valcourt does little more than document the injustice, corruption, and 
complacency around him and make everyone else feel uncomfortable. Even if he is 
‘trapped, part of what [he] rail[s] against’, Valcourt’s ‘placid[ity]’ by no means 
indicates that he is ‘content’ with his role in the ‘vaguely surreal play’ unfolding by 
the pool. Instead, Valcourt ‘does not stir’ because his sense of integrity is based 
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almost entirely on the fact that he is ‘not like the others’. All Valcourt needs to do to 
establish his integrity is to distinguish himself from his fellow expats, and for 
Courtemanche he manages to do so simply by refusing to overlook the injustice 
around him, along with his implication in the forces that give rise to it. 
Courtemanche’s emphasis, therefore, is on how Valcourt is ‘not like the others’, to 
the extent of distracting from how this difference is undercut by affinities, including 
Valcourt’s Eurocentric association of sexual brutality and licentiousness with 
distinctly African forms of masculinity. Even when Courtemanche has Valcourt 
acknowledge how he is indeed ‘like the others’, such gestures are meant primarily to 
demonstrate how he is in fact ‘not like the others’, given that ‘the others’ are 
unlikely to admit to participating in the unsavoury tendencies of the hotel’s white 
patrons.  
Valcourt’s integrity, then, is deduced solely in terms of his difference from that 
which he ‘dis-identifies’ himself from, but without a clear notion of what he 
identifies himself as instead, his own complacency largely escapes scrutiny in the 
novel itself. As long as he is not compelled to identify himself positively, Valcourt is 
under no pressure to redress his own contradictions. At most, his ‘dis-identification’ 
amounts to ‘the denial of an identity given by another, given by the ruling order of 
policy’, without entailing a simultaneous ‘assertion of an[other] identity’ in its place. 
As a result, we are no more able to ‘name’ Valcourt as we are Orwell or Naipaul, 
other than as the ‘master’ that he identifies himself as, even though in so doing he 
renders it a misnomer. If there is any ‘conflict between one sensible order and 
another’ in this novel, then it is between the Rwandan government’s lies and the 
testimonies of those few expatriates who refuse to overlook the atrocities those lies 
provoke. Unlike Orwell, therefore, Valcourt is not caught between two ‘sensible 
orders’ that ‘give’ him two different identities, but neither of which he identifies 
himself with. Yet just as Orwell’s lack of action stems from the absence of a 
‘sensible order’ that registers multiple intentions even among imperialism’s 
representatives and beneficiaries, Valcourt’s passivity reflects the absence of a 
‘sensible order’ that encourages anything other than reaction, ‘dis-identification’, 
and a relational sense of integrity. My point, then, is not that Valcourt could not 
have done anything else to intervene more effectively in the events that led to the 
genocide. Instead, I mean to understand why he did not pursue any such 
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intervention; why he resigned himself to his ‘role’ in the expatriates’ ‘vaguely 
surrealistic play’, documenting those events without doing much else to stop them.  
Here, then, is where the danger lies in the subtlety with which Kincaid affirms 
that her manner of addressing her reader is reductive and synecdochal. It may well 
be necessary for a ‘master’ to identify themselves as a ‘master’ if they are to become 
anything else. Moreover, it is undoubtedly necessary to address a ‘master’ as 
nothing but a ‘master’ in order to encourage this identification. Yet to do so in a way 
that refuses to recognise the possibility that variances of consciousness, purpose, and 
practice obtain among ‘masters’ risks becoming counterproductive. For in the 
process this mode of address refuses to recognise any distinction between the 
addressee and Kincaid’s ‘master’ figure, and so the addressee’s efforts to distinguish 
themselves might well detract from a serious engagement with how they are indeed 
a ‘master’. Hence the hostility of Aegerter and Frederick’s students to Kincaid’s 
mode of addressing them as her readers in A Small Place, whose efforts to register 
their ‘dis-identification’ from Kincaid’s touristic ‘you’ distract them from seriously 
engaging with their ‘privileged place of power (white-skin privilege, class privilege, 
and “first world” privilege)’.232 Indeed, these responses exemplify how addressing 
‘masters’ as if they were nothing else becomes self-corroborating. For the students’ 
impatience with Kincaid’s ‘legitimate anger’ derives from her refusal to cater to 
their desire for affirmations of a ‘common humanity’ – that is, from Kincaid’s 
wresting from her privileged audience the power to determine her agenda. Kincaid’s 
readers respond like ‘masters’ to being addressed as ‘masters’, a cycle that is broken 
only by the interventions outlined by teachers like Aegerter and Frederick.  
For both Orwell and Courtemanche, variances of consciousness and purpose 
are possible among ‘masters’, even if there is little or no corresponding variance of 
practice. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether both of these writers believe that 
these variances of consciousness and purpose can ever lead to corresponding 
variances of practice among ‘masters’. This uncertainty, though, leaves open this 
possibility, in contrast to Naipaul’s pessimistic belief that, although they might 
evince variances of consciousness and purpose, ultimately ‘masters’ are just 
‘masters’. Yet as I demonstrate above, even Naipaul seems uncertain in this belief, 
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given how his own ‘master’ status, coupled with his ‘dis-identification’ of himself 
from other ‘masters’ – especially ‘secure white European liberals’ like Jane and 
Roche – registers a variance of consciousness, intention, and to some extent practice 
among ‘masters’. Moreover, Naipaul’s pessimism is self-perpetuating: if all 
previous attempts at ‘system-toppling upheaval’233 failed to achieve lasting social 
justice, then he sees little point in continuing to fight for such comprehensive 
change. This conclusion, though, discourages anyone from trying to change 
anything, which in turn compounds Naipaul’s pessimistic belief that ‘the world is 
what it is’, and what it always will be. In Guerrillas, Naipaul seems aware of how as 
a ‘master’ he can afford to be nihilistic, and how his unflattering portrait of 
‘masters’ like Jane, therefore, is equally one of himself. Naipaul’s consciousness 
exceeds his own deterministic portrait of ‘masters’. As a result, he is troubled by a 
nagging uncertainty over where he himself fits within the ‘stable distribution of 
places, identities, functions, and competencies’ outlined by his own understanding 
of the world. Naipaul’s deterministic, pessimistic portrait of ‘masters’ deprives him 
of the means of identifying himself positively, just like Valcourt’s insistence on 
identifying himself as a complacent white expat frustrates Gentille’s efforts to 
identify him as something else. It is significant, therefore, that in both cases a 
variance of consciousness gives rise to no corresponding variance of practice. As 
with Naipaul and Valcourt, so with Orwell and Kincaid’s touristic ‘you’: refusing to 
recognise even the possibility that ‘masters’ are never just ‘masters’ risks 
foreclosing any effort to encourage them to act and think as something other than a 
‘master’. Indeed, this foreclosure would in turn corroborate the initial refusal, 
inducing a circular, self-perpetuating logic that risks ‘stop[ing] the possibility of 
social change’.234 
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3.6  Articulating the ‘unassimilable excess’ in Bret Easton Ellis’s 
American Psycho 
In order to avoid this logic, we should not assume that we can ever exhaustively 
apprehend the consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices of ‘masters’; or 
that ‘masters’ are only ever just ‘masters’. These assumptions can prompt us to 
either overlook evidence that ‘masters’ are something else besides, or to interpret 
that evidence as somehow demonstrating the contrary. Both habits abound 
throughout the critical literature on Ellis’s third novel American Psycho, given the 
tendency of most critics to approach the novel’s narrator-protagonist Patrick 
Bateman as ‘Everyyuppie’, as the epitome of the ‘yuppie’ stereotype. Although, in 
many respects this is the case, my reading of this novel will demonstrate how this 
approach either ignores many aspects of Patrick’s character that are not ‘typical’ of 
yuppies, or reduces them to that stereotype, often in untenable ways. The term 
‘yuppie’ has almost always referenced a stereotype. Moreover, the considerable 
media attention to ‘young urban professionals’ or ‘young and upwardly-mobiles’ 
indicates a drawn-out dispute over their merits, over whether they are to be lauded 
as entrepreneurs or derided as selfish, ruthless spendthrifts. The term was 
popularised by Chicago columnist Bob Greene as a way of distinguishing yuppies 
from ‘yippies’ – members of the Youth International Party of the 1960s – albeit with 
the implication that the latter had grown up to become the former.235 Indeed, many 
media commentators found it ironic how many yuppies had once been hippies, given 
how the former’s characteristic selfishness and materialism contrasted with the 
latter’s emphasis on social and political activism.  
 Not everyone was surprised by this connection, though. In a special report 
declaring 1984 to have been ‘the Year of the Yuppie’, Newsweek described how 
‘[m]uch of the energy and optimism and passion of the '60s seems to have been 
turned inward, on lives, careers, apartments and dinners.’ Similarly, the often 
ferocious personal ambition of yuppies derived from the hard-headed, single-minded 
determination of hippies to change the world. As one interviewee observed – 
                                            
235 Greene claimed to have actually overheard someone else coining the term in a bar in 
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referring to student protests against the Vietnam war – ‘We were upper-middle-class 
white kids who were used to getting what we wanted [...] I really felt strongly about 
the strength of our will – that if we wanted the bombing stopped it would stop.’ The 
report’s authors comment on how this statement ‘pretty much sums up the way 
another upper-middle class white kid, Carrie Cook of Boston, feels about getting 
rich.’ What had prompted these former hippies to ‘turn inward’, to start ‘vot[ing] on 
[their] wallets’ rather than ‘on [their] consciences’, was debated throughout the 
press. According to a Harvard alumnus quoted in a 1986 article, hippies ‘who once 
attacked the ''establishment'' [were] now part of it’ because ‘the world we found was 
the only one there was.’236 So much for the ‘strength of will’ of ‘upper-middle-class 
white kids’ who, having ‘ended a war (more on this in a second), brought down two 
presidents (Johnson and Nixon) and founded the women's movement’,237 suddenly 
felt unable to go much further. For those who still ‘want[ed] to make a difference’, 
business now appeared to be the best place to do so. Moreover, unlike public 
service, in business you could make a difference and get rich in the process.238 
 The Newsweek report lauded this new professional caste for ‘challenging 
ossified corporate structures, just as they once challenged the sacred traditions of 
academia, forcing them into more imaginative solutions’.239 Yuppies could be 
ruthlessly ambitious, but this made them hardworking, enterprising, creative, and 
resourceful, even if they flaunted their personal success in often outlandish and 
tastelessly extravagant fashion. Even as it extolled the virtues of ‘yuppiedom’, the 
Newsweek report described the more surreal aspects of an emerging ‘yuppie’ 
consumer profile. One interviewee explained how she decided to pursue a yuppie 
lifestyle after first eating Brie cheese and pita bread, which she described as ‘my 
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first exposure to the expanded experiences of the planet.’ An obsession with Brie 
and other imported cheeses quickly became a staple ingredient of the yuppie 
stereotype as it developed in the U.S. press. So too the yuppies’ fondness for 
imported cars, especially BMWs and Porsches; renovated brownstones in gentrified 
Manhattan neighbourhoods; designer clothing; Adidas running shoes; portable CD 
players; pocket calculators; portable telephones; yellow ‘power’ ties; arugula; and 
bespoke kitchens, fully equipped with food processors, espresso machines, and 
cooking magazines, even though many yuppies almost never cooked for themselves. 
Typically, yuppies bought something as a status symbol, rather than for its use-
value. As a result, yuppie trends could be arbitrary, if not bizarre. Hence the image 
with which the Newsweek report opens, of a yuppie ‘with $1,200 worth of pots and 
pans in her kitchen who eats every meal in a restaurant’.  
 Even in this early portrait, therefore, there is something absurd about 
yuppies. Despite admiring their go-getting mentality, the Newsweek report parodies 
the inflated grandiosity with which the above interviewee describes first eating brie, 
when remarking that  
[w]hat Yuppies have discovered is nothing less than a new plane of 
consciousness, a state of Transcendental Acquisition, in which the 
perfection of their possessions enables them to rise above the messy 
turmoil of their emotional lives. They know that Beauty Is Truth, and 
Truth is Beauty, which is why their most eloquent symbol is the 
Rolex watch, which has both.240  
The hyperbolic tone invites us to be sceptical towards the notion that yuppies had 
managed to transcend ‘the messy turmoil of their emotional lives’ through 
materialism. Indeed, several months after the Newsweek report, a Washington-based 
psychologist publicly claimed that ‘the compromises and trade-offs yuppies make in 
pursuing a career are taking a psychic toll’.241 As a result, yuppies who ‘get caught 
up in materialism and want all the perks of a successful career’ found that, in the 
process of ‘molding themselves to the attitudes and values needed for success in 
many organizations [...] they have betrayed themselves.’ The psychologist – Dr 
Douglas LaBier – contended that much of this disillusionment was a ‘legacy of the 
‘60s’, a hangover from his clients’ hippie days, given it reflected a desire for ‘more 
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personal fulfilment from their work and private lives’ than they had so far managed 
to find. Contrary to other commentators, LaBier found that many yuppies had not 
quite shaken off the hippie mentality altogether.  
 Indeed, as the term ‘yuppie’ became increasingly pejorative, and the 
stereotype increasingly negative, many self-identified yuppies objected to the 
stereotype by emphasising their own, continued involvement in social causes.242 
Such protests, though, did little to stop the term from gradually becoming an insult. 
Having initially been an amusing curiosity, yuppie materialism quickly became a 
morbid symptom. Writing in 1986, Washington Post columnist Bob Levey 
described yuppies as being so ‘self-centered and skin-deep’ that they ‘honestly think 
you can tell all you need to know about The Inner Man or woman by the brands he 
or she chooses.’243 Conceding that he was ‘about to generalize dangerously here’, 
Levey nonetheless maintained that yuppies could not  
easily see past their own pleasure and comfort. They are incessantly 
preoccupied with their beautiful bodies and their beautiful bank 
accounts. But do you ever see a Yuppie making sandwiches in a 
shelter for the homeless? Or serving on a volunteer committee? Or 
giving anything to anyone that won’t produce a tax deduction? 
Three weeks later, Levey summarised some of the responses to the piece sent in by 
readers, many of which objected to his ‘generalizations – or, to use the word 
Melanie A. Scott of Arlington chose, “caricatures.”’ One response – from a woman 
who claimed to donate freshly-baked bread to the homeless every morning, and old 
clothes to the House of Ruth244 without claiming any tax reductions – prompted 
Levey to acknowledge that not all yuppies were reducible to his earlier, unsavoury 
stereotype. Indeed, it became increasingly unclear how many yuppies there actually 
were in the U.S.A. as characterised by the media, or even whether they existed at all, 
beyond the pages of newspapers and magazines. In 1985, Christopher Reed reported 
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in the Guardian that ‘market analysis by SRI International, the California think-tank 
that produced the Values and Lifestyles profiles of US consumers, has serious 
doubts about the value of the yuppies market.’245 At most, analysts found that ‘strict 
interpretation of the type produces no more than 1.2 million’ American yuppies, 
‘which rises to two million by discarding the ‘urban’ requirement to include 
‘yumpies,’ young, upwardly-mobile professionals who are permitted to live in the 
country.’ Reed describes how ‘[t]he marketing and ad people [...] haven’t had such 
fun for years’, as they sought to tap into this new and – it seemed – highly lucrative 
market. Yet given how small the demographic actually seemed to be, the possibility 
arose that ‘the media and a self-interested advertising industry ha[d] been fooling 
themselves’, stoking a media sensation that was hardly borne out in reality.  
 Such doubts, though, did not dissuade commentators like Levey from 
continuing to critique yuppies as if they actually existed, and those who did identify 
themselves as yuppies continued to object to how such commentators characterised 
them. It seems that no one could talk about yuppies without succumbing to 
exaggeration and sensationalism. No wonder, then, that when the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average fell by 22% on October 19
th
 1987 – thereafter known in Europe 
and North America as ‘Black Monday’ – a crowd gathered in Wall Street chanting 
‘Down with Yuppies’. The crash had originated in Hong Kong before spreading 
westwards, yet the media’s response placed most of the blame with the yuppies’ 
characteristic selfishness, greed, and careless risk-taking. Three days later, one 
article declared that the ‘yuppies’ last rites [were being] readied’,246 and soon 
afterwards Elizabeth Kolbert remarked that ‘it is open season on yuppies in New 
York City’, given how ‘yuppie-bashing is apparently in’.247 Schadenfreude quickly 
set in, with gleeful reports of ruined yuppies signing for bedsits in Brooklyn rather 
than buying condominiums in Manhattan; of newly-popular jokes about yuppie 
penury; and of the sudden reluctance of brands and advertising agencies to court the 
yuppie market. By the 1990s, the yuppie had been declared ‘dead’ many times 
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over.248 Black Monday appeared to have settled the debate over whether the cons of 
yuppie culture outweighed the pros. Subsequently, the term became largely 
pejorative.  
 However much they were actually to blame for the crash, yuppies had long 
ago become an easy target for the American moral vanguard.249 They spent 
extravagantly and flaunted their success, preaching to others the virtues of hard 
work, tenacity, creativity, and prioritising oneself. In return, their critics reminded 
yuppies of the virtues of family life, living for others, and investing oneself in 
something for any other reason than a financial return. For most critics, American 
Psycho added to this critical discourse, further exposing the faults of yuppie culture, 
in what Elizabeth Young described as ‘an old-fashioned, straightforwardly 
moralistic reading’250 of U.S. society under the Reagan administration. American 
Psycho has largely been read as a ‘not-so-subtle satire’251 of disparate yet 
overlapping aspects of Manhattan’s social conjuncture during the late 1980s. For 
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Elizabeth Young, the novel is more than ‘a classic of the 1980s. In a sense it is the 
1980s. It embodies the decade and all the clichés of the decade in the West – the 
rampant self-serving greed, relentless aggression and one-upmanship; the manic 
consumer overdrive, exhaustion, wipe-out and terror.’252 As a result, Young was 
unsurprised at the media sensation that greeted the novel’s publication in 1991. 
Journalists and interest groups mostly focused on the novel’s numerous, graphic 
accounts of the torture of women. Young describes how  
Tammy Bruce of NOW [specifically, head of the Los Angeles chapter 
of the National Organization for Women] said it was “a how-to 
manual on the torture and dismemberment of women” and called for 
a national boycott of the book. Gloria Steinem suggested that Ellis 
would have to take responsibility for any women tortured and killed 
in the same manner as described in the novel.253 
The British media echoed these objections, with some critics imputing that ‘the 
novel [was] virtually autobiographical. It was said that Ellis “chose to sit in his 
apartment month after month imagining unoriginal ways of torturing women (not to 
mention dogs, gays and homeless people)”’.254 Indeed, ‘[f]eminist groups again 
behaved as though this were not fiction but a manifesto, a statement of intent.’255 For 
Young, all this controversy was deeply telling, and she found it  
hardly surprising that a novel which unequivocally condemned a way 
of life to which many people had sacrificed their youth and energy 
was tepidly received; journalists were as much at the mercy of the 
status-driven conspicuous consumption of the eighties as anyone else 
and the froth over the book’s alleged violence may have concealed a 
hideous disquiet that the leotards and Agnès B. leggings, the 
enormous mortgages and obscene restaurant bills 
were...just...not...worth it.256 
Journalists who themselbes were still swept up in the ‘furious, doomed drive 
towards success and perfection [that] was still dominant’ in the early 1990s, felt 
deeply uncomfortable about the novel’s narrator-protagonist Patrick Bateman, 
                                            
252 E. Young, p. 88 (emphasis in original). 
253 E. Young, p. 86. 
254 E. Young, p. 87. 
255 E. Young, p. 87. 
256 E. Young, p. 89. 
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whom Young describes as ‘a spirit; the Zeitgeist, all-yuppie, all-corrupt.’257 The 
reaction Young documents here is comparable to how McMillan’s reader ‘dis-
identifies’ themselves from Stella, according to Frederick. The hysteria with which 
the media responded to American Psycho might well have been stoked by a ‘slightly 
funny feeling’ that those who condemned the novel had more in common with 
Patrick and his loathsome peers then they would have liked to admit. They may not 
have been disembowelling prostitutes, socialites, and street dwellers, but many of 
these journalists were still caught up in the same materialistic rat race that the novel 
eviscerates.  
 Given all this hysteria, it is unsurprising that of all of Ellis’s oeuvre, it is 
American Psycho that has attracted by far the most scholarly attention. As Eldridge 
notes ‘the hostile reception itself inevitably marked American Psycho as a text in 
need of rehabilitation’, and although he attends primarily to how this was achieved 
through Mary Harron’s 2000 film adaptation of the novel, Eldridge maintains that 
academics – Young especially – have largely led the way.258 Yet I find that in the 
process, most of the subsequent scholarship on American Psycho appears to have 
‘sacrificed’ Patrick in order to ‘save’ Ellis from the regrettable fate of popular and 
intellectual indifference. Patrick’s apparent lack of subtlety as a satirical device 
renders him vulnerable to simplification. Hence Young’s repeated claim that Patrick 
is ‘a cipher, rather than a “character”. He is “Everyyuppie”’,259 a two-dimensional 
archetype that lacks the depth or complexity of what Young vaguely describes as 
‘character in the traditional sense’.260 There is nothing about Patrick that exceeds the 
consumer discourse that he pores over, memorises, and regurgitates verbatim. 
Young does not quite establish why Patrick is therefore ‘an impossibility’,261 why an 
‘ultimate consumer, someone who is composed entirely of inauthentic commodity-
                                            
257 E. Young, p. 118. 
258 Eldridge, p. 19. 
259 E. Young, p. 103. 
260 E. Young, p. 103. 
261 E. Young, p. 119. 
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related desires cannot exist as a person.’262 Indeed, since much of one’s subjectivity 
is constituted in language and discourse,263 I am sceptical towards Young’s claim 
here that someone like Patrick cannot exist whatsoever beyond fiction. Given his 
desire only for what is ‘newest, brightest, best, most expensive and most 
fashionable’,264 Patrick might well choose not to navigate through the eclectic and 
often nonsensical combinations of products and cultural codes promoted by GQ 
magazine.265 Yet for someone like Catherine Belsey, Patrick’s inconsistency would 
hardly be exceptional, given her claim that ‘the displacement of subjectivity across a 
range of discourses implies a range of positions from which the subject grasps itself 
with the real, and these positions may be incompatible and contradictory.’266 All that 
distinguishes Belsey’s subject from Patrick is the former’s active pursuit of ‘new, 
non-contradictory subject-positions’267 amidst all these contradictions. Someone like 
Patrick, therefore – as defined by Young above – might well exist: they just would 
not respond to their ‘displacement’ across a range of ‘incompatible and 
contradictory’ discourses by actively seeking out less contradictory subject-positions 
for themselves.  
 Perhaps, then, what Young means when claiming that Patrick ‘cannot exist’ 
relates to her claim that Patrick is ‘a cipher, rather than a “character”’. As an 
archetype of the yuppie stereotype, Patrick cannot exist, because archetypes are 
aggregates of the characteristics that mark individuals as belonging to a particular 
group. As we have seen, Spivak’s notion of ‘self-metonymisation’ suggests that an 
individual’s subject-position always exceeds any and all groups they are regarded as 
belonging to, whether by themselves or by others. Patrick, therefore, cannot exist 
                                            
262 E. Young, p. 121 (emphasis in original).  
263 Belsey, Catherine, ‘Constructing the Subject, Deconstructing the Text’, in Feminisms: 
An Anthology of Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. by Robyn Warhol and Diane Price 
Herndl (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991), p. 597. 
264 E. Young, p. 103. 
265 An associate even tells Patrick that he’s ‘total GQ’, and Patrick admits to himself that 
although ‘I can’t tell if he’s being sarcastic [...] it makes me feel proud in a way’ (Ellis, 
p. 90). 
266 Belsey, 597 (Quoted in Hall, 99). 
267 Belsey, 597 (Quoted in Hall, 100). 
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insofar as he is nothing more than a yuppie, insofar as the sum total of his 
consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices are reducible to the yuppie 
stereotype defined by the media above. I have mentioned above how as early as 
1985, market analysts were suggesting that the yuppie phenomenon had been over-
exaggerated in the media, to such an extent that they wondered if yuppies existed at 
all beyond newspapers and magazines. Those who complained about how the media 
portrayed young urban professionals made a similar claim, that this portrait was 
mostly unfounded and unwarranted caricature, and that many ‘real’ yuppies were 
charitable and family-oriented. Insofar as he does not exceed the yuppie stereotype, 
then, Patrick indeed does not ‘exist’ beyond the pages of books, journals, 
newspapers, and magazines. As Young observes, Ellis explicitly draws attention to 
‘the fact that Patrick’s only “existence” is within fiction’, given how  
[h]e is the big brother of Sean Bateman in The Rules of Attraction and 
has already made an appearance in that book. He works at Pierce and 
Pierce which was Sherman McCoy’s investment firm in The Bonfire 
of the Vanities. He knows people from other “brat-pack” novels; 
Stash could be the person of the same name in Slaves of New York. 
Patrick tells of a chilling encounter with Alison Poole, heroine of Jay 
McInernay’s Story of My Life.268 
Of course, that Patrick exists only within fiction is largely a moot point. American 
Psycho is after all a work of fiction, albeit one that is based on Ellis’s own 
impressions of New York’s yuppie culture, along with his father’s own experiences 
of living and working in the city.269 If, however, Patrick is nothing more than a 
                                            
268 Young, p. 109; in American Psycho, Stash is an unkempt, socally-inept liberal arts 
student who spends the first chapter in a drug-induced stupor, much to Patrick’s 
disgust.  
269 In a 1999 interview, Ellis described Patrick as ‘[p]artly guys I met on Wall Street, partly 
myself, and partly my father’ (Clarke, Jaime, ‘Interview with Bret Easton Ellis’, in 
Mississippi Review, 27.3 (Spring-Summer 1999), p. 81). While researching the novel, 
Ellis spent ‘two exhausting weeks of hanging out with’ Wall Street financiers and other 
New York young professionals, after which he concluded that ‘it just seemed logical 
that one of these guys would be driven so nuts by how status-obsessed everyone is that 
it would incite him into becoming a murderer’ (Clarke, pp. 74-5). Ellis admits that after 
having moved to New York, he himself initially ‘got sucked up into this whole yuppie-
mania that was going on at the time’, and that American Psycho was in part ‘my way of 
fighting against myself slipping into a certain kind of lifestyle’ (Clarke, p. 81). Equally, 
though, the novel ‘was a criticism of the way [Ellis’s] father lived his life, because he 
did slip into that void. He was the ultimate consumer’ (Clarke, p. 82). This connection 
between Patrick and Ellis’s father would provide the basis for his surreal 2005 fictional 
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stereotypical yuppie, then Ellis purposely draws attention to his fictionality in order 
to suggest that no such person can possibly exist beyond fiction; that no one can 
‘exist’ as nothing more than a stereotypical yuppie.  
 Just like Kincaid’s A Small Place, then, American Psycho peddles in 
reductive stereotype, presenting us with an image of excess, boorishness, 
selfishness, and intellectual, moral, and emotional bankruptcy that is recognisably 
‘yuppie’. Equally, though, just like A Small Place, American Psycho tests the limits 
of reductive stereotype, by having Patrick exceed the terms of the yuppie type as 
defined both in the media and by Ellis. The most obvious aspect of Patrick that 
exceeds this stereotype is his claim to being a serial killer. Trawling through the 
media discourse on yuppies during the 1980s, I have come across no indication that 
anyone seriously believed that yuppies had a penchant for homicide. We might 
argue, of course, that Patrick’s violence merely allegorises a psychopathic tendency 
that was regarded as being typical of yuppies, even if no one claimed that this 
tendency often led to the kind of violence depicted in American Psycho.270 Indeed, 
critics have mostly followed Young’s lead in finding that Patrick’s homicidal 
activities reinforce the fact that he is nothing more than a yuppie. I have already 
mentioned David Eldridge’s observation – comparable to Young’s – that Patrick’s 
opinions and desires amount to ‘a mixture of GQ and Stereo Review and Vanity Fair 
and Fangoria’.271 As Eldridge notes, Patrick’s violence is just as ‘secondhand’,272 
                                                                                                                           
autobiography Lunar Park, towards the end of which Ellis repudiates his prior claim 
that his father was a fictional version of Patrick.  
270 John Conley claims that in a scene where Patrick kills an African-American street 
dweller, Ellis ‘condenses, figures, and dramatizes the complexities of gentrification and 
“revanchist” city policy into a murderous urban allegory’ (‘The Poverty of Bret Easton 
Ellis’, in Arizona Quarterly, 65.3 (Autumn 2009), p. 131). Yet Conley also points out 
the chilling fact that this scene is by no means exclusively allegorical, given how 
‘every year hundreds of homeless people are murdered in [the] United Stated. 
Supposedly random acts of violence against the homeless are not the stuff of fiction; on 
the contrary, while Ellis was writing American Psycho, it was not uncommon to read 
such stories in the New York Times’ (Conley, p. 131). Conley notes how such stories 
were especially common following the clearances of homeless shanty towns in the 
Lower East Side and Tompkins Square Park by the Dinkins mayoral administration 
between 1988-89, after which shanty towns – or ‘Dinkinsvilles’ – began appearing 
throughout Manhattan. The grim realities of urban poverty and gross structural 
inequality continually manage to punch through the veneer of allegory and textual self-
consciousness, through which Ellis otherwise ‘deconstruct[s] and disentangle[es] the 
implicit agreements that lie behind fictive “realism”’ (E. Young, p. 109).   
271 Eldridge, p. 27. 
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insofar as he largely imitates the modus operandi of historical and fictional serial 
killers. Hence the manner in which the novel’s painfully graphic murder scenes 
entail, ‘on the authorial level, specific interjections from other texts – Ellis drew 
upon the FBI case files of real serial killers in providing the horrific level of 
detail’.273 Moreover, Patrick ‘tells us directly that his reading matter consists of the 
biographies of real-life serial killers (Ted Bundy, Ed Gein and so on), and that he 
compulsively watches “video nasties”’.274 Patrick’s ‘secret’ identity, then, only 
reinforces how ‘[a]lmost everything [he] has to say is a “recycling” of such texts’,275 
and how he subsequently ‘has no identity beyond that which he consumes.’276  
Critics addressing American Psycho’s gender dynamics approach Patrick’s 
‘secret’ identity in much the same way as Young and Eldridge, by demonstrating 
how it subscribes to an extreme form of heteronormative hypermasculinity that 
informs the yuppie mentality, as depicted in the novel itself.277 Echoing Young’s 
claim that Patrick ‘cannot exist’, Mark Storey suggests that Patrick ‘exists only as an 
exemplar of traditionally male language systems (violence, pornography, the media, 
fashion, commerce) taken to their extremes’, and that he is nothing more than ‘a 
representation of representations in which he is in the center as the negative 
space.’278 Moreover, Storey draws attention to how Patrick’s modus operandi as a 
serial killer ‘singles out’ ‘[w]omen in particular, but also homosexuals, blacks, and 
other ethnic minorities’.279 Noting how these are ‘the groups who, in a postmodern 
                                                                                                                           
272 Eldridge, p. 28. 
273 Eldridge, p. 28. 
274 Eldridge, p. 27. 
275 Eldridge, p. 27. 
276 Eldridge, p. 27. 
277 How heteronormative yuppie culture really was is unclear. For one thing, the 
subcategory of ‘guppy’ (gay urban professional) was recognised in the media as early 
as 1986, and had even been mentioned in the Yuppie Handbook, a tongue-in-cheek 
yuppie version of the Preppy Handbook that first appeared in 1983 (Porter, Henry, 
‘The Great Quest for...’, in The Sunday Times, October 12 1986).  
278 Storey, p. 58. 
279 Storey, p. 64. 
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society, find their place in the margins being brought into the center’, Storey finds 
that Patrick’s habit of targeting these groups in particular suggests that, ‘[t]o 
[Patrick], the rise of the marginalized threatens his central position as hegemonic 
male; to protect that position, he lashes out, attempting to eliminate the threat.’280 
Here, Patrick’s alter ego functions in much the same way as Rancière’s ‘police’. For 
if this ‘rise of the marginalized’ entails groups like women and homosexuals 
stepping ‘out of place’ – out of ‘the margins’ into ‘the center’ – and thus ‘arriv[ing] 
as a supplement to the social distribution’, then Patrick’s ‘elimination’ of this 
‘threat’ amounts to the ‘dismiss[al or] exp[ulsion of] surplus subjects’281 that ‘cannot 
be identified as a part of the police order’282 that sustains the existing ‘patriarchal 
hierarchy’. 
 More recent scholarship continues to emphasise how Patrick’s violence 
accentuates his epitomisation of ‘yuppiedom’, even as critical attention following 
the 2008 financial crisis shifts to how American Psycho engages with the cultural 
logic of finance capital. Echoing Storey’s claim that Patrick is ‘a representation of 
representations’, Leigh Claire la Berghe illustrates how Patrick’s homicidal exploits 
parody what la Berghe calls ‘financial print culture’,283 the standard tropes in which 
finance capital was represented by the media during the 1980s, and in which it often 
represented itself. Patrick’s brutal murders literalise these tropes, which were often 
violent, sexualised, and militaristic. 1980s financiers articulated themselves as a 
collective ‘masculine financial subject’284 that was engaged in ‘making a killing’ or 
                                            
280 Storey, p. 64; we ought to note, though, that Ellis portrays only the first two groups – 
women and homosexuals – as possessing any significant economic power in the 
Manhattan social hierarchy, given how every yuppie in American Psycho is white, with 
no exception. In contrast, almost all of the novel’s street dwellers are non-Caucasian, 
and all other non-whites mentioned in the novel exist at the lower end of the Manhattan 
economy, such as Patrick’s house cleaner and the proprietors of his local Laundromat, 
who in both cases are Chinese. 
281 Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, p. 71. 
282 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561. 
283 La Berge, Leigh Claire, ‘The Men Who Make the Killings: American Psycho, Financial 
Masculinity, and 1980s Financial Print Culture’, in Studies in American Fiction, 37.2 
(Fall 2010), p. 273. 
284 La Berge, p. 274. 
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‘taking America’.285 In a notably selective reading of American Psycho, Thomas 
Heise claims that Patrick’s violent escapades impose a neoliberal order onto the 
abject bodies of the Manhattan poor, ‘efficiently dispos[ing] of surplus populations 
that strain limited resources. Where the welfare state is slow and rehabilitative, 
Bateman is swift, delivering punishment as deserved. He is the “invisible hand” of 
the market, wielding a knife concealed in a designer jacket.’286 Heise’s argument, 
though, derives from a reading of just one of the many murder scenes in American 
Psycho, the only one in which Patrick kills a street dweller. Otherwise, as Young 
notes, ‘Patrick is a thoroughly democratic killer and by the end of the book the 
body-count, by my reckoning stands at thirty-three and covers the entire cross-
section of race, class, age and gender in New York society.’287 In particular, Heise 
would be hard pressed to explain how Patrick’s murder of his yuppie colleague Paul 
Owen fits into his central role in Ellis’s ‘neoliberal revenge satire’.288  
 What I find more questionable, though, is Heise’s interpretation of this novel 
as if it were not a novel at all, but some treatise on neoliberal political economics 
instead, albeit presented in allegorical form. As Storey and la Berghe both 
demonstrate, if American Psycho analyses anything, then it is the manner in which 
yuppie culture and finance capital in general are represented. Indeed, as la Berghe 
puts it, insofar as it ‘is a satire of a range of financial texts’, the novel is ‘ultimately 
[...] a satire of itself’.289 For the novel itself is no less a part of a discourse that gives 
rise to ‘the grandiose though ultimately uncertain and phantasmatic masculinity of 
the financier’, even if Ellis ‘takes the most widely distributed metaphor of 1980s 
financial print culture – the violent financier – and then [...] tries to “kill” that very 
metaphor’,290 by literalising it to the point of absurdity. No doubt the ‘financial 
                                            
285 La Berge, p. 278. 
286 Heise, Thomas, ‘American Psycho: Neoliberal Fantasies and the Death of Downtown’, 
in Arizona Quarterly, 67.1 (Spring 2011), p. 154. 
287 E. Young, pp. 113-14. 
288 Heise, p. 135. 
289 La Berghe, p. 293. 
290 La Berghe, p. 293. 
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order’ created by Wall Street is one whose ‘social violence’ is ‘all too real and 
simultaneously obfuscated’.291 Given such obfuscations, literalising this violence 
and – more to the point – the financier’s direct responsibility for it in the form of a 
serial killer stockbroker, serves much the same purpose as Kincaid’s manner of 
conflating white tourists with slavers and plantation owners, despite the several 
hundred years between the two. Yet allegory is surely no substitute for rigorous, 
thorough analysis, as Doug Henwood acknowledges when introducing his 1997 
book Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom with the following personal 
anecdote: 
One morning, riding the elevator up to work, I noticed a cop standing 
next to me, a gun on his hip. I realized in an instant that all the 
sophisticated machinations that went on upstairs and around the 
whole Wall Street neighborhood rested ultimately on force. Financial 
power, too, grows out of the barrel of a gun. Of course a serious 
analysis of the political economy of finance has to delve into all those 
sophisticated machinations, but the image of that gun should be kept 
firmly in mind.292 
Henwood objects to how theorists of postmodernity like Jean Baudrillard and 
Fredric Jameson postulate that capital has now become ‘“weightless,” “astral,” or 
able to “launch itself into orbit”’293 – in short, decoupled from any material basis, 
such as the production of goods. For Henwood, these formulations lead these 
thinkers into ‘a second- or even third-order fetishism’ that leaves them ‘unable to 
decode the real relations of power behind the apparently disembodied ecstasies of 
computerized trading.’294 Yet Henwood rounds off the above anecdote by 
acknowledging how metaphorising the systemic violence of finance capital in the 
form of a gun is itself a kind of fetishism, especially when it allows one to bypass 
the daunting task of working through the dizzyingly complex inner working of the 
financial industries.  
                                            
291 La Berghe, p. 293. 
292 Henwood, Doug, Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom (London, New York: Verso, 
1997), p. 1. 
293 Shonkwiler, Alison, ‘Don DeLillo’s Financial Sublime’, in Contemporary Literature, 51, 
2 (Summer 2010), p. 246. 
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 I find that Ellis has a very similar point to make in American Psycho, 
presenting a deliberately ‘not-so-subtle’ critique of finance capital that roots its 
violent excesses in those of a yuppie, a demographic that by 1991 had become 
everyone’s favourite scapegoat, regardless of whether or not they actually existed as 
characterised in the media. If ‘the media and a self-interested advertising industry 
ha[d] been fooling themselves’ in their obsession with yuppies during the 1980s, 
Ellis’s portrayal of Patrick explores the ironic possibility that the critics of yuppies 
directed their moral outrage towards a media mirage. Yuppies might well have 
existed, but the extent to which they resembled that mirage remained uncertain. As 
such, commentators like Bob Levey were critiquing this mirage, more so than 
actually-existing yuppies, even after the latter objected to his reductive stereotyping 
of them. As I will shortly demonstrate, Ellis finds this stereotype to be reductive as 
well. For unlike Young, Eldridge, Storey, and Heise, I find that Ellis portrays Patrick 
as being more than a yuppie, just as Kincaid articulates her touristic ‘you’ as being 
more than a tourist. I take my cue here from David Roche, who as I mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, is perhaps the only critic of American Psycho to have read 
Patrick’s claim to being a serial killer against what Roche calls ‘his social self, his 
public appearance’295 – that is, the yuppie persona that is all that Patrick’s friends, 
colleagues, and associates know him as. Like Young, Eldridge, Storey, and Heise, 
Roche does ultimately draw parallels between this public persona and Patrick’s 
‘second identity’. Echoing Eldridge’s claim – outlined above – that this ‘second 
identity’ is no less ‘secondhand’ than his yuppie persona, Roche concludes that even 
if it is meant ‘to set him apart from the other yuppies [...] this differentiation is 
compromised because the figure of transgression he constitutes himself as is just 
borrowed from another set of pop culture texts.’296 In failing to assert a monadic 
sense of self, Patrick comes to realise that ‘“being” or “representing” a psychopath 
or a yuppie comes down to the same thing; the true self and the false, social or 
performing self are one and the same, or rather, there is no true self; identity, [...] is 
a discursive construct.’297  
                                            
295 Roche, p. 124. 
296 Roche, pp. 135-36. 
297 Roche, p. 136. 
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As with Eldridge, so for Roche, Patrick is ultimately unable to fashion an 
identity for himself out of anything other than ‘that which he consumes.’298 And yet 
by claiming that Patrick pursues a ‘second identity’ for himself ‘as a reaction 
against’ the yuppie mentality, Roche appears to disagree with Eldridge that Patrick 
‘has no identity beyond that which he consumes’, that nothing about him exceeds 
whatever his consumption habits tell us about him. At the very least, then, Patrick’s 
‘second identity’ articulates a consciousness and intention that exceeds the yuppie 
stereotype. For Roche, this excess is Patrick’s troubling awareness that the constant, 
petty one-upmanship between himself and his peers ‘point[s] at the impossibility to 
perfectly conform to the etiquette, something which often fills Patrick with 
“nameless dread” [...] an expression he uses eight times.’299 The ‘slight variations’ 
that distinguish the novel’s yuppies from one another indicate their failure to achieve 
the etiquette’s impossibly idealised image of the perfect yuppie – peerless in one’s 
professional and social status, including one’s financial assets, one’s professional 
seniority and contacts, one’s physical appearance, one’s fashion sense, and one’s 
sexual prowess. For all the bragging and one-upmanship that pervades American 
Psycho, there is always someone who is doing better than everyone else. And yet 
everyone continues trying to outdo everyone else, Patrick included. Nonetheless, 
whereas everyone else seems300 oblivious to the futility of their efforts, Patrick’s 
awareness of it haunts him as a ‘slightly funny feeling’, one that compounds his 
sense of his own imperfection by further distinguishing him from his apparently 
oblivious peers.  
According to Berthold Schoene, Patrick’s modus operandi – in particular, his 
physical annihilation of his victims, whether by dismembering them, eating them, or 
dissolving them in acid – subscribes to a logic of abjection as defined by Calvin 
                                            
298 Eldridge, p. 27. 
299 Roche, p. 125. 
300 It is a subtle yet important detail to note here, that because we only ever encounter 
Patrick’s peers through his first-person narrative, we can never be sure of whether 
Patrick is alone in claiming to be a serial killer, or at least anything other than a yuppie. 
This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that Patrick appears to be so successful at 
concealing his homicidal activities, which raises the question of whether his peers are 
equally successful – whether all he knows of them is their own ‘false, social or 
performing’ selves, their own ‘mask[s] of sanity’ (Ellis, 279) that might one day slip, 
revealing other serial killers.  
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Thomas, as ‘the excrementalization of alterity’, ‘the mode by which others become 
shit’.301 Within Patrick’s ‘sensible order’, to be anything other than the yuppie 
etiquette’s impossible image of perfection – white; male; heterosexual; able-bodied; 
good-looking; snappy-dressing; rich; and professionally, socially, and sexually more 
successful than everyone else – is not to be different, but rather imperfect. Patrick’s 
‘second identity’, then, is an effort to make sense of his own difference to this image 
as something other than imperfection. Ellis conveys the standard yuppie response to 
such difference via Patrick’s scorn towards his colleague Luis Carruthers. Luis is 
continually mocked behind his back by everyone around him for his terrible dress 
sense and bumbling incompetence when it comes to keeping up with the latest 
consumer trends. Indeed, Patrick’s first disclosure of his ‘second identity’ to his 
reader makes it very clear that his alter ego functions precisely in order to 
distinguish his own transgression of the etiquette from Luis’s. This initial disclosure 
occurs after Patrick describes attending a dinner party hosted by his fiancée Evelyn, 
a stereotypically insipid yuppie who has spent the entire evening flirting with Tim 
Price, Patrick’s colleague and apparently his closest friend. Patrick has repeatedly 
been the butt of this verbal foreplay.302 Thus, at one point, Tim calls Patrick a 
‘dufus’,303 and before Patrick can respond, Evelyn comes to his apparent defence, 
telling Tim to ‘leave Patrick alone […] He’s the boy next door. That’s Patrick. 
You’re not a dufus, are you, honey?’ 304 Rather than respond, Patrick here simply 
remarks to himself that ‘Evelyn is on Mars’ while moving off in search of a drink. 
Evelyn continues to counter Tim’s jibes with this label throughout the evening. Only 
once does Patrick openly respond:  
                                            
301 Thomas, Calvin, Male Matters: Masculinity, Anxiety, and the Male Body on the Line 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), pp. 64-65 (quoted in Schoene, p. 391).  
302 Quite literally, given how Evelyn at one point takes Tim upstairs, ostensibly to find him 
a lint brush. When they reappear – ‘Tim glar[ing] at me as he takes the seat next to 
mine’ – Patrick observes that Evelyn ‘looks only slightly flushed’ (Ellis, p. 12). After 
the party is over, and as he struggles to send a drunken Tim home, Patrick privately 
admits that ‘I am fairly sure that Timothy and Evelyn are having an affair’ (Ellis, p. 
22). After Tim finally leaves, Patrick asks Evelyn whether she would ever consider 
‘just go[ing] for Price’: Evelyn’s response – ‘Why Price? Price?’ – only compounds 
Patrick’s suspicions that ‘she has had sex with him’ (Ellis, p. 23).  
303 Ellis, p. 11. 
304 Ellis, p. 11. 
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“Leave Patrick alone. He’s the boy next door,” Evelyn says [...] 
“You’re not an extraterrestrial, are you honey?” 
“Should I even dignify that question with an answer?” I sigh. 
“Oh baby.” She pouts into the mirror, looking at me in its 
reflection. “I know you’re not an extraterrestrial.” 
“Relief,” I mutter to myself.305 
Even here, Patrick allows Evelyn to have the last word, keeping his second retort 
strictly to himself. It is largely irrelevant what Patrick might think he is, because 
Evelyn knows well enough what he is. Moments later, Evelyn comes to Patrick’s 
‘defence’ for a third time, insisting that ‘Patrick is not a cynic, Timothy. He’s the 
boy next door, aren’t you honey?’306 Patrick once again responds only to himself, 
yet in a manner that contests his appellation as Evelyn’s endearing yet unremarkable 
‘boy next door’: ‘“No I’m not,” I whisper to myself. “I’m a fucking evil 
psychopath.”’307 This particular invocation of his ‘second identity’ encapsulates how 
it functions for Patrick as a way of refuting how others characterise him as – for 
example – ‘the boy next door’, a ‘dufus’, or ‘a brown-nosing goody-goody’ who 
‘could barely pick up an escort girl, let alone...what was it you said he did to her? 
[...] Oh yes, ‘chop her up’’.308  
 Nowhere does Patrick’s assertion of this ‘second identity’ function so clearly 
as ‘the denial of an identity given by another, given by the ruling order of policy.’309 
For Patrick here asserts that he is ‘a fucking evil psychopath’ specifically in order to 
contest Evelyn’s assertion that he is ‘the boy next door’, as well as Tim’s various 
claims that he is a ‘dufus’ and an ‘extraterrestrial’. In this respect, Patrick’s claim 
here effects ‘a displacement or a break in a given set of places and identities’,310 
                                            
305 Ellis, p. 18. 
306 Ellis, p. 20. 
307 Ellis, p. 20. 
308 Ellis, pp. 387-88; this particular description of Patrick comes from Harold Carnes during 
the scene in which Patrick confronts him about the confession he left on Harold’s 
voicemail (See note 44, p. 171 above). Given how Harold mistakes Patrick for 
someone else during this scene, it appears that he unknowingly describes someone else 
here, although Ellis leaves this ambiguous.  
309 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
310 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560. 
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insofar as, by claiming to be ‘a fucking evil psychopath’, Patrick implicitly concedes 
that he is not just a ‘yuppie’, and yet he also asserts that – despite this apparent 
defect – neither is he a ‘dufus’ like Luis. For there is already a place within the 
etiquette’s ‘given set of places and identities’ for anyone who is not just a ‘yuppie’, 
a place that Tim in this opening chapter refers to as that of the ‘dufus’. As such, 
Patrick’s claim to being ‘a fucking evil psychopath’ breaks with that ‘given set of 
places and identities’ by denying all such existing, abject identities. In the process, 
Patrick steps ‘out of place’,311 and so from this moment he ‘arrives as a supplement 
to the social distribution, since [he] cannot be identified as a part of the police 
order.’312 In this respect, it is immaterial whether or not Patrick’s ‘second identity’ is 
any more ‘real’ than his yuppie persona. As ‘the denial of an identity given by 
another,’ this alter ego articulates a consciousness and will, rather expressing than an 
essence.  
 However, in denying this ‘identity [...] given by the ruling order of policy’, 
Patrick hardly denies the ‘ruling order of policy’ itself, as defined by the yuppie 
etiquette. For in many ways this ‘second identity’ is an effort to reconcile a conflict 
that the etiquette otherwise appears incapable of resolving. This is the conflict 
between his desire to be accepted among his yuppie peers – among whom he so 
desperately ‘want[s]…to…fit…in’313 – and that growing awareness of his inability 
to ‘perfectly conform to the etiquette’, something that Patrick fears will become 
apparent to his peers, who will then ostracise him, just as they shun Luis. This alter 
ego, therefore, attempts to resolve this tension by articulating this inability to 
achieve yuppie perfection in terms that somehow conform to the etiquette, and 
which therefore distinguish Patrick’s transgression of the etiquette from that of Luis 
and other hapless ‘dufuses’. As Schoene notes, Patrick’s ‘ultraviolent outbursts, or 
fantasizing about such outbursts, [are] acts of manly self-assertion compensating for 
a perceived lack in masculine stature’,314 an anxiety that Patrick’s peers – Tim 
                                            
311 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 559. 
312 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561. 
313 Ellis, p. 237. 
314 Schoene, p. 381. 
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especially – compound whenever they belittle him as a ‘dufus’ or even a ‘faggot’.315 
If Patrick responds to this lack of stature by pursuing an extreme form of 
‘masculinity with the volume turned up’,316 Luis responds to his own imperfection 
in a very different manner. Midway through American Psycho, Luis mistakes 
Patrick’s attempt to throttle him in a restaurant bathroom as an advance, and so he 
coyly comes out to Patrick, revealing how ‘I’ve seen you looking at me’, how ‘I’ve 
noticed your [...] hot body’, how ‘[y]ou don’t know how long I’ve wanted it.’317 
Patrick lets Luis live – most likely because he is simply overwhelmed by shock – 
only to find himself running into Luis throughout Manhattan and having to fend off 
his increasingly desperate advances.  
Both Luis and Patrick, then, embrace their imperfection, their difference – 
however negligible – from the yuppie etiquette’s image of the ideal yuppie. Yet 
whereas in doing so Luis consciously breaks with that image – given how it is 
resolutely heterosexual – the hypermasculinity of Patrick’s ‘second identity’ denotes 
a conformist response to Patrick’s realisation that he is an ‘unassimilable excess’. 
Thus, Patrick’s unease around Luis – even before Luis comes on to him – as well as 
around male homosexuals in general, has less to do with ‘a perceived lack in 
masculine stature’ per se, than with how the etiquette articulates imperfection 
precisely in terms of this lack. For if the etiquette’s definition of yuppie perfection is 
heteronormative, then any indication of imperfection is equally one of 
homosexuality or – perhaps more accurately – effeminacy, which for Patrick’s peers 
amounts to the same thing. Hence Luis’s treatment by yuppie society, which makes 
it clear that homosexuality is imperfection, but also that imperfection can easily 
prompt suspicions of homosexuality. Luis does appear to confirm those suspicions 
as they pertain to him, when coming on to Patrick midway through the novel. Ellis, 
though, leaves it unclear whether Luis’s sexual orientation is common knowledge 
                                            
315 As much as I find the term ‘faggot’ distasteful, I use it here in distinction to 
‘homosexual’, so as to differentiate between homosexuality as mere sexual orientation 
and as a pejorative way of articulating imperfection as defined in the yuppie etiquette.  
316 Storey, p. 61. 
317 Ellis, p. 159. 
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among his social circles,318 and most of his colleagues and peers simply deride him 
for being a ‘dufus’, rather than a ‘faggot’. However, if yuppie perfection is a 
heterosexual male, then one is a ‘dufus’ as long as one is a ‘faggot’.  
It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that after having called him a ‘dufus’ 
throughout the opening chapter, Tim soon afterwards accuses Patrick of being a 
homosexual. The accusation arises when Tim points out a British intern in a bar 
whom he claims is a ‘faggot’.319 Patrick and another colleague – David Van Patten – 
both ask Tim how he could possibly know this, to which Tim responds that ‘I saw 
him fuck Bateman up the ass in the men’s room at Morgan Stanley’.320 As Schoene 
notes, such ‘bullying’ most likely has no ill intentions,321 and Patrick appears to take 
the insult in relatively good humour, shrugging off Tim’s juvenile impertinence with 
an impatient ‘sigh’. Indeed, shortly afterwards, Patrick manages to give as good as 
he gets, telling Tim to ask his girlfriend Meredith ‘if I’m a homosexual. That is, if 
she’ll take the time to pull my dick out of her mouth.’322 At no other point does 
Patrick indicate that he is sleeping with Meredith behind Tim’s back, just like 
Patrick suspects Tim of sleeping with Evelyn behind his back, and just like Patrick 
himself claims to be sleeping with Courtney Lawrence behind Luis’s back. 
Nonetheless, the retort serves to reject Tim’s characterisation of Patrick as a ‘faggot’ 
– even though Tim responds by claiming that ‘Meredith’s a fag hag [...] that’s why 
I’m dumping her’323 – by asserting an aggressively heterosexual, sexually 
promiscuous, and thus unimpeachable, perfect masculinity in its place.  
                                            
318 Again, if all we know of Patrick’s peers is their ‘false, social or performing’ selves, then 
it remains uncertain whether anyone else knows for sure that Luis is a homosexual. 
After all, Patrick does not appear to tell anyone about Luis coming on to him – 
doubtless because doing so would raise suspicions regarding his own sexual orientation 
– which raises the possibility that Luis has come on to other male yuppies, who in turn 
are keeping it strictly to themselves.  
319 Ellis, p. 36. 
320 Ellis, p. 36. 
321 Schoene, p. 381. 
322 Ellis, p. 37. 
323 Ellis, p. 37. 
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As he recounts this scene, Patrick does not invoke his homicidal ‘second 
identity’. However, insofar as it amounts to a form of ‘masculinity with the volume 
turned up’, this alter ego contests this accusation of homosexuality in precisely the 
same way as it contested Tim’s prior characterisation of Patrick as a ‘dufus’. This 
secret identity, then, conveys no less of a desire to achieve yuppie perfection as his 
yuppie persona does. Instead, if Patrick’s claim to being ‘a fucking evil psychopath’ 
registers a ‘difference between the voice and the body, [an] interval between 
identities’,324 then the ‘interval’ obtains between Patrick and Luis, between two 
figures who do not resemble the yuppie etiquette’s image of perfection, but only one 
of whom – Luis – is imperfect. Indeed, this alter ego equally serves to distinguish 
Patrick from Tim, given how Tim in many respects is no less of a ‘dufus’ than 
Patrick is. For both Patrick and Tim encounter several peers whose superiority over 
both of them neither can deny. One such peer is their aforementioned colleague Paul 
Owen, who is by far the nearest of Patrick’s ‘victims’ to resemble him.325 Paul, 
though, ‘handles’ the mysterious ‘Fisher account’,326 a responsibility that provokes a 
simmering, unabated jealousy in everyone around him, not least of all Tim and 
Patrick. Paul is even able to reserve seats at Dorsia, Manhattan’s trendiest restaurant, 
a feat that even Patrick repeatedly proves himself incapable of. If Patrick mostly 
preys upon ‘the groups who, in a postmodern society, find their place in the margins 
being brought into the center’ – as Storey claims – then Paul is an anomaly, given 
how little distinguishes him from Patrick except for the professional success implied 
by his association with the Fisher account. Indeed, we might consider Patrick’s 
grisly disposal of him – by burying an axe in his face – as an extreme response to 
Patrick’s inability to outdo him professionally, and therefore socially.  
In short, Paul is closer than both Patrick and Tim to achieving yuppie 
perfection, and so he is living proof of their failure to ‘perfectly conform to the 
[yuppie] etiquette’, and thus of their imperfection. Tim reacts to Paul’s success with 
                                            
324 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
325 Given Patrick’s claim that Paul ‘is exactly my age’ – that even Paul’s voice, ‘to someone 
hearing it over the phone[, sounds] probably identical’ to his own – Schoene finds that 
Paul is Patrick’s ‘insufferably career-driven and professionally successful alter ego’ 
(Schoene, p. 383 (emphasis in original)).    
326 Ellis, p. 5. 
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a sullen, grudging envy that implicitly concedes his inability to even hope to 
compete with Paul, professionally and socially. In the process, this envy renders 
Tim’s bravado rather pathetic. Having bombastically declared on the first page of 
American Psycho that ‘society cannot afford to lose me. I’m an asset’,327 Tim’s 
animosity towards Paul denotes a resentful awareness that, no matter how highly he 
values himself, he is not nearly as valuable as Paul is. Thus, by murdering Paul, 
Patrick distinguishes himself from Tim in precisely the same way as his ‘second 
identity’ more generally strives to distinguish him from ‘dufus-faggots’ like Luis. 
For on one hand, Paul’s murder is invariably a concession that Patrick does not fully 
embody the yuppie etiquette’s image of perfection. Yet on the other hand, Patrick 
articulates this concession in a manner that distinguishes him from Tim, who can 
only watch on with morose envy as Paul ascends through the ranks of Manhattan 
society, leaving him and Patrick far, far behind. Paul’s murder, therefore, reinforces 
the sense that Patrick would rather be ‘a fucking evil psychopath’ than a hapless 
yuppie wannabe who can only ever dream of achieving perfection.328  
Once again, though, if it is meant to distinguish him from ‘dufuses’ like Tim 
and ‘faggots’ like Luis, then Patrick’s alter ego renders him ‘a supplement to the 
social distribution, since [he] cannot be identified as a part of the police order.’329 In 
short, within the etiquette’s ‘stable distribution of places, identities, functions and 
competencies’, there is no ‘place’ for anyone who is imperfect, but who is somehow 
neither a ‘dufus’ not a ‘faggot’. By claiming such a place for himself, Patrick 
                                            
327 Ellis, p. 3. 
328 On at least one occasion, Patrick and Tim encounter yuppies who are even more 
successful than Paul. Scott Montgomery, for example, is purportedly worth $800 
million, is two years younger than Patrick – who is the same age as Tim and Paul – and 
makes a point of his superiority when ordering Patrick, Tim and their colleagues a 
complimentary bottle of nonvintage champagne (Ellis, p. 50). To add insult to injury, 
Tim cannot help but notice how Scott’s small stature – that is, his physical 
imperfection – hardly keeps him from outdoing Tim in terms of achieving yuppie 
perfection, given how much more successful he has been professionally (Ellis, p. 43). 
In short, Tim is incredulous towards the fact that, although this ‘dwarf’ (Ellis, p. 43) is 
so obviously unable to ‘perfectly conform to the etiquette’, he nevertheless outstrips 
Tim’s own efforts to do so in practically every other way. As if to confirm this added 
insult, Scott’s date is an anorexic, alcoholic, ‘uptight’ French model whom Tim 
nonetheless ‘grudgingly’ agrees is ‘hot’ (Ellis, p. 43).  
329 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561. 
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effectively claims ‘a position without identity’. Patrick’s homicidal alter ego may 
well be a conformist effort to ‘fit in’, to find a place within the etiquette’s ‘stable 
distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’. As such, we might 
argue that his intentions do no exceed that ‘social distribution’. What exceeds that 
distribution, therefore, is Patrick’s consciousness and experience, along with his 
inability to disavow the ways in which they exceed the etiquette’s strictures. 
Apprehending Patrick as ‘Everyyuppie’, therefore; assuming that every aspect of 
Ellis’s portrayal of Patrick – including his ‘second identity’ – is reducible to how 
Ellis defines the yuppie stereotype, risks overlooking or even disavowing how the 
practice of claiming to be a serial killer reflects a consciousness that exceeds the 
terms of that stereotype. Indeed, I find Patrick’s apprehension as ‘Everyyuppie’ by 
critics like Young, Eldridge, Storey, and Heise rather ironic, given how Patrick 
himself arguably does not disavow this excess, even as he attempts to reconcile it 
with his persistent, conformist desire to achieve the etiquette’s image of yuppie 
perfection.  
In short, to claim that Patrick is nothing more than a yuppie is to metonymise 
him, to identify the whole of him according to those aspects of his character that 
correspond to the yuppie stereotype. Thus, Young is right to claim that as 
‘Everyyuppie’, Patrick ‘cannot exist’, but only insofar as he is indeed a ‘cipher’, 
rather than a ‘character in the traditional sense’. What I have argued here is that 
Patrick is not just ‘Everyyuppie’; that as much as he epitomises the petty greed, self-
interest, and intellectual, moral, and emotional bankruptcy of his yuppie peers, 
Patrick also exhibits a self-awareness that no one else appears to possess, and which 
is therefore atypical of yuppies as they are characterised in the novel itself. 
Subsequently, Patrick’s continuing desire to be ‘Everyyuppie’ suggests that, within 
the novel itself, Patrick can think of no other way of articulating his sense of a 
disjuncture between himself and his peers, other than how the yuppie etiquette itself 
articulates such ‘gaps’ – as something that renders one a ‘dufus’, or even a ‘faggot’. 
In much the same way, wherever they contend that Patrick is ‘Everyyuppie’, critics 
like Young read American Psycho within a ‘sensible order’ in which yuppies are 
never more than yuppies. Patrick’s ‘second identity’, then, renders him ‘a 
supplement’ not only to ‘the social distribution’ that is the yuppie etiquette within 
the novel, but also to these critical ‘sensible orders’. Critics who identify Patrick 
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only as a yuppie ignore how his characterisation exceeds that identity, and so they 
recognise him as what he strives to be recognised as, responding to his ‘self-
metonymisation’ with a corresponding synecdochal address.  
 I have argued here that Patrick’s alter ego registers a ‘difference between the 
voice and the body, [an] interval between identities’, or rather several such 
‘intervals’: between Patrick and the figure of ‘Everyyuppie’; between Patrick and 
Luis; and between Patrick and Tim. If critics like Young, Eldridge, Storey and 
Schoene have overlooked all such ‘intervals’ that obtain in American Psycho, then 
we might argue that this alter ego gives form to something that as yet remains ‘a 
position without identity’. What I mean here is not that Patrick is ‘removed from all 
lines of social mobility’,330 for as a young, white, heterosexual, able-bodied, 
affluent, professional, male urbanite, Patrick quite clearly possesses considerable 
social power and mobility. Instead, my reading of American Psycho has sought to 
illustrate the need to distinguish the notion of occupying ‘a position without identity’ 
from this ‘reasonable and rarefied definition of the word subaltern’.331 For what 
Patrick’s ‘second identity’ conveys is the absence of an alternative to how the 
yuppie etiquette articulates difference, in terms of imperfection or even abjection. 
Patrick’s alter ego might well attempt to articulate his own difference in more 
palatable, less abject terms. Yet if this alter ego paradoxically subscribes to the 
etiquette, then so much only reinforces the sense that the only non-abject image 
available to Patrick is the etiquette’s own image of the perfect yuppie, something 
that Patrick cannot ever emulate. I am not arguing that Ellis’s Manhattan is 
completely devoid of any alternative to a ‘sensible order’ that empowers white, 
heterosexual, able-bodied, male yuppies like Patrick at the expense of the rights or 
agency of others, including women and homosexuals. After all, we see another such 
order at work – namely, Storey’s postmodernity – whenever a horrified Patrick 
describes an encounter with affluent homosexuals or professional women around 
Manhattan.  
                                            
330 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 475. 
331 Spivak, ‘Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular’, p. 475. 
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Nonetheless, if Patrick is unable to imagine women, homosexuals, and racial 
and ethnic minorities – not to mention street dwellers and prostitutes – as being in 
any way his equals, neither can anyone within the novel who subscribes to 
something other than Patrick’s yuppie-centric ‘symbolic order’ imagine Patrick as 
being anything more than a yuppie. On the rare occasion that Patrick uses the term 
‘yuppie’, it only ever seems to be pejorative. For example, when he inadvertently 
finds himself in a nightclub playing rap music, rather than join his fellow ‘Wall 
Street guys’ as they quickly leave, Patrick tries to chat up ‘a couple of hardbody rich 
girls’, only to find himself being told by ‘the one with the nose ring’ to ‘[g]o back to 
Wall Street [...] [f]ucking yuppie’.332 Apparently unfazed, Patrick responds by 
claiming that ‘[y]ou may think I’m a really disgusting yuppie but I’m not, really’.333 
Elsewhere, Patrick describes an incident where he found someone – another ‘Wall 
Street guy’ – writing ‘Kill...All...Yuppies’ on the wall above a urinal in a restaurant 
bathroom.334 Again, at the level of the narrative, Patrick here insists on 
distinguishing between ‘Wall Street guys’ and ‘really disgusting yuppies’, a 
distinction that Ellis’s reader might find to be negligible, but which serves more to 
deny the latter as an ‘identity given by another’, one that is no less abject than the 
identity of ‘dufus’ or ‘faggot’. The term ‘yuppie’, therefore, functions here in a 
manner that refuses to distinguish between yuppies, just like Kincaid’s 
characterisation of white tourists in A Small Place. Moreover, just as the latter 
provokes hostile responses from Aegerter and Frederick’s ‘mainstream students’, so 
Patrick ‘denies’ this identity of ‘yuppie’ in favour of either that of ‘Wall Street guy’ 
or serial killer. Even for Patrick, there is only one kind of ‘yuppie’ in American 
Psycho: the ‘really disgusting’ kind. Similarly, there is only one kind of ‘yuppie’ for 
the novel’s critical audience: the kind who have ‘no identity beyond that which [they 
consume]’; the kind who are ‘indifferent to art, originality or even pleasure except in 
so far as [their] possessions are the newest, brightest, best, most expensive and most 
fashionable’; the kind who perceive ‘the rise of the marginalized’ solely as a threat 
                                            
332 Ellis, pp. 198-99. 
333 Ellis, p. 199. 
334 Ellis, p. 374; the film adaptation has Patrick write these words inside a closet in Paul 
Owen’s apartment, which he appropriates after killing Paul.  
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to their ‘central position’. Both within and beyond the diegesis of American Psycho, 
every yuppie is ‘Everyyuppie’.  
My point is not to argue against the assumption that yuppies are ‘really 
disgusting’, or rather that they are racists, classists, misogynists and homophobes 
who lack any form of intellectual or emotional depth. Equally, in arguing that 
Patrick himself is more than just a ‘really disgusting yuppie’, I do not mean to treat 
American Psycho as if it were some reliable account of the historical phenomenon 
of the yuppie social type, some social or cultural document’ rather than a novel.335 
Instead, my interest here has lain with the extent to which even those critics who 
have sought to rehabilitate the novel have done so in a way that reduces the 
complexity of its central character, as if it is the critics that have ‘negate[d] him as a 
“character”’, more so than Ellis. Patrick’s efforts to be recognised and accepted by 
his peers as a yuppie easily distract from the ways in which he is not a yuppie. As 
long as these efforts continue to distract critics like Young and Eldridge in this way, 
then the metonymic moment of Patrick’s self-identification as a yuppie will go 
unnoticed. Without losing sight of Patrick’s fictionality, American Psycho illustrates 
how assuming that existing frameworks and categories are capable of exhaustively 
apprehending the consciousness and will of any given individual or group can risk 
establishing a self-perpetuating, circular logic, in which ‘self-metonymisation’ 
validates synecdochal address, and vice versa. In order to break this circular logic, I 
argue that we must pursue other ways of articulating the ‘unassimilable excess’ that 
inevitably remains after ‘self-metonymisation’, and which therefore obtains among 
all who subscribe to a wider discourse, ideology or collective identity. Without such 
alternatives, that circular logic persists, and the task of dissolving such collective 
structures – like Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ – remains all too daunting.  
Conclusion 
In disparate ways, Spivak, Kincaid, Orwell, Naipaul, Courtemanche, and Ellis all 
suggest that ‘dis-identifying’ oneself from one’s ‘place’ within a ‘stable distribution 
of places, identities, functions and competencies’ can only occur if one’s 
                                            
335 Sahlin, Nicki, ‘“But This Road Doesn’t Go Anywhere”: The Existential Dilemma in 
Less Than Zero’, in Critique, 33, 1 (Fall 1991), p. 24. 
- 256 - 
consciousness, experience, intentions, or practices exceed how that ‘place’ is 
defined. Moreover, in no less disparate ways, all of the writers and thinkers 
discussed in this chapter attest to variances of consciousness, purpose, and in some 
cases practice among the privileged, even though not all of them believe it is 
possible for the privileged to align their practices with an avowed opposition to the 
structures that render them privileged. I have explored how the pessimism of 
Memmi and Naipaul risks leading us into a self-perpetuating cul-de-sac. For if we 
assume that no such alignment is possible, then there seems to be little point in 
attempting to encourage the privileged to even declare their opposition to those 
structures. In turn, we mount no significant challenge to the hegemonic ascendancy 
of Said’s ‘imperial consensus’, and Memmi’s ‘colonizer who rejects’ continues in 
their ‘tormented dance’, agonising over their integrity rather than actively 
contributing towards overturning the colonial order they avowedly oppose.  
 If we are to challenge that ‘imperial consensus’, then, we must assume that 
everyone who participates in it do so by ‘metonymising’ themselves as Spivak 
describes. For only then would it be possible to encourage them to ‘dis-identify’ 
themselves from it instead, in response to a consciousness that that consensus cannot 
hope to incorporate. Thus, assuming that no such excess exists, that Said’s ‘imperial 
consensus’ exhaustively articulates the consciousness and will of everyone who 
subscribes to it, forecloses this possibility of ‘dis-identification’. In the process, this 
assumption risks inducing a circular, self-corroborating logic in which existing 
categories appear to be capable of exhaustively apprehending that consciousness and 
will. This circular logic can only impede any attempt to dissolve Said’s ‘imperial 
consensus’, by encouraging the assumption that all such attempts can only fail to 
encourage those to participate in it to assume an alternative ‘sensible order’ instead. 
Once again, Spivak’s notion of ‘self-metonymisation’ provides us with a way of 
approaching such participation in a manner that does not reduce the consciousness, 
experience, will and intentions of those who do so to the terms of that consensus, 
and which therefore does not efface Young’s ‘unassimilable excess’ entirely.  
 Nonetheless, I have also emphasised that keeping open this possibility of 
‘dis-identification’ is not enough to ensure that it actually occurs. I have suggested 
that Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ will only dissolve if alternatives become available, 
in which case distinctions like Memmi’s between ‘the colonizer who accepts’ and 
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‘the colonizer who refuses’ become important, even if they articulate a mere 
possibility rather than an already-existing reality. Ultimately, the latter’s material 
illogicality may well be irreducible; moreover, as Memmi notes, the integrity of 
anyone who claims to be a ‘colonizer who refuses’ must be judged according to their 
willingness to become something other than a ‘colonizer’. In the same way, I have 
argued in this chapter that no ‘political and legal order’ can be overcome simply by 
encouraging or registering ‘dis-identification’ among those who otherwise consent 
to it. As I have demonstrated with reference to Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white male’ 
students – as well to Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’ – ‘dis-identification’ can 
induce paralysis wherever it occurs as merely ‘the denial of an identity given by 
another’, rather than as the displacement of that identity by another that more 
adequately articulates one’s consciousness, experience, will, intentions and practice. 
Of course, though, the danger of providing alibis for complacency remains, which I 
will address in my next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Liberalism, Apartheid, and ‘inactive dis-identification’ 
The hegemonic ascendancy of imperialism can only be challenged by encouraging 
those who subscribe to Edward W. Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ to ‘dis-identify’ from 
it instead. Clearly, though, we can hardly expect to dissolve imperialism entirely by 
simply encouraging this mass ‘dis-identification’. For one thing, ‘dis-identification’ 
does not always entail actively pursuing the dissolution of whatever one ‘dis-
identifies’ from. Moreover, this ‘inactive dis-identification’ might well be common 
wherever a ‘hegemonic discourse’336 is confronted by well-established ‘alternative 
or directly oppositional politics and culture[s]’337 – wherever there is ‘a conflict 
between one sensible order and another’,338 an ‘opposition between logics that count 
the parties and parts of the community in different ways.’339 As we saw in Chapter 
3, this first of Jacques Rancière’s two definitions of ‘politics’ implies that anyone 
whom the prevailing ‘sensible order’ does not ‘count’ as ‘a part of the community’ 
may well be counted in this way by an alternative order. Thus, in this first definition, 
‘dis-identification’ from the prevailing ‘count’ occurs as a double moment, as the 
simultaneous ‘assertion of an identity’ and ‘the denial of an identity given by 
another, given by the ruling order of policy.’340 What proved to be supplementary to 
the prevailing ‘count’ is incorporated into another, without disturbing its own, 
alternative ‘stable distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’.341  
                                            
336 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, ‘The Intervention Interview’, in The Postcolonial Critic: 
Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. by Sarah Harasym (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 121. 
337 Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
p. 113. 
338 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, in Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural 
Studies, 21, 4 (December 2007), p. 560. 
339 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. by 
Steven Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 35. 
340 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, in October, 61, ‘The Identity in 
Question’ (1992), p. 62. 
341 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 561. 
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 In this chapter, I explore how this first definition of ‘politics’ can give rise to 
inactive ‘dis-identification’, and how we can address the latter in a way that 
encourages active, unconditional opposition instead. Previously, I have considered 
how Rancière’s second definition of politics might give rise to ‘inactive dis-
identification’ in the form of paralysis, as contended by Albert Memmi. This second 
form of politics occurs whenever ‘there is something wrong in the picture, when 
something is not at the right place […] when we don’t know how to designate what 
we see, when a name no longer suits the thing or the character that it names, etc’.342 
Here the ‘dis-identified’ appear to have no recourse to any more suitable way of 
‘naming’ themselves.343 Hence the statement by Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white male’ 
students that they are ‘only bourgeois white male[s]’,344 even as their subsequent 
claim that they ‘can’t speak’ indicates that they are in fact more than just ‘bourgeois 
white males’.345 In contrast, therefore, in Rancière’s first definition of ‘politics’, 
‘inactive dis-identification’ occurs wherever an existing alternative identity allows 
one to deny one’s ‘identity given [...] by the ruling order of policy’, without actively 
pursuing the dissolution of that order.  
 Such alternatives can clearly function as alibis for avoiding active politics. 
Hence my emphasis on how ‘dis-identification’ is merely a starting point, a 
necessary condition that enables the subsequent task of encouraging active, 
unconditional opposition instead. I maintain that it is important for us to assume that 
‘dis-identification’ is always possible, no matter how unlikely it might be. Yet we 
cannot allow this working assumption to provide those who forego active politics 
with a way of disregarding their implication in whatever they might ‘dis-identify’ 
from, as if one’s declared intentions exonerated one from any culpability for that  
‘ruling order of policy’. However, neither can we allow this culpability to ever 
convince us that those who ‘dis-identify’ without undertaking active opposition will 
never do so, for whatever reason. In this chapter, I explore how this secondary 
                                            
342 Rancière, ‘What Does it Mean to be Un?’, p. 560 (my emphasis). 
343 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
344 Spivak, ‘Questions of Multiculturalism’, in Harasym ed., p. 62. 
345 See Chapter 3 of this thesis, p. 175. 
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working assumption applies as much to instances where ‘inactive dis-identification’ 
occurs among those who continue to benefit from whatever they claim to have ‘dis-
identified’ themselves from. I address one such exemplary instance: white South 
Africans who openly declared their opposition to Apartheid’s white-supremacist 
regime, even as they continued to enjoy the considerable privileges reserved for 
whites at the expense of the country’s ‘non-white’ population.346 A majority of these 
avowedly dissident whites were English-speaking proponents of South Africa’s 
tradition of Anglophone liberalism, and they opposed Apartheid out of a declared 
belief in the fundamental equality of all human beings, regardless of spurious racial 
hierarchies. South African liberals were committed to non-racialism, and they firmly 
insisted on opposing the incumbent Afrikaner National Party (NP, or ‘Nats’) through 
non-violent means, respecting the rule of law, and campaigning via existing 
parliamentary structures, in which only whites could participate, and which the NP 
subsequently dominated. 
 Under Apartheid, this liberal agenda was the only openly anti-government 
front within South Africa that the country’s authorities tolerated. Moreover, during 
much of the 1960s, liberalism seemed to be the only anti-government front in 
existence. A year after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the government officially 
banned the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC); 
two years later, these organisations’ highest-profile leaders – including Nelson 
Mandela – were imprisoned in the Rivonia trial of 1963-64. A generation of non-
whites gradually succumbed to defeatist quietism, and ‘politics’ became ‘a dirty 
word and people “bottled it all in” for fear of banning, imprisonment, or worse.’347 
Non-whites were still ‘free to join the Liberal and Progressive parties until 1968[: 
                                            
346 Under Apartheid law, the racial composition of South Africa was sorted into four 
categories. There were three categories that qualified under ‘non-white’: ‘African’, 
‘Indian’ and ‘coloured’. The first two were self-explanatory: anyone of full African 
descent were categorised as ‘Africans’, while anyone of full Indian descent were 
classified as ‘Indians’. Similarly, anyone of full European descent qualified as ‘whites’. 
Those whose heritage was mixed-race, though, were ‘coloureds’. These categories 
were then hierarchised. Predictably, ‘whites’ were afforded the most privileges under 
Apartheid, while ‘Africans’ had the least. ‘Indians’ and ‘coloureds’ were afforded a 
slightly higher standard of living than ‘Africans’, although their quality of life was still 
much closer to that of ‘Africans’ than that of ‘whites’. 
347 Magaziner, Daniel R., The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 
1968-1977 (Athens, Jacana, Johannesburg: University of Ohio Press, 2010), p. 21. 
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however,] it was whites in these organizations who for the most part took on the task 
of articulating African grievances and demands. Blacks who spoke out invited 
martyrdom.’348 In 1968, the government banned all political parties from having 
mixed-race memberships. In protest, the Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA) 
disbanded; the government had already driven the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) underground in 1950. As can be expected, by the end of the decade, liberal 
opposition to Apartheid had done little to prevent successive NP majority 
governments from realising Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd’s (1961-66) vision of 
‘Grand Apartheid’ with relative impunity. As a result, the 1960s saw the 
implementation of such infamous Apartheid policies as the ‘Homelands’ and the 
country’s racially-segregated education system.  
 Ironically, this latter policy was to sow the seeds of Apartheid’s eventual 
demise. In 1969, non-white members of the National Union of South African 
Students (NUSAS) broke away to form the South African Student Organisation 
(SASO), a national student group that denied membership to whites. The new 
organisation promoted Black Consciousness, a new sensibility that called upon non-
whites to shake off their defeatism, and once again assume responsibility for their 
own emancipation.349 SASO’s founders were motivated by the clear failure of liberal 
strategies to achieve any meaningful change in South Africa, coupled with an 
increasing sense that liberal whites had become complacent towards their own 
implication in the regime’s oppression of non-whites. The rallying call of Black 
Consciousness, then, entailed branding liberal whites as closet Nats who sought to 
frustrate non-white aspirations by channelling them into ineffective strategies. 
                                            
348 Gerhart, Gail M., Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), p. 257; the terminology 
used in reference to Apartheid’s four official racial profiles – ‘White’, ‘Indian’, 
‘Coloured’ (i.e. mixed race) and ‘Bantu’, ‘African’ or ‘Native’ – is often variable, 
partly because of SASO’s efforts to discredit the term ‘non-white’ in favour of the 
more affirmative ‘Black’. This essay will use the term ‘non-white’ to refer to Indians, 
Coloureds and Africans collectively; ‘African’ to refer to non-mixed-race Africans 
specifically; and ‘Black’ to refer to the alternative, more positive sense of self 
promoted by SASO.  
349 Almost all historical accounts of South African socio-politics under Apartheid dedicate a 
chapter to the rise and subsequent legacy of Black Consciousness, generally beginning 
with the movement’s foundation in 1969 and ending with the Soweto uprisings in 
1976.  
- 262 - 
Eventually, this claim was extended to dissident whites in general, regardless of 
their ideological persuasions. According to SASO’s simplistic analysis of South 
African socio-politics, whites only ever looked out for themselves and their ill-
gotten privileges, and cared little for the rights and wellbeing of their non-white 
compatriots. Predictably, these claims provoked a multitude of objections and 
counter-accusations from among avowedly dissident whites, many of which 
ironically exposed the very complacency that SASO had accused them of. SASO, it 
seemed, had a point: whites were not interested in bringing down Apartheid – not 
even those who claimed they were, who ‘dis-identified’ themselves from white 
supremacy.   
 Not all whites, though, responded in this manner, and in this chapter I 
explore Nadine Gordimer’s response to these claims. In her non-fiction, Gordimer 
made it clear that she welcomed Black Consciousness as a positive development. 
Her fiction was marginally more critical, registering what the movement made 
possible, but also what it risked foreclosing. In particular, between 1978 and 1981, 
Gordimer’s fiction suggested that the movement’s habit of addressing all whites as 
white-supremacists was closing down potentially productive avenues of political co-
operation between white and non-white dissidents. Hence the ambiguous endings of 
two of Gordimer’s novels published during this period – Burger’s Daughter (1978) 
and July’s People (1981) – the latter of which has been described by Robin Visel as 
one of Gordimer’s several portraits of ‘dead-end heroines’.350 The ‘heroine’ of 
July’s People is Maureen Smales, a white, middle-class housewife who with her 
husband Bamford ‘Bam’ Smales and their three children, finds herself at the mercy 
of her former servant July, who has offered to shelter them all in his rural home 
from the ravages of a civil war between the South African government and non-
white rebels. As per their liberal sensibilities, the Smaleses had made some effort to 
treat their non-white household servants as fellow human beings, and they believed 
they had earned their friendship in return. Given this belief, the Smaleses hope that 
July will protect them should either side find them in the middle of the bush351 – not 
                                            
350 Visel, Robin, ‘Othering the Self: Nadine Gordimer’s Colonial Heroines’, in ARIEL: A 
Review of International English Literature, 19.4 (October 1988), p. 38. 
351 Gordimer does not specify the precise location of July’s community in the South African 
countryside.  
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as his employers, nor as fellow human beings, but as his friends, no less. This 
conviction, though, gradually fades, as July confronts Maureen over her own role in 
the regime’s oppression of him as a non-white. Eventually, Maureen appears to 
assume responsibility for her own survival, and July’s People ends ambiguously, 
with Maureen running straight towards a helicopter which, being unmarked, could 
equally contain non-white rebels or government troops – that is, death or salvation 
from exile, destitution, and an uncertain future.  
 In this chapter, I compare this ambiguous ending with that of Burger’s 
Daughter, in which the titular Rosa Burger is incarcerated in the same prison – 
perhaps even the same cell – in which her father Lionel died near the beginning of 
the novel. This circularity suggests a testing of the limits of Black Consciousness 
ideology, of what effect the movement’s ‘polarised rhetoric’352 might have had on 
white political behaviour during the 1970s, and perhaps beyond. Rosa finds herself 
in a similar situation as Maureen does, confronted by someone who she thought was 
a friend, who at least did not doubt her integrity as an opponent of Apartheid, but 
who summarily dismisses her as just another white racist, in terms that echo the 
rhetoric of Black Consciousness. Both Burger’s Daughter and July’s People 
reiterate Gordimer’s claims in her non-fiction, that the provocations of Black 
Consciousness towards complacent liberal and dissident whites were cogent and 
necessary. However, the ambiguous endings of both novels suggest that these 
provocations risked either compounding that very complacency, or inducing a sense 
of paralysis, just like that which besets Memmi’s ‘tormented’ figure of ‘the 
colonizer who refuses’.353 For these provocations mostly imputed that all whites 
could be nothing other than a white supremacist: only rarely did SASO activists and 
ideologues like Steve Biko suggest that dissident whites were something else. Much 
like Memmi’s dispiriting portrait of ‘the colonizer who refuses’, then, these 
                                            
352 MacQueen, Ian, Re-Imagining South Africa: Black Consciousness, Radical Christianity 
and the New Left, 1967-1977 (Brighton: University of Sussex PhD thesis, March 
2011), p. 3. 
353 Memmi, Albert, The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. by Howard Greenfeld (London: 
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provocations left dissident whites with nothing other than the identity of ‘the 
colonizer who accepts’, an identity that they had ostensibly ‘denied’354 already.  
The ‘polarised rhetoric’ of Black Consciousness forcefully registered a 
‘difference between the voice and the body’,355 between the declared intentions of 
dissident whites and their collusion in the daily injustice of Apartheid. I find it 
debatable, though, how effective this rhetoric was at redressing this difference, at 
encouraging dissident whites to align their practices more closely with their 
intentions. Certainly, Black Consciousness ideologues insisted that it was necessary 
for whites to more actively pursue Apartheid’s downfall, rather than ‘simply shut up 
and leave it to the blacks’.356 Nonetheless, the debate never really moved beyond the 
question of whether whites were even capable of redressing this difference between 
purpose and practice. As such, the question of how whites were to do so mostly went 
unanswered, even unaddressed. Mabel Raisibe Maimela and Ian MacQueen both 
attribute the persistence of the former question to mere rhetoric. For the claim that 
whites could never commit themselves to overcoming white supremacy was at most 
a provocation, a way of shocking liberal whites out of their complacency. The 
liberal reaction to this manoeuvre, though, suggests that this tactic had mixed results 
at best. For most liberals responded to such claims by merely reiterating the ‘denial 
of an identity given [...] by the ruling order of policy’ that was already implicit in 
every liberal’s subscription to the liberal agenda. As a well-established ‘alternative 
or directly oppositional politics’, the enduring appeal of South African liberalism lay 
in its affirmation of a variance of purpose among whites, its recognition that not all 
whites were white supremacists, even if they all benefited from white supremacy.  
What was needed, therefore, was a challenge to this appeal. Black 
Consciousness forcefully disputed the integrity of liberal whites, but in a manner 
that refused to recognise any variance of purpose among white South Africans. For 
this approach offered no alternative to that already-existing, liberal alternative to the 
‘identity given [...] by the ruling order of policy’ that liberal whites had already 
                                            
354 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
355 Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, p. 62. 
356 Turner, Richard, ‘Black Consciousness and White Liberals’, in Reality: A Journal of 
Liberal Opinion, 4.3 (July 1972), p. 21. 
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‘denied’. Black Consciousness, therefore, compounded the lack of an alternative to 
an already-existing ‘directly oppositional politics’ that allowed whites to ‘dis-
identify’ themselves from white supremacy without actively pursuing its dissolution. 
Instead, the ‘polarised rhetoric’ of Black Consciousness suggested that any such 
second-order alternative was impossible – that in fact there was no such thing as an 
‘alternative’ way of being white in South Africa, that ‘alternatives’ to the identity of 
the ‘Afrikaner nationalist’, the ‘racist’, the ‘white-supremacist’ or ‘the colonizer 
who accepts’ were actually misleading variants of that identity. As I demonstrate in 
this chapter, though, this ‘polarised rhetoric’ belies how Black Consciousness sought 
precisely to encourage liberal whites to ‘dis-identify’ themselves from the liberal 
‘sensible order’. Yet without any other way of registering their opposition to 
Apartheid, it is no wonder that so many liberal whites refused to do so, in favour of 
defending their integrity in liberal terms, and accusing Black Consciousness in turn 
of having capitulated Apartheid.  
I demonstrate how in Burger’s Daughter, July’s People, and to a lesser 
extent, A Sport of Nature (1987), Gordimer registers the absence of second-order 
alternatives for dissident white South Africans. I also explore how in these novels, a 
common consequence of this absence is something like the political paralysis that 
grips Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’, and which is no less productive than the 
complacency of liberal whites. In all three novels, then, Gordimer imputes that 
redressing ‘inactive dis-identification’ must certainly involve registering a 
‘difference between the voice and the body’, between one’s professed intentions and 
actual practices. Yet in doing so, we should maintain that the consciousness, 
experience, and intentions of anyone that subscribes even to an existing ‘alternative 
or directly oppositional politics’ exceed it. In short, we can only redress ‘inactive 
dis-identification’ by encouraging a second-order ‘dis-identification’, which in turn 
is only possible if the conditions that give rise to ‘dis-identification’ from any 
‘sensible order’ exist. Otherwise, we risk succumbing to Memmi’s fatalistic ‘failure 
of vision’, condemning the ‘dis-identified beneficiary’ to the ‘tormented dance’ of 
Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’. In the process, we subscribe to that circular, self-
corroborating logic that I described in my previous chapter, according to which a 
‘colonizer’ is nothing more than a ‘colonizer’, and that there is no point in trying to 
encourage them to ‘refuse’, to become something more than a ‘colonizer’, if not 
something else altogether. As I argued in my previous chapter, if we subscribe to 
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this circular logic, then we cannot hope to challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of 
imperialism. It remains important, therefore, to avoid ever assuming that any 
collective identity or ‘sensible order’ exhaustively articulates the consciousness, 
experience, and intentions of those who subscribe to them – not even those which 
are ‘alternative or directly oppositional’.  
4.1  Black Consciousness in debate with South African liberalism 
The ‘polarised rhetoric’ of Black Consciousness reflected the frustrations of SASO’s 
founders as non-white members of NUSAS, given how the latter was dominated by 
liberal whites. SASO was the product of a schism between white and non-white 
NUSAS members that came to a head in 1968. NUSAS already had a reputation for 
its vocal opposition to Apartheid. However, as with every other openly dissident 
group, the authorities tolerated NUSAS only because it promoted and practiced a 
liberal agenda. Towards the end of the decade, NUSAS was succumbing to the 
shortcomings of South African liberalism in general. Indeed, according to Gail M. 
Gerhart, NUSAS had started drifting politically to the right, ‘largely confining itself 
for several years to symbolic multiracial activities and protests after-the-fact against 
government and infringements on academic freedom.’357 During these years, 
NUSAS adopted ‘an ill-defined political mandate that valued the sanctity of political 
and moral convictions over radical action’, a mandate that MacQueen has described 
as being ‘more broadly representative of liberals at this time.’358 NUSAS also firmly 
subscribed to the implicit consensus among Apartheid’s opponents at the time that 
‘[t]o be politically legitimate meant being “colourless.”’359 Thus, NUSAS 
confidently claimed a mandate in opposing Apartheid ‘not only from the schools, 
where whites were in the majority, but also from the general population, where they 
most decidedly were not’.360 This claim was clearly problematic, and in fact was 
only sustainable as long as NUSAS denied the country’s non-white majority a 
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359 Magaziner, p. 27. 
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substantial voice in its own affairs. For the Union practiced ‘colourlessness’ in the 
form of one-man-one-vote, thus giving South Africa’s 46,000 white students a clear 
advantage over their 8,600 non-white peers.  
 According to Maimela, as early as 1965, non-white members were making 
‘allegations that the Union’s leadership had virtually no prospects of ever changing 
or altering government policy or structure.’361 Increasingly, NUSAS seemed no less 
complacent than South African liberalism in general, which by then had ‘become 
not an inspiration to constructive action but a sterile dogma disguising an 
unconscious attachment to the status quo.’362 Yet non-whites did not seriously 
consider breaking away from NUSAS until the Union’s 1967 annual congress, 
where it was ‘standard practice’ for non-white delegates to be ‘allocated racially 
separate sleeping accommodation.’363 Using this policy as ‘the pretext for breaking 
away from the Union’, non-white NUSAS members met a year later at Stutterheim, 
where they decided to found an alternative national student organisation whose 
agenda would prioritise non-white interests.364 Among the delegates was Steve Biko, 
an African student of the University of Natal Non-European medical school 
(UNNE), and a rising star in the NUSAS leadership. In defiance of ‘colourlessness’, 
Biko proposed that the new organisation deny membership to whites entirely, in 
order to protect its prioritisation of non-white affairs. Plans for SASO’s inaugural 
conference were formalised at a more public meeting at Marianhill in 1968, and 
SASO was formally inaugurated at Turfloop on July 1 1969, with Biko elected as its 
first president.  
 Inevitably, SASO’s departure from liberalism’s insistence on non-racialism 
provoked controversy. Daniel R. Magaziner notes that, even before SASO’s formal 
inauguration, NUSAS’s white leaders ‘were predictably appalled by black students’ 
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decision [...] to meet without them’ at Marianhill.365 SASO, though, anticipated 
these objections, and initially tempered its position regarding non-racialism to such 
an extent that its ‘early communiqués seemed to apologize for the organization’s 
existence.’366 These communiqués emphasised the parallel goals of SASO and 
NUSAS, including eventual racial integration, despite the two organisations’ 
divergent methods.367 Nevertheless, Gerhart remarks that, despite these conciliatory 
gestures, ‘a strong reaction from the NUSAS rank and file and from white liberals 
generally was soon forthcoming’:368 
In NUSAS, a minority, including most of the top leadership, was 
sympathetic to black initiatives and accepted SASO’s emergence as a 
healthy development. To the majority, however, acceptance of black 
separatism came hard and many of the attitudes caricatured in SASO 
attacks were openly exhibited. If whites were not to be allowed to 
play the role of defenders and saviors of the oppressed, what role was 
left for them to play? Excluded from power by the racist white 
majority, and excluded from the camp of the underdogs by blacks bent 
on going it alone, liberal whites felt a sense of isolation and weakness 
unknown in the history of South African liberalism.369 
These fervent objections to SASO’s foundation are generally far better documented 
than those few responses that took SASO’s critiques of liberal complacency more 
seriously, some of which I will explore below. Indeed, Gerhart’s account here of the 
response to SASO’s foundation is typical in both its brevity and emphasis on the 
ways in which this response corroborated Biko’s claim that, ‘although [the white 
liberal] does not vote for the Nats (now that they are in the majority anyway) he 
feels quite secure under the protection offered by the Nats and subconsciously shuns 
the idea of change.’370 For Maimela, these accounts are misleading, given how 
SASO’s ‘criticism of white liberals and liberal institutions [...] is often adduced as 
evidence of a basic hostility and variance of purpose’ between SASO and South 
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African liberals.371 In contrast, Maimela demonstrates abundantly – as does 
MacQueen – that ‘many such statements (but by no means all) veiled an often 
complex symbiotic reality which was frequently concealed from public view under 
many rhetorical flourishes of the time.’372 
 As per Gerhart’s account, liberals were just as susceptible to such 
‘flourishes’ as SASO’s activists. Maimela and MacQueen both provide substantial 
evidence of collaboration between SASO and white-led organisations. Yet even 
then, this evidence suggests that only a minority of dissident whites were open to 
SASO’s critiques. Otherwise, liberal whites either defended South African 
liberalism on its own terms, or responded to SASO’s charges of conspiring with 
Apartheid with similar accusations, most of which focused on SASO’s racially-
exclusive membership policy. Hence Alan Paton’s remark that, although ‘[b]lack 
consciousness is the direct creation of white arrogance’, SASO’s ‘refusal to believe 
– on principle – that any white person can speak the truth’ risked rendering Black 
Consciousness ‘the twin of White Nationalism’, and depriving it of ‘the noble future 
which Mr. Biko dreams for it’.373 A year later, Leo Marquard confessed that ‘for the 
most part I find it impossible to distinguish the language and idiom of black 
consciousness from that of nationalism.’374 Neither Paton nor Marquard addressed 
SASO’s appraisal of liberalism’s credentials as an anti-Apartheid platform. Indeed, 
their own appraisals of Black Consciousness reflect a stubborn refusal to part with 
‘the essential principles of liberalism’.375 This resolve would persist throughout the 
                                            
371 Maimela, p. 3. 
372 Maimela, p. 3. 
373 Paton, Alan, ‘Black Consciousness’, in Reality: A Journal of Liberal Opinion, 4, 1 
(March 1972), pp. 9-10; Paton was arguably the most influential figure in South 
African liberalism during Apartheid, and was leader of the LPSA up until it disbanded 
in 1968. Paton continued to serve as chairman of the editorial board for the current 
affairs periodical Liberal Opinion, and the later Reality: A Journal of Liberal Opinion.  
374 Marquard, Leo, ‘Black Consciousness’, in Reality: A Journal of Liberal and Radical 
Opinion, 5, 4 (September 1973), p. 10; Reality changed its name from its November 
1972 issue onwards, in response to critiques of ‘the traditional attitudes, approaches 
and formulations of many of those who have supported liberal principles [...] by a 
number of liberally-inclined people, many of them young’ (Editorial, Reality: A 
Journal of Liberal and Radical Opinion, 4, 5 (November 1972), p. 2).  
375 Editorial, p. 2. 
- 270 - 
1970s among many liberal commentators, who maintained that ‘there can never be 
any question of abandoning or modifying’ these principles, given how they were 
‘“as immortal as the heart of man”.’376 Thus, despite conceding in 1979 that 
liberalism had ‘failed in South Africa’, Pierre L. van den Berghe would insist upon 
assessing this ‘failure’ on liberalism’s own terms, declaring that it had ‘failed nobly, 
for complex reasons which had little to do with its proponents’.377  
 No doubt SASO’s damning appraisal of liberalism was only further 
corroborated by these responses, especially in their insistence on assessing political 
integrity according to ‘the essential principles of liberalism’. However, this 
insistence might well have been a consequence of SASO’s claim, that liberal 
complacency merely proved that all whites who declared their opposition to 
Apartheid were in fact its knowing collaborators. Certainly, this claim forcefully 
conveyed how liberalism’s emphasis on upholding the sanctity of ‘reason, decency 
and universalism’,378 only allowed its white adherents to disregard certain 
inconvenient aspects of their socio-historical circumstances.379 Yet this claim 
equally kept the debate from moving beyond the question of whether dissident 
whites could ever eschew this ‘sterile dogma’, and so commit themselves 
unconditionally to actively opposing Apartheid. Hence Paton and Marquard’s 
insistence on critiquing Black Consciousness for failing to abide by ‘the essential 
principles of liberalism’, as well as van den Berghe’s efforts to rehabilitate both 
liberalism and liberals, by shifting the blame for their ‘failure’ in South Africa onto 
the fact that ‘South Africa is such an insane society.’380  Indeed, Gerhart’s 
account of how SASO’s rejection of liberalism led liberal whites to feel ‘a sense of 
isolation of weakness’, is reminiscent of the paralysis that Memmi describes as ‘the 
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tormented dance of the colonizer who refuses and continues to live in a colony’.381 
Moreover, just as this paralysis reflects Memmi’s inability to imagine anything other 
than a compromised existence for his ‘colonizer who refuses’, so Gerhart conveys a 
comparable absence of second-order alternatives, when remarking that ‘[i]f whites 
were not to be allowed to play the role of defenders and saviors of the oppressed, 
what role was left for them to play?’ Clearly there is a touch of irony here, given 
Gerhart’s implication that Apartheid’s white opponents were susceptible to white-
supremacist tendencies. Gerhart equally suggests, though, that this particular 
complacency could hardly be redressed as long as there was no alternative ‘role for 
[whites] to play’ in the resistance, nothing other than ‘the role of defenders and 
saviors of the oppressed’ that SASO had now rendered untenable.  
Hence the following, rather glib remark by Paton, who in exasperation asked 
‘[w]hat [do] SASO want liberals to do? [...] Emigrate? Join the National Party?’382 
As Magaziner notes, ‘[t]he answer to Paton’s question was, more or less, 
nothing.’383 This ‘answer’ was clearly insufficient, given SASO’s claim that liberals 
had colluded with Apartheid precisely by doing ‘nothing’. Yet if ‘nothing’ was 
indeed SASO’s answer here, then I suspect it reflected a shortcoming of SASO’s 
‘polarised rhetoric’. For if white complacency did reflect a cynical hidden agenda, 
then there would simply have been no point in considering how ‘dissident’ whites 
might overcome their complacency and ineffectiveness. This ‘polarised rhetoric’, 
then, risked substituting paralysis for complacency, a ‘tormented dance’ in place of 
deluded self-assurance. Having said that, I hardly mean to blame SASO alone for 
what appears to have been the general failure of whites to more actively oppose 
Apartheid during and after the 1970s. It was hardly SASO’s mandate to guide 
dissident whites towards a more effective way of contributing to the resistance. 
Instead, SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’ was primarily meant to galvanise non-whites to 
stop looking towards dissident whites to overcome Apartheid on their behalf, and to 
assume responsibility for achieving their own liberation instead, independently of 
whites. Moreover, for SASO to have instructed whites on how to contribute more 
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meaningfully to the resistance would have gone against the organisation’s belief in 
the necessity of self-direction and self-liberation.  
These principles were usually extolled with reference to non-white activism, 
yet SASO activists – including Biko – occasionally suggested that they applied 
equally to whites. Thus, with its emphasis on ‘“continuous self-examination,” on 
“self-awareness, self-analysis, and self-criticism”’,384 Black Consciousness itself 
presented whites with ways of overcoming their complacency, as well as non-whites 
with the means to take active, self-assertive responsibility for themselves. As 
Maimela and MacQueen both demonstrate – and as I outline below – this dual 
applicability was not entirely drowned out by SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’, with 
NUSAS and the ecumenical Christian Institute being two white-led organizations 
that sought to radicalise themselves from the early 1970s onwards. As we have seen, 
though, Paton and Marquard’s appraisals of Black Consciousness, as well as van den 
Berghe’s later ‘epitaph’385 to a ‘failed’ liberalism, demonstrate how other dissident 
whites stubbornly continued refusing to even consider questioning or reassessing the 
supposedly ‘immortal’ ‘essential principles of liberalism’. Again, if SASO’s 
emphasis on ‘self-awareness, self-analysis, and self-criticism’ was lost on liberal 
whites like Paton, Marquard, and van den Berghe, then I wonder how much of it was 
due to SASO’s claim that whites could never shake off their complacency, and 
contribute meaningfully to the resistance. For if ‘white critics of white 
supremacy’386 could not hope to espouse any kind of ‘logical attitude’ – never mind 
one that was ‘materially coherent’387 – then it seemed pointless to pursue other ways 
of being a dissident white, other options that would enable them to break out of 
Memmi’s ‘tormented dance’.  
SASO’s insistence, therefore, on addressing whites as ‘a homogeneous 
community’ was at odds with the movement’s conviction in the possibility of 
change and self-reinvention. Black Consciousness sought to encourage active 
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politics among non-whites by presenting them with an ‘interval between identities’, 
in the form of two images of the non-white South African that Biko at one point 
referred to as the ‘non-white’ and the ‘black’. For Biko, the former was a wretched 
figure whose ‘aspiration is whiteness but [whose] pigmentation makes attainment of 
this impossible’.388 A ‘non-white’ ‘calls a white man “Baas”,’ and ‘serves in the 
police force or Security Branch’.389 In contrast, ‘[b]lack people – real black people – 
are those who can manage to hold their heads high in defiance rather than willingly 
surrender their souls to the white man.’390 The very term ‘non-white’ imputed that 
being ‘black is an aberration from the “normal” which is white’.391 In defiance of 
this claim, Biko’s ‘real black people’ swelled with ‘a new-found pride in 
themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion and their 
outlook to life.’392 ‘Real black people’ no longer sought ‘to run away from 
themselves and to emulate the white man’,393 including the dissident white man, 
who for all his avowed opposition to the injustices of Apartheid, nonetheless was 
mostly blind to his own, frequent albocentric tendencies.  
Biko’s ‘black man’ was an ‘envisioned self’, ‘a free self’394 insofar as, even 
if he continued to endure ‘the yoke of oppression’, he did so without the ‘sheepish 
timidity’395 of the defeated, compliant, yet resentful, impotent ‘non-white’. For Biko, 
the ‘non-white’ was complicit ‘in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and 
therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth.’396 Biko’s ‘non-
white’ had allowed himself to be ‘[r]educed to an obliging shell [that] looks with 
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awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as the “inevitable 
position”’.397 As such, the ‘non-white’ only had himself to blame for having 
‘become a shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated, drowning in his own 
misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity.’398 
Biko here is just as derisive as he is towards liberal whites who feel ‘quite secure 
under the protection offered by the Nats’, and who therefore shun ‘the idea of 
change.’399 Indeed, Biko’s ‘non-white’ is all the more pitiable in striving to emulate 
a people who themselves were guilty of ‘sheepish timidity’, if not sheer hypocrisy, 
in the face of all the daily injustices committed in their name. Biko’s dual portrait of 
the ‘non-white’ and the ‘black man’, therefore, presented non-white South Africans 
with a choice, affirming their capacity to reinvent themselves in ways that broke out 
of their complicity in their own ‘reduc[tion] to an obliging shell’. Moreover, if all 
non-whites were capable of reinventing themselves, then anyone who continued 
‘sheepishly’ ‘obliging’ the ‘white power structure’ had chosen to do so, and was 
therefore complicit in their own oppression.  
In contrast, though, by insisting that ‘[b]asically the South African white 
community is a homogenous community’, Biko presented whites with no such 
choice, as if they lacked their non-white compatriots’ capacity for self-reinvention. 
Black Consciousness spurred non-whites into action by presenting them with an 
‘envisioned self’. As such, the relative inaction of dissident whites during and after 
the 1970s tellingly coincided with a relative absence of a corresponding white 
‘envisioned self’, one that might have affirmed whites’ ability to contribute more 
meaningfully to the resistance. If Biko’s rallying calls were predicated on the 
possibility of self-reinvention, then we might argue that these calls went relatively 
unheard among dissident whites because Biko affirmed that possibility almost 
exclusively in non-whites. Again, given their emphasis on ‘intense self-questioning’, 
it was hardly up to SASO and Biko to make it clear to whites that they too were 
capable of reinventing themselves. Nonetheless, if whites generally failed to 
reinvent themselves during and after the 1970s, I wonder whether this failure was 
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written into the ‘polarised rhetoric’ of Black Consciousness itself, into its singular 
portrait of ‘the white man’ as a ‘homogeneous’ entity whose albocentrism and self-
interest were congenital, and thus ineradicable.  
Indeed, SASO’s singular portrait of a ‘homogeneous’ white community 
ironically validated itself by provoking a response from liberal whites that mostly 
corroborated it. Thus, as long as SASO provoked this response, it risked sustaining 
the very inactivity among whites that it so virulently condemned as complacency. 
White South Africans would only ever remain ‘a homogeneous community’ as long 
as SASO claimed that ‘[b]asically the South African white community is a 
homogenous community’. Subsequently, any hope of breaking out of this circuitous, 
self-corroborating claim demanded affirming something other than Biko’s 
homogenisation of those intentions, something that would therefore affirm whites’ 
capacity to reinvent themselves by pursuing alternative ways of opposing Apartheid. 
In short, breaking out of this circuit demanded something like Jamaica Kincaid’s 
affirmation in A Small Place, that white ‘masters’ – whether they be slavers, 
plantation owners, colonialists, or tourists – are never just ‘masters’, and that they 
are therefore capable of becoming something other than a ‘master’.  
4.2  Nadine Gordimer, Richard Turner, and the pursuit of second-
order alternatives for dissident whites 
Both Maimela and MacQueen amply demonstrate how there were exceptions among 
the liberal response to SASO’s foundation described above by Gerhart. Thus, 
MacQueen insists that ‘[v]iewing the 1970s through the lens of the polarised rhetoric 
of Black Consciousness obscures moments of meaningful interaction and their 
consequences’, and encourages ‘assumptions of rigid separation’ that overlook how 
SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’ did in fact encourage ‘real dialogue’ between SASO 
and more receptive dissident whites.400 In many cases, this dialogue took the form of 
a collaborative ‘search for a new model of political change for South Africa.’401 In 
Gordimer’s own reflections on Black Consciousness, this search entailed looking for 
new ways of apprehending the role and motivations of Apartheid’s white opposition. 
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Speaking in a 1971 lecture about SASO’s dismissal of white student activists, 
Gordimer freely admitted that as a dissident white, she found it ‘hard to accept 
[such] rebuff[s], even in terms of other people’s needs.’402 Gordimer, though, 
welcomed Black Consciousness, arguing that ‘the ironic refusal of black students to 
co-operate with white students who have fought so many battles on their behalf [...] 
must be seen in the light of a healing négritude.’403  
Moreover, Gordimer readily accepted much of SASO’s critique of ‘the 
dispersion and ultimately failure of the liberal ideal in South Africa’, despite 
insisting that ‘the genuine liberals [...] the real liberals honestly did want to abolish 
white supremacy’.404 Thus, Gordimer conceded that ‘radical liberals offered 
everything, and were powerless to give anything’, and that ‘[a]gainst the cold 
measure of the needs of our historical situation, the liberals with small or large ‘L’ 
failed twice over; first, to gain a following where political power existed, among 
whites; second, by inevitably falling into the role of acting proxy for black 
aspirations.’405 The message of Black Consciousness was clear, and the time had 
come for ‘those of us who are outraged by and prepared to take responsibility for the 
injustices of our society [to] relinquish the role of proctor’.406 However, Gordimer 
found it equally clear that, although they could no longer ‘play the role of defenders 
and saviors of the oppressed’, dissident whites could hardly do ‘nothing’ instead. 
Nonetheless, as with Gerhart, so with Gordimer, the question remained: if dissident 
whites ‘must relinquish the role of proctor, what is left to us?’407 If whites could 
neither claim ‘the role of proctor’ nor ‘simply shut up and leave it to the blacks’,408 
‘what role was left for them to play?’ 
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As we have already seen, Paton posed a similar question, to which the 
answer ‘was, more or less, nothing.’409 Gordimer’s answer to her own question was 
very different. For whereas Paton could see no alternative to a strict liberal agenda, 
Gordimer accepted that ‘what is needed [...] now is a change of emphasis.’410 Rather 
than continuing to ‘see our efforts [...] as attempts to right wrongs on behalf of the 
blacks’, Gordimer called upon dissident whites to oppose Apartheid ‘on behalf of 
[them]selves’ instead, as a ‘demand to be fully human’ as opposed to white 
perpetrators of injustice.411 Gordimer here might have been echoing Biko’s call for 
whites to stop being ‘presumptuous enough to think that it behove[s] them to fight 
the battle for the blacks’,412 and instead ‘fight on [their] own and for 
[themselves].’413 Biko rationalised this notion of whites ‘fight[ing] for their own 
freedom’ by claiming that all whites who were ‘true liberals should realise [...] that 
they themselves are oppressed’.414 We might be sceptical towards Biko’s suggestion 
here that Apartheid’s white-supremacist regime oppressed whites, given the rather 
obvious fact that, as Margo Russell noted in 1979, ‘[a]lthough the very wide powers 
sought by and granted to the government inevitably threaten [dissident whites’] 
liberties in principle, in practice the vast majority of whites are unaffected by 
legislation essentially designed to perpetuate their unduly privileged position.’415 
Indeed, Biko’s suggestion here appears towards the end of an essay in which he 
otherwise pours scorn on claims by whites to ‘feel the oppression [of Apartheid 
racialism] just as acutely as the blacks’, claims that Biko derides for ‘say[ing] that 
they [dissident whites] have black souls wrapped up in white skins.’416 Undoubtedly, 
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these claims trivialised the considerable differences between the standard of living 
enjoyed by whites under Apartheid, and those endured by their non-white 
compatriots. As a result, Biko’s contention that Apartheid ‘oppressed’ whites who 
were ‘true liberals’, might well reflect a lack of recourse to any other way of 
rationalising white opposition to white supremacy, other than in terms of resisting 
one’s own oppression.  
It is unsurprising, therefore, that Gordimer largely avoided suggesting that 
whites were also oppressed under Apartheid, although she occasionally toyed with 
the idea that racial ‘segregation is harmful to those who impose it and those who 
submit to it.’417 For Gordimer, this harm took the form of ‘guilt, shame or that 
coarsening and blunting of the spirit that is the price of indifference’.418 This blight 
could only be redressed by actively, defiantly ‘demand[ing] to be fully human’, in 
the sense of being ‘ordinary members of a multi-coloured, any-coloured society, 
freed both of the privileges and the guilt of the white sins of our fathers.’419 
Gordimer was not alone in claiming that the injustices of white supremacy also took 
a unique, psychological toll on whites. Hence Richard Turner’s claim that ‘[i]n an 
important sense both whites and blacks are oppressed, though in different ways, by a 
social system which perpetuates itself by creating white lords and black slaves, and 
no full human beings.’420 Yet although oppressed in different ways, Turner found 
that Black Consciousness promised to help redress whites’ oppression under 
Apartheid as much as non-whites’, for one significant similarity between both 
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groups was their tendency to ‘oppress themselves’.421 If Biko’s scorn for ‘non-
whites’ signalled ‘a rejection of the idea that the ideal for human kind is “to be like 
the whites”’, then Turner found that this rejection ‘should lead to the recognition 
that it is also bad for whites “to be like the whites”.’422 As a result, if the ‘non-
white’s’ desire ‘to be like the whites’ was a central aspect of his oppression, then 
‘whites themselves [were] oppressed in South Africa’,423 at least wherever they too 
desired ‘to be like the whites’.  
The lesson of Black Consciousness, therefore, was not that ‘white critics of 
white supremacy’ should ‘simply shut up and leave it to the blacks’. Instead, 
dissident whites were now required to undertake the daunting task of ‘changing 
white consciousness’, of ‘devis[ing] ways of bringing home to [whites] the extent to 
which the pursuit of material self-interest empties their lives of meaning.’424 
Towards this end, Turner found that Black Consciousness was an alternative to the 
present state of ‘white consciousness’, which Turner described as ‘cabbage 
consciousness, a mindless absorption of material from the environment.’425 The 
meaning of the term ‘Black Consciousness’, therefore, was by no means restricted to 
an awareness among non-whites ‘of the significance and importance of their own 
value systems’.426 Instead, ‘Black Consciousness’ was an ‘antithesis’ to ‘cabbage 
consciousness’, and non-white value systems were credible alternatives to the 
‘moribund materialism’427 that was inflicting ‘mental atrophy’ on white South 
Africans.428 Thus, the principal goal of Black Consciousness was no different to that 
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of liberals like Paton – a ‘synthesis of cabbage consciousness and its antithesis black 
consciousness’ that would yield ‘human consciousness’.429 
Both Gordimer and Turner, therefore, rationalised white opposition to 
Apartheid in terms of ‘demand[ing] to be fully human’, in the sense of resisting 
one’s constitution as a white, and therefore one’s implication in the systemic 
injustices of white supremacy. Gordimer and Turner looked to the category of 
‘human’ in order to achieve something similar to Biko’s distinction between ‘non-
white’ and ‘black’. Just as Biko’s distinction articulated non-whites’ capacity to 
reinvent themselves, so Gordimer and Turner sought to convey a similar capacity in 
whites, in terms of an ‘interval’ between two identities – ‘white’ and ‘human’. The 
question, though, is whether whites could ever ‘liberate’ themselves of their 
constitution as ‘whites’, as long as non-whites refused to recognise them as anything 
other than ‘whites’. For SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’ was emphatic in this refusal. 
Thus, as much as Turner insisted on distinguishing ‘liberals’ from ‘racists’, and 
‘radicals’ from ‘liberals’,430 SASO officially recognised no such variances among 
whites. According to SASO, ‘radical’ and ‘liberal’ whites were ultimately ‘racists’. 
As a result, whites like Paton who remained steadfast liberals did so because 
liberalism as a ‘partition of the sensible’ already recognised these variances, thus 
allowing liberal whites to distinguish themselves from the ‘racist’ majority without 
having to take SASO’s conflation of ‘liberals’ with ‘racists’ all that seriously.431  
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For Gordimer and Turner, therefore, such stubbornness could only be 
redressed by coming up with second-order alternatives to that of liberalism, whether 
they were the ‘human’ resisting their constitution as a ‘white’, or the ‘radical’ who 
distinguishes themselves from ‘liberals’ and ‘racists’ by more actively resisting 
Apartheid. Moreover, as MacQueen demonstrates, these efforts went beyond mere 
postulations in essays and articles. For many white-led organisations that opposed 
Apartheid sought practical ways of making these proposals a reality. Perhaps the 
most well-known and successful experiment at radicalisation is the Black 
Community Programmes (BCPs), a joint initiative between SASO and the Christian 
Institute launched in 1972, under the auspices of the latter’s Spro-cas 2 
commission.432 MacQueen very briefly mentions that the BCPs were launched 
alongside ‘a separate, white conscientisation project, under Horst Kleinschmidt’,433 
of which I have found no mention elsewhere. Kleinschmidt did edit a collection of 
essays entitled White Liberation which was published in 1972 as part of Spro-cas 2. 
However, since no one in the volume refers to a ‘white conscientisation project’, its 
connection to the venture mentioned by MacQueen remains conjectural at best. 
Nonetheless, the essays rehearse SASO’s critiques of liberal methods, before 
discussing case studies of community engagement programmes in the United States 
of America concerning race relations. As with Turner, Kleinschmidt’s introduction 
proceeds from Biko’s claim that whites ‘themselves are oppressed’ to reconceive 
white opposition to Apartheid as ‘fight[ing] for their own freedom’, rather than on 
behalf of non-whites.434 Turner was meant to contribute to the collection: however, 
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where his essay should be, there are only blank pages with a caption attributing the 
essay’s absence to a banning order issued against him.435 
It is likely that the paucity of information on this ‘white conscientisation 
project’ – compared with information available on the BCPs – suggests that the 
initiative came to nothing. Indeed, MacQueen notes that a similar undertaking by 
NUSAS met with little success. In 1971, NUSAS sought to radicalise itself by 
splitting ‘into three separate affiliate bodies, concerned with social, educational and 
welfare matters’, in order ‘to signal ‘a change of emphasis [...] from talk to action’ 
as well as marking a withdrawal from black politics and instead a direct engagement 
with white society.’436 The three initiatives – ‘Aquarius’, ‘NUSED’ and ‘NUSWEL’ 
– sought to ‘influence and spread progressive ideas in the country’: 
Aquarius rejected ‘moribund materialism’ and the consumer culture of 
the previous generation, rather seeking to reflect ‘more humane moral 
beliefs’ which they sought to spread through popular culture, using 
song, poetry and drama. NUSED, mirroring student protests in 
Britain, protested against the ‘tyranny of examinations’ and called for 
an ‘education that liberates rather than oppresses’ and which opened 
new ways of thinking. NUSWEL looked to engage students by 
bringing them into a closer relationship with the wider community, 
and took on the radical impulse to ‘tackle problems at their roots, not 
just their symptoms’.437 
According to MacQueen, though, NUSAS’s pursuit of a more radical agenda was 
almost immediately hampered by ‘[g]overnment bannings [that] significantly 
curtailed the activities of NUSAS. In June 1973 the government outlawed all 
outdoor gatherings in the centre of Cape Town, an action which, together with 
restrictions on its national leadership, placed NUSAS on the back-foot until the 
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outbreak of the student uprisings in Soweto.’438 Moreover, according to Maimela, 
NUSAS’s leaders found it increasingly difficult to garner interest in these initiatives 
among its grass-roots members, who grew ‘apathetic as they lost interest in NUSAS 
or succumbed to the blandishments of the widespread and coordinated propaganda 
onslaught which the government waged against NUSAS.’439 
Most historians identify the rise of Black Consciousness as a watershed 
moment in the history of the anti-Apartheid struggle. According to some 
historiographers like Tom Lodge, the movement’s activities led to the situation that 
– beginning with the Soweto disturbances in 1976 – provoked schoolchildren across 
South Africa to boycott classes, march unarmed in the streets, and confront the 
government’s security forces, who readily responded with lethal force.440 Soweto 
rocked South African socio-politics in ways that permanently undermined 
Apartheid’s long-term future, as the government would struggle to contain the 
aspirations of an evermore active, confrontational non-white majority throughout the 
following decades. Moreover, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP, or ‘Progs’) 
consolidated its status as the official Opposition in the 1981 General Election, which 
suggested that after Soweto, whites were more open to a liberal alternative to 
Apartheid. As Anthony Lemon noted, though, ‘it remained true that all the seats won 
by the PFP and almost those which it came close to winning in 1981 were in areas of 
traditional United Party [UP] allegiance’, while ‘total support for parties to the ‘left’ 
of the NP remained below the level of 1974.’441 In other words, the PFP’s success 
remained largely confined to traditional strongholds of South African liberalism. 
Elsewhere, the NP’s authority was threatened by the rise of the resurgent Herstigte 
Nasionale Party (HNP; in English, the ‘Re-established National Party’), a far-right 
alternative that protested the NP’s conciliatory approach to non-white demands. A 
year after the election, another far-right alternative arose in the form of the 
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Conservative Party (CP), founded by former NP members of parliament – including 
Dr. Andries Treurnicht, who at the time was Minister of State Administration and 
Statistics – who left the party in protest against Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s support 
for ‘some form of qualified power-sharing’ between whites, coloureds and 
Indians.442  
Whatever efforts were undertaken to engage with white communities in the 
1970s appear to have done little to foment enough opposition to Apartheid among 
whites to challenge its ascendancy via parliamentary means. Certainly, the PFP’s 
gains in 1981 suggested a receptiveness among liberal and English-speaking whites 
to a more radical liberal agenda, than those of either the UP or Paton’s LPSA in 
previous decades.443 However, even as the official Opposition, the PFP’s 26 seats 
were dwarfed by the NP’s 131, meaning that liberalism’s parliamentary presence in 
South Africa remained miniscule compared to that of Afrikaner nationalism. When 
considering how SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’ might have contributed to the 
entrenchment of support for Apartheid among the white community’s political right, 
it is important to acknowledge that the organisation oversaw a profound resurgence 
in non-white political activism, that would continue unabated until the end of 
Apartheid in South Africa’s first multiracial General Election in 1994. It is equally 
important to acknowledge the multitude of factors that contributed to this 
entrenchment – and Apartheid’s subsequent survival for almost two more decades – 
including precisely the complacency and ‘unconscious attachment to the status quo’ 
that SASO observed among Apartheid’s white opponents.  
Nevertheless, Maimela and MacQueen are alone among SASO’s 
historiographers to consider whether its ‘polarised rhetoric’ has overshadowed 
historical accounts of the anti-Apartheid struggle during and after the 1970s, as well 
as the extent to which this rhetoric was also polarising, in the sense of alienating 
potentially receptive whites. As I have demonstrated, this rhetoric certainly did not 
alienate all whites. Yet those who presented moderate responses – including 
Gordimer and Turner – did so in the form of critiques of SASO’s ‘very loose grasp 
of the concept “liberal”’’, as well as the necessity of ‘see[ing] different ‘categories’ 
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of white South African, namely ‘racist, liberal and radical’.’444 I have outlined above 
how Turner provided one such balanced response. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
will consider how Gordimer explored the consequences of SASO’s ‘polarised 
rhetoric’ in her fiction towards the end of the 1970s. I have established how, in her 
non-fiction, Gordimer was receptive towards SASO’s critiques of liberal 
complacency, and how she joined other ‘radicals’ like Turner in pursuing an 
alternative to the now-tarnished identity of the ‘liberal’ that might recuperate the 
integrity of dissident whites in the eyes of their non-white counterparts. Nonetheless, 
in her fiction, Gordimer put Black Consciousness itself to the test, as a means of 
fomenting more active opposition among whites. Indeed, in these fictional 
engagements with SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’, Gordimer suggests that the 
organisation risked replacing complacency with paralysis, by refusing to 
acknowledge in whites a capacity to be anything other than self-interested, white-
supremacist ‘racists’. In the process, Gordimer sought to register multiple intentions 
among dissident whites, in order to envision how they might affirm the integrity of 
their commitment to non-racialism by assuming a more radical praxis. 
4.3  Gordimer’s ‘dead-end heroines’ and the search for a white 
‘envisioned self’ 
So far, critics have largely emphasised how Gordimer’s perspective on the political 
circumstances of white South Africans converge with SASO’s own accounts of 
white complacency, especially among liberals. Often this emphasis gives rise to a 
prescriptive pessimism among Gordimer’s critics, as if any suggestion that the 
prospects of white Africans were anything other than ‘hopeless’ or ‘tragic’445 were 
‘symptomatic’ more of Gordimer’s ‘desperate hope’,446 than of a staid, reliable 
assessment of those prospects. Hence Visel’s description of Hillela Kgomani – 
protagonist of Gordimer’s 1987 novel A Sport of Nature – as ‘half joke, half wistful 
dream’, ‘a mythic rather than realistic character’ who indicates ‘Gordimer’s 
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frustration, not so much with the limits of the realist genre, as with the political 
stalemate for whites in South Africa.’447 Certainly, we cannot imagine a more 
unlikely portrait of a white who successfully engineers the downfall of Apartheid. 
Yet even if she amounts to a departure from a rigid realism, I find that Visel too 
readily dismisses Hillela as authorial fantasy. Hillela’s unreality may well derive 
from her ability to overcome obstacles that Gordimer had suggested were 
insurmountable in her previous two novels, Burger’s Daughter and July’s People. 
However, as I demonstrate below, Hillela is no less ‘mythical’ than Biko’s ‘real 
black people’, those proud, upstanding non-whites who initially existed mostly as a 
potential, an ‘envisioned self’ for non-whites to assume in order to liberate 
themselves of being ‘sheepish’ ‘non-whites’.  
 Indeed, as an ‘envisioned self’ for whites, Hillela redresses an absence of 
‘envisioned selves’ that, among other things, is what leads to the discouraging 
conclusions to both Burger’s Daughter and July’s People. Both novels search for a 
‘post-liberal alternative’,448 a new sensibility following the trauma of being rejected 
by someone whom their central protagonists thought of as a close friend, but who 
accuses them of being no less white-supremacist than the Apartheid regime they 
claim to oppose. Stephen Clingman notes how Black Consciousness looms over 
Burger’s Daughter, especially given the recent Soweto uprisings, which Clingman – 
like Lodge – attributes to circumstances that Black Consciousness helped foment.449 
Thus, in Burger’s Daughter, Gordimer’s pursuit of a new role for dissident whites in 
response to Soweto entailed confronting SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’, and seeking 
out a productive white response to its provocations. Most critics agree with 
Clingman that Gordimer eventually finds a suitable response, and that the ending of 
Burger’s Daughter is encouraging, even though its protagonist Rosa Burger ends up 
in a South African prison, detained without charge. For unlike her celebrated father 
Lionel Burger, a prominent figure in the illegal SACP who died in prison, ‘in the 
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aftermath of Black Consciousness and the Soweto Revolt there can be no special 
glory attaching to [Rosa’s] situation. In contrast to Lionel, whose role as a white 
leader had been pre-eminent, after the events of 1976 [i.e. the Soweto uprisings] 
Rosa’s can at best be secondary, supportive, peripheral.’450 
 Rosa is imprisoned shortly after returning to South Africa, after having tried 
to ‘defect’ to Europe in pursuit of a carefree life away from the incessant demands 
of the anti-Apartheid resistance. She returns after a traumatic encounter with 
Zwelinzima Vilundlela in London, whom Rosa had previously known as Baasie, 
Afrikaans for ‘little boss’. As a child, Zwelinzima – whose name means ‘suffering 
land’ – had been taken in by Lionel due to his own father’s political activities, 
eventual imprisonment, and death, apparently via suicide. Having not seen or heard 
from him in years, Rosa notices Zwelinzima watching her at a party, where she is 
being paraded as the daughter of the late, great Lionel Burger, Afrikaans opponent 
of Afrikaner nationalism. Later in the evening, Zwelinzima accuses Rosa of living 
off her father’s legacy, which in itself indicated how deeply white-supremacist 
tendencies run even among Apartheid’s white opponents. Zwelinzima derides how 
[e]veryone in the world must be told what a great hero he was and 
how much he suffered for the blacks. Everyone must cry over him and 
show his life on television and write in the papers. Listen, there are 
dozens of our fathers sick and dying like dogs, kicked out of the 
locations when they can’t work any more. Getting old and dying in 
prison. Killed in prison. It’s nothing. I know plenty blacks like 
Burger. It’s nothing, it’s us, we must be used to it, it’s not going to 
show on English television.451 
For Zwelinzima, Lionel Burger’s prominence was almost entirely due to his skin 
colour. Otherwise, as opponents of Apartheid go, Lionel was somewhat 
unremarkable, especially given how many non-white fathers were dying in prison at 
the time of Lionel’s death. Nonetheless, no one remembers any of these non-white 
prisoners, although Rosa points out how she has not forgotten Zwelinzima’s father. 
Zwelinzima, though, retorts by pointing out how ‘[n]obody talks about him. Even I 
don’t remember much about him.’452  
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Clingman, therefore, finds Rosa’s own incarceration to be an encouraging 
litmus test of the potential for whites to respond productively to such critiques, given 
how she claims no glory from her situation, nor is it glorified by others, unlike her 
father’s. Similarly, Kelly Hewson remarks that, having initially found that ‘there is 
no “place” for her in her father’s country’, Rosa’s incarceration is positive insofar as 
she ‘finds herself “in place,” in prison, fulfilling her responsibilities to herself and to 
her society.’453 Visel echoes this notion that Rosa’s rightful place in the world is in a 
South African prison, when describing her incarceration as – quite literally – a 
homecoming, in the sense that ‘only within that enchanted circle can she overcome 
her whiteness, her alienation, her otherness. Outside, apartheid laws, distrust, 
resentment, fear and confusion separate her from her black comrades.’454 Rosa’s 
decision to forfeit a comfortable life in Europe for the risks of returning to an 
increasingly turbulent South Africa may well reflect a newfound ‘sense of historical’ 
or ‘necessary engagement’.455 Moreover, this commitment may well entail breaking 
with her father’s near-religious adherence to Communist doctrine, in favour of a 
more personal, more immediate commitment to witnessing and alleviating the 
suffering of others.456 Nonetheless, I find it curious how Clingman, Hewson, and 
Visel identify prison as the rightful place of Apartheid’s opponents, as well as the 
only place where a cross-racial fraternity can ever be more than a thwarted 
aspiration. All three critics ironically concur with Apartheid’s own ‘stable 
distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’, with respect to where 
the regime’s opponents belong in South African society. 
Thus, Rosa’s incarceration might well affirm the integrity of her 
commitment to overcoming Apartheid, yet it hardly marks a radical rupture of that 
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distribution, since her place in South African society remains dictated by Apartheid. 
Indeed, the similarities between the opening chapter of Burger’s Daughter and its 
closing scene reinforce this sense of Apartheid’s redoubtability, by implying a 
cyclical return to a situation that has hardly progressed at all. Having opened with 
Rosa visiting her mother in prison, the novel closes with Rosa herself receiving a 
visitor in prison. Moreover, Gordimer strongly suggests that Rosa has come to 
occupy her father’s old cell, given how she writes a postcard to Lionel’s first wife, 
in which she originally described ‘a water-mark of light that came into the cell at 
sundown every evening, reflected from some west-facing surface outside; something 
Lionel Burger once mentioned. But the line had been deleted by the prison 
censor.’457 If Rosa ultimately finds her rightful place in Apartheid’s ‘stable 
distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’, then Burger’s 
Daughter conveys a pessimistic appraisal of the prospects of breaking radically out 
of that distribution, of destabilsing it in the process, and thus of eventually 
dissolving it entirely.  
 For Visel, the contrasting fates of Rosa and Hillela only further emphasise 
the latter’s unreality, insofar as Hillela is somehow able ‘to manipulate the transition 
to the Future, which even for Rosa Burger is unattainable’.458 Gordimer, though, 
seems aware of this contrast, given how she counterpoints Hillela’s successes with 
the increasingly sorry lot of her cousin Sasha. As adolescents, it was Sasha who was 
politically attuned, dropping out of university in order to commit himself 
wholeheartedly to the resistance, only to end up in prison rather swiftly. Meanwhile, 
Hillela – who had never shown much interest in politics – becomes an unlikely 
talismanic figure in the global call to end Apartheid. Hillela accidentally falls into 
here political career after being forced to flee South Africa, as a known associate of 
a foreign journalist459 who attracts the authorities’ suspicions. She finds her way to a 
transnational community of political exiles, one of which is Whaila Kgomani, a 
fictional ANC leader, whom Hillela marries only to witness his assassination by the 
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South African government soon after. As the widow of an internationally well-
known anti-Apartheid activist, Hillela soon comes to bear Whaila’s cause, 
eventually remarrying after meeting Reuel, a former president of a newly-
independent African country. Reuel was recently ousted during a military coup 
organised by the former colonial power, and orchestrated in part by his own son. He 
quickly re-established himself through military means, and afterwards plays a key 
role in the negotiations that culminate in Apartheid’s formal abolition. A Sport of 
Nature closes with the triumphal image of Hillela and Reuel attending the 
inauguration of South Africa’s new, majority-rule dispensation, watching as the new 
national flag slowly rises over them.  
 Meanwhile, Sasha watches Hillela’s unlikely rise to global prominence from 
his jail cell, occasionally sending her letters that she hardly ever receives. By the 
novel’s triumphal closing image, he has fallen into complete obscurity, although he 
was never that publicly prominent anyway. As with Rosa, so with Sasha, ‘there can 
be no special glory attaching to [his] situation’, and he must settle for a role in the 
resistance that is ‘secondary, supportive, peripheral’, if indeed there is any role for 
him. In Rosa’s case, this humble role is encouraging, at least according to Clingman 
and Hewson. Juxtaposed with Hillela’s, though, Sasha’s fortunes question how 
sufficient a challenge to Apartheid’s ascendancy Sasha and Rosa’s  ‘more binding 
commitments’ really are. For their comparable fates suggest that the task of 
rupturing the symbolic circuit of Apartheid – along with its ‘political and legal 
order’ – demands something still more radical of whites than simply assuming ‘a 
more binding commitment’ to opposing the regime. Thus, if critics like Visel and 
Richard Peck are dissatisfied with Hillela’s unlikely triumph, then it is precisely 
because she manages to rupture this order, by radically breaking out of a ‘stable 
distribution of places, identities, functions and competencies’ that defines the 
rightful place of dissident white South Africans as being in prison, on the furthest 
margins of history.  
 Thus, to dismiss Hillela as ‘a mythic rather than realistic character’ is to risk 
dismissing the possibility of breaking out of the ‘sensible order’ of Apartheid. As 
such, I find Visel’s dismissal of Hillela to be unsettling in its suggestion that white 
South Africans are ultimately incapable of breaking out of ‘the social ties, the rules 
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of behavior, [and] finally, the failure of imagination, which bind and limit’ 
Gordimer’s ‘dead-end heroines’.460 Moreover, such pessimism is ironic when 
applied to Maureen Smales, protagonist of July’s People and one of Visel’s hapless 
‘dead-end heroines’. Certainly, compared with those of Rosa, Sasha, and Hillela, 
Maureen’s fate is profoundly ambiguous. For one thing, it remains unclear whether 
Maureen proves herself capable of overcoming her complacency as an affluent, 
politically-inactive liberal white, and making ‘a more binding commitment’ to an as 
yet uncertain future. Hence the inconclusive ending of July’s People, with Maureen 
running towards an unmarked military helicopter that, for all we know, could 
equally contain government troops or non-white rebels, life or death. Maureen and 
her family have been given shelter by their former servant July in his rural 
community, as South African society is engulfed in a civil war between an 
intransigent Apartheid government, rebellious non-whites, and their respective 
foreign allies, including Rhodesian commandos and communists from Russia and 
Cuba. Given how we never find out who is in the helicopter, Maureen’s decision to 
run straight towards it has so far proven ‘baffling’ for critics, since  ‘logic would 
seem to suggest that she should run in the opposite direction to the helicopter in 
order to assure her own safety and survival.’461  
As with Rosa’s incarceration, Clingman finds that Maureen’s flight towards 
the helicopter is an encouraging development, insofar as Maureen acts out of a 
newfound resolve or ‘personal integration’ that is comparable to that which prompts 
Rosa’s return to South Africa. The circumstances that prompt this ‘personal 
integration’ are very similar to those which lead to Rosa’s renewed sense of 
‘necessary engagement’. Thus, just as Rosa’s integrity is called into question by 
someone whom she thought of as a friend and comrade, so July scorns the integrity 
of Maureen’s liberal opposition to Apartheid. For years, Maureen and Bam have 
striven to respect the dignity of their non-white servants as fellow human beings, 
believing that in turn they have earned a similar reciprocal respect, perhaps even 
their servants’ friendship. Ali Erritouni, though, contends that the Smaleses’ ‘liberal 
                                            
460 Visel, p. 38. 
461 Nicholls, Brendon, Nadine Gordimer’s July’s People (London, New York: Routledge, 
2011), p. 33. 
- 292 - 
views and [their] humane treatment of [their] servant[s] before the revolutionary war 
do not go to the heart of the racist and discriminatory policies of white South Africa. 
They are cosmetic and leave intact the economic discrimination of apartheid.’462 
With their seven bedrooms, swimming pool, garish pickup – or ‘bakkie’ – and their 
live-in servants, the Smaleses have enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle, even by white 
standards. Moreover, ‘their attempts to overcome the color bar have blinded them to 
the economic component of apartheid’,463 which as Rosemarie Bodenheimer notes, 
prompts the Smaleses to ‘manifest the ‘morbid symptoms’ of a dying consumer 
culture in which identity is created by ownership and relationships are mediated by 
objects.’464 
Bodenheimer here alludes to the epigraph of July’s People, which Gordimer 
takes from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks – ‘The old is dying and the new 
cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid 
symptoms.’465 ‘Morbid symptoms’ are aspects of ‘the old’ that linger on after its 
demise, hampering the emergence and ascendancy of ‘the new’.466 These remnants 
litter July’s People, from the Smaleses’ complacency and latent white-supremacist 
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tendencies, to July’s own investments in the old order, such as the prestige among 
his own people that comes with his connection to the Smaleses.467 With respect to 
the Smaleses, Bodenheimer finds that the persistence of these ‘morbid symptoms’ 
demonstrates how ‘[t]he ethic of private property remains ineradicably etched in 
[their] white consciousness’.468 Indeed, such is the extent of the Smaleses’ 
investment in this ethic that Bodenheimer cannot decide whether Gordimer believes 
it is possible to change ‘the mental equipment of an adult white South African’, so 
as to establish a ‘new white identity’.469 Thus, for Bodenheimer, the ambiguous 
ending of July’s People is not quite as encouraging as Clingman and Erritouni find it 
to be. The latter two critics agree that Mareen’s ‘audacious dash’ towards the 
helicopter indicates a desire to overcome the complacency of her dubious liberal 
principles. For Clingman, Maureen 
is running from old structures and relationships, which have led her to 
this cul-de-sac; but she is also running towards her revolutionary 
destiny. She does not know what that destiny may be, whether it will 
bring death or life. All she knows is that it is the only authentic future 
awaiting her.470 
Maureen’s run reaffirms the capacity of complacent whites to get beyond the ‘dead-
end of history’471 that they have sleep-walked into, and to assume ‘a more binding 
commitment’ to a future that as yet still cannot guarantee a place for any whites, 
complacent or otherwise. Similarly, Erritouni finds that Maureen in this moment 
pursues ‘a new identity, one that is different from the liberal identity she has 
cultivated under and in opposition to the political and social arrangements of 
apartheid.’472  
 Of course, we cannot know for sure whether Maureen ever finds a ‘new 
identity’, given how ambiguous and inconclusive this closing episode is. Hence 
Bodenheimer’s suggestion that Gordimer is uncertain in July’s People over whether 
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we can alter ‘the mental equipment of an adult white South African’. Given this 
claim, though, it is unsurprising that Bodenheimer should find that ‘Maureen’s run 
for the helicopter is an almost unreadable act.’473 For despite suggesting otherwise, 
Bodenheimer’s response to this episode lends credence to Erritouni’s claim that 
Maureen’s ‘audacious dash’ enacts ‘a new identity, one that is different from the 
liberal identity’ that she had previously maintained. Just as Hillela’s unreality stems 
from her radical break with Apartheid’s ‘stable distribution of places, identities, 
functions and competencies’, so Maureen’s response to the helicopter’s appearance 
is ‘baffling’, ‘illogical’, and ‘unreadable’ because unlike Rosa and Sasha, Maureen 
steps ‘out of place’.474 Her final flight is ‘baffling’ only insofar as it is 
incomprehensible within any existing ‘sensible order’. In this moment, Maureen 
does something that we would least expect in her – indeed, perhaps in anyone, but 
least of all in self-interested, hypocritical white liberals who have already agreed to 
flee should either side in the conflict arrive in the village. As such, Maureen’s flight 
towards the helicopter leaves us unable ‘to designate what we see’ since – as per 
Rancière’s second definition of ‘politics’475 – this act seems uncharacteristic of a 
complacent, self-interested, materialist liberal hypocrite. That description, therefore, 
‘no longer suits the thing or the character that it names, etc’,476 the ‘thing’ here being 
Maureen. Yet the uncertainty surrounding this act suggests that we are unable to 
more adequately ‘name’ Maureen, as if there is no alternative ‘stable distribution of 
places, identities, functions and competencies’ that differentiates between 
complacent, self-interested, materialist liberal hypocrites, and liberals like Maureen 
who appear to have become aware of their hypocrisy, and – moreover – who pursue 
a way beyond it.  
 Thus, the very fact that Maureen’s run is ‘baffling’, ‘illogical’, and 
‘unreadable’ indicates a radical break with ‘the old’, even if the inconclusive ending 
of July’s People leaves the nature of ‘the new’ unknown, along with Maureen’s 
place in it, if there is one. As such, to claim that Gordimer is ultimately uncertain of 
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whether we can alter ‘the mental equipment of an adult white South African’, is to 
contribute to that hampering of the birth of ‘the new’ that, according to Gramsci, 
gives rise to ‘a great diversity of morbid symptoms.’ To claim that July’s People 
simply ‘makes plain the hopelessness of the South African situation’477 is to risk 
foreclosing the possibility of breaking out of Apartheid’s symbolic circuit, by 
attributing the ascendancy of this ‘sensible order’ with a sense of inevitability. 
Indeed, these approaches are ironic, given how July’s People plays out a very 
similar foreclosure via July and Maureen’s confrontations, albeit with respect to how 
SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’ risked foreclosing the possibility of encouraging white 
radicalisation, as described above. For it becomes clear in these confrontations that 
to insist upon viewing ‘the South African white community [as] a homogeneous 
community’ risks hampering the task of promoting among whites ‘a more binding 
commitment’ to the dissolution of Apartheid. Thus, Maureen’s ‘audacious dash’ 
may well suggest that ‘it is incumbent on white South Africans – more so than 
blacks – to take a leap of faith and embrace the unknown future.’478 However, the 
uncertainty of that future equally suggests that it is incumbent on non-white South 
Africans to take their own ‘leap of faith’, by acknowledging in whites a similar 
capacity for self-reinvention as Biko sought to affirm in non-whites.  
4.4  An ‘interregnum’ of identity in July’s People 
If she is as unrealistic as Visel suggests, then Hillela serves precisely as an 
‘envisioned self’, through which Gordimer seeks to affirm that whites too are 
capable of meaningful, productive self-reinvention. Moreover, if ‘the new’ shows no 
signs of being born by the end of July’s People, then we might attribute its 
elusiveness to the absence of a white ‘envisioned self’. As I have already discussed, 
the novel’s epigraph is most often read as alluding to the death of Apartheid, yet 
something else ‘dies’ in July’s People. For with Apartheid goes a liberal agenda that 
allowed whites to both vocally oppose the regime without actively pursuing its 
demise, and legitimise their security and comforts in terms of Bodenheimer’s ‘ethic 
of private property’. The epigraph of July’s People appears in a passage of the 
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Prison Notebooks that I briefly discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.479 In this 
passage, Gramsci describes a scenario where a ‘ruling class’ and its respective 
‘ruling ideologies’ are confronted by a ‘crisis of authority’, insofar as ‘the great 
masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer 
believe what they used to believe previously, etc.’480 Clearly, it is unlikely that non-
white South Africans ever subscribed to the ‘ruling ideologies’ under Apartheid. As 
such, the ‘crisis of authority’ that Gordimer’s epigraph alludes to is more likely to be 
that which besets the Smaleses’ liberalism. Again, it is unclear whether July or any 
of the Smaleses’ servants ever shared their liberal principles. Either way, the 
Smaleses were able to convince themselves that they did, and so were able to sustain 
their pretensions of liberal decency and integrity without significant challenge.  
 Once they are reduced dispossessed refugees, though, July quickly realises 
that the Smaleses have no way of sustaining those pretensions – that they ‘can’t do 
anything. Nothing to us anymore.’481 July, therefore, becomes increasingly obstinate 
towards both Maureen and Bam, appropriating their bakkie, and prompting a series 
of confrontations between himself and Maureen after she asks him to return it. As 
with Rosa’s argument with Zwelinzima, in many respects Maureen’s with July 
resembles the debate between Black Consciousness and South African liberalism. In 
particular, July’s refusal to address Maureen as anything other than a white 
supremacist is highly reminiscent of SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’. Thus, Maureen is 
taken aback when July begins referring to himself as her ‘boy’, to her as his 
‘madam’, and to Bam as ‘the master’, a language burdened with white supremacism 
that ‘was never used in her house; she priggishly shamed and exposed others who 
spoke it in her presence. She had challenged it in the mouths of white shopkeepers 
and even policemen.’482 Maureen initially reacts with disbelief, although she appears 
to accept the implication of this mode of address early on, conceding to July that 
‘[i]f ever I offended you, if I hurt your dignity [...] I know I don’t know, I didn’t 
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know, and I should have known’.483 Of course, Maureen’s gestures of apology and 
reconciliation provide little solace for July, who for fifteen years has had to endure 
the hypocrisy of his liberal employers, who opposed Apartheid only in principle, and 
only vocally.  
 However, in accusing Maureen of white supremacy, July demands more than 
a mere apology or admission of guilt from her: hence his persistence in referring to 
himself, Maureen and Bam in white-supremacist terms, even after she apologises. 
For these accusations also call on Maureen to acknowledge July as her equal, in a 
way that departs radically from the understanding of equality that had informed the 
Smaleses’ previous efforts to respect July’s dignity. Certainly, though, these 
accusations amount to ‘a show of claiming a due’,484 as Gordimer describes them – 
of demanding that Maureen acknowledge how she and Bam had effectively hijacked 
July’s sense of self, in order to exonerate themselves of any culpability for ‘all the 
inequalities. The things we couldn’t put right. Oh, and those we could have, I 
suppose.’485 July’s accusations, therefore, incite Rancière’s first definition of 
‘politics’ as outlined in my previous chapter – ‘politics’ as ‘a conflict between one 
sensible order and another’,486 an ‘opposition between logics that count the parties 
and parts of the community in different ways.’487 The Smaleses initially ‘count’ 
themselves and July as equals who respect one another’s dignity, yet July challenges 
this ‘count’ or ‘sensible order’ with another that ‘counts’ them as perpetrators of 
injustice, and himself as their victim. This challenge takes Maureen by surprise, 
given her assumption that July’s offer to shelter her family in his village affirmed 
her belief that she and Bam had earned his friendship.  
From the opening page, though, it is clear that the ‘offer’ was in fact one of a 
diligent servant seeing to his employers’ welfare, as per the terms of his 
employment. Although they urge him not to, July continues to wait on the Smaleses 
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like a servant, ‘as his kind has always done for their kind.’488 As a result, when 
Maureen points out that he no longer works for her, July appears shocked to realise 
that he will not be paid for that month. Maureen reacts with similar astonishment: 
‘Pay you! [...] You know we can pay you what you used to get, but we can’t pay you 
for – ’.489 Either July cuts Maureen off here, or she abruptly realises the subtext of 
his remark – that he has saved her life not as her loyal, caring friend, but rather as 
her ‘good boy’490 seeing to his responsibilities. July’s demand for payment might 
well be flippant, given his awareness of how the Smaleses are now destitute. Thus, 
the demand is less for money than for recognition. For by referring to himself as 
Maureen’s ‘good boy’, July rejects the identity of ‘July’ as ‘an identity given by 
another, given by the ruling order of policy’.491 As the Smaleses later learn, ‘July’ 
‘was a name for whites to use’ – his own people know him as ‘Mwawate’.492 For 
July himself, this ‘name for whites to use’ is synonymous with the shameful figure 
of Maureen’s ‘good boy’, which itself amounts to Biko’s ‘non-white’. Thus, by 
conflating these identities, July disrupts the ‘stable distribution of places, identities, 
functions and competencies’493 that informs the liberal ‘ruling order of policy’ of the 
Smales household, which he has had to endure for fifteen years, and which 
dissociates the Smaleses meticulously from white supremacism.  
Maureen responds by insisting on sustaining this ‘ruling order of policy’. 
Claiming that ‘[n]obody’s ever thought of [...] as anything but a grown man’,494 
Maureen distinguishes  ‘July’ from her ‘good boy’, whom she initially rejects out of 
hand, so as to distinguish her intentions from those of white-supremacists. As with 
Paton, Marquard, and van den Berghe, Maureen does not immediately abandon 
liberalism because it allows her to ‘dis-identify’ from white supremacy, without 
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seriously considering the cogency of July’s accusations. Whereas for July himself 
the name ‘July’ is synonymous with Maureen’s ‘good boy’, for Maureen ‘July’ 
refers to a ‘grown man’, to someone who is her equal as an adult human being, and 
who therefore deserves as much respect as she does. The signifier ‘July’, therefore, 
becomes the principal site in which the conflict between the Smaleses’ ‘ruling order 
of policy’ and July’s alternative ‘count’ plays out. As long as this conflict persists; 
as long as the Smaleses refuse to relinquish their liberal ‘sensible order’, then July is 
suspended in the ‘interval’ between two identities – ‘July’ the ‘good boy’ and ‘July’ 
the ‘grown man’. 
Hence July’s, or rather Mwawate’s recourse to a third identity whenever he 
declares that ‘I’m big man, I know for myself what I must do.’495 This third ‘name’ 
manifests itself in terms of a corporeal, increasingly aggressive, threatening 
masculinity, such as when July abruptly thumps his chest in anger during his second 
altercation with Maureen. This gesture is as ‘unreadable’ for Maureen as her own 
‘audacious dash’ at the end of July’s People is for Bodenheimer, given how the 
sound of this gesture ‘echoe[s] no other experience she ha[s] ever had.’496 Moreover, 
the gesture provokes fear in her, albeit not ‘in him, not physical, anyway, but in 
herself. How was she to have known, until she came here, that the special 
consideration she had shown for his dignity as a man, while he was by definition a 
servant, would become his humiliation itself’.497 Again, Maureen here carefully 
avoids conceding the veracity of July’s own ‘count’, by insisting that, even if she 
has not treated him as a ‘man’, it remains that she has treated him as a ‘servant’ 
rather than a ‘good boy’. Once again, this qualitative difference allows Maureen to 
come to terms with July’s ‘dis-identification’ from her liberal ‘sensible order’, 
without having to seriously question the veracity of her own ‘dis-identification’ 
from white supremacism. July may have been her social inferior, but Maureen 
maintains that she never regarded this as evidence of racial inferiority.  
By referring to himself as Maureen’s ‘good boy’, therefore, July challenges 
Maureen’s conviction that she has treated him like a ‘grown man’. Moreover, in 
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claiming to be a ‘big man’, July equally asserts a very different understanding of 
what it means to be a man, and be treated like a man, than that which informs 
Maureen’s contention that ‘[n]obody’s ever thought of you as anything but a grown 
man.’ The bone of contention here, then, is not just July’s identity or Maureen’s 
integrity, but also the terms in which they encounter one another. Hence the 
inadequacy of Maureen’s apologies for ‘hurting’ July’s dignity.498 For what July 
demands of her is respect not as a ‘grown man’, but rather as a ‘big man’ – that is, 
respect in terms that he himself defines, and by extension respect for him as 
someone who is just as entitled as she is to define those terms in the first place. This 
latter demand is perhaps the most traumatic for Maureen, given how within the 
terms of her liberal ‘sensible order’, her apologies would have demanded in turn that 
July treat her fairly. For Maureen, therefore, to step outside this order is to relinquish 
any such demand, and thus consign herself to a deeply uncertain fate, dependent on 
the whim of someone who has become something other than what she knew and 
could depend on – or indeed what she controlled. Moreover, as long as that 
‘someone’ is unable to address her as anything other than a white supremacist, 
Maureen’s fate seems sealed. As such, in objecting to July’s insistence on referring 
to himself as her ‘good boy’, Maureen tries to re-establish control over both him and 
the terms in which they relate to one another, in the hope of influencing her fate, 
which is entirely in his hands.  
Undoubtedly, Maureen’s efforts to retain control over these terms indicate a 
latent dependence on her prior authority as a white. July, therefore, is fully justified 
in accusing her of white supremacy. Nonetheless, as long as Maureen is unwilling to 
let go of this authority, then her confrontations with July prove unable to give rise to 
‘the new’, whether it is a non-racial, post-Apartheid commonwealth, or a ‘post-
liberal alternative’ that enables Maureen to get beyond the ‘cul-de-sac’ or ‘dead-end 
of history’499 into which her liberal commitments have led her. For as long as July 
refuses to distinguish Maureen’s intentions from those of Afrikaner nationalism, 
then he himself compounds her initial reluctance to abandon ‘the essential principles 
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of liberalism’.500 For only a liberal ‘sensible order’ appears to recognise that 
distinction. Maureen, then, hangs onto liberalism because no other ‘sensible order’ 
exists – at least within the novel’s diegesis – that recognises any distinction between 
‘racists’, ‘liberals’, and ‘radicals’. As such, when responding to July’s accusations, 
Maureen initially fails to move beyond a fervent self-defence that remains squarely 
within a liberal framework, towards a reassessment of that framework itself that 
might provoke her to seek out an entirely ‘new frame of reference’.501 Given his 
claim that she cannot think of him as anything other than her ‘good boy’, July 
condemns Maureen to remaining strictly within the terms of ‘the old’ – not just 
those of a dying Apartheid, but also those of a dying liberalism. Both Maureen and 
July, then, are responsible for the fact that their confrontations prove inadequate as a 
crucible for the birth of ‘the new’. Clingman, Visel, Bodenheimer, and Erritouni 
largely place the onus on Maureen to take the ‘leap of faith and embrace the 
unknown future.’ Yet as long as July refuses to take his own ‘leap of faith’ and trust 
in Maureen’s readiness to embrace that future, he condemns them both to remain 
trapped in the symbolic circuit of ‘the old’. Without this double ‘leap of faith’, the 
‘interregnum’ can only persist, and ‘the new cannot be born’ as long as both 
Maureen and July do not allow it to.  
Thus, the ‘baffling’, ‘illogical’, and ‘unreadable’ nature of Maureen’s 
response to the helicopter’s appearance is both discouraging and encouraging. On 
one hand, the fact that we cannot establish whether or not Maureen is prompted by a 
more progressive, ‘post-liberal’ sensibility indicates our lack of a ‘sensible order’ 
that can adequately make sense of her response, and that can therefore also perceive 
liberal whites as being capable of acting in ways that are otherwise uncharacteristic 
of liberal whites. On the other hand, this inadequacy is encouraging, since it 
suggests that Maureen has finally succeeded in moving beyond the ‘dead-end of 
history’ that she has sleep-walked into. Just like July’s drumming of his chest, 
Maureen’s run ‘echoe[s] no other experience [we] ha[ve] ever had’, and thus 
demands that we consider the possibility that complacent liberal whites can exceed 
what we would normally expect of them. The very fact that critics continue to 
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debate the significance of Maureen’s run; the very fact that it has ‘become one of the 
standard debates of South African fiction’,502 surely demonstrates how it defies all 
categorisation. In contrast, Rosa and Sasha’s incarceration dramatises categorisation. 
In Rosa’s case, her imprisonment is an act of unconditional submission to a ‘sensible 
order’ that is entirely defined by Zwelinzima, insofar as she affirms the integrity of 
her newfound sense of ‘necessary engagement’ in a way that conforms completely 
to how Zwelinzima defines ethical and political integrity. Rosa claims that ‘[i]t isn’t 
Baasie [...] who sent me back here’,503 yet as Clingman notes, she strongly suggests 
otherwise when articulating the reason for her return in terms of suffering: 
I don’t know the ideology: 
It’s about suffering. 
How to end suffering.  
And it ends in suffering.504  
We might well be sceptical towards Rosa’s insistence that Zwelinzima in no way 
provoked her decision to return to South Africa, given his Considering Zwelinzima’s 
claim that the Burgers had never experienced suffering, at least compared with the 
suffering endured by non-whites. Once she is back in the country, Rosa takes a job 
as a physiotherapist at ‘a black hospital’,505 ‘teaching them to walk again, at 
Baragwanath hospital. They put one foot before the other.’506 After Soweto is 
engulfed in violence, Rosa finds herself having to tend to both her own patients and 
‘those who had been shot’ in the fighting.507 Eventually, of course, Rosa herself is 
made to suffer, detained indefinitely without charge in a prison cell that looks 
suspiciously like her father’s. Thus, if Rosa succeeds in re-establishing her integrity 
as an opponent of Apartheid, she does so by personally confronting, and then 
experiencing suffering under the regime. Burger’s Daughter, therefore, suggests that 
one’s ethical and political integrity after Soweto depends on the extent to which one 
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has suffered under Apartheid. Rosa sums up this reconception when recalling 
Russian communist Vera Figner’s remark that ‘a trial is the crowning point of a 
revolutionary’s activity.’508  
 In contrast, although she eventually acknowledges July’s entitlement to 
define the terms in which they relate to one another, Maureen certainly does not do 
so quite as unconditionally as Rosa does. Nonetheless, by refusing to submit herself 
unconditionally to July’s authority, Maureen demands from him precisely what he 
demands from her – an acknowledgement that she is as entitled as he is to define the 
terms in which they relate to one another. Rosa’s response to Zwelinzima’s 
provocations implies a mere inversion of a previous unequal relationship. 
Subsequently, the scathing, simmering mutual indifference in which Maureen and 
July take leave of one another after their final confrontation is perversely 
encouraging. After Bam’s shotgun goes missing from their allotted hut, Maureen 
demands that July ‘get it back’ for her,509 in what appears to be a lapse back into a 
familiar role of unquestioned authority over him as a white. July initially responds 
by claiming to know nothing about the shotgun’s whereabouts, before objecting to 
her assumption that ‘I must know who is stealing your things? Same like always. 
You make too much trouble for me. Here in my home too [...] I don’t want it any 
more. You see?’510 Yet again, July here accuses Maureen of refusing to trust him on 
racialist grounds. From his perspective, the subtext of her constantly looking to him 
to recover misplaced items is that he knows where they are, and that – as with the 
bakkie – he took them in the first place. Ironically enough, since arriving in the 
village, Maureen has continually found small, inconsequential household items that 
disappeared from her home over the years, scattered among the huts. She therefore 
counters July’s insinuation by observing that ‘[y]ou stole small things. Why? I 
wouldn’t tell you then but I tell you now.’511 July objects to this accusation of theft 
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by claiming that ‘[a]lways you give me those thing!’512 Maureen, though, repudiates 
the claim, although she admits that she never voiced her suspicion that he was 
stealing from her ‘because I was ashamed to think you would do it.’513  
At this point, July begins ‘to talk at her in his own language, his face 
flickering powerfully.’514 Gordimer does not disclose the content of his outburst, but 
just as when July thumped his chest at her, the message is clearly conveyed to 
Maureen without meaningful words,515 and the effect upon her is profound:  
The heavy cadences surrounded her [...] She understood although she 
knew no word. Understood everything: what he had had to be, how 
she had covered up to herself for him, in order for him to be her idea 
of him. But for himself – to be intelligent, honest, dignified for her 
was nothing; his measure as a man was taken elsewhere and by others. 
She was not his mother, his wife, his sister, his friend, his people. He 
spoke in English what belonged in English.516 
Maureen here acknowledges how ‘July’ has mostly been ‘her idea of him’, a 
personal fantasy that has underwritten what has been no less of a fantasy – her 
‘envisioned self’ as the principled, unimpeachable, and appreciated liberal white 
opponent of white supremacy. In response, though, Maureen turns the tables on July 
by sneering at his own ‘envisioned self’, driving around in what was once a white 
man’s bakkie 
like a gangster, imagining yourself a big man, important, until you 
don’t have any money for petrol, there isn’t any petrol to buy, and it’ll 
lie there, July, under the trees, in this place among the old huts, and 
it’ll fall to pieces while the children play in it. Useless. Another wreck 
like all the others. Another bit of rubbish.517 
This counter-riposte leaves July speechless, and Maureen laughs at him 
triumphantly. Maureen might well have recognised that July’s effrontery towards 
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her was mostly a way of contesting her previously absolute control over the terms in 
which they related to one another. However, Maureen’s scorn towards what she 
perceives to be the inherent pretension beneath the virile, self-sufficient identity that 
July fashions for himself in the process, initially appears to be an attempt to re-
establish that control. Maureen’s recognition that July’s ‘measure as a man was 
taken elsewhere and by others’ initially appears to give rise only to more ‘morbid 
symptoms’, rather than to something that presages the imminent birth of ‘the new’.  
 Nevertheless, this scorn does depart from Maureen’s previous pretension of 
liberal concern for his dignity and well-being, her efforts to treat him like a ‘grown 
man’. Maureen sees no reason to sustain that pretension, having realised that she can 
no longer depend on July to validate her liberal agenda, and thus affirm the integrity 
of her declared opposition to Apartheid. Indeed, this realisation prompts Maureen to 
point out how July’s own ‘envisioned self’ is no less of a pretension. Oddly enough, 
this exchange is encouraging, insofar as Maureen appears to have overcome the 
stubborn commitment to liberalism that had led her into the ‘cul-de-sac’ or ‘dead-
end of history’518 that has confronted all the ‘white pariah dogs in a black 
continent’519 like her and Bam. Now that she is of no significance to July, Maureen 
in turn dismisses any significance he might have to her. As such, they part ways in 
an atmosphere of mutual indifference, he free of her control over his sense of self, 
and she free of the guilt that had driven her to assert such control in the first place. 
In this respect, this indifference frees both July and Maureen from the symbolic 
circuit of Apartheid. Rather than ‘madam’ and ‘servant’ – or ‘madam’ and ‘boy’ – 
they take leave of one another as refugees from the ruins of ‘the old’, equally 
destitute, equally vulnerable, and equally uncertain of where their respective places 
will be in the as yet unborn ‘new’.  
 Of course, though, it remains frustratingly unclear whether this newfound 
indifference can provide an adequate basis for ‘the new’, or whether Maureen’s 
indifference towards July is any more progressive than her prior condescension 
towards him as her charity case. Yet just as this uncertainty haunts optimistic 
readings like Clingman’s and Erritouni’s, it also troubles pessimistic approaches like 
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Bodenheimer’s. This uncertainty conveys the complexity of ‘the South African 
situation’, but I hardly find that it establishes the hopelessness of that situation. 
Instead, the ‘notoriously open-ended’520 finale of July’s People seeks to reconcile 
optimism with realism: optimism insofar as complacent liberal whites are capable of 
taking a ‘leap of faith and embrac[ing] the unknown future’; realism insofar as 
Gordimer remained aware of how that future – being unknown – could not 
guarantee even the most committed whites anything at all. Judging by the scepticism 
among her critics towards A Sport of Nature, it seems that this reconciliation of 
optimism with realism proved elusive elsewhere in Gordimer’s oeuvre. Yet even as 
a realist appraisal of the political circumstances of white South Africans after the 
‘trauma’521 of Black Consciousness and Soweto, July’s People identifies the 
necessity of optimism as much as of realism. Thus, precisely because she is more 
‘myth’ than reality, what Hillela amounts to is not a practical guide on how dissident 
whites are to contribute towards Apartheid’s downfall. Instead, Hillela affirms the 
potential for whites to do so – their capacity to ‘earn a civic and national status other 
than that of colonizer, eternal outsider.’522 Hillela presents us with a white 
‘envisioned self’, whose absence from July’s People is what prompts Maureen to 
hang on to the only ‘sensible order’ that acknowledged the disparities between her 
intentions and those of Afrikaner nationalists, between Turner’s ‘liberals’ and 
‘racists’. Thus, what is missing from July’s People is the crucial third term – 
Turner’s radical – a second-order alternative to a liberal alternative to Afrikaner 
nationalism, given how July and SASO render the latter completely untenable. It is 
unclear whether Hillela might have identified herself as a political radical, yet she is 
‘radical’ insofar as she effects a radical break with a ‘stable distribution of places, 
identities, functions and competencies’ in which the only rightful place of radical 
dissident whites – it seems – is in prison.  
 The figure of Hillela, then, is ‘mythic’ only insofar as her success is 
impossible. In my previous chapter, I argued that encouraging anyone to ‘dis-
identify’ from a ‘partition of the sensible’ – such as Said’s ‘imperial consensus’ – is 
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only possible if we affirm their capacity to identify with another ‘sensible order’. 
This capacity, though, depends on there being another such order in the first place, 
one that affirms that the consciousness, experience, and intentions of the ‘dis-
identified’ do indeed diverge from, or exceed the terms of the first ‘partition of the 
sensible’. I argue above that Black Consciousness was precisely this kind of 
alternative ‘sensible order’, affirming the capacity of non-whites to reinvent 
themselves in ways that broke out of the ‘sheepish timidity’ of Biko’s abject figure 
of the ‘non-white’. Just as the ‘sociological actuality’523 of Biko’s ‘black man’ was 
called into question by liberals like Paton; just as Maureen mocks July’s self-
assertion as a ‘big man’ – in other words, just as these figures were more an 
‘envisioned self’ than an actual self, so Hillela is more ‘myth’ than ‘reality’. 
However, just as Biko’s ‘black man’ and July’s ‘big man’ affirm the capacity of 
non-whites to reinvent themselves, so Hillela affirms a similar capacity in whites. 
Equally, therefore, Hillela is more possibility than actuality, an ‘envisioned self’ for 
whites to affirm in themselves by making ‘a more binding commitment’ than ever to 
actively, unconditionally pursuing Apartheid’s demise. As such, if Maureen is more 
‘realistic’ than Hillela, then it is because in Maureen, Gordimer concedes that even 
this heightened commitment cannot guarantee whites a place in South Africa’s post-
Apartheid future. Thus, any such commitment can only entail being prepared for the 
possibility of exclusion from that future, regardless of how prepared one was to ‘do 
something really dangerous’.  
 Maureen’s altercations with July, therefore, suggest that redressing liberal 
complacency was only possible if the ‘mythic’ figure of Hillela were presented as a 
possibility, no matter how unlikely. As a result, Maureen’s initial inability to come 
to terms with the shifts in how she and July encounter one another, may be 
compounded by July’s refusal to recognize in her any possibility of reinventing 
herself, in ways that break entirely with her own white-supremacist tendencies. 
There are no ‘envisioned selves’ for whites in July’s People, nor are there any in 
Burger’s Daughter, that are not somehow compromised and problematic. If both 
these novels are more ‘realistic’ than A Sport of Nature, then their ambiguous 
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endings suggest that this lack of more productive ‘envisioned selves’ may prove to 
have profound political consequences, not just for whites but for South Africans in 
general, who will never be reconciled with one another at any level. Thus, as much 
as ‘it is incumbent on white South Africans – more so than blacks – to take a leap of 
faith and embrace the unknown future’, in Burger’s Daughter and July’s People, 
Gordimer suggests that it is equally incumbent on non-whites to take a ‘leap of faith’ 
with respect to the integrity of dissident whites’ claims to have different intentions 
to those of Afrikaner nationalists. If South Africa is to break out of the symbolic 
circuit of Apartheid entirely, then it is important for all opponents of Apartheid to 
distinguish ‘radicals’ from ‘liberals’ – if not as a reality, then certainly as a 
possibility.  
Conclusion 
The debate between SASO and South African liberalism concerning the methods 
and – more importantly – the intentions of liberal whites under Apartheid amply 
illustrates my argument in this chapter, that the possibility of encouraging active 
opposition in place of inactive ‘dis-identification’ is only foreclosed wherever we 
assume that it is impossible. SASO’s historiographers have largely attended to how 
the organisation’s critiques of liberal complacency were corroborated by reactions 
among liberal whites to non-white activists’ decisions to ‘go it alone’ in the early 
1970s. I have drawn attention, therefore, to the possibility that SASO’s ‘polarised 
rhetoric’ may have contributed to the failure of this debate to foment enough active 
opposition to Apartheid among the white community to bring down the regime 
sooner. I have explored how Gordimer appraised this rhetoric in terms of what it 
made possible and what it risked foreclosing, including a mass mobilisation of 
whites against Apartheid. I have suggested that, particularly in her fiction, Gordimer 
found that SASO hampered the task of radicalising whites, by foreclosing the 
possibility of new, more promising ‘envisioned selves’ for whites to pursue, even as 
the organisation called upon whites to reinvent themselves in this manner. 
Subsequently, in Burger’s Daughter and July’s People, Gordimer portrays this 
search for a new ‘envisioned self’ as being inconclusive and uncertain, even if both 
novels affirm that whites are capable of achieving ‘a more binding commitment’ to 
overcoming Apartheid than they had made in previous decades. In A Sport of 
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Nature, Gordimer appears to succeed in finding a new ‘envisioned self’ in the figure 
of Hillela. However, compared with the ‘realistic’ Rosa and Maureen, Hillela’s 
‘mythic’ nature demonstrates how there could be no easy answer to the question of 
how to promote opposing white supremacy among its principal beneficiaries and, in 
many cases, its primary orchestrators.  
 The complacency of liberal white South Africans during and after the 1960s 
exemplifies how ‘dis-identification’ alone will not thoroughly dissolve a ‘political 
and legal order’, or even a ‘sensible order’. As I argued in my previous chapter, ‘dis-
identification’ is at most a starting point, a necessary condition for opposition to be 
possible, but one that cannot stand in for opposition as evidence of the integrity of 
one’s opposition to a ‘political and legal order’. However, as a way of galvanising 
more radical, more productive activism among whites, SASO’s ‘polarised rhetoric’ 
had mixed results. I have explored here whether Biko’s claim that ‘basically the 
South African white community is a homogeneous community’ hampered this task 
of promoting white radicalisation, in much the same way as assuming that a 
collective exhaustively articulates the consciousness, experience, and intentions of 
those who subscribe to it. In my previous chapter, I argued that this latter 
assumption risks inducing a circuitous, self-corroborating logic, according to which 
those who subscribe to a given collective do not exceed its terms in any way. 
Without this excess, we cannot hope to dissolve the collective, since it is this excess 
that makes ‘dis-identification’ possible. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how 
encouraging active opposition in place of inactive ‘dis-identification’ is only 
possible if we continue to assume that the consciousness, experience, and intentions 
of anyone who claims to have ‘dis-identified’, but who is politically inactive, 
exceeds the terms of whatever alternative collective they identify themselves with. 
As such, if we are to challenge the ascendancy of alternative identities that enable 
such ‘inactive dis-identification’, then we must present second-order alternatives to 
these alternative identities that entail more active, more radical practice. Turner’s 
distinction between ‘liberals’ and ‘radicals’ exemplified this notion of second-order 
alternatives, whereas Biko’s homogenisation of white intention foreclosed them as a 
viable option for whites. 
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Conclusion 
 
By definition, any total vision of a properly postcolonial world must encompass 
even the hegemonic apex of today’s geopolitical hierarchy, whether it is ‘the West’, 
‘Euro-America’, ‘the First World’, the ‘metropolis’, or the ‘core capitalist nation-
states’. Here, though, the task is to establish how we might challenge the popular 
hegemonic ascendancy of that global conjuncture, how to promote opposition to the 
myriad forms of imperialism that continue to uphold that conjuncture, among their 
principal beneficiaries. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that in many ways, 
postcolonial criticism remains ill-equipped for this task, given many of its 
assumptions regarding this geopolitical apex. All too often, postcolonial critics 
impute that this apex amounts to a spontaneous, integral monolith, geopolitically, 
socio-politically, socio-economically, culturally, and ideologically. I have 
established not only how such formulations are questionable in themselves, but also 
how they jeopardise that prospect of a properly postcolonial world. For we have 
seen how Edward W. Said’s totalised articulation of ‘the West’ led him to doubt the 
possibility of challenging what he claimed was the near-ubiquitous ‘imperial 
consensus’1 gripping ‘Western society’. In this thesis, therefore, I have considered 
how we might reconceive that ‘virtual unity of purpose’2 without closing down that 
possibility. Central to my approach has been to avoid assuming that any form of 
collective unity either occurs spontaneously, or exhaustively articulates the 
subjective experience of those belonging to it.  
Instead, I have assumed that any such unity belies the irreducibly infinite 
complexity of the sum total of the subjective experience of its constituents. To this 
end, I have drawn dialogues between the disparate work of Antonio Gramsci, 
Raymond Williams, Claude Lefort, Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal 
Mouffe, and Jacques Rancière. In various ways, each of these thinkers contends that 
                                            
1 Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 62. 
2 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 62. 
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all forms of collective unity persist only as long as power intervenes in the 
consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices of their constituent elements. 
Their frontiers are maintained via the ‘policing function’3 of some apparatus of 
instrumental power, without which they would dissolve under the weight of both 
their internal differences, and the traffic that undercuts their frontiers, exposing the 
inherent contingency of their unity. Meanwhile, I have established how a similar 
logic informs Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s assertion that identifying oneself as 
belonging to a group is always a metonymic form of self-identification. The 
implication here is comparable to that assumption that the content and complexity of 
society are both irreducibly infinite, and that something always exceeds any attempt 
to apprehend an entire society. For if identifying oneself as a member of a group is 
always metonymic, then no group identity can ever exhaustively articulate one’s 
consciousness, experience, intentions, and practices, the sum total of which is no 
less irreducibly infinite. At both the social and the individual level, then, something 
always exceeds the collective, and so collective unity always entails disavowing this 
‘unassimilable excess’.4  
The first half of this thesis outlined this approach in order to establish the 
relevance of categories like ‘the West’ to the task of adequately understanding ‘what 
imperialism is and how it works’.5 I registered my sympathy with Neil Lazarus’s 
impatience with any approach that ‘refers’ imperialism solely to ‘the West’, as if it 
were merely the expression of a cultural predisposition. Equally, I agreed with 
Lazarus that all too often, postcolonial critics overstate the unity of ‘the West’, 
especially with respect to the ‘structuring assumptions’ that supposedly cut across 
the ‘many and manifest differences’ between ‘Western’ thinkers like Karl Marx and 
                                            
3 Gramsci, Antonio, ‘The Political Party’, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973), p. 
155. 
4 Young, Robert J.C., White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1990), p. 136. 
5 Lazarus, Neil, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, in Marxism, Modernity 
and Postcolonial Studies, ed. by Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 54. 
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Thomas Carlyle, to borrow one of Lazarus’s examples.6 I certainly agree that failing 
to register these differences – if only at the level of intention – can yield an 
understanding of those ‘structuring assumptions’ that is simply ‘too blunt an 
instrument, too reductive and undiscriminating.’7 However, I maintained that it is 
just as important to avoid allowing these differences to detract from commonalities, 
wherever they do exist. For postcolonial critics might well be susceptible to a 
‘disposition to homogenisation’ with respect to the consciousness and intentions of 
‘Westerners’.8 Yet I find that any adequate corrective here cannot simply dismiss the 
claim that some form of unity underlies the ‘many and manifest differences’ 
between individual ‘Westerners’. As such, I contended that we must ‘refer’ 
imperialism to both ‘the West’ and capitalism simultaneously, in order to establish 
why this unity was necessary for the latter’s global proliferation under European 
imperialism, and then neoliberal globalisation. However, we must equally 
reconceive that unity in light of the contingency of all such collectives.  
Moreover, we should also repurpose the category of ‘the West’ itself. For as 
I established in Chapter 1, the category is not always meant to refer to a polity, state, 
or confederation of states,9 so much as to three ‘hyperreal’ or ‘imaginary figures’.10 
First, we have the ‘Hegelian West’, the telic apogee of human progress, that recasts 
the contemporary geopolitical hierarchy as a natural consequence of the superiority 
of ‘Western civilisation’, and European imperialism as a benevolent mission 
civilisatrice. The second ‘West’, the ‘other West’, emerges from the ‘dispute over 
[this] distribution of the sensible’11 that has unfolded ever since formal 
decolonisation, the dispute over what European imperialism was, what it entailed, 
                                            
6 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, in Race & Class, 53.1 (July 2011), pp. 
15-16. 
7 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15-16. 
8 Lazarus, ‘What postcolonial theory doesn’t say’, p. 15. 
9 Lazarus, ‘The fetish of “the West” in postcolonial theory’, p. 44. 
10 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 36. 
11 Rancière, Jacques, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, 
trans. by steven Corcoran (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 37. 
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and what motivated it. The ‘other West’ emerges from a counter-history of 
European imperialism that encompasses much of what official histories omit, 
including the violence, the oppression, the exploitation, the injustice of European 
colonial rule. A significant outcome of this dispute is Dipesh Chakrabarty’s claim 
that the ‘Hegelian West’ is nothing more than an ‘imaginary figure’, yet we should 
be mindful of how the ‘other West’ is in many ways no less ‘hyperreal’. For one 
thing, referring to this latter ‘West’ simply as ‘the West’ can encourage the 
assumption that the category refers equally to an entire social aggregation. Yet the 
‘other West’ is no less of a totality than is the ‘Hegelian West’, in which case this 
latter assumption can lead to the kind of homogenising tendencies that Said’s 
articulation of ‘the West’ in Culture and Imperialism exemplifies.  
The need to distinguish more explicitly between different senses of the term 
‘the West’ became much more pressing when considering the third ‘imaginary 
figure’ that ‘the West’ refers to in postcolonial studies. For this third ‘West’ is by far 
the most ‘hyperreal’ of the three. What I called the ‘Other West’ in no way refers to 
a polity or agency. Instead, this third ‘figure’ refers to an intention or predisposition, 
an imperialist will to power, that serves as a ‘constitutive outside’12 against which 
postcolonial critics identify themselves and their critical practices, according to an 
anti-imperialist counter-intention. Each of these ‘Wests’, then, serves a very clear 
purpose, but none of them provide an adequate way of understanding how Said’s 
‘imperial consensus’ could have encompassed all of ‘Western’ society. For all three 
of these ‘Wests’ were never really meant to refer to a polity, to the constituent 
societies of the ‘geopolitical West’, so much as to an idea, an agency, and an 
intention respectively. If we are to better understand Said’s ‘imperial consensus’, 
then, we must distinguish these ‘Wests’ from the polities and aggregations that 
together make up the ‘Western world’, the ‘geopolitical West’, ‘Western society’, 
whatever we want to call it.  
Postcolonial studies has compellingly disputed the reliability of official 
histories of European imperialism, U.S. militarism, and neoliberal globalisation. Yet 
as Said and Paul Gilroy have variously claimed, these histories have yet to 
significantly challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of these official histories 
                                            
12 Mouffe, Chantal, The Return of the Political (London, New York: Verso, 1993), p. 2. 
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throughout much of the ‘Western world’. Clearly, then, challenging this ascendancy 
must entail more than casting doubt on truth-claims and exposing systematic 
misinformation. In this thesis, I have proposed that we conceive this ascendency in 
properly ‘hegemonic’ terms – that is, in terms of the formation of subjects and 
subjectivities, including how individuals and groups perceive their own interests, 
even themselves. Again, this approach avoids turning to a totalised articulation of 
‘the West’ in order to explain the endurance of imperialism’s hegemonic ascendancy 
among ‘Westerners’. For rather than reflecting a passive predisposition to an 
imperialist will to power, approaching this ascendancy in terms of the active 
formation of subjects accords with the claim that all forms of collective unity are 
contingent, and that they persist only as long as some agency of instrumental power 
actively sustains them. My second chapter outlined how we might apply this 
approach to Said’s Orientalists, in particular Gustave Flaubert, Richard Burton, and 
Alexander William Kinglake. I suggested that we understand the ‘internal 
consistency’ of Orientalist discourse not in terms of some external pressure, against 
which ‘individualists’ like Flaubert and Burton resisted, but rather in terms of 
Spivak’s notion of ‘self-metonymisation’. This approach would explain why that 
external pressure eludes Said throughout Orientalism, given his efforts to explain 
Orientalism’s ‘internal consistency’ by way of such vague notions as ‘a formidable 
mechanism of omnicompetent definitions’, which ‘operated specifically (and 
effectively) upon personal human experiences that otherwise contradicted’ that 
consistency.13  
Moreover, this approach would also explain why Kinglake’s experiences of 
the ‘terrestrial reality’ of the Levant appear to have corresponded entirely with the 
spurious, truncated truth-claims of ‘bookish Orientalism’. For this claim emerges 
from Said’s distinction of ‘conformists’ like Kinglake from ‘individualists’ like 
Flaubert and Burton, whose highly personal accounts of their travels in the Levant 
consciously, deliberately fought against the rigid, enforced anonymity of ‘bookish 
Orientalism’. According to this distinction, though, only among those who 
consciously resisted Orientalism did individual consciousness, experience, intention, 
and practice exceed Orientalism’s terms. This logic has severe implications for the 
                                            
13 Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 156. 
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prospect of challenging the hegemonic ascendancy of the ‘imperial consensus’ that 
Said would describe in his later book, Culture and Imperialism. Having 
acknowledged how Orientalism had ‘said nothing about the possibility of 
resistance’,14 in Culture and Imperialism Said continued to figure ‘resistance’ in 
terms of conscious opposition or a counter-intention. As a result, Said’s articulation 
of ‘the West’ became more totalised, and thus – ironically – more ‘Foucauldian’, at 
least as Said himself understood Foucault’s claim that ‘power is everywhere’.15 
Through his distinction in Orientalism between Flaubert, Burton, and Kinglake, Said 
acknowledged the possibility that some Orientalists could see beyond the rigid 
strictures of Orientalist orthodoxy, even if he did so in order to sustain his 
‘theological’16 conviction in the immutability of a common humanity. In Culture 
and Imperialism, though, Said gives very little indication that ‘Westerners’ can see 
or even think beyond the ‘virtual unity of purpose’ that renders imperialism 
hegemonic.  
My third chapter established how this implication forecloses the possibility 
of challenging this hegemonic ascendancy. I contended that Rancière’s notion of 
‘dis-identification’ provides a useful, plausible way of imagining this challenge. Yet 
I also established how ‘dis-identification’ only occurs wherever an individual’s 
subjective experience exceeds the terms of whatever ‘sensible order’ or collective 
identity they ‘dis-identify’ themselves from. In short, an imperialist will only ‘dis-
identify’ themselves from imperialism if they are more than just an imperialist; 
moreover, they are more likely to do so if they are able to identify themselves in turn 
as something else. I attributed the complaints of Spivak’s ‘bourgeois white male’ 
students to being unable to ‘speak’ to an absence of this other way of identifying 
themselves: hence their claims that they are ‘only bourgeois white males’. Similarly, 
I suggested that the ‘tormented dance’ of Albert Memmi’s ‘colonizer who refuses’ is 
partly down to Memmi’s refusal to distinguish them from his ‘colonizer who 
                                            
14 Said, ‘Orientalism and After’, in A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals, ed. by 
Peter Osborne (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 214 (emphasis in original).  
15 Foucault, Michel, History of Sexuality, Volume I: The Will to Knowledge, trans. by 
Robert Hurley (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1998), p. 93.  
16 Young, p. 134. 
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accepts’. If we cannot allow for even the possibility of a variance of purpose among 
the socially privileged, then we cannot possibly dissolve the structures that underpin 
their privilege entirely.  
I further illustrated this claim by addressing literary reflections on the 
subjective experience of those who benefit the most from today’s grossly unequal 
global conjuncture. Jamaica Kincaid’s A Small Place clearly affirms that today’s 
imperial ‘masters’ will only become something else if we assume that no one is ever 
just a ‘master’. No wonder, then, that George Orwell felt compelled to shoot the 
elephant in spite of himself, given how the Burmese refused to address him as 
anything other than a European colonial functionary, a ‘master’. Meanwhile, V.S. 
Naipaul’s claim in Guerrillas that all ‘masters’ are only ever just ‘masters’ – even 
when they try to make something else of themselves – is troubled by his own status 
as a ‘master’ who is nonetheless more than a ‘master’. Hence Naipaul’s doubts over 
whether his fatalistic pessimism is simply just a mark of his privileged status, given 
his ability to avoid enduring most of the consequences of such pessimism for 
citizens of the Third World. In A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali, Gil Courtemanche 
echoes Kincaid’s claim that although we should avoid assuming that ‘masters’ are 
nothing more than ‘masters’, nonetheless a ‘master’ can become something else only 
if they identify themselves as a ‘master’ first. Yet Courtemanche warns that if we 
refuse to affirm that excess, then this self-identification can hinder this 
transformative process. Thus, Valcourt’s self-identification as a ‘master’ initially 
does not lead him beyond his paralysing self-remorse over his implication – as a 
white French-Canadian expatriate – in the circumstances leading to the 1994 
Rwandan genocide. Finally, I demonstrated how critical attention to Bret Easton 
Ellis’s American Psycho has largely reduced the novel’s protagonist Patrick 
Bateman to a familiar stereotype of boorish, ignorant, selfish, materialist yuppies. 
Having traced how the media discourse on yuppies had a penchant for stereotype, I 
suggested that Ellis parodies the yuppie stereotype, ostensibly offering a 
reassuringly familiar, moralistic condemnation of ‘yuppiedom’, and yet literalising it 
to the point of absurdity. In the process, Ellis warns that such stereotypes offer little 
to anyone wishing to intervene in the conjuncture that underpins and perpetuates 
both yuppie privilege, and the ascendancy of their selfish value-systems.   
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We can hardly dissolve that conjuncture entirely, though, simply by 
encouraging its principal beneficiaries to ‘dis-identify’ themselves from it. Hence 
my insistence that such ‘dis-identification’ is only a starting-point, a necessary 
condition for the no less necessary task of encouraging opposition to that 
conjuncture. in Chapter 4, I addressed a historical scenario in which ‘dis-
identification’ did not in itself compel beneficiaries of injustice to actively pursue 
the dissolution of that which they benefited from. I explored what we could learn 
from Black Consciousness’s provocations against liberal white South Africans 
during the early 1970s, about how to redress this ‘inactive dis-identification’. Insofar 
as they refused to register any variance of purpose among whites – whether or not 
they supported Apartheid – I considered whether these provocations compounded 
the very inactivity among dissident whites that Black Consciousness condemned as 
political complacency. Hence Richard Turner and Nadine Gordimer’s various efforts 
to displace liberalism’s popularity among dissident whites, by promoting a second-
order alternative, based on the identity of Turner’s ‘radical’. Black Consciousness 
might well have forcefully disputed any claim that the intentions of liberal whites 
exonerated them of culpability for Apartheid. Yet by refusing to recognise the 
possibility that whites could be something other than white supremacists, Black 
Consciousness ironically left South African liberalism as the only  ‘sensible order’ 
that acknowledged this possibility. As a result, the identity of ‘liberal’ remained the 
identity of choice for any white wishing to register their ‘dis-identification’ from 
Apartheid, a scenario that was hardly conducive to the promotion of active, 
unconditional resistance to the regime among whites.  
In short, we can only redress ‘inactive dis-identification’ by encouraging a 
second-order ‘dis-identification’, which in turn is only possible given the conditions 
necessary for any form of ‘dis-identification’ – that individual subjective experience 
exceeds all collective identities and ‘sensible orders’, including ‘alternative or 
directly oppositional’17 ones. As such, we should avoid assuming that no one is 
capable of ‘dis-identification’. As I argued in Chapter 3, this assumption can only 
discourage us from attempting to promote anyone from doing so, thus sustaining the 
                                            
17 Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 
113. 
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hegemonic ascendancy of whatever ‘sensible order’ we seek to challenge in the 
process. For then the persistence of this order would in turn appear to corroborate 
our initial scepticism towards the prospect of challenging that ascendancy. This 
circuitous, self-corroborating logic can only hamper the endeavours of postcolonial 
critics to contribute meaningfully to the final, lasting dissolution of imperialism. We 
must therefore take a leap of faith and anticipate the possibility of ‘dis-
identification’ obtaining wherever we might otherwise expect it to be absent, 
unlikely, or altogether impossible. We must certainly also expect resistance from 
Gramsci’s ‘reactionary social elements’: how we are to meet that challenge 
effectively, though, remains unanswered. However, if we respond to these elements 
by retreating back into familiar ways of understanding their consciousness, 
experience, intentions and practices, then we risk rendering ourselves politically 
irrelevant. We must be wary of comfortable, familiar, yet pessimistic appraisals of 
the consciousness and intentions of those whose consent lends imperialism its 
hegemonic durability. Yet this is only a starting-point, a premise on which to 
proceed to the much more daunting, difficult task of intervening in the 
consciousness, intentions, and practices of those who benefit the most from today’s 
unequal global conjuncture, in order to turn them against that conjuncture, and so 
undermine that durability once and for all.  
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